Hostname: page-component-788cddb947-jbkpb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-10-15T02:20:06.425Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

“H Newman” and Ludwig Wittgenstein: Re-evaluating the History of John Henry Newman's Philosophical Reception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Daniel Pratt Morris-Chapman Open the ORCID record for Daniel Pratt Morris-Chapman [Opens in a new window]
Daniel Pratt Morris-Chapman*
Affiliation:
Wesley House, Cambridge
*
[email protected]
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

It is commonly held that that the dominance of logical positivism, in the early part of the twentieth-century, hindered Newman's philosophical recognition. However, commentators also argue that Newman's writing began to gain wider recognition following Wittgenstein's reference to “H Newman” (1969) in the posthumous publication of On Certainty. This essay explores whether or not this version of the history of Newman's philosophical reception rings true – exploring whether or not the reference to “H Newman” really marks a watershed for Newman's philosophical legacy.

Keywords

John Henry NewmanLudwig WittgensteinLinguistic PhilosophyLogical PositivismPhilosophical Reception
Type
Original Article
Information
New Blackfriars , Volume 101 , Issue 1096 , November 2020 , pp. 716 - 725
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers

Introduction

It is frequently argued that that the prevalence of a variant of evidentialism within linguistic philosophy, logical empiricism,Footnote 1 delayed Newman's recognition as a philosopher up until the late 1960s.Footnote 2 A recent example (2015) of this perspective is visible in the writing of Duncan Pritchard who argues that ‘Newman went from being one of the most important intellectual figures of his day to being hardly discussed at all by philosophers by the middle of the twentieth century.’Footnote 3 In order to support this narrative, Pritchard cites Fergus Kerr's essay ‘In an Isolated and, Philosophically, Uninfluential Way’ (2000) in which Kerr suggests that interest in Newman's work was eclipsed when A J Ayer (1910) began his tenure at Oxford (1959-1978).Footnote 4

Kerr is correct to note the disinterest in Newman by logical positivists like Ayer who maintained that the only genuine propositions are those which ‘picture’ or ‘represent’ a possible state of affairs.Footnote 5 Ayer's position well illustrates what Kerr identifies as the ‘pervasively secular environment of analytic philosophy’ during this period,Footnote 6 and Kerr is not alone in connecting Newman's neglect to the dominance of logical positivism in the early part of the twentieth-century.Footnote 7 In an essay entitled ‘Newman as a Philosopher’ (1990), the late Basil Mitchell argued that the rise of logical empiricism made Newman irrelevant to the dominant concerns of both British and continental philosophy:Footnote 8

For much of the period that has elapsed since his death it must have seemed that his predominant concerns were simply irrelevant to the development of philosophy. Philosophy of religion was itself increasingly peripheral to the interests of professional philosophers and, within the philosophy of religion, the central question was taken to be that of the meaning of theological utterances. The outstanding challenge to the whole theological enterprise was taken to consist in the problematic character of theological claims as judged by the standards of scientific thought [evidentialism]. Whether these were articulated crudely in terms of verifiability or in more sophisticated ways, it was generally taken for granted that theology could not satisfy them.Footnote 9

In this essay Mitchell indicates that the logical positivist tradition within British empiricist philosophy, which had ‘been predominantly hostile’ to religious belief,Footnote 10 rendered Newman's writing uninteresting to professional philosophers until the late 1960s.

One real weakness in these analyses is that they focus upon Newman's philosophical reception within Europe. Antony Kenny's assessment of ‘Newman as a Philosopher of Religion’ (1990) is broader in that he appears to take the analytic tradition within the United States more into account. Nevertheless he likewise believes that ‘in the analytic tradition, which is dominant here [in the UK] and in much of the United States’Footnote 11 Newman's work has had almost no ‘progeny’ in the century after the publication of the Grammar (1870-1969). Though Mitchell's study is wider than that of Kerr (which discusses Newman in relation to Oxford Philosophy), and while Kenny's is broader still the belief common to these writers is that the emergence of Logical Positivism hindered Newman's philosophical recognition.

Newman and Wittgenstein

For many Newman commentators, the posthumous publication of Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1889-1951) On Certainty (1969)Footnote 12 was a watershed moment for Newman's philosophical recognition.Footnote 13 Wittgenstein's earlier work, such as the Tractatus (1921) which argued that meaningful propositions offer a picture of reality,Footnote 14 was often employed by Logical Positivists.Footnote 15 However, in his later writings, Wittgenstein argued that the sense of a proposition is not determined by it mirroring reality.Footnote 16 Instead he argued that the meaning of an expression is found in its use within a linguistic community.Footnote 17 It is to these later publications that many Newman commentators show considerable interest.

