‘FOR THEMISTOCLES OF PHREARRHIOI, ON ACCOUNT OF HONOUR’: OSTRACISM, HONOUR AND THE NATURE OF ATHENIAN POLITICS

Abstract

This article offers a new interpretation of the Athenian institution of ostracism and explores its significance for our understanding of democratic politics. A popular scholarly trend interprets ostracism as an instrument for pursuing (or regulating) conflict among aristocratic politicians, in accordance with a view of Athenian democracy as dominated by a restricted elite competing for power and prestige. This article aims to reassess this picture by investigating ostracism in the light of recent studies of honour, which have stressed honour's potential for balancing competition and cooperation within communities. By using the ostracism of Themistocles as a case study, it argues that ostracism was a manifestation of an institutionalized concern for honour in Athenian democracy. On the one hand, ostracism could punish politically active citizens who, in excessively enhancing their own honour, failed to respect democratic equality. On the other, it could be employed for tackling shameful behaviour which placed the agent below the community's standards of honour. The article then sets ostracism against Athens’ broader institutional framework and argues that Athenian democracy was not so much concerned with policing intra-elite conflict as much as it was designed to foster a balance between competitive and cooperative values and ensure broad participation in the political domain.

Around 470 b.c. the Athenians ostracized Themistocles, son of Neocles, of the deme of Phrearrhioi.² Themistocles went into exile to Argos, and ended his days in the Persian empire to escape a later conviction for treason (Thuc. 1.135–8; Diod. Sic. 11.54–60; Plut. Them. 21–9). Among the ostraka against Themistocles discovered in Athens, one is inscribed with an interesting comment: ‘this ostrakon is for Themistocles of Phrearrhioi, on account of honour (Θεμισθοκλ|εῖ τόδε ὄστ|ρακον [Φ]ρεα|ρίωι [τ]ιμ|ε̃ς hέν̣ε|κα)’ (Kerameikos 8463).³ This comment is paralleled in several sources which suggest that Themistocles’ ostracism was intimately connected with Athenian attitudes towards honour (Kerameikos 7262; Hdt. 8.124–5; Dem. 23.205; Plut. Them. 22). The significance of this evidence, however, has mostly been overlooked. Instead, Themistocles’ ostracism is usually interpreted as the outcome of factionalism between Themistocles and the Alcmeonids,⁴ in accordance with a picture of Athenian democracy as dominated by a restricted group of elite politicians competing for power and prestige.⁵ This article uses the case study of Themistocles to argue that ostracism as an institution aimed to enforce appropriate behaviour in matters of honour on the part of politically active citizens. By reassessing the role of competition in the rationale of ostracism in accordance with recent studies of honour, it will shed new light on the nature of democratic politics in Classical Athens.

The procedure of ostracism is well known. During the sixth prytany of each year, the Assembly voted on whether to hold an ostracism. The Athenians would then carry out the ostracism in the eighth prytany. Each voter would write the name of a fellow citizen on a potsherd (ostrakon). If a quorum of 6,000 votes was met, the man with most votes would be exiled for ten years while being allowed to keep his property.⁶ The rationale of the institution, on the other hand, has long been debated. A popular scholarly trend connects ostracism with aristocratic politics and elite competition. Ostracism would have been an instrument for elite politicians to get rid of their rivals and for the polis to prevent divergences over policy.⁷ This interpretation, however, cannot account for the extreme variety of explanations of ostracism found in ancient sources, which include references to tyranny, Medism or luxurious lifestyle. An influential version of this view has been offered by Sara Forsdyke, who interprets ostracism as a ritualized form of democratic control over the politics of exile typical of archaic elite competition. Ostracism would have been deployed in periods of intense elite conflict in order to act as a symbolic reminder of the power of the people over exile.⁸ While Forsdyke convincingly stresses the existence of a ritual element in ostracism,⁹ her argument necessarily depends on the acceptance of the controversial Cleisthenic origin of the institution.¹⁰ The conflicts thought to have led to individual ostracisms are also dubiously attested. A prominent example is Cimon's ostracism, which is interpreted as the outcome of his struggle with Ephialtes.¹¹ Yet the existence of such a struggle is seriously undermined by recent studies which have compellingly challenged Ephialtes’ centrality in Athenian politics and the historicity of his divisive reform.¹²

Older views of ostracism ignored elite competition but were equally unsatisfactory. Scholars once regarded ostracism as a weapon against traitors and Medizers,¹³ or as an instrument to prevent tyranny.¹⁴ These views conflict with the fact that traitors and people suspected of aiming at tyranny could face much harsher penalties than ostracism, such as disenfranchisement and death.¹⁵ Such interpretations are also not entirely supported by the evidence. Accusations of treason and Medism feature on a series of ostraka but are never found in the literary sources, and are contradicted by the comments on several other ostraka which are unrelated to these crimes. The connection of ostracism and tyranny is supported by Aristotle and the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians. However, while the aforementioned ostraka against Medizers might amount to allusions to tyrannical aspirations,¹⁶ tyranny is never explicitly linked to ostracism in the fifth-century sources.¹⁷ This is not to suggest that this evidence is unreliable. Suspicions of treason, Medism or tyrannical aspirations may well have played a role in ostracism, but, as we shall see, they were manifestations of the institution's broader concern with honour.¹⁸

The most convincing interpretations of ostracism have been put forward by Christian Mann and by Peter Siewert. Their studies have successfully considered several contradictory explanations of ostracism found in the evidence, which encompass both the political and the social domains. Mann has argued that the dēmos viewed ostracism as a means to exert control over influential individuals and maintain equality, and has rightly noted how this institution was often interpreted by the elite as a sign of envy (φθόνος) for their success.¹⁹ Siewert has similarly proposed to view ostracism as an extrajudicial means to pressure the elite into abiding by the political, social, moral and religious norms of the community.²⁰ Yet both interpretations are problematic because they presuppose a clear-cut distinction between the values of the dēmos and those of the elite and underestimate democracy's capacity to produce ideas and values shared by the whole community.²¹

