Nicola Cacciatore's book aims to reassess the controversial relationship between the British – and especially the Special Operations Executive (SOE), Churchill's new volunteer force established to wage a secret war in occupied Europe – and the Italian Resistenza throughout the Second World War. Starting from the assumption that, for decades, Italian historiography has focused on producing a ‘tarnished image’ of the British in Italy (p. 157), Cacciatore reviews the longstanding myth that the British ‘betrayed’ the Italian partisans, supposedly to fragment the movement and undermine its fast-growing, dreaded Communist branch. Based on extensive fieldwork in both British and Italian archives, Italian Partisans and British Forces in the Second World War: Working with the Enemy explores the SOE–Resistance partnership in Italy and contextualises it within the wider SOE objective to ‘set Europe ablaze’. The book effectively shows that the SOE's course of conduct was driven by broader – rather than local – geopolitical interests as well as by contingency military – rather than political – strategies dictated by the unpredictable evolution of the conflict.
The book is structured to gradually build a comprehensive picture of the relationship between the British and the Italian Resistance. Following the introduction, the second chapter addresses the origins of this controversial partnership, considering the activity of prewar antifascist movements – both within and outside Italy – up to the turning point of 8 September 1943, the birth of the SOE and its first – unsuccessful – missions. While the third chapter shifts the focus to field interactions between British Liaison Officers (BLOs) and Italian partisans, the last two sections cover British issues with communication and self-representation as they deal with propaganda strategies and the approach to the disarmament and dispersion of partisan units in different post-liberation Italian cities.
The section covering the experience of BLOs in the field provides the most interesting and original contribution. It reassesses the role played by BLOs, bringing individuals’ experiences and perceptions to the fore and adding a relevant – grassroots – perspective to the partnership between the British and the Resistance. The analysis of the BLOs’ reports effectively exposes their awkward position in Italy with regard to the crucial issue of airdrops. Caught between the frequent requests and complaints of the partisans they fought with, BLOs also had to contend with the British authorities’ decisions that often looked inexplicable to them and to all those who could rely only on the limited viewpoint provided by their field perception.
In trying to unearth the roots of the stereotypical depiction of the British as vindictive and inherently hostile to Italy, Cacciatore dedicates ample space to their struggle with self-representation. Communication with the partisans – or the lack thereof – is identified as the main cause of the yawning gulf between the British and the Italians during and after the war. According to the author:
The British decision-making process was rooted in a ruthless utilitarian policy rather than a deliberate will to direct political evolution in Italy and balance out the more left-wing components of the Resistance. However, a lack of communication and coordination caused this policy to be misinterpreted by the partisans. (p. 116)
A relevant example is the (in)famous proclamation of November 1944 when the British General Alexander allegedly ‘betrayed’ the Italian cause by asking partisans to lie low and preserve their strength before the final 1945 spring offensive. While ‘many scholars’ see it ‘as the moment when the British finally “dropped their mask”’, Cacciatore argues that this ‘was nothing more than the continuation of the [contingency] policy’ of the British and ‘the acknowledgement of a new situation that called for a new strategy’ (pp. 85–86).
Cacciatore's analysis of contemporary SOE documentation identifies the organisation's distinct stance compared with the attitude to partisan formations among the British authorities and leads him to argue that, while ‘politics had a marginal role in the decision process to assign supplies’, the ‘SOE had almost no interest in politics’ (p. 104). The author, however, concedes that, by the end of 1944, ‘the SOE start[ed] to “play favourites”’ with the partisans, differentiating their approach to airdrops not on the basis of politics but of strategic choices – favouring groups in the North-East to the detriment of those in the North-West of the country (p. 104).
Those who engage with issues concerning the crucial 1943–5 period of Italian history are aware that this is a very crowded historiographical field, and providing new evidence or offering novel interpretations of well-known issues is no easy task. That said, while the book addresses an issue that has been widely scrutinised by historians, Italian Partisans and British Forces in the Second World War successfully addresses and challenges enduring myths and stereotypical depictions of this ambiguous partnership, exposing British shortcomings in their policy towards Italy. Furthermore, by considering both parties’ points of view and the multifaceted relationship between BLOs and partisans, Cacciatore brings to the fore the human side of this story, contributing to a more complex and balanced history of the controversial Second World War British–Italian partnership.
