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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 October 2024
This article explores the role of Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions in balancing justice and peace during transitions from armed conflict to peace. It argues that the provision, which encourages the granting of broad amnesties at the cessation of hostilities, requires a re-evaluation of the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish under international law. By analyzing the legal context and scope of Article 6(5), as well as its application in transitional justice models such as in Colombia, the article highlights how the principle of peace can be prioritized alongside justice without undermining victims’ rights. The discussion critically addresses maximalist interpretations of justice, presenting a nuanced approach that foregrounds restorative justice and the importance of reconciliation in post-conflict societies.
Juana Inés Acosta López is a member of the Editorial Board of the Review. The author would like to thank Ana María Moya Silva for her support in editing this article.
The advice, opinions and statements contained in this article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC. The ICRC does not necessarily represent or endorse the accuracy or reliability of any advice, opinion, statement or other information provided in this article.
1 Iverson, Jens, “Transitional Justice, Jus post Bellum and International Criminal Law: Differentiating the Usages, History and Dynamics”, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2013CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Serena Sharma, “Reconsidering the Jus ad Bellum/Jus in Bello Distinction”, in Carsten Stahn and Jann Kleffner (eds), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace, T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2008.
2 Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP II).
3 While rules are mandates for action, principles are norms that set out, in an open manner, how to act or make decisions. When applying them, their weight or force must be defined in light of the specific case, using methods such as weighting to establish balance. Fabio Enrique Pulido Ortiz, El derecho y sus normas [The Law and Its Norms], Temis, Universidad de La Sabana, 2022.
4 Alejandro Valencia Villa, Derecho internacional humanitario: Conceptos básicos – Infracciones en el conflicto armado Colombiano [International Humanitarian Law: Basic Concepts – Infractions in the Colombian Armed Conflict], 2nd ed., Office in Colombia of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Bogotá, 2013, p. 17.
5 Ibid., p. 103.
6 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 1 January 1981 (entered into force 2 December 1983), Preamble.
7 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (ICRC Customary Law Study), Rule 139, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/rules (all internet references were accessed in September 2024).
8 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd ed., Geneva, 2016, Art. 1.
9 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 7, Rules 151–161.
10 Emily Crawford, “Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I (1977)”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, June 2015, available at: https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1804; Jean-Baptiste, Marie-Claude, “Cracking the Toughest Nut: Colombia's Endeavour with Amnesty for Political Crimes under Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions”, Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2007, Art. 4Google Scholar.
11 European External Action Service, The EU's Policy Framework on Support to Transitional Justice, 2015; United Nations (UN), Further Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Croatia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1019 (1995), UN Doc. S/1997/195, 5 March 1997.
12 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decision No. C-007, 1 March 2018; Special Jurisdiction for Peace, Resolution of 25 October 2018, File No. 400003892018, para. 31; Court of Peace Appeals Division, Judgment TP-SA-AM 168, 18 June 2020; Supreme Court of Justice of El Salvador, Judgment on Unconstitutionality (Constitutional Chamber), 44-2013/145-2013, 2013; Supreme Court of Chile, Case No. 3125-04, Decision on Annulment (Criminal Law Chamber), 13 March 2007, para. 21.
13 Congress of the Republic of Colombia, Law 1957, 2019, Art. 82; Senate of the Republic of Mexico, “Exposición de motivos, iniciativa con proyecto de decreto por el que se crea la ley de amnistía para los presos y perseguidos por Motivos políticos en el estado de Oaxaca durante los años 1996 y 2000” [“Memorandum, Draft Decree Creating the Amnesty Law for Prisoners and Persons Persecuted for Political Reasons in the State of Oaxaca from 1996 to 2000”]; Congress of the Republic of Colombia, Law 1820, 2016, Art. 21; Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Law on Amnesty, 1999, Art. 1; Congress of the Republic of Guatemala, Decree 145, 1996, Arts 2, 4.