I agree that ostracism compelled politically active Athenians to abide by the social and political norms of the community, including democratic equality. However, I argue that these norms (and the φθόνος against those believed to infringe them) belonged to the broader domain of honour, which was shared by the mass and the elite. Scholars have traditionally understood honour exclusively as a scarce resource pursued through zero-sum competition.²² Recent studies across various fields, however, have been increasingly stressing how honour can equally foster cooperative values and social cohesion.²³ The model elaborated by anthropologist Frank Stewart is particularly appropriate for the Greek world. Stewart defines honour as ‘the right to be treated as having a certain worth’; in other words, a right to respect.²⁴ He distinguishes between two interconnected kinds of honour. Horizontal honour is the right to respect owing to all members of the peer group qua equals, irrespective of their individual merits. Vertical honour is ‘the right to special respect enjoyed by those who are superior’, for example the competitive honour enjoyed by virtue of individual merits.²⁵

In the Greek world, the dynamics described by Stewart belonged to the domains of τιμή and αἰδώς. Of these, τιμή referred both to the value one is attributed by oneself or others and to the esteem one is conferred by others; as an expression of one's status and esteem, it could also indicate a right, prerogative or public office.²⁶ αἰδώς denoted both the shame one feels in connection with actions and situations which compromise one's own honour and the respect one is expected to show for the honour of others.²⁷ The notions of τιμή and αἰδώς (as well as related notions such as hybris and φθόνος) expressed relations of horizontal and vertical honour. Horizontal honour is at work among peers in the Iliad, as attested by Poseidon's claim to equal honour (μ᾽ ὁμότιμον ἐόντα) with Zeus and Hades (15.184–9).²⁸ Horizontal honour within the citizen community is implied in the Mynians’ request to share in the Spartans’ prerogatives (μοῖράν τε τιμέων μετέχοντες); the Mynians mention no personal merits but recall their Peloponnesian origins, and the Spartans grant them citizenship because of their connections with the Dioscuri (Hdt. 4.145.4–5). Vertical honour is most evident in the Homeric heroes’ desire to increase their status through prowess in war.²⁹ Glaucus, for example, declares that his father sent him to Troy to be the best of all heroes and so that he would not bring shame upon his ancestors (μηδὲ γένος πατέρων αἰσχυνέμεν, Hom. Il. 6.206–10). The same is true of Athenian honorific practices. These granted honours to public benefactors through inscribed decrees and several kinds of gifts, from crowns and exemptions to the μέγισται τιμαί, which included the erection of a statue and the permanent right to be fed at public expense in the Prytaneion.³⁰

Unlike other themes, honour recurs throughout both fifth-century and later evidence on ostracism and provides a tool for constructing a comprehensive view of this institution which encompasses the conflicting explanations raised in the ancient sources. I argue that ostracism was one of several manifestations of an institutionalized concern for honour in Athenian democracy. On the one hand, ostracism could punish those who, in pursuit of vertical honour, failed to respect democratic equality. On the other, it could be employed for tackling shameful behaviour which placed the agent below the community's standards of horizontal honour. The ostracism of Themistocles provides a perfect illustration of these dynamics. Section 1 analyses the evidence connecting Themistocles’ ostracism with vertical honour and compares it with the case of Megacles. It then sets this evidence against the discussion of ostracism in Aristotle and the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians and shows how ostracism's regulation of the pursuit of vertical honour related to democratic equality. Section 2 focusses on ostracism as an instrument to prevent politicians from engaging in shameful behaviour and to enable them to maintain their horizontal honour as citizens.³¹ An ostrakon faulting Themistocles for dishonourable sexual behaviour is analysed alongside a series of ostraka against traitors and Medizers as well as Thucydides’ description of the ostracism of Hyperbolus. Section 3 investigates the centrality of honour in the formal procedure of ostracism and its significance for our understanding of Athenian politics. It sets ostracism against Athens’ broader institutional framework and shows that Athenian democracy was designed to foster a balance between competitive and cooperative values and ensure broad participation in the political domain.

1. OSTRACISM, VERTICAL HONOUR AND DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY

An analysis of ostracism and vertical honour cannot but start with the ostrakon against Themistocles ‘on account of honour ([τ]ιμ|ε̃ς hέν̣ε|κα)’ (Kerameikos 8463). Literary parallels for the expression τιμῆς ἕνεκα suggest that the ostrakon related to Themistocles’ pursuit of honour.³² The expression usually refers to the honour one could acquire for oneself or grant to others. Herodotus, for example, states that the Spartans chose the Tegeans as their neighbours in the Greek army at Plataea on account of their honour and valour (τιμῆς εἵνεκα καὶ ἀρετῆς) (Hdt. 9.28.3). Xenophon recounts a banquet at which Greek guests were expected to bring gifts for the Thracian king Seuthes. Among them was a humble Athenian, who stated that the wealthy should give to the king for the sake of honour (τιμῆς ἕνεκα) but the king should give to the poor so that they too may honour him (τιμᾶν) with gifts (An. 7.3.28).³³ Accordingly, two interpretations of our ostrakon are possible. Its author may have cast his vote on account of the honour Themistocles had already gained, or he may have ironically conferred on the ambitious politician an honour in the form of an ostrakon.³⁴ Either way, the ostrakon attacks Themistocles for his behaviour in the realm of vertical honour.

The impression that Themistocles may have been excessively eager for honour is confirmed by Herodotus. The historian recalls how Themistocles, after the Greeks at Salamis failed to honour him, immediately went to Sparta because he wanted to be honoured (ὅτι δὲ νικῶν οὐκ ἐτιμήθη πρὸς τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχησάντων, αὐτίκα μετὰ ταῦτα ἐς Λακεδαίμονα ἀπίκετο θέλων τιμηθῆναι). The Spartans honoured him greatly (μεγάλως δὲ ἐτίμησαν), and this irritated Timodemus of Aphidnae, who became crazed with envy (φθόνῳ καταμαργέων). To Timodemus’ remark that the credit for his honours belonged to Athens, Themistocles replied that he would not have been honoured if he had been from Belbina but that Timodemus had not been honoured despite being an Athenian (οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐγὼ ἐὼν Βελβινίτης ἐτιμήθην οὕτω πρὸς Σπαρτιητέων, οὔτ᾽ ἂν σύ, ὤνθρωπε, ἐὼν Ἀθηναῖος, Hdt. 8.124–5). Herodotus thus provides evidence for Themistocles’ inappropriate attitude towards vertical honour and shows that this could cause resentment in his fellow citizens.