Wittgenstein's reference, in On Certainty, to a certain ‘H Newman’ has been interpreted as highly significant:

1. If you do know that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest. When one says that such and such a proposition can't be proved, of course that does not mean that it can't be derrived from other propositions; any propositions can be derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself. (on this a curious remark by H. Newman)Footnote 18

Kenny views this reference to ‘H Newman’ as a turning point and considers that ‘in recent decades professional philosophers in the analytic tradition have become interested’ in the issues that preoccupied Newman.Footnote 19 In a similar vein Cyril Barrett, a Roman Catholic philosopher who wrote extensively on Wittgenstein,Footnote 20 considers that: ‘Since the appearance of that book in 1969 quite a number of papers on Newman as a philosopher, many of them comparing him with Wittgenstein, have appeared.’Footnote 21

It is true that following this publication works on both Wittgenstein and Newman have recognised several parallels between these writers, including: Yearley (1978),Footnote 22 Ferreira (1980),Footnote 23 McCarthy (1982),Footnote 24 McGuinness (1988),Footnote 25 and Barrett (2005).Footnote 26 Writing on the Tractatus, Roy Lemoine argues that Wittgenstein's ‘understanding of certainty owes much to Newman's discussion of certitude’ (1975).Footnote 27 Mitchell suggests that Newman's rejection of any neutral standard of rationality anticipates Wittgenstein (1990).Footnote 28 Ker considers that Newman's treatment of doubt foreshadows Wittgenstein's fundamental insight into the absurdity of universal scepticism.Footnote 29

Though commentators are correct that Wittgenstein's reference has lead to numerous comparisons between J H Newman and Wittgenstein - and has had a positive effect on Newman's philosophical reception- it is imprudent to view this reference as a basis for evaluating J H Newman's philosophical legacy. A decade before the publication of On Certainty, the philosopher Ernest Gellner (1925-1995) observed parallels between Newman's Apologia and Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy.Footnote 30 Moreover, the claim that Wittgenstein's reference to ‘H Newman’ in On Certainty (1969) acts as a turning point at which Newman began to be taken seriously by philosophers is problematic for another reason - there is some uncertainty as to whether Wittgenstein is even referring to John Henry Newman.

The identity of ‘H Newman’

The reference to ‘H Newman’ is perceived by many writers to be a direct reference to John Henry Newman. For example, Wolfgang Kienzler's article ‘Wittgenstein and John Henry Newman’ (2006), Bottone's article ‘Newman and Wittgenstein’ (2004) and others, suggest that this reference indicates that Wittgenstein was influenced by John Henry Newman.Footnote 31 It is equally possible, however, that this reference refers not to John Henry Newman but to the Cambridge Mathematician, with whom Wittgenstein worked and argued, Maxwell Herman Newman (1897-1984). Kienzler confidently asserts that any suggestion that the remark in On Certainty alludes to Max Newman is ‘excluded’ by the use of the initial H.Footnote 32 This is most inaccurate. It is just as possible for Wittgenstein to be referring to Maxwell ‘H Newman’ as to John ‘H Newman.’ It is therefore erroneous to suggest that the initial ‘H’ rules out the idea that Wittgenstein cites Maxwell H Newman.

Wittgenstein and M H Newman were colleagues at Cambridge during the nineteen thirties. They both taught Alan Turing (1912-1954), and for a time were both on Alice Ambrose's (1906-2001)Footnote 33 Ph.D examination committee until Wittgenstein withdrew.Footnote 34 While M H Newman preferred to be referred to as ‘Max,’Footnote 35 it is possible that Wittgenstein, an Austrian, called Max ‘Herman.’Footnote 36 In his correspondence with German speaking writers, such as Albert Einstein (1879-1955), M H Newman is often addressed as H NewmanFootnote 37 and ‘Herm.’Footnote 38 His father, Herman Alexander Neumann, was born in Germany and was ‘interned’ as an enemy alien (by the English) during the First World War. Soon after his incarceration M H Newman changed his surname from ‘Neumann’ to ‘Newman’ (1916). Thus it seems that while circumstances required that M H Newman evaded his German heritage with English colleagues, he sustained it wherever possible.Footnote 39 On this basis, it would seem that Wittgenstein's reference in On Certainty could just as easily be referring to M ‘H Newman’ as it could to J ‘H Newman.’

