(Re)writing commentaries: Alexander on Metaphysics V 2 and Simplicius on Physics II 3

Abstract

This article presents and analyses new evidence for how Simplicius made use of Alexander of Aphrodisias for his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. Alexander’s commentary on the Physics is lost to us (except for scholia on Physics IV–VIII), but, as argued in section II of this article, we have a slightly abridged version of Alexander’s commentary on Physics II 3 in the form of his commentary on Metaphysics V 2 (Aristotle’s Physics II 3 and Metaph. V 2 are more or less identical). This allows a comparison of Alexander’s and Simplicius’ commentaries on the same Aristotelian text. In section III, it is shown that Simplicius relies much more extensively on Alexander than his explicit references indicate. In section IV, it is shown that (a) when Simplicius refers to Alexander disapprovingly, he reports reliably what Alexander said, but that (b) when Simplicius refers to Alexander approvingly and as an authority in support of his own view, he provides a tendentious interpretation of Alexander’s argument. My results help to evaluate Simplicius’ reliability as a witness to the many works of ancient philosophy for which he is our only source.

I. Introduction

Simplicius (ca. 480–560 CE) is the most important Neoplatonic commentator on Aristotelian works. The history of philosophy relies on his testimony for Presocratic, Platonic and Peripatetic philosophy to a greater extent than on almost any other indirect source. ¹ Looking, for instance, at Parmenides and Empedocles, two of the most important thinkers of the early phase of Greek philosophy, our knowledge of their work is in large part based on Simplicius’ quotations from it. In the case of Parmenides, our knowledge of his philosophy and thought on being is virtually based on Simplicius’ quotations (161 lines in total) from his poem; ² in the case of Empedocles, we owe the most crucial parts of his On Nature ³ to Simplicius’ extensive quotations.

In addition, Simplicius is often our only source for important figures of the later history of philosophy, such as his eminent commentator-predecessor Alexander of Aphrodisias (second to third century CE). Simplicius gives us indirect access to several of Alexander’s commentaries which he used when writing his own, but which are lost to us today. ⁴ Indeed, we know well that Simplicius made ample use of Alexander’s commentaries. Numerous references to him in Simplicius’ commentaries attest to that. ⁵ However, we do not really know in which ways and to what extent Simplicius relied on Alexander. Compared to the cases of Parmenides and Empedocles, where the hexametric form clearly marks beginning and end of a quotation, it is much harder to get a sense of how Simplicius excerpted from Alexander by relying solely on his explicit references to ‘Alexander’. In this situation, it would help if we had a commentary by both commentators on the same Aristotelian work. Yet all of Alexander’s commentaries on Aristotelian works on which we also have a commentary by Simplicius are lost. ⁶ There is thus no possibility of comparing Simplicius’ comments with Alexander’s. That we cannot assess Simplicius in this regard is troublesome, to say the least, because he is often our only source for Alexander’s comments, and we cannot be sure how trustworthy a source he is for his predecessor’s work.

That we do not have Simplicius and Alexander on the same Aristotelian work is unlikely to be coincidence. Rather, it is the result of a selection process during the transliteration period (from majuscule to minuscule) in the ninth century CE. ⁷ Given that Simplicius incorporates many of Alexander’s comments, the copying and hence preservation of Simplicius’ commentary likely seemed sufficient, even economical, for saving the ideas of both ancient commentators. ⁸ Indeed, the idea that the existence of Simplicius’ commentary appeared to make the preservation of Alexander’s commentary on the same work unnecessary corroborates the claim (to be evaluated in this article) that Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics is the result of a process of rewriting and expanding of Alexander’s commentary. ⁹ Yet we still do not really know what rewriting means in Simplicius’ case.

The claim that Simplicius’ commentary (like ancient commentaries more generally) is the result of his rewriting of earlier commentaries is not new. ¹⁰ In his 2008 book on Simplicius’ and Philoponus’ commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics, Pantelis Golitsis points out that Simplicius constantly dwells on Alexander’s commentary and suggests that if we had Alexander’s commentary in integral form, we would be able to see many more loans in Simplicius. ¹¹ But since we do not have an integral piece of Alexander’s commentary (one might continue the argument), we cannot know just how much or, more precisely, what kinds of comments by Alexander Simplicius copied or reworked in his own commentary.