The picture drawn in the contemporary evidence lends credibility to two later accounts where Themistocles’ ostracism is linked with vertical honour. The first is an allusion in Demosthenes’ Against Aristocrates. The speech belonged to a γραφὴ παρανόμων against an honorific decree that conferred inviolability on the mercenary Charidemus. Demosthenes recalls Charidemus’ actions against Athens to show that he deserves punishment rather than public honours (23.144–214). The orator compares the ancestors’ moderate and righteous honorific policies with the excessive and inappropriate honours the Athenians now grant to benefactors (23.196–210). Among other examples, he mentions the case of Themistocles. Despite his services to the city, the ancestors expelled (ἐξήλασαν) Themistocles when they caught him presumptuously believing to be superior to them (λαβόντες μεῖζον ἑαυτῶν ἀξιοῦντα φρονεῖν).³⁵ Demosthenes concludes that the ancestors rightly honoured Themistocles and other benefactors when they behaved worthily (χρηστοὺς μὲν ὄντας ἐτίμων) but did not yield to them when they tried to do wrong (205).

When discussing the cause of his ostracism, Demosthenes characterizes Themistocles as guilty of hybris.³⁶ This was a disposition to overvalue one's own honour in a way that potentially impinged upon the honour of others.³⁷ The expression μεῖζον φρονεῖν faults Themistocles with ‘thinking big’ (μέγα φρονεῖν), which was a regular component of hybris.³⁸ The best example comes in Herodotus. In Book 7, Xerxes declares his wish to invade Greece so as not to appear inferior in honour (μὴ λείψομαι … ἐν τιμῇ τῇδε) to his predecessors (7.8a.2) and make Persian territory coextensive with the sky of Zeus (7.8c.1–2). Xerxes’ excessive pursuit of honour troubles Artabanus, who warns the king that the god does not allow anyone but himself to think big (φρονέειν μέγα, 7.10e), and worries that Xerxes’ plan would increase hybris (τῆς μὲν ὕβριν αὐξανούσης, 7.16a.2). As a sign of hybris, Themistocles’ tendency to μέγα φρονεῖν is an indication of an inappropriate attitude towards vertical honour, and Demosthenes’ allusion to the honours the ancestors conferred on deserving benefactors (χρηστοὺς μὲν ὄντας ἐτίμων) may even imply that Themistocles’ hubristic behaviour arose as a result of his honours.³⁹

The second account connecting the ostracism of Themistocles to his attitude towards vertical honour appears in Plutarch's Life of Themistocles. According to Plutarch, when the Athenians were led by their envy (τὸ φθονεῖν) to believe the slanders against him, Themistocles repeatedly recalled his achievements to the Assembly and made himself unpopular.⁴⁰ Themistocles also angered the people when he built a temple to Artemis Aristoboule near his house, implying that he was the best advisor of the city (22.1). The Athenians thus ostracized him to curtail his dignity and prominence (κολούοντες τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχήν), as they did against all those believed to be overbearing in power and disproportionate with democratic equality. Plutarch even provides a general interpretation of ostracism. This he saw as a relief of the envy that takes pleasure in humbling those who are prominent (παραμυθία φθόνου καὶ κουφισμός) and as a form of disenfranchisement (ταύτην τὴν ἀτιμίαν, 22.3).

Plutarch's insistence on φθόνος as the cause of ostracism is noteworthy. The Greek notion of φθόνος has no univocal equivalent in English but was often related to honour.⁴¹ A common meaning was ‘envy’.⁴² Aristotle defines the envious man (ὁ δὲ φθονερός) as someone who feels pain at the (deserved or undeserved) good fortune of others (Eth. Nic. 1108a35–b6; cf. Rh. 1386b11–12).⁴³ As such, φθόνος can be felt against those who are honoured. Herodotus recalls how some Persian allies were envious of Artemisia because she was held in the highest honours by the King (φθονέοντες αὐτῇ, ἅτε ἐν πρώτοισι τετιμημένης διὰ πάντων τῶν συμμάχων, 8.69.1). Demosthenes’ Against Leptines warns the Athenians that they would appear envious (φθονερούς) if they abolished the honours due to public benefactors (Dem. 20.10).⁴⁴ Another common meaning of φθόνος was ‘indignation’.⁴⁵ This emotion was often (though not exclusively) felt against those guilty of hybris. The most notable example is Demosthenes’ Against Meidias, a case of public action for hybris, where Demosthenes invites the judges to feel indignation towards Meidias’ hubristic actions (μῖσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ ὀργή⋅ τούτων γὰρ ἄξια ποιεῖς, 21.196).⁴⁶ In Euripides’ Electra, the heroine is ashamed of committing hybris against the dead Aegisthus because this could cause indignation (αἰσχύνομαι … | νεκροὺς ὑβρίζειν, μὴ μέ τις φθόνῳ βάλῃ, 900–2).

Plutarch's reference to φθόνος, therefore, connects the ostracism of Themistocles with his pursuit of vertical honour.⁴⁷ But is Plutarch's account trustworthy? The biographer may have inferred the cause of Themistocles’ ostracism from Herodotus, whom he acknowledges as his source several times throughout the Life.⁴⁸ Plutarch's account, however, is supported by a passage in Aristophanes’ Knights. The Sausage-Seller claims that his rival demagogue, the Paphlagonian, would organize a revolt if Demos were to try to ostracize him (847–57). Significantly, ostracism is suggested after the Paphlagonian has been bragging to the Assembly about his honours (763–6), his victory at Pylos (843–6) and his services to the city (773–6) and has been reproached for boasting to be greater than Themistocles (810–19). While we cannot completely rule out the possibility that Plutarch may have modelled his account on this passage,⁴⁹ Aristophanes provides further fifth-century evidence that indignation against a boastful politician was perceived as an appropriate reason for ostracism.