Newman's ‘Influence’ on Wittgenstein?

While uncertainty pervades the identity of Wittgenstein's reference to ‘H Newman,’ a number of writers have attempted to bolster the suggestion that J H Newman influenced him through an appeal to the testimony of students, or professors, with whom Wittgenstein worked. For example, compare the following quotations:

[Barret] Yorick Smythies, a former student of Wittgenstein's, told me that Wittgenstein had said of J. H. Newman's Grammar of Assent, that Newman thought the grammar was supporting the Christian faith whereas, in fact, the faith was supporting the grammar, as if it were suspended from a balloon.Footnote 40

[FitzPatrick] In 1977 I read a Paper to a Wittgenstein Conference [and] was informed by Professor Anscombe that Wittgenstein did not read the Grammar of Assent; but that, on hearing [its] theme…he acknowledged the likeness to his own views…Footnote 41

The above suggests that Wittgenstein's witnesses are unclear as to whether or not he had read Newman's Grammar of Assent. Wittgenstein's other associates present more conflicting claims. While some suggest ‘that he admired Newman's obvious sincerity’Footnote 42 others contend that ‘He disliked the theological writings of Cardinal Newman, which he read with care during his last year at Cambridge.’Footnote 43

Regardless of the conflicting testimonies above, it is clear that Wittgenstein was aware of Newman and it is of course possible that this may have had an influence upon him. Dewi Phillips, in his essay on ‘Antecedent Presumption’ (2004), argues that Wittgenstein's work has a number of similarities with Newman and, moreover, considers it fruitful to compare these writers.Footnote 44 He considers they are ‘as one’ in that they reject the idea that ‘we posses a [basic] concept of reason which justifies all knowledge’ (1988)Footnote 45 and illustrates the similarities between these writers using the following citations:

[Newman] to write theology is like dancing on the tight rope some hundred feet above the ground. It is hard to keep from falling, and the fall is great.Footnote 46

[Wittgenstein] an honest religious thinker is like a tightrope walker. He almost looks as if he were walking on nothing but air.Footnote 47

Phillips citation is taken from a volume of Newman's Letters and Diaries that was posthumously published a decade after Wittgenstein's death (1961). While it is true that extracts of this letter were published in Ward's biography (1912), and thus Wittgenstein could have read the contents, it would be difficult to determine whether the similarities between the quotations above are the result of a direct influence of Newman upon Wittgenstein.

More recently, Duncan Pritchard has suggested that aspects of Newman's Grammar of Assent could have had ‘a major influence’ on Wittgenstein's On Certainty.Footnote 48 In an essay entitled ‘Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman,’ (2015) Pritchard offers a powerful re-reading of On Certainty ‘through the lens of Newman.’ Here he proposes the hypothesis that Wittgenstein developed these ideas ‘with a specific view to applying them to religious belief in the way that Newman does.’Footnote 49 Following this exercise Pritchard concludes that re-reading the text in this way casts Wittgenstein's discussion of scepticism and relativism in quite a different light. He writes:

This reading of OC … suggests that Wittgenstein had a conception of the epistemology of religious belief which is very different to that usually attributed to him. According to the standard reading of Wittgenstein in this regard … he is endorsing a straightforward fideism…If Wittgenstein's aim in OC is to unpack Newman's ideas concerning the rationality of religious belief, however, then this would suggest that Wittgenstein's account of the epistemology of religious belief should be thought of very differently. Although it would share with fideism the idea that the most fundamental religious beliefs of the faithful are to be regarded as essentially groundless, this would not be in contrast to ordinary non-religious belief. Indeed, the point would be that a subject's most fundamental beliefs, whether religious or non-religious, are to be regarded as essentially groundless. Moreover, this point about the ultimately groundlessness of fundamental religious belief is not meant to imply that religious beliefs are in general groundless. Instead, the idea would be that non-fundamental religious beliefs are locally grounded in much the same way as non-fundamental non-religious beliefs are.Footnote 50