In 2011, Marwan Rashed published what he convincingly claims to be scholia that ultimately derive from Alexander’s commentary on books 4–8 of Aristotle’s Physics. ¹² This is potentially a big step forward in our understanding of how Simplicius used Alexander. We can now compare the text of the scholia and Simplicius’ corresponding comments to draw at least some conclusions about Simplicius’ working method. ¹³ Yet, as Rashed makes clear, scholia are by nature reworked and impoverished bits and pieces of Alexander’s original commentary. ¹⁴ And since their purpose is to give a short digest of Alexander’s comments on a particular issue in Aristotle’s text, they fail to provide a reliable picture of a continuous piece of commentary and the argument developed therein. But to understand better how Simplicius worked, we would need to see how, for at least the length of an entire lemma section or even for the length of a chapter, he adopts and/or changes Alexander’s comments on that lemma or chapter. Thus, with the scholia, we are still a far cry from having a section of integral commentary.

As I will show, the situation is not so dire, as we do in fact have something that comes close to a piece of integral text from Alexander’s Physics commentary, though none of the scholars mentioned so far have acknowledged this or made use of it. I will argue that we have a slightly abridged version of Alexander’s commentary on Physics II 3 in the form of his commentary on Metaphysics V 2. ¹⁵ Why did Alexander copy his own commentary? Because Aristotle, in the second chapter of his discussion of metaphysically relevant terms, Metaphysics V, copied his own exposition of the different meanings of ‘cause’ (aition) from Physics II 3. ¹⁶ And so Alexander did the same in his commentary on Metaphysics V 2, and took over his comments on Physics II 3 with only a few and, as I will claim, clearly identifiable changes.

If this is true, then we can for the first time compare an integral piece of Alexander’s commentary on an Aristotelian work, the Physics, with Simplicius’ commentary on the same text. In what follows, I will first present the case and justify the claim that Alexander’s commentary on Metaphysics V 2 is in fact a slightly abridged version of his commentary on Physics II 3 (section II). Then, by means of examples I will provide a comparison between Alexander’s and Simplicius’ comments. My aim is to determine how Simplicius used Alexander and to identify patterns of his behaviour as a commentator. I will distinguish two kinds of reference: undeclared adoptions from Alexander’s commentary (section III) and declared adoptions or explicit references (section IV). Comparing both kinds of adoption with Alexander’s original comments sheds new light on Simplicius’ working method.

II. An abridged copy of Alexander’s On Physics II 3

Alexander prefaces his comments on Metaphysics V 2 by stating that what Aristotle says here is identical to what he says in Physics II 3. ¹⁷ He then states the consequence that follows for him as a commentator on both works:

The meaning of the first sentence is straightforward: Aristotle’s Metaphysics V 2 is identical to Physics II 3. The meaning of the second is less clear. As my translation shows, I take it to announce that Alexander transfers his own commentary on Physics II 3 into his Metaphysics commentary ad loc. ¹⁹ This understanding needs some justification and further clarification.

First the justification. The word διὸ marks the sentence as a consequence of the preceding statement. Aristotle copied his text from the Physics to the Metaphysics, and therefore Alexander needs to react in a certain way (μϵτϵνϵκτέον, ‘one must transfer’). ²⁰ The following καὶ (left untranslated by Dooley) is important. It means ‘also’ and highlights the action that must be taken as similar or at least related to the action that Aristotle took when he copied his own text. The prepositional phrase ἐξ ἐκϵίνων is the trickiest part of the sentence. Let us first look at the verb form at the end of the sentence: μϵτϵνϵκτέον literally means ‘one must transfer’. The thing transferred is expressed by the accusative τὴν ἐξήγησιν. Alexander typically uses ἐξήγησις to denote his own or someone else’s explanation of an Aristotelian (or other philosophical) text or problem. ²¹ What remains then is the phrase ἐξ ἐκϵίνων. The demonstrative pronoun ἐκϵίνων (‘these’, in the genitive) most naturally takes up ‘what is said in book II of the Physics’ from the previous clause. But why ἐξ? One might want to take it as denoting the place from which (ἐκ-) the exegesis needs to be transferred. ²² This understanding, however, faces two obstacles. First, what would it mean to ‘transfer the interpretation from (the things said in) Physics II’? This is odd, because the explication of Physics II is not exactly to be transferred from Physics II itself. To make this reading work, one would need to regard the phrase ‘from Physics II’ as shorthand for ‘from our exegesis of Physics II’. And it is possible that this is what Alexander meant to say. Second, Alexander does not typically construe the verb μϵταφέρϵιν with ἐκ, denoting the place from which something is transferred. He instead uses the prepositions ἀπό and ἐπί to indicate where something is transferred to and from, respectively. ²³ To adhere to this reading, one would need to excuse his use of ἐκ here as an exception justified by the specific kind of transfer (namely, of words) ‘out of’ another commentary. As an alternative to the understanding of ἐκ- as denoting the origin of the transfer, one could take it as reinforcing and repeating the ἐξ- in ἐξ-ήγησιν. Then ἐξ ἐκϵίνων would simply denote the subject of the explication, that which is explicated. ²⁴ The phrase ἐξ ἐκϵίνων τὴν ἐξήγησιν would then simply mean ‘the explication of Physics II’. That this is what needs to be transferred makes perfect sense. Since Metaphysics V 2 is identical to Physics II 3, Alexander transfers his own exegesis of Physics II 3 to the present point in his commentary on Metaphysics V 2. ²⁵