14 Defence for Dr Saif Al-Islam Gadafi before the ICC, Second Redacted Version of Corrigendum of Defence Consolidated Reply to Prosecution “Response to ‘Admissibility Challenge by Dr Saif Al-Islam Gadafi pursuant to Articles 17(1)(c), 19 and 20(3)of the Rome Statute” and Response to “Observations by Lawyers for Justice in Libya and the Redress Trust Pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”, 20 November 2018, para. 66.
15 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Marguš v. Croatia, Case No. 4455/10, Judgment, 27 May 2014, para. 72.
16 IACtHR, Masacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Judgment, 25 October 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge Diego García-Sayán, para. 17; IACtHR, Herzog et al. v. Brazil, Judgment, 15 March 2018, para. 280; IACtHR, Gelman v. Uruguay, Judgment, 24 February 2011, para. 210.
17 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–1977), Federal Political Department, Bern, 1978.
18 Ibid.
19 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Special Problems of a Duty to Prosecute: Derogation, Amnesties, Statutes of Limitation and Superior Orders”, in Naomi Roht-Arriaza (ed.), Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995; Official Records, above note 17; Mégret, Frédéric, “Should Rebels Be Amnestied?”, in Stahn, Carsten, Easterday, Jennifer and Iverson, Jens (eds), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014Google Scholar.
20 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decision No. C-007, above note 12: “not every amnesty or similar benefit is incompatible with the state's obligations”, and “some amnesties and similar measures are admissible to achieve reconciliation”.
21 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987 (ICRC Commentary on the APs), pp. 4617–4618.
22 Ibid.
23 Pablo de Greiff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/46, 9 August 2012; Kai Ambos, Justicia de transición y constitución [Transitional Justice and Constitution], Temis, Bogotá, 2014; Diana Dajer, “Las garantías de no repetición en el Acuerdo Final: ¿El día después de mañana de la justicia transicional en Colombia?” [Guarantees of Non-Recurrence in the Final Agreement: The Day after Tomorrow for Transitional Justice in Colombia?], in Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (ed.), El posconflicto colombiano: Una perspectiva transversal, Strategic Dossier No. 189, Ministry of Defence, Spain, 2017.
24 Slye, Ronald, “The Legitimacy of Amnesties under International Law and General Principles of Anglo-American Law”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, No. 173, 2002, p. 76Google Scholar; Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Amnesties, UN Doc. HR/PUB/09/1, 2009, p. 11.
25 Margalit, Avishai, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2009Google Scholar, cited in Camila de Gamboa and Juan Felipe Lozano, “El perdón interpersonal en contextos de justicia transicional”, in Kai Ambos et al. (eds), Justicia transicional y derecho penal internacional, Siglo del Hombre Editores S. A., Bogotá, 2018.
26 Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes and María Paula Saffon, “Justicia transicional y justicia restaurativa: Tensiones y complementariedades” [“Transitional Justice and Restorative Justice: Tensions and Complementarities”], in Angelika Rettberg (ed.), Entre el perdón y el paredón: Preguntas y dilemas de la justicia transicional, Ediciones Uniandes, Bogotá, 2005; O'Mahony, David and Doak, Jonathan, “Transitional Justice and Restorative Justice”, International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2012Google Scholar; Juana Inés Acosta López and Cindy Vanessa Espitia Murcia, “La justicia restaurativa en un sistema de justicia transicional: Divergencias, convergencias y aportes” [“Restorative Justice in a Transitional Justice System: Divergences, Convergences and Contributions”], Vniversitas, Vol. 69, 2020.
27 Juan Pablo Hinestrosa Velez, “Contexto y patrones de macrocriminalidad en Colombia: Una forma de buscar el derecho a la justicia” [“Context and Patterns of Macrocriminality in Colombia: A Way to Pursue the Right to Justice”], Justicia en las Américas, 22 March 2018, available at: https://dplfblog.com/2018/03/22/contexto-y-patrones-de-macrocriminalidad-en-colombia-una-forma-de-buscar-el-derecho-a-la-justicia/.
28 Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Criteria for Prioritizing and Selecting Core International Crimes Cases, 2nd ed., Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2010.