There are problems with Pritchard's fideistic interpretation of Newman. Newman was more of a ‘soft rationalist’ than a fideist in that he did not consider our basic beliefs to be groundless.Footnote 51 Nevertheless, Pritchard's re-reading of On Certainty offers a powerful example of Newman's contemporary relevance. More specifically it demonstrates the way in which Newman's work can shed philosophical light upon this text. Nevertheless, even Pritchard acknowledges that his claim that Newman influenced Wittgenstein is tenuous. He states that he ‘won't be offering a full defence of this alternative reading of OC’ since ‘I'm not convinced that such a full defence can be even in principle offered.’ Moreover, he states that his ‘exegetical claim,’ that Wittgenstein is seeking to develop Newman's ideas, is ‘at best quite modest’ and ‘even if an overarching reading of OC could be defended, it would require far more than the evidence I marshal here.’ Pritchard makes clear that he is not so much interested here in the ‘historical details’ but rather in the ‘philosophical light such a non-standard reading could cast on the text.’Footnote 52 Thus, while Pritchard is uncertain as to whether or not Newman influenced Wittgenstein he does think Newman's work is highly relevant to the philosophical issues raised in On Certainty.

Conclusion

From the above it seems that, even if it were the case that Wittgenstein ‘did not read’ a word of Newman, many philosophers have discussed Newman in relation to him as a result of his reference to ‘H Newman.’Footnote 53 Nevertheless, while it is clear that parallels exist between these writers, and that Newman's thought has the potential to illumine the relevance of Wittgenstein's work to contemporary thought, it is unclear as to what extent Wittgenstein really engaged with Newman. Whatever the case may be, it is quite untrue to suggest that prior to Wittgenstein's On Certainty Newman was ignored by philosophers. While the influence of logical positivism and its significance for the philosophy of religion have been considerableFootnote 54 it is demonstrable that Newman was discussed by a range of twentieth-century philosophers before the demise of this form of evidentialism within linguistic philosophy. Hence, though it is right that Wittgenstein remains one of the most important figures in the history of twentieth-century philosophy, he is not the only philosopher. Important as they are, the history of twentieth-century philosophy cannot be confined to the history of logical positivism or the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In conclusion, any assessment of the extent to which philosophers engaged with Newman's work must give due attention to the great diversity within twentieth-century thought. Though it may be too early to process the vast complexities of the last century of philosophical debate, it is important to attend to as wide a variety of philosophers as is possible so as to explore the extent to which philosophers engaged with Newman's work.Footnote 55

Footnotes

*

I would like to dedicate this article to my mentor the late Mervyn Davies – a “St. Andrew” in Newman scholarship: John Henry Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, 8 Vols (London: Longmans, Green, 1907–1909), II, 3.

References

1 The prevalence of logical positivism during this period in Anglophone philosophy as argued by Garcia: ‘From the 1920s to the 1960s, large tracts of English-speaking philosophy labored under the shadow of logical positivism and its verification criterion of meaning. Positivism is evidentialism for the twentieth-century; empirical certitude extends only to what is immediately presented to sense experience (sense-data), and statements that cannot be verified falsified by such evidence are…meaningless.’ Garcia, Laura L, ‘Catholic Philosophical Theology,’ in Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Meister, C & Copan, P (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 525-534, at p. 530Google Scholar.

2 For examples of this view see: Mitchell, Basil, ‘Newman as a Philosopher,’ in Newman after a Hundred Years, ed. Ker, I & Hill, A G (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 223-246 at p. 241Google Scholar; Barrett, Cyril, ‘Newman and Wittgenstein on the Rationality of Belief,’ in Newman and Conversion, ed. Ker, I (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1997), pp. 89-99Google Scholar; Kerr, Fergus, ‘“In an Isolated and, Philosophically, Uninfluential Way” Newman and Oxford Philosophy,’ in Newman and the Word, eds. Merrigan, T & Ker, I T (Louvain: Peeters Press, 2000), pp. 155-179Google Scholar. For an alternative perspective on Newman's philosophical reception see: Morris-Chapman, D J Pratt ‘The Philosophical legacy of John Henry Newman: A Neglected Chapter in Newman Research,’ in New Blackfriars (2017), 722-750CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Pritchard, Duncan, ‘Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman,’ God, Truth and Other Enigmas, ed. Szatkowski, M. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 141-164 at p. 163 fn11Google Scholar. Pritchard's analysis is not quite accurate for, while it is clear that Newman was recognized as an important dialogue partner in many philosophical writings his philosophical reception during the nineteenth century was shaped by a form of evidentialism typified in Clifford who stated that ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.’ For further discussion see: Pratt Morris-Chapman, ‘The Philosophical Legacy of John Henry Newman,’ 722-750; Clifford, W K, ‘The Ethics of Belief,’ in Lectures and Essays, 2 Vols (London: Macmillan, 1879), II, p. 186Google Scholar.