Now for the clarification. What does ‘transfer’ entail? Does it mean that Alexander, so to speak, copied and pasted his own comments? Or did he revise them in the process? Based on the remark just analysed, we may conclude the following: the fact that Alexander makes this remark suggests that he simply copied his comments without rephrasing them. He stresses that Aristotle uses the same words (αὐταῖς λέξϵσι) in both chapters and then draws from that the consequence (διό) that he too (καί) will transfer his remarks, most likely also using the same words. In addition, and as we will see shortly, Simplicius’ quotations of Alexander’s Physics commentary coincide word for word in several passages with Alexander’s comments in his Metaphysics commentary. This indicates that Alexander overall did not rephrase or revise his comments in transferring them.

Still, there are a few points where Alexander must have made some adjustments when transferring his comments into the Metaphysics commentary. First, he made a few minor changes at the beginning of the section. In the early section of the comments on Metaphysics V 2, we find an embedding into both the Physics context and the Metaphysics context. ²⁶

In addition, there is one longer passage that Alexander must have left out when he transferred his comments from the Physics to the commentary on the Metaphysics. In in Phys. 310.31, Simplicius refers to Alexander as the source for the thought paraphrased in 310.31–311.37. This comes after a paraphrase of Alexander’s comments (310.23–31) that overlaps with the corresponding lines of in Metaph. 349.6–16 (see section IV.i.1 below). In this case, we might readily assume with Carlo Natali that Alexander, when copying, only kept the first part of his commentary on the formal cause and left out his extensive discussion of how nature produces irrationally, because that discussion makes perfect sense in a commentary on the Physics, but is less well-suited to comments on the ‘handbook of terms’ presented in Metaphysics V. ²⁷

To conclude this section, Alexander’s commentary on Metaphysics V 2 is a reliable but slightly shortened copy of his own commentary on Physics II 3. Alexander made changes to make the text fit by adjusting the references at the beginning of the commentary section and by cutting out one longer section that he deemed irrelevant for the Metaphysics context. He did not, however, change or rephrase his former comments in any extensive way. This conclusion underlies my following comparison of Simplicius’ commentary on Physics II 3 and Alexander’s commentary on Metaphysics V 2 (= Alexander’s commentary on Physics II 3) and the results that I draw from this comparison.

III. The unacknowledged Alexander in Simplicius

Before Rashed’s edition of the scholia we could not know how much of Alexander was in Simplicius. We had numerous references by Simplicius that marked passages as containing Alexander’s comments, ²⁸ but we could not know how many unacknowledged passages there were. Rashed provides evidence that there is much more of Alexander in Simplicius than the acknowledged passages indicate. ²⁹ Yet, since the scholia are often only brief extracts and do not represent entire commentary sections, we could not really know how much of Alexander’s comments Simplicius incorporated. The situation is now significantly improved, given that we have both commentators’ work on Physics II 3. The following examples can help us better understand how Simplicius worked with Alexander.

i. Unacknowledged Alexander as a starting point for Simplicius’ exegesis

There is indeed much unacknowledged Alexander in Simplicius. Based on my comparison of the two commentary sections, Simplicius used Alexander’s commentary as the basis for his own. In other words, it seems that Simplicius composed his commentary not by excerpting here and there from Alexander’s, but instead by first copying and slightly rephrasing Alexander’s comments, before adding his own exegesis in response to Alexander. ³⁰