29 Kai Ambos, Selección y priorización como estrategia de persecución en los casos de crímenes internacionales: Un estudio comparado [Targeting and Prioritization as a Prosecutorial Strategy in Cases of International Crimes: A Comparative Study], 1st ed., ProFis, Bogotá, 2011; Alejandro Aponte, “Macrocriminalidad y función penal en lógica transicional: Aportes posibles del derecho penal a las garantías de no repetición” [“Macrocriminality and the Criminal Function in Transitional Logic: Possible Contributions of Criminal Law to Guarantees of Non-Recurrence”], in Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (ed.), above note 23; IACtHR, Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, Judgment, 26 May 2010; ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 15 November 2011; ICC, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, Bogotá and Medellín, 2016.
30 R. Uprimny Yepes and M. P. Saffon, above note 26; Nelson Camilo Sánchez León and Oscar Parra Vera, Elementos para una justicia de paz restaurativa [Elements of Restorative Justice for Peace], Ediciones USTA, Bogotá, 2018, available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv15kxft9; Blumenson, Eric, “National Amnesties and International Justice”, Eyes on the ICC, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2005Google Scholar; Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster, The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability, Belfast, 2013 (Belfast Guidelines), Guideline 11; Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decision No. C-080, 2018; Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decision No. C-007, above note 12.
31 Paul McCold, Jennifer Llewellyn and Daniel W. Van Ness, An Introduction to Restorative Peacebuilding, Working Party on Restorative Justice of the Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Briefing Paper No. 1, 2007.
32 F. Mégret, above note 19.
33 Perhaps one of the best and most recent texts that aims to systematize these minimums is Jacopo Roberti di Sarsina, Transitional Justice and a State's Response to Mass Atrocity: Reassessing the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute, T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2019, Chap. 4. However, this text does not differentiate the minimums according to the type of transition.
34 The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability attempted this exercise but adopted, in my view, a balance that gives too much weight to amnesties and too little weight to access to justice. Belfast Guidelines, above note 30.
35 Thus, the courts of the regional human rights systems have analyzed the amnesty laws of those States in which the transition was from armed conflict to peace, and those in which the transition was from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one, without establishing differences between them with respect to the limits and requirements of amnesties. See, for example, IACtHR, Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment, 4 March 2001, para. 15; IACtHR, Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Judgment, 26 September 2006, para. 114. And see ECtHR, Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania, Judgment, 25 May 2011 (transition from dictatorship to democracy); ECtHR, Tarbuk v. Croatia, Judgment, 11 December 2012; UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 21 July 2015 (transitions from armed conflict to peace); UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Argentina, 3 November 2000 (transition from authoritarian to democratic regime).
36 Compared with the number of cases in which the courts have analyzed amnesties vis-à-vis States’ obligations, there are very few pronouncements that expressly refer to Article 6(5). For example, the IACtHR has only mentioned it in three cases: IACtHR, Mozote, above note 16, Concurring Opinion of Judge Diego García-Sayán, para. 17; IACtHR, Herzog, above note 16, para. 280; IACtHR, Gelman, above note 16, para. 210. For its part, the ECtHR has only mentioned it in the case of Margus v. Croatia, Judgment, Appl. No. 4455/10, 27 May 2014, paras 72 ff. Likewise, the African Court on Human and People's Rights has not made any reference to Article 6(5), and while the African Commission on Human Rights analyzed amnesty in the case of Thomas Kwoyelo v. Uganda, Communication No. 431/12, 17 October 2018, it did not mention Article 6(5).
37 IACtHR, Truth, Justice and Reparation: Fourth Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, Organization of American States, Doc. 49/13, 2013, para. 269.
38 Louise Mallinder and Ronald Slye, “Rethinking Peace and Justice”, Institute for Integrated Transitions, Law and Peace Practice Group, available at: https://ifit-transitions.org/publications/rethinking-peace-and-justice-2/.
39 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 7.