Themistocles was not the only Athenian whose ostracism can be connected with φθόνος and vertical honour. A notable parallel is provided by Megacles, son of Hippocrates, an Alcmaeonid ostracized in 487/6 b.c. ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.5) and possibly a second time around 470 (Lys. 14.39).⁵⁰ φθόνος figures prominently in an allusion to Megacles’ ostracism in Pindar's Seventh Pythian, which celebrates Megacles’ victory in the four-horse chariot race at the Pythian Games in 486 b.c., shortly after his first ostracism. After listing Megacles’ victory alongside the Panhellenic victories of his ancestors, Pindar laments that their beautiful deeds are repaid with envy (φθόνον ἀμειβόμενον τὰ καλὰ ἔργα, 7.14–19).⁵¹ The poet implicitly connects the ostracism of Megacles with the Athenians’ φθόνος for his family's successes in horse-racing.⁵² In adopting Megacles’ point of view, he employs φθόνος with the meaning of envy. In other words, he accuses the Athenians of failing to grant Megacles the honour he and his family had rightfully acquired through their agonistic merits.⁵³

From the Athenians’ point of view, the same φθόνος could refer to their indignation provoked by Megacles’ inappropriate pursuit of vertical honour. This is illustrated by a series of ostraka dating to 471 b.c. where Megacles is criticized for his practice of horse-breeding.⁵⁴ In addition to reinforcing Pindar's connection of Megacles’ ostracism with his family's involvement in horse-racing, these ostraka express indignation towards luxury and conspicuous consumption.⁵⁵ Horse-breeding was a typical elite activity and was often associated with inappropriate attitudes towards honour. In Thucydides, Alcibiades brags to the Assembly about his Olympic victory in 416 b.c., when he entered the extraordinary amount of seven chariots, and claims the honour deriving from such deeds (νόμῳ μὲν γὰρ τιμὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα); he expects the envy of his fellow-citizens (τοῖς μὲν ἀστοῖς φθονεῖται φύσει) and states that it is fair for one who thinks big not to be equal with his peers (οὐδέ γε ἄδικον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονοῦντα μὴ ἴσον εἶναι, 6.16).⁵⁶ Strepsiades, the rustic protagonist of Aristophanes’ Clouds, associates horse-breeding and luxury with the arrogance of the elites. He complains that his son, Pheidippides, is squandering his money on horses, and blames this passion on Pheidippides’ mother (59–74). A descendant of Megacles, she is described as ‘haughty, luxurious, and Coesyrafied’ (σεμνὴν τρυφῶσαν ἐγκεκοισυρωμένην, 39–55). ἐγκεκοισυρωμένην is a neologism based on the name of Megacles’ rich and haughty mother, Coesyra, and alludes to her hubristic disposition to think big (κοισυρεῖσθαι τὸ μέγα φρονεῖν, Schol. Ar. Nub. 46a Holwerda).

The fact that Pindar and several ostraka conceptualized ostracism in terms of, respectively, unjustified and justified φθόνος against Megacles for his involvement in horse-riding shows that ostracism was concerned with regulating the pursuit of vertical honour.⁵⁷ This view is confirmed by the theoretical analyses of ostracism in Aristotle's Politics and in the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians. Aristotle's Politics first mentions ostracism in Book 3 when discussing the circumstances when it is admissible for an individual or a group to hold absolute power (1283a42–1284b34).⁵⁸ Aristotle examines an abstract scenario in which several political actors each claim access to power on account of different qualities, such as virtue, nobility of birth, wealth or free status. If a claimant possesses a quality to an extent superior, yet comparable, to those of other claimants, then it would not be right for him to exercise absolute rule. If instead there is one person or group who completely surpasses everyone else in virtue, this person or group will be as a ‘god amongst men’; they would suffer injustice if they were deemed equal (ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων) and it would be right for them to hold absolute power (1284a4–34).⁵⁹

It is at this stage that Aristotle introduces a digression on ostracism. The philosopher states that the purpose of ostracism is to preserve the democratic principle of equality (τὴν ἰσότητα) against the threat of powerful individuals (τοὺς δοκοῦντας ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει) (Arist. Pol. 1284a18–24), and explains that ‘ostracism has in a way the same effect as docking off the outstanding men (τῷ κολούειν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας) by exile’ (1284a36–8; transl. Rackham).⁶⁰ If we look at this passage with an eye to Aristotle's ethical theory, it is evident that his combination of ostracism with equality implicitly connects this institution with honour.⁶¹ In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains that the equal (τὸ ἴσον) is, together with the lawful, a fundamental component of the just (1129a31–1129b). Equality is involved in a specific kind of justice, which Aristotle labels ‘distributive justice’ (τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον). This is the kind of justice which distributes honour, wealth and all other goods that can be divided among the members of the state (τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας), and the philosopher specifies that this distribution can be unequal or equal (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, 1130b31–2).