1. The beginning of the commentary on Physics II 3

Alexander and Simplicius start out with comments on the following Aristotelian text (Ph. II 3, 194b23–26): ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἴτιον λέγϵται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίγνϵταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη (‘In one way, then, that out of which a thing comes to be and which is inherent, is called a cause, for instance, the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl and the genera of these’). ³¹

Here are their comments:

Alexander starts off by condensing Aristotle’s phrase τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίγνϵταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος (‘that out of which a thing comes to be and which is inherent’) into the term hulē. Simplicius adopts this, using a slightly different formulation (τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ ὑλικὸν καὶ ὑποκϵίμϵνον). Next, Alexander explains the term ἐνυπάρχοντος as distinguishing the material cause from other things ‘out of which’ something comes to be, like privation (στέρησις) and its contrary (τὸ ἐναντίον), but which are not inherent (ἐνύπαρχον). Simplicius makes exactly the same comparison with privation (leaving aside the contrary) but presents it somewhat differently.

Alexander further compares the material cause with the efficient cause, the former being inherent in the thing caused, the latter not. He refers to what Aristotle said elsewhere (namely in Metaph. V 1, 1013a7–8, as quoted by Alexander in 348.32). Simplicius takes over from Alexander the comparison of the material cause with another cause, but chooses the formal instead of the efficient cause. ³³ Then Simplicius, deviating from Alexander, adds that Aristotle discusses the material cause first, because earlier thinkers mostly referred to this cause. Finally, Alexander comments on καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη (‘and the genera of these’) by spelling out what it means in the case of matter. Simplicius follows closely, but expands on the examples offered.

Comparison of the two entries shows that Simplicius adopts the structure of Alexander’s commentary and his basic explanation of Aristotle’s text. Generally speaking, Simplicius adopts what Alexander says. But he does not just copy it. He reformulates and varies examples. He takes Alexander as his starting point and basis but reworks it by rethinking what Alexander says and reacting to it. One might say his comments are in close conversation with Alexander. All this happens without ever acknowledging Alexander.

2. Another beginning of a commentary section

The Aristotelian text commented on here is Ph. II 3, 195a3–4 τὰ μὲν οὖν αἴτια σχϵδὸν τοσαυταχῶς λέγϵται … (‘As there are then roughly speaking this many causes, …’).

Alexander starts off by specifying the meaning of the word σχϵδὸν (‘roughly speaking’). He states that Aristotle uses the word to signal that there are also (in addition to those just mentioned) causes that are so only accidentally. Simplicius adopts a slightly reformulated version of Alexander’s statement (without indicating his source), but introduces it as one of two options (ἢ, ‘either’). He then adds a second (ἢ, ‘or’) understanding of σχϵδὸν. That brings Plato into the picture and the Neoplatonist reading of Platonic causes (316.24–29). Simplicius’ attempt to show Plato’s presence in Aristotle’s words is part of the harmonizing impetus that runs through his work. ³⁴ Alexander’s linguistic explanation is the starting point for Simplicius: he copies it (without acknowledgement) and then adds an alternative view which then turns into a detailed exploration of causation and the interrelation of causes from a Neoplatonic perspective (see 316.23–318.25).

ii. Direct quotations without indication of Alexander as the source

So far we have looked at examples from the beginning of a commentary section, yet Simplicius may silently adopt Alexander’s comments at any point of his commentary.

1. Copying and pasting Alexander on the basics I

In his discussion of Aristotle’s remark καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβϵβηκότων ὡσαύτως (‘so too with the accidental attributes’, 195b9–10), Alexander spells out that it concerns the accidental attributes of effects, and then provides examples. These illustrate how accidental attributes of effects can, similarly to the accidental attributes of causes, be either more proximate or more remote: the accidents of this particular statue, for instance this particular red, are more proximate than the accidents of the species ‘statue’, for instance, colour.