4 Kerr, ‘Newman and Oxford Philosophy,’ p. 156.

5 He writes: ‘A genuine proposition pictures a possible state of affairs. These pictures themselves are facts and share a pictorial and a logical form with what they represent. Failure of representation occurs when a sentence, laying claim to a truth or falsehood, depicts no possible state of affairs, whether simple or complex. Inasmuch as they are themselves neither elementary propositions nor truth-functions of elementary propositions, metaphysical pronouncements fail to represent anything. They are nonsensical…This applies to ethics an aesthetics.’ Ayer, A J, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1982), p. 112Google Scholar

6 Kerr, ‘Newman and Oxford Philosophy,’ p. 157.

7 In this regard Ayer's Dictionary of Philosophical Quotations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) is revealing, for this posthumous work not only fails to mention Newman but its obsession with recent developments in analytic philosophy leads Ayer to virtually ignore the British Idealists and the Cambridge Platonists.

8 Mitchell, ‘Newman as a Philosopher,’ p. 241.

9 Mitchell, ‘Newman as a Philosopher,’ pp. 236-237.

10 Another reason given by Mitchell is that the tendency toward idealism in continental philosophy detached Newman, who he describes as being ‘firmly rooted in the Empiricist tradition,’ from the affairs of European philosophers. Mitchell, ‘Newman as a Philosopher,’ p. 223.

11 Kenny, ‘Newman as a Philosopher of Religion,’ pp. 98-100.

12 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, trans. Paul, D & Anscombe, G E M (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), p. 3Google Scholar.

13 Though not all commentators mention Wittgenstein's reference to ‘H Newman’ it is implied by the fact that the date of this publication is often mentioned as a turning point.

14 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Pears, D.F. & McGuiness, B. F. (London: Routledge, 1974), p. 74 (6.54)Google Scholar.

15 According to Puchner: ‘the reception of the Tractatus, which was taken by many members of the Circle as a kind of foundational document, comparable to a foundational manifesto, of logical positivism.’ Puchner, Martin, ‘Doing Logic with a Hammer: Wittgenstein's “Tractatus” and the Polemics of Logical Positivism,’ in Journal of the History of Ideas (2005), 285-300, at 291CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an example of this kind of philosophical reception see: Ayer, A. J., Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1982), pp. 111-112Google Scholar.

16 Wittgenstein, Ludwig J J, Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, G. E. M. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2001)Google Scholar.

17 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, pp. 31-32 (65-66); Clack, Brian R, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion (Edinburgh: University Press, 1999), p. 16Google Scholar.

18 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, trans. Paul, D & Anscombe, G E M (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), p. 3Google Scholar.

19 Kenny, ‘Newman as a Philosopher of Religion,’ pp. 98-100.

20 For further discussion see: Barrett, Cyril, Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991)Google Scholar.

21 Barrett, ‘Newman and Wittgenstein on the Rationality of Belief,’ pp. 88-90, 93.

22 Yearley, Lee, The Ideas of Newman: Christianity and Human Religiosity (University Park. PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), pp. 85 & 161n45Google Scholar.

23 Ferreira, J M, Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman's Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 69Google Scholar. Ferreira (a philosopher and Newman commentator) compares Wittgenstein's understanding of religious language with that of Newman.

24 McCarthy, G, ‘Newman and Wittgenstein: The Problem of Certainty’ in Irish Theological Quarterly (1982), 98-120CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 McGuinness, Brian, Wittgenstein: a Life: young Ludwig 1889-1921 (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1988), p. 153Google Scholar.

26 Barrett argues that the ‘type of religious reasoning that Wittgenstein favours is very similar to that of John Henry Cardinal Newman in the Grammar of Assent.’ Barrett, Cyril, ‘The Wittgensteinian Revolution,’ in Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Harris, H, Insole, C (Farnham: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 61-71, at 67Google Scholar.

27 Lemoine, Roy Emanuel, The Anagogic Theory of Wittgenstein's “Tractatus” (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), pp. 13-14CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 Mitchell, Basil ‘Newman as Philosopher,’ in Newman After a Hundred Years, ed. Ker, I & Hill, A G (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 223-246, at p. 239Google Scholar.

29 Ker, Ian, The Achievement of John Henry Newman (London: Collins, 1991), pp. 71-73Google Scholar.

30 Gellner, Ernest, Words And Things: An Examination Of, And An Attack On, Linguistic Philosophy (London: Routledge, [1959] 2005), pp. 36-37Google Scholar.