In understanding ostracism as a democratic instrument to preserve equality, Aristotle implicitly characterizes this institution as concerned with the distribution of honour within the community. Any individual who pursues vertical honour, in other words, needs to be respectful of the horizontal honour of the other members of the community.⁶² This is confirmed in Book 5 of the Politics, where Aristotle mentions ostracism in his discussion of στάσις and constitutional change. The philosopher first analyses the origin of στάσις, which lies in people's feelings about equality and inequality. While some people enter στάσις because they desire equality, others do so because they want to be unequal and superior (1302a24–32). Aristotle then investigates the objects for which political actors wage στάσις. These are gain and honour (κέρδος καὶ τιμή), because people engage in factional strife to acquire them or avoid their opposites (1302a32–4).⁶³ Finally, he examines the particular causes of στάσις. These are the specific circumstances that lead στάσις to arise, and include, among others, honour (τιμήν) and excessive predominance (ὑπεροχήν, 1302a35–b6).⁶⁴

The discussion of ὑπεροχή prompts a short digression on ostracism (Arist. Pol. 1302b16–20; transl. Rackham):

Excessive predominance (δι᾽ ὑπεροχήν) causes faction, when some individual or body of men is greater and more powerful than is suitable to the state and the power of the government; for such are the conditions that usually result in the rise of a monarchy or dynasty (μοναρχία ἢ δυναστεία). Owing to this in some places they have the custom of temporary banishment (ὀστρακίζειν), as at Argos and Athens.

Just as in Book 3, Aristotle connects ostracism with ὑπεροχή. Here, however, ostracism is not only an instrument to preserve equality but also a tool to prevent στάσις and constitutional change, as superior people could try to give rise to a monarchy or to an extreme oligarchy. ὑπεροχή, as a cause of στάσις, is distinguished from τιμή, which causes faction when people ‘see other men in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share (τοὺς μὲν δικαίως τοὺς δ᾿ ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας) of [honour]’ (1302a39–b3; transl. Rackham). Superiority is again discussed alongside honour as one of the causes of ostracism later in Book 5. There, Aristotle restates ostracism's function as an instrument to prevent στάσις (Arist. Pol. 1308b11–21; transl. Rackham, adapted):

But it is a policy common to democracy and oligarchy and to monarchy, and every form of constitution not to raise up any man too much beyond due proportion (μήτ᾽ αὐξάνειν λίαν μηθένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν), but rather to try to assign small honours and of long tenure or great ones quickly (μικρὰς καὶ πολυχρονίους διδόναι τιμὰς ἢ ταχὺ μεγάλας) (for officials grow corrupt, and not every man can bear good fortune), or if not, at all events not to bestow honours in clusters and take them away again in clusters, but by a gradual process; and best of all to try so to regulate people by the law that there may be nobody among them specially superior in power (ὥστε μηθένα ἐγγίγνεσθαι πολὺ ὑπερέχοντα δυνάμει) due to friends or wealth, or, failing this, to arrange for their expulsion abroad.

Aristotle here associates ὑπεροχή and excessive τιμαί as factors that ‘raise up any man beyond due proportion’ (μήτ᾽ αὐξάνειν λίαν μηθένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν). The philosopher treats ὑπεροχή and τιμή as two related, yet distinct, causes of στάσις, and only associates ὑπεροχή with ostracism. However, there are several reasons to think that honour is central to Aristotle's view of ostracism in both passages from Book 5. Aristotle believes that the origin of στάσις lies in people's feelings about equality and inequality (Pol. 1302a24–32). Issues of equality, as we have seen, belong to the domain of distributive justice, which deals with the distribution of honour within the community. Moreover, στάσις, even when caused by ὑπεροχή, involves τιμή as its possible object, because, as Aristotle had previously explained, people engage in faction to obtain honour or avoid dishonour. As an instrument to prevent στάσις, ostracism is thus implicitly connected with the distribution of honour within the community.

Aristotle's remarks on ostracism and constitutional change are echoed in the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians and suggest that its author too connected ostracism with the distribution of honour within the community.⁶⁵ According to that work, ostracism had been instituted owing to the suspicion against those in positions of power (διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν), because Pisistratus had made himself tyrant when he was a popular leader and a general (δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγὸς ὢν τύραννος κατέστη, 22.3).⁶⁶ The author of the Constitution of the Athenians adds that for three years the Athenians kept ostracizing the friends of the tyrants but then started to ostracize ‘any other person who seemed to be too great’ (τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τις δοκοίη μείζων εἶναι, 22.6; transl. Rackham). The passage is reminiscent of the Politics, where Aristotle connected ostracism with the need of democracies to prevent the rise of a monarchy or an extreme oligarchy (μοναρχία ἢ δυναστεία) owing to the superior power of an individual or a group (ὅταν τις ᾖ τῇ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ εἷς ἢ πλείους, 1302b16–20). Aristotle's influence is even more evident from another passage in the Politics which argues that tyrannies once used to arise when the same person became both a popular leader and a general (ὅτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγός, 1305a8–10).⁶⁷ The author of the Constitution of the Athenians thus plausibly shares Aristotle's view that the establishment of a tyranny, just as any cases of constitutional change, is motivated by a desire to pursue vertical honour (as well as wealth).

This view is reinforced by the fact that the Greeks commonly associated tyrants with inappropriate attitudes towards vertical honour. Tyrants are often characterized as hubristic.⁶⁸ In Herodotus’ constitutional debate, Otanes, who endorses democracy, complains that tyrants perform wicked actions out of hybris and jealousy (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὕβρι κεκορημένος ἔρδει πολλὰ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα, τὰ δὲ φθόνῳ, 3.80.4). The Chorus in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King states that ‘hybris breeds the tyrant’ (ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον, 873), while in Euripides’ Helen the heroine is suffering hybris (ὕβριν θ᾽ ὑβρίζειν) from the Egyptian tyrant Theoclymenus (785–8). Akin to the tyrant's hybris are his love for honour (φιλοτιμία) and his desire for a larger share of material or non-material goods (πλεονεξία), including honour.⁶⁹ Both are problematic in the context of democratic equality.⁷⁰ In Euripides’ Phoenician Women, for example, Jocasta tries to dissuade Eteocles from his pursuit of tyranny (499–525) by warning him against the dangers of love of honour (τί τῆς κακίστης δαιμόνων ἐφίεσαι φιλοτιμίας, παῖ;) and by advising him to pursue equality instead (κεῖνο κάλλιον, τέκνον, ἰσότητα τιμᾶν, 531–53). In Xenophon's Hiero, Simonides states that people pursue tyranny to acquire honour (ὅμως προπετῶς φέρεσθε εἰς [τυραννίδα], ὅπως τιμᾶσθε, 7.1–2), while Hiero complains that citizens resent the tyrant for hiring mercenary troops because they believe that these are kept for the tyrant's acquisitiveness (πλεονεξίας ἕνεκα) rather than for the sake of equality of rights (ἰσοτιμίας, 8.10).⁷¹ One's desire to set himself up as a tyrant could be perceived as an infringement of his fellow-citizens’ honour. This is implicit in Aristotle's Politics, where it is said that the monopolization of political offices by the good or even the most virtuous individuals deprives all other citizens of honour (ἀρχόντων δ᾿ αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους, 1281a30–5).⁷²