40 F. Mégret, above note 19.
41 Ibid.
42 American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969 (entered into force 18 July 1978), Arts 27, 30; Pedro Nikken, “El derecho internacional de los derechos humanos en el derecho interno” [“International Human Rights Law in Domestic Law”], Revista IIDH, Vol. 57, 2013; Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019; Thomas Buergenthal, “Human Rights”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, March 2007, available at: https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e810.
43 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969 (entered into force 27 January 1980), Art. 31(2): “The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes …” (emphasis added).
44 Common Article 3, Preamble.
45 M.-C. Jean-Baptiste, above note 10. See also J. R. di Sarsina, above note 33, p. 131; Santiago Canton, “Leyes de Amnistía” [“Amnesty Laws”], in Félix Reátegui (ed.), Justicia transicional: Manual para América Latina, International Center for Transitional Justice et al., New York and Brasilia, 2011.
46 M.-C. Jean-Baptiste, above note 10.
47 ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 21.
48 UN Security Council, Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 32.
49 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/915, 4 October 2000, para. 22.
50 See M.-C. Jean-Baptiste, above note 10: “For example, the UN Security Council encouraged the granting of amnesties for political crimes in South Africa, Angola, and Croatia as has the UN General Assembly in Afghanistan and Kosovo. The UN Commission on Human Rights adopted resolutions in support of amnesty for political crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan”. See UNSC Res. 1120, 14 July 1997.
51 European External Action Service, above note 11, p. 10.
52 African Union, Transitional Justice Policy, 2019, p. 18.
53 See, for example, F. Mégret, above note 19.
54 For an analysis of this scope, see, for example, M.-C. Jean-Baptiste, above note 10.
55 Letter from Toni Pfanner, Chief of ICRC Legal Division, to Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Douglass Cassel, 15 April 1977, quoted in Cassel, Douglass, “Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for Atrocities”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 59, 1996, p. 218CrossRefGoogle Scholar (emphasis added in Cassel).
56 ICC Appeals Chamber, Separate and Concurring Opinion of Judge Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza on the Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision on the ‘Admissibility Challenge by Dr Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Pursuant to Articles 17(1)(c), 19 and 20(3) of the Rome Statute’”, 2019.
57 ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in Libya, in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision on the ‘Admissibility Challenge by Dr Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Pursuant to Articles 17(1)(c), 19 and 20(3) of the Rome Statute’”, 5 April 2019.
58 ICC Appeals Chamber, above note 56.
59 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978), Arts 43, 44; Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950); ICRC, “Combatants and POWs”, How Does Law Protect in War?, available at: https://casebook.icrc.org/law/combatants-and-pows; Marco Sassòli, “Combatants”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, September 2015, available at: https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e272.
60 Author's translation from Spanish, “por haber cometido actos de hostilidad”, in Jean de Preux, “Texto de síntesis VII: Estatuto de combatiente y de prisionero de guerra”, Revista Internacional de la Cruz Roja, Vol. 14, No. 91, 1989.
61 Nils Melzer (ed.), Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva, 2019 (ICRC Interpretive Guidance); Preux, Jean de, “Combatant and Prisoner of War Status”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 29, No. 268, 1989CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
62 During the discussions that gave rise to AP II, some countries (such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Spain) also stated that when granting amnesties, each country's national processes and interests must be respected, taking into consideration that each nation should consider how amnesties may or may not contribute to reconciliation. In this regard, see Official Records, above note 17, Vol. 7, pp. 103, 105.
63 UN Security Council, Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, paras 10, 64.
64 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 7, Rule 3; ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 61.
65 International Law Commission, Third Report on Crimes against Humanity, UN Doc. A/CN.4/704, 23 January 2017, para. 286.
66 See, in this regard, L. Mallinder and R. Slye, above note 38.
67 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 7, Rules 158–159.
68 ICC Appeals Chamber, above note 56.
69 University of Notre Dame, Peace Matrix Accord, 2023.
70 Freeman, Mark and Peña, Mariana Casij, “Negotiating with Organized Crime Groups: Questions of Law, Policy and Imagination”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 105, No. 923, 2023, p. 646CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
71 See, for example, Tomuschat, Christian, “Common Values and the Place of the Charter in Europe”, European Review of Public Law, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2002Google Scholar; Belfast Guidelines, above note 30, p. 41.