31 Kienzler, Wolfgang, ‘Wittgenstein and John Henry Newman on Certainty,’ in Grazer Philosophische Studien 71 (2006), 117-138, at 134-136CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bottone, Angelo, ‘Newman and Wittgenstein after Foundationalism,’ New Blackfriars 86 (2005), 62-75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Barrett, Cyril, ‘Newman and Wittgenstein on the Rationality of Belief,’ in Newman and Conversion, ed. Ker, I (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1997), pp. 89-99Google Scholar; Lemoine, The Anagogic Theory of Wittgenstein's “Tractatus”, p. 14; Ferreira, J M, Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 161n25Google Scholar; McCarthy, G, ‘Newman and Wittgenstein: The Problem of Certainty’ in Irish Theological Quarterly (1982), 98-120CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Kienzler, Wolfgang, ‘Wittgenstein and John Henry Newman on Certainty,’ in Grazer Philosophische Studien 71 (2006), 117-138, at 118n6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 Ambrose was an American Philosopher who studied at Cambridge.

34 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions ed. Klagge, J C, Nordmann, A (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), p. 375Google Scholar.

35 Hilton, Peter, ‘Obituary M H A Newman,’ in Bulletin: London Mathematical Society 18 (1986), 67-72, at 67Google Scholar.

36 While he preferred to be known as Max by his friends, it is not clear that they were such. Some of their discussions were so heated that Wittgenstein once wished M H Newman had been ‘drowned at birth.’ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions ed. Klagge, J C, Nordmann, A (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 374-375Google Scholar.

37 Albert Einstien, cited in ‘The Max Newman Digital Archive’ [item 2 13 2] Box 2 Folder13 item2 http://www.cdpa.co.uk/Newman/MHAN/view-item.php?Box=2&SubBox=&Folder=13&SubFolder=&Item=2&SubItem=&Page=1 (Accessed 14.12.09).

38 H K H Weil, cited in ‘The Max Newman Digital Archive’ [item [box]2 [folder]8 [item]2]http://www.cdpa.co.uk/Newman/MHAN/view-item.php?Box=2&SubBox=&Folder=8&SubFolder=&Item=2&SubItem=&Page=1 (Accessed 14.12.09).

39 Hilton, Peter, ‘Obituary M H A Newman,’ in Bulletin: London Mathematical Society 18 (1986), 67-72, at 67Google Scholar.

40 Barret, Cyril, Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 181Google Scholar.

41 FitzPatrick, P J, ‘Newman's Grammar and the Church Today,’ in John Henry Newman Reason, Rhetoric and Romanticism, ed. Nicholls, D & Kerr, F (Bristol: Classical Press, 1991), pp. 109-134, at 128n1Google Scholar.

42 Rhees, R, ed. Recollections of Wittgenstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), p. 130Google Scholar.

43 Malcolm, Norman, Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 59Google Scholar.

44 Phillips, Dewi Z, ‘Antecedent Presumption, Faith and Logic’ in Newman and Faith, ed. Ker, I & Merrigan, T (Louvain: Peeters Publishers, 2004), pp1-24, at pp. 16-17Google Scholar.

45 Phillips, D Z, Faith after Foundationalism (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 84-86Google Scholar.

46 LD XXII, p. 215.

47 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Culture and Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), p. 73Google Scholar.

48 Pritchard, Duncan, ‘Is “God Exists” a “Hinge Proposition” of Religious Belief?’ in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000), pp. 129-140, at 132CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

49 Pritchard, Duncan H., ‘Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman,’ in God, Truth, and Other Enigmas, ed. Szatkowski, M (2015), pp. 197-216CrossRefGoogle Scholar at.

50 Pritchard, ‘Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman,’208-209.

51 For Newman faith has grounds, even if the grounds are found retrospectively to be inadequate. For further discussion on this point see: Aquino, Frederick, ‘Newman on the Grounds of Faith,’ Quaestiones Disputatae (2018):5-18, at 13-14CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52 Pritchard, ‘Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman,’ 197-198.

53 Both proponents and critics of linguistic philosophy cite Newman. For example: Mundle, C W K, A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy (London: Glover & Blair, [1970] 1979), p. 107Google Scholar. White, Alan R, Misleading Cases (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 129Google Scholar.

54 Moran, Dermot, ‘Towards an Assessment of Twentieth-Century Philosophy,’ in The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy, ed. Moran, D (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 1-40, at p. 2CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

55 Pratt Morris-Chapman ‘The Philosophical legacy of John Henry Newman’, 722-750.