The ostracisms of Themistocles and Megacles as well as the theoretical discussions in Aristotle and in the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians have shown that one aim of ostracism was to regulate the pursuit of vertical honour. The Athenians were not hostile to the enhancement of one's own honour through virtuous performance. Their eagerness to honour victorious generals and χορηγοί as well as office-holders is a clear sign of the opposite.⁷³ Yet the Athenians were expected to pursue vertical honour while respecting the horizontal honour of their fellow citizens. During the fifth century, ostracism provided a powerful instrument to enforce this notion. On a political level, it worked as a deterrent against those who appeared to be pursuing honours and offices to an extent incompatible with democratic equality. This is why the Constitution of the Athenians, within the context of Aristotle's reflection on constitutional change, could interpret ostracism as a weapon against tyranny. On a social level, ostracism policed the behaviour of the elites in pursuing their vertical honour through luxury and conspicuous consumption. Ostracism, therefore, allowed the Athenians to implement behavioural rules meant to reconcile potentially incompatible dynamics of vertical honour and democratic equality both in the political and in the social spheres.

2. OSTRACISM, HORIZONTAL HONOUR AND SHAMEFUL BEHAVIOUR

The case of Themistocles also illustrates a second function of ostracism as an instrument against individuals who engaged in shameful behaviour and fell short of the standards of horizontal honour demanded from any Athenian.⁷⁴ This is suggested by an ostrakon from the Ceramicus which reads: ‘Themistocles, the arsehole, son of Neocles’ (Θεμισθοκλε̃ς | καταπύγο̄ν | Νεοκλέο̄ς) (Kerameikos 7262). Themistocles is here called a καταπύγων, which literally translates to ‘down to arse’. Despite being often used as a generic insult,⁷⁵ the word originated as a term of abuse against people believed to indulge excessively in sexual pleasures, often with an emphasis on passive homosexuality.⁷⁶ As a result, the καταπύγων (and his fourth-century equivalent, the κίναιδος) was commonly associated with dishonour. The Sausage-Seller in Aristophanes’ Knights, for example, recalls how, while he was praying for a shameless voice (φωνήν τ᾽ ἀναιδῆ) to rival the lies of the Paphlagonian in the Council, he received an omen in the form of a καταπύγων farting on his right (μοι ἐκ δεξιᾶς ἐπέπαρδε καταπύγων ἀνήρ). The Sausage-Seller bent over in obeisance, shattered the gate of the Council House with his buttocks, and addressed the Council with the most demagogic speech (632–45). Aristophanes thus associates the behaviour inspired by the καταπύγων with the lack of shame the Sausage-Seller wished to possess.⁷⁷

One could argue that Themistocles’ characterization as καταπύγων need not be taken literally and may have been a generic insult without any sexual or dishonourable overtones.⁷⁸ Yet an excessive pursuit of sexual pleasures compatible with the character-type of the καταπύγων is implied by a fragment by Idomeneus of Lampsacus which states that Themistocles once yoked a chariot of hetaerae and drove it amongst the crowd (FGrHist/BNJ 338 F 4a–b).⁷⁹ Moreover, attacks against politicians accused of shameful sexual behaviour are not unattested in the ostraka.⁸⁰ A prominent example is an ostrakon inviting Cimon to ‘take Elpinice and go away’ (Kerameikos 1336), which has been taken as an allusion to his alleged incestuous relationship with his sister.⁸¹ By calling Themistocles καταπύγων, therefore, the author of our ostrakon associated him with some kind of shameful sexual behaviour and questioned his standing as an honourable, equal member of the Athenian community.

A series of ostraka which feature accusations of treason or Medism confirm that ostracism could be a response to perceived dishonourable behaviour. An ostrakon from the Agora, for example, dubs Callixenus a traitor ([hο πρ]οδότες, Agora 589), while an ostrakon from the Ceramicus is directed ‘against Leagros, son of Glaucon, because he committed treason’ (hότι ἐπρ̣οδίδο̄σε̣) (Kerameikos 1745).⁸² A series of ostraka against Callias, son of Cratius, similarly accuse the candidate of being a Mede (Kerameikos 321, 351, 363–4, 373, 405, 1062, 1065–73),⁸³ and are paralleled by accusations of Medism against Habronicus of Lamptrai (με̄δ|ίζοντι, Kerameikos 249) as well as against an individual, tentatively identified as Aristides, possibly addressed as ‘the brother of Datis’ (Ἀριστ[είδεν] | τὸν Δα[τίδος] | ἀδελφ[όν], Agora 56).⁸⁴