72 Juana Inés Acosta López, Derecho internacional y derecho interno en las transiciones del conflicto armado a una paz negociada: Una propuesta normativa frente a una relación Problemática [International Law and Domestic Law in Transitions from Armed Conflict to Negotiated Peace: A Normative Proposal in the Face of a Problematic Relationship], working paper, Universidad Nacional Autónoma De México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2022.
73 “[T]here are currently eight non-international armed conflicts in Colombia. Three of them are between the government of Colombia and … armed actors …. The other five conflicts are between non-state armed actors.” ICRC, “The Human Cost of Armed Conflicts in Colombia”, 3 April 2024, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/human-cost-armed-conflicts-Colombia. “On Tuesday 9 January 2024, the constitutional president of the Republic of Ecuador, through Executive Decree No. 111, reiterated the declaration of the state of emergency made the day before and established the recognition of the existence in Ecuador of an internal armed conflict”. José Burneo Labrin, “Ecuador y el conflicto armado interno” [“Ecuador and the Internal Armed Conflict”], Ventana Jurídica, 16 January 2024, available at: https://facultad-derecho.pucp.edu.pe/ventana-juridica/ecuador-y-el-conflicto-armado-interno/. See also Redaelli, Chiara and Arévalo, Carlos, “Targeting Drug Lords: Challenges to IHL between Lege Lata and Lege Ferenda”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 105, No. 923, 2023CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
74 Other instruments do, however. These include the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1988, which enshrines peace as a purpose of the right to education, but not of the instrument in general.
75 Particularly Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights, on judicial guarantees and judicial protection.
76 Oscar Parra Vera, “La jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana respecto a la lucha contra La impunidad: Algunos avances y debates” [“The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court on the Fight against Impunity: Some Developments and Debates”], Revista Jurídica de La Universidad de Palermo, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2012; Javier Dondé Matute, “El concepto de impunidad: Leyes de amnistía y otras formas estudiadas por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos” [“The Concept of Impunity: Amnesty Laws and Other Forms Studied by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”], in Gisela Elsner, Kai Ambos and Ezequiel Malarino (coords), Sistema interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos y derecho penal internacional, Vol. 1, Fundación Konrad Adenauer, Bogotá, 2010; Luis Miguel Gutiérrez Ramírez, “La obligación internacional de investigar, juzgar y sancionar graves violaciones a los derechos humanos en contextos de justicia transicional” [“The International Obligation to Investigate, Prosecute and Punish Serious Human Rights Violations in Transitional Justice Contexts”], Estudios Socio-Jurídicos, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014; Christina Binder, “The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”, German Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 5, 2011.
77 IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment, 26 June 1987, para. 164.
78 IACtHR, Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment, 14 March 2001; IACtHR, La Cantuta v. Peru, Judgment, 29 November 2006.
79 IACtHR, Almonacid Arellano, above note 35.
80 IACtHR, Gelman, above note 16.
81 IACtHR, Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) v. Brazil, Judgment, 24 November 2010.
82 See, for example, L. M. Gutiérrez Ramírez, above note 76.
83 In this regard, see for example, María Clara Galvis et al., Las víctimas y la justicia transicional: ¿Están cumpliendo los estados americanos con los estándares unternacionales? [Victims and Transitional Justice: Are American States Meeting International Standards?], Due Process of Law Foundation, Washington, DC, 2010.
84 L. M. Gutiérrez Ramírez, above note 76. In the same sense, see Elizabeth Salmón, “Algunas reflexiones sobre derecho internacional humanitario y justicia transicional: Lecciones de la experiencia latinoamericana” [“Some Reflections on International Humanitarian Law and Transitional Justice: Lessons from the Latin American Experience”], in F. Reátegui (ed.), above note 45.
85 See, for example, Bassiouni, Cherif, “Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability over Realpolitik”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, 2003Google Scholar. See also Human Rights Watch's reaction to the negotiations in Kosovo: Human Rights Watch, “No Kosovo Settlement without Accountability for War Crimes”, 6 February 1999, available at: www.hrw.org/news/1999/02/06/no-kosovo-settlement-without-accountability-war-crimes.