Treason and Medism were inextricably linked to shame in the eyes of the Athenians.⁸⁵ The most significant example is Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates. The speech belonged to a case of εἰσαγγελία, a procedure against individuals accused, among other things, of treason.⁸⁶ Lycurgus insists on the shameful character of treason throughout the whole speech. He defines treason as ‘the most shameful action’ (τὸ αἴσχιστον, 1.68), accuses Leocrates of feeling no shame at the walls of his fatherland (οὔτε τὰ τείχη τῆς πατρίδος αἰσχυνόμενος) while he was deserting it at the moment of need (1.17),⁸⁷ and exhorts the Athenians to punish those who dishonour and betray their country just as they honour their benefactors (ὥσπερ τοίνυν τοῖς εὐεργέταις μεγίστας τιμὰς ἀπονέμετε, οὕτω δίκαιον καὶ τοὺς τὴν πατρίδα καταισχύνοντας καὶ προδιδόντας ταῖς ἐσχάταις τιμωρίαις κολάζειν, 1.51).⁸⁸ In Euripides’ Phoenician Women, Menoeceus sacrifices himself to save Thebes because he feels that it would be shameful to betray his father, brother and city (αἰσχρὸν γάρ … | ἐγὼ δέ, πατέρα καὶ κασίγνητον προδοὺς | πόλιν τ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ, δειλὸς ὣς ἔξω χθονὸς | ἄπειμι, 994–1005). Isocrates’ Plataicus similarly stresses how the trophies of the Persian Wars bring shame upon the Thebans (τὰ γὰρ μνημεῖα τῶν τότε γενομένων αἰσχύνη τούτοις ἐστίν, 14.59) because they act as reminders of their Medism. It is, therefore, clear that accusations of treason or Medism against candidates for ostracism can be taken as an indication of the centrality of horizontal honour in the rationale of ostracism.

The connection of ostracism and shameful behaviour features also in the last ostracism in Athenian history: that of Hyperbolus.⁸⁹ As noted by Thucydides, Hyperbolus was ostracized not out of fear of his power and status (ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον) but because of his wickedness and the shame he brought upon the city (διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως, 8.73.3).⁹⁰ Yet a series of passages in Plutarch have led scholars to dismiss the importance of shame in the ostracism of Hyperbolus and interpret the event as somewhat exceptional.⁹¹ According to Plutarch, Hyperbolus persuaded the Athenians to hold an ostracism because he hoped to get rid of one person among Alcibiades, Nicias and Phaeax (Nic. 11.3–5, 11.10). In response, Alcibiades and Nicias (Nic. 11.1–8; Arist. 7.3; Alc. 13.1–7) or, alternatively, Alcibiades and Phaeax (Nic. 11.10; Alc. 13.8) made a secret pact and ostracized Hyperbolus with the help of their respective ἑταιρεῖαι. Hyperbolus, because of his lesser social standing, would not have been the intended victim of this ostracism, and this departure from the rule supposedly outraged the Athenians and led them to abandon ostracism (Arist. 7.3–4; Nic. 11.6–8).⁹²

Plutarch's interpretation of the ostracism of Hyperbolus as a misuse of the institution cannot be trusted.⁹³ His inconsistent accounts derive from the combination of several sources, which Plutarch supplements with his own views to explain the disappearance of ostracism as an institution.⁹⁴ In addition to Thucydides’ aforementioned passage, which says nothing of Alcibiades’, Nicias’ or Phaeax's role in the ostracism of Hyperbolus, Plutarch mainly relies on Athenian comedians (Plut. Alc. 13.4), Ps.-Andocides’ Against Alcibiades (Plut. Alc. 13.3) and Theophrastus (Plut. Nic. 11.10; Alc. 13.8). Yet comedians tell us nothing about the circumstances of Hyperbolus’ ostracism. Ps.-Andocides’ Against Alcibiades, which dates from the fourth century, purports to be a speech delivered before the vote which resulted in the ostracism of Hyperbolus.⁹⁵ Its speaker, usually identified with Phaeax, never mentions Hyperbolus or a pact against him but only a choice among Alcibiades, Nicias and himself as possible candidates for ostracism ([Andoc.] 4.2). The scheme against Hyperbolus was mentioned by Theophrastus, who stated that Alcibiades made a deal with Phaeax (fr. 139 Wimmer). Theophrastus, however, was active in the early Hellenistic period, when Athenian politics were more elite-centred than in the fifth century.⁹⁶ It is, therefore, safe to conclude that his interpretation of the ostracism of Hyperbolus as the outcome of a pact between two major elite politicians was influenced by the political dynamics of his time.

Alcibiades’ framing of Hyperbolus was not a fifth-century tradition but a late fourth-century invention. If one looks at the contemporary evidence without Plutarch's filter, it appears clear that the case of Hyperbolus was not an exception but fitted perfectly within the honour dynamics governing ostracism. In a fragment quoted by Plutarch (Plut. Nic. 11.6–7; Alc. 13.9), Plato Comicus claimed that Hyperbolus suffered a fate appropriate to his ways of life (τῶν τρόπων μὲν ἄξια αὑτοῦ) but inappropriate to his slave brands (τῶν στιγμάτων ἀνάξια), because ostracism had not been devised for men of his stamp (οὐ γὰρ τοιούτων εἵνεκ᾽ ὄστραχ᾽ εὑρέθη, fr. 203 K.–A.). The playwright does make a comparison, exaggerated for comical purposes, between the alleged slave Hyperbolus and the higher social standing of previous ostracized citizens. Yet the fragment also suggests that ostracism was expected to tackle exactly the kind of behaviour displayed by Hyperbolus. That this behaviour belonged to the domain of honour is clarified by Thucydides. The historian's assertion that Hyperbolus had been ostracized not out of fear of his power and status (ἀξιώματος) but because of his wickedness and the shame (αἰσχύνην) he brought upon the city does not imply that the motivations of Hyperbolus’ ostracism were unusual.⁹⁷ It illustrates two possible causes for ostracizing an individual, both of which belonged within the domain of honour, namely exceptionally prominent status and shameful behaviour, and specifies that Hyperbolus had been ostracized for the latter reason.