86 Colombian Commission of Jurists, Demanda contra el marco jurídico para la paz, presentada ante la Corte Constitucional de Colombia” [Lawsuit against the Legal Framework for Peace, Presented before the Constitutional Court of Colombia], 2012; Rodrigo Uprimny, Luz María Sánchez and Nelson Camilo Sánchez, Justicia para la paz: Crímenes atroces, derecho a la justicia y paz negociada [Justice for Peace: Atrocity Crimes, the Right to Justice and Negotiated Peace], 1st ed., Dejusticia, Bogotá, 2014.
87 See, for example, IACtHR, Almonacid Arellano, above note 35; IACtHR, La Cantuta, above note 78.
88 IACtHR, Mozote above note 16, para. 286.
89 In this case, the IACtHR cited Article 6(5) of AP II as a basis, but only to refer to the limits of amnesties for war crimes, as part of a broader list of prohibitions. IACtHR, Gelman, above note 16, para. 210.
90 IACtHR, Mozote, above note 16, para. 286.
91 IACtHR, Rochac Hernández et al. v. El Salvador, Judgment, 14 October 2014.
92 Centre for Justice and International Law, “Corte IDH emite resolución que obliga a Congreso guatemalteco desistir de aprobar una amnistía general” [“IACtHR Issues Ruling Forcing Guatemalan Congress to Desist from Approving General Amnesty”], 13 March 2019, available at: https://cejil.org/comunicado-de-prensa/corte-idh-emite-resolucion-que-obliga-a-congreso-guatemalteco-desistir-de-aprobar-una-amnistia-general/.
93 Human Rights Watch, “Colombia: Amend ‘Legal Framework for Peace’ Bill”, 31 May 2012, available at: www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/31/colombia-amend-legal-framework-peace-bill; “‘El acuerdo promueve más la impunidad que la justicia’: Human Rights Watch” [“‘The Agreement Promotes Impunity Rather than Justice’: Human Rights Watch”], El Espectador, 18 January 2018.
94 Colombian Commission of Jurists, Comentarios al Marco Jurídico Para La Paz [Comments on the Legal Framework for Peace], 2012; Colombian Commission of Jurists, Demanda contra el marco jurídico para la paz, presentada ante la Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Lawsuit against the Legal Framework for Peace, Presented before the Constitutional Court of Colombia], 2012.
95 IACtHR, Herzog, above note 16, para. 280.
96 Ibid., para. 292.
97 IACtHR, Members and Militants of the Patriotic Union v. Colombia, Judgment, 27 July 2022.
98 Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, “A Broader Look at the Transformative Impact of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Decisions”, in Armin von Bogdandy et al. (eds), The Impact of the Inter-American Human Rights System: Transformations on the Ground, Oxford Academic, New York, 2024; María Carmelina Londoño Lázaro, “Impactos estructurales de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Una mirada a propósito de sus 40 años” [“Structural Impacts of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: A Look at Its 40 Years”], in Armin von Bogdandy et al. (eds), Cumplimiento e impacto de las sentencias de la Corte Interamericana y el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos: Transformando realidades, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and Public International Law, Instituto de Estudios Constitucionales del Estado de Querétaro Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas –Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2019, pp. 513 ff.; Pablo Saavedra Alessandri “40 años cambiando realidades una mirada al impacto estructural de las decisiones de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos” [“40 Years of Changing Realities: A Look at the Structural Impact of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Decisions”], in A. von Bogdandy et al. (eds), ibid., pp. 551 ff.
99 “The diffuse control of compliance consists of the duty of all national authorities to examine compatibility between national acts and norms, and the American Convention on Human Rights, its additional protocols, and the jurisprudence of the Court that interprets that inter-American corpus iuris.” Laura Alicia Camarillo Govea and Elizabeth Nataly Rosas Rábago, “El control de convencionalidad como consecuencia de las decisiones judiciales de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos”, Revista IIDH, Vol. 64, 2016; IACtHR, Almonacid Arellano, above note 35, para. 124 ff.; Pablo González Domínguez, “La doctrina del control de convencionalidad a la luz del principio de subsidiariedad” [“The Doctrine of Conventionality Control in the Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity”], Estudios Constitucionales, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2017; Pablo González Domínguez, “La relación entre la doctrina del control de convencionalidad y el derecho nacional” [“The Relationship between the Doctrine of Conventionality Control and National Law”], Cuestiones Constitucionales: Revista Mexicana de Derecho Constitucional, Vol. 38, 2018; Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, “Conventionality Control: Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Procedural Law, December 2018, available at: https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law-mpeipro/e3634.013.3634/law-mpeipro-e3634.
100 On 4 September 2012, the official negotiations were established between the national government of Colombia and the FARC-EP.
101 On 24 August 2016, the dialogue phase was closed, and on 26 September, the Peace Agreement was signed in Cartagena. The president called for a referendum on 2 October for Colombians to approve the contents of the Agreement: 50.21% of Colombians rejected the Agreement and 49.79% approved it.
102 After the “no” victory in the referendum, the president opened a space for participation and dialogue with citizens to receive proposals from the “no” proponents. The deadline for receiving proposals was 20 October 2016. On 21 October, the negotiations between the government and the FARC were reinstated to incorporate the changes suggested into the Agreement.
103 Congress of the Republic of Colombia, Legislative Act 01, 2017, Art. 4.
104 Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, 24 November 2016 (signed after renegotiation), Preamble.
105 Legislative Act 01, above note 103, Art. 4.
106 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-171/17, 22 March 2017.
107 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-379/16, 18 July 2016.
108 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-630/17, 11 October 2017.
109 This caused an adverse political reaction from the FARC-EP, who described the Legal Framework for Peace as an illegitimate regulation because it was adopted “unilaterally” by the Colombian Government. “If peace is indeed sought, common sense alone indicates that a conceptualization for such a construction must be the product of joint analysis and decisions.” FARC-EP, “Communiqué of the FARC”, August 2013.
110 In other research, the present author and others have found that the Constitutional Court of Colombia has issued more than seventy rulings related to transitional justice models in the country. For a more in-depth analysis of this topic, see Juana Inés Acosta López and Cindy Vanessa Espitia Murcia, “La justicia transicional a la luz del derecho internacional: La perspectiva de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana” [“Transitional Justice in the Light of International Law: The Perspective of the Colombian Constitutional Court”], in Juana Inés Acosta López, Paola Andrea Acosta and Daniel Rivas-Ramírez (eds), De anacronismos y vaticinios: Diagnóstico sobre las relaciones entre el derecho internacional y el derecho interno en Latinoamérica, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá, 2017.
111 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-57, 28 August 2013, p. 254.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid., paras 271, 272.
114 Congress of Colombia, Law 1820, 2016.
115 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-070, 4 July 2018; Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decision No. C-080, above note 30.
116 ICRC, Colombia: Humanitarian Challenge 2024, 3 April 2024.
117 Juana Inés Acosta López and Cindy Vanessa Espitia Murcia, “The Transitional Justice Model in Colombia vis-à-vis the Inter-American Human Rights System”, in Alejandro Linares Cantillo (ed.), Constitutionalism: Old Dilemmas, New Insights, online ed., Oxford Academic, 2021.
118 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-674, 14 November 2017.
119 IACtHR, Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Interpretation of the Judgment, 19 August 2013; IACtHR, Gelman, above note 16; IACtHR, Almonacid Arellano, above note 35; IACtHR, Gomes Lund, above note 81; P. de Greiff, above note 23.
120 Law 1957, above note 13, Art. 20.
121 Ibid.
122 Legislative Act 01 of 2017, above note 103, Art. 1; Law 1957, above note 13, Art. 13.
123 Law 1957, above note 13, Art. 39.
124 Ibid., Art 97, 127, 128, 140.
125 UN, Handbook on Restorative Justice Programmes, New York, 2006.
126 Coleen Murphy, “Transitional Justice: A Conceptual Map”, in Krushil Watene and Jay Drydyk (eds), Theorizing Justice: Critical Insights and Future Directions, Rowman and Littlefield, London, 2016.