Thucydides’ characterization of Hyperbolus as shameful is confirmed in other contemporary sources. Andocides claimed to be ashamed to even talk about Hyperbolus (περὶ Ὑπερβόλου λέγειν αἰσχύνομαι) because of his alleged servile and barbarian origins and his job as a lamp-maker (Andoc. fr. 6 Blass). In a fragment of Eupolis’ Maricas, the Semi-Chorus asks Maricas, a comic alter ego of Hyperbolus (Ar. Nub. 551–9), why he is hanging his head (τί κέκυφας;, fr. 192.120–1 K.–A.). We do not know the context of the fragment, but Eupolis employs the verb κύπτω (‘to bend over’), which in comedies often implies shameful behaviour on the part of the agent (Ar. Eq. 1350–5, Thesm. 929–42).⁹⁸ The Chorus in Aristophanes’ Women at the Thesmophoria similarly states that the mothers of useful citizens should receive honours (λαμβάνειν τιμήν τινα), while the mothers of worthless men, such as Hyperbolus’ mother, should be made to sit with their head shaven in order to shame them for begetting such children (830–46). Thucydides’ view of Hyperbolus was thus shared by his contemporaries, and suggests that the Athenians’ perception of Hyperbolus as a dishonourable politician was a significant factor in his ostracism.⁹⁹

The ostracism of Hyperbolus, seen in conjunction with the evidence of the ostraka against Themistocles and those against traitors and Medizers, shows that an important function of ostracism was to punish those politicians who, because of their shameful behaviour, fell short of the standards of horizontal honour to which all Athenian citizens, as equal members of the community, had to abide. If they were suspected (or persistently accused) of engaging in dishonourable sexual behaviour or of betraying the polis, or, like Hyperbolus, were considered shameful and dishonest, Athenian politicians risked being ostracized as a result of the dishonour they had brought upon themselves and, by lessening their own horizontal honour as citizens, upon their community and their fellow citizens.¹⁰⁰

3. OSTRACISM, HONOUR AND ATHENIAN POLITICS

My analysis has shown that honour was central to the Athenians’ conceptualization of ostracism both during the lifetime of the institution and after the last instance of its use in the late fifth century. On the one hand, ostracism punished excessive pursuit of vertical honour, both on the political and on the social levels. It could target those who, like Themistocles, were seen as overly driven by φιλοτιμία in their political career, or those who, like Megacles, were believed of making an excessive display of their superior social status. Both kinds of behaviour were perceived as incompatible with the equality and the horizontal honour of the democratic community. On the other hand, ostracism could discipline Athenian politicians who were believed to indulge in shameful behaviour, such as dishonourable sexual attitudes, treason or Medism, and fall short of the standard of horizontal honour expected of any Athenian citizen.¹⁰¹

Not only was honour central in how the Athenians understood ostracism, but it was embedded in the institution itself. This is suggested by a singular aspect of the procedure of ostracism: the quorum. After a vote of ostracism had taken place, the archons counted the total number of ostraka that had been cast. If this number was smaller than 6,000, they would declare the ostracism invalid.¹⁰² Only two other Athenian procedures required the quorum.¹⁰³ One was the law about naturalization, which stated that grants of citizenship were not valid unless they were confirmed by at least 6,000 votes in the Assembly ([Dem.] 59.89). The other procedure was the law on ἄδεια for the ἄτιμοι. As reported in a document in Demosthenes’ Against Timocrates, this forbade proposing motions regarding the restoration of rights to disenfranchised citizens (μηδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων, ὅπως χρὴ ἐπιτίμους αὐτοὺς εἶναι) unless an immunity had been voted by at least 6,000 Athenians (Dem. 24.45).¹⁰⁴ It is significant that both procedures were concerned with honour. The grant of citizenship was among the greatest honours the Athenians could confer on foreign benefactors, while ἀτιμία consisted in the partial or total loss of one's citizen rights, in other words, the loss of one's share of honour. The quorum was thus characteristic of procedures which empowered the Athenians to take important decisions on matters related to honour, and the symbolic value of 6,000 votes as representative of the consensus of the community sits well with the ritual elements of the ὀστρακοφορία.¹⁰⁵

Recognizing the significance of honour for ostracism brings about a new picture of Athenian politics. The coexistence of cooperative and competitive aspects within honour dynamics poses a significant challenge to the popular view of Athenian democracy as dominated (and destabilized) by an elite constantly competing for power and influence. Several Athenian laws and institutions attested throughout the fifth and fourth centuries were designed for policing individuals’ pursuit of honour while granting appropriate honours to those who deserved them. The Assembly and the Council granted several kinds of honours to Athenians and to foreigners who had benefitted the city, and were eager to display their gratitude through the inscription of honorific decrees.¹⁰⁶ The State funeral for the war dead similarly honoured the Athenians who had fallen in defence of the city through the erection of inscribed casualty lists and the delivery of a funeral speech.¹⁰⁷ The Athenians, however, also instituted the γραφὴ ὕβρεως. Despite being rarely attested in court speeches, this procedure was meant to prosecute anyone who displayed a hubristic disposition and disrespected the honour of others.¹⁰⁸ Ostracism, therefore, was part of a broader institutional framework which fostered a balance between competitive and cooperative values in the name of democratic equality.

The potential of honour for providing mass and elite with a shared tool for understanding ostracism suggests that we should shift our gaze from elite competition to collective democratic politics. Ostracism regulated the pursuit of vertical honour vis-à-vis the horizontal honour of the entire community. The institution was not concerned with competition within the elite as much as it aimed at creating a broad, equal platform for political participation and social recognition. This impression is even stronger if one considers the quantitative data provided by the ostraka. These show that the Athenians tended to target members of the economic elite who were active in politics, most often archons and elected officials such as the στρατηγοί.¹⁰⁹ Ostracism can, therefore, be interpreted as one of the institutional features of Athenian democracy which discouraged the establishment of a narrow political class. These included, for example, the limit of two non-consecutive terms for Councillors¹¹⁰ and, at least during the fourth century, the dispersal of political initiative to a large pool of decree proposers not limited to the elite.¹¹¹ This is not to say that the elite played no role in Athenian politics,¹¹² or that competition was absent from the political realm in democratic Athens.¹¹³ Detaching ostracism from elite competition and appreciating the centrality of complex honour dynamics in its rationale, however, is fundamental for painting a picture of Athenian democracy which grants cooperative values an appropriate weight and envisions the dēmos not as an arbiter in the internal struggles of the elite but as a political actor in its own right.