127 Coleen Murphy, “Judging the Justice of the Colombian Final Agreement”, in Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora, Andrés Molina Ochoa and Nancy Doubleday (eds), The Colombian Peace Agreement: A Multidisciplinary Assessment, Routledge, Abingdon, 2021; David Dyzenhaus and Alma Diamond, “The Resilient Constitution”, in A. Linares Cantillo (ed.), above note 117; Pablo de Greiff, “Algunas reflexiones acerca del desarrollo de la justicia transicional” [“Some Reflections on the Development of Transitional Justice”], Anuario de Derechos Humanos, Vol. 7, 2011.
128 Paul Seils, The Place of Reconciliation in Transitional Justice Conceptions and Misconceptions, ICTJ Briefing, 2017; UN, Report to the Human Rights Council on the Foundation of the Mandate and the Importance of a Comprehensive Approach, 2012.
129 Law 1957, above note 13, Art. 20.
130 Ibid., Art. 127.
131 James Stewart, “The Role of the ICC in the Transitional Justice Process in Colombia”, speech given to conferences on transitional justice, Bogotá and Medellín, 30–31 May 2018.
132 Juana Inés Acosta López and Cindy Vanessa Espitia Murcia, “Pasado, presente y futuro de la justicia transicional en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos” [“Past, Present and Future of Transitional Justice in the Inter-American Human Rights System”], Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional, Vol. 15, No. 30, 2017; Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-017, 21 March 2018; Anamaría Muñoz Rincón, “La (in)suficiencia del derecho: La producción de la verdad en escenarios transicionales” [“The (In)Sufficiency of Law: The Production of Truth in Transitional Scenarios”], Revista Derecho del Estado, No. 48, 2021; Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes and María Paula Saffon, “Derecho a la verdad: Límites y potencialidades de la verdad judicial” [“The Right to the Truth: Limits and Potential of the Judicial Truth”], in Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes et al. (eds), ¿Justicia transicional sin transición? Verdad, justicia y reparación para Colombia, Dejusticia, Bogotá, 2006.
133 Luis Felipe Henao, “Los avances de JEP frente a la justicia ordinaria” [“The Progress of the SJP Compared with the Ordinary Justice System”], El Espectador, 23 February 2021; Felipe Morales Sierra, “¿Qué ha pasado en la JEP en sus tres años de existencia? Expertos analizan” [“What Has Happened to the SJP in its Three Years of Existence? Experts Analyze”], El Espectador, 27 November 2021; “El 76% de casos por falsos positivos quedaron en la impunidad” [“76% of False Positive Cases Remain Unpunished”], Caracol Radio, 2021; “JEP: secuestros, tortura y violencia sexual, la histórica imputación a la antigua cúpula de las FARC en Colombia” [“SJP: Kidnappings, Torture and Sexual Violence, the Historical Indictment of Colombia's Former FARC Top Leadership”], BBC News, 29 January 2021, available at: www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-55850699.
134 UN, United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2021/603, 25 June 2021; UN, United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2021/1090, 27 December 2021; UN, “Bachelet aplaude los avances en la investigación de los “falsos positivos” en Colombia que ascienden a más de 6400” [“Bachelet Applauds Progress in the ‘False Positives’ Investigation in Colombia, which Totals More than 6,400”], Noticias ONU, 19 February 2021.
135 UN Doc. S/2021/603, above note 134.
136 “Fiscal de la Corte Penal Internacional destaca avances en los macrocasos de la JEP” [“ICC Prosecutor Highlights Progress in SJP Macro-Cases”], Prensa JEP, 2022.
137 Ibid.
138 M Bergsmo (ed.), above note 28.
139 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decision No. C-080, above note 30.
140 Cooperation Agreement between the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC and the Government of Colombia, 28 October 2021.
141 Ibid.
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