Simplicius reproduces this passage very closely, with only minor differences in phrasing. Still, he nowhere indicates that he is copying from Alexander. The reason for this silence is evident. Alexander spells out the basics of Aristotle’s theory of causation. He adheres closely to the Aristotelian text and operates with basic Aristotelian terminology. This is an uncontroversial explication of what Aristotle means, and Simplicius wholeheartedly agrees with it. He therefore copies it, and he sees no need to acknowledge Alexander. ³⁵

To derive a rule from this case would be to suggest that any exposition in Simplicius’ commentary that reads like a close exegesis of Aristotle’s text, perhaps enriched with a few examples, may well be a verbatim or near-verbatim copy of Alexander’s commentary.

2. Copying and pasting Alexander on the basics II

On Aristotle’s words about the final cause διαφϵρέτω δὲ μηδὲν ϵἰπϵῖν αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμϵνον ἀγαθόν (‘it should make no difference whether we call it good or apparently good’, 195a25–26), Alexander comments with a citation from the Nicomachean Ethics. So does Simplicius:

Alexander quotes the opening lines of the Nicomachean Ethics to illustrate the idea that the goal of our actions is always something good, whether real or apparent. Simplicius follows Alexander and quotes the same phrases, and for the same reason. He only changes the order in which the line of thought is presented.

We may then conclude from section III that Simplicius relies on Alexander much more often and to a much wider extent than his references to Alexander by name would suggest. As the examples in section III.i demonstrate, Simplicius begins his commentary by adopting from Alexander what he finds useful: he regularly adopts Alexander’s first comments and either takes over the structure of the entire section or takes it as the starting point for his own interpretation. As the examples in section III.ii show, it is not just at the beginning of a commentary section that Simplicius adopts what Alexander says, it can happen anywhere. In any case, the direct adoptions mostly concern the basics of Aristotelian philosophy, spelling out the meaning of the text. However, it would be wrong to claim that Simplicius just copies what Alexander says in this regard. As section III shows, Simplicius is careful in his reliance on Alexander, he rephrases and reshapes the presentation of the argument. Simplicius’ commentary is written in reaction to Alexander. He relies on Alexander to explain the Aristotelian text without acknowledging Alexander as his source. I stress this point not to accuse Simplicius of plagiarism anachronistically, but to demonstrate that Alexander’s commentary, though often hidden, is ubiquitous in Simplicius’.

IV. Alexander as a named authority in Simplicius

Let us then turn to those places where Simplicius makes a point of his reliance on Alexander. Here, it is not about discovering how much hidden Alexander there is in Simplicius. Instead, comparing Simplicius’ acknowledged borrowings with Alexander’s text will help us to understand how trustworthy Simplicius is in his references. This means on a basic level whether Simplicius’ acknowledged quotations are accurate, and on a higher level whether his representation of Alexander’s arguments and views is faithful and fair. ³⁶

i. Explicit quotations

1. Alexander as a sparring partner

Let us look at the first instance where Simplicius refers to Alexander by name in his commentary on Physics II 3. In 194b26, Aristotle introduces the formal cause as τὸ ϵἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδϵιγμα (‘the form or the model’). This is what we find in the commentaries ad loc.:

Simplicius adopts Alexander’s comments on παράδϵιγμα as a term for the formal cause. He copies Alexander’s explication that Aristotle does not use the word in the Platonic sense, and then adds what that sense is. Simplicius then adopts Alexander’s explanation of παράδϵιγμα as the form towards which nature aims, which is the completion of a natural process rather than a model as it would be in the crafts. Simplicius ascribes this section to Alexander explicitly (φησὶν Ἀλέξανδρος).

After the passage quoted here, Simplicius quotes Alexander again (φησὶν Ἀλέξανδρος, 310.31) and seems to copy a longer stretch on how nature works irrationally (310.31–311.37). For this text, however, there is no equivalent in Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics. Presumably, Alexander did not transfer this section of his Physics commentary (see my discussion above, section II). In the remainder of the section (312.1–314.24), Simplicius gives an extensive discussion of, and Neoplatonic answer to, Alexander’s understanding of the formal cause, paying attention to the irrationality that the latter ascribes to nature. ³⁹

For my purposes, this example indicates that Simplicius is generally reliable in his quotations (introduced by φησὶν). Furthermore, the passage offers an answer to the question of why Simplicius refers to Alexander by name in some cases. We might say that Alexander makes a distinctive point in his interpretation of Aristotle and introduces the notion that nature, though working with a ‘model’, works irrationally. Simplicius found this position worth presenting at length and takes it as a springboard to argue extensively for his own, differing position. In a way, then, Alexander serves as a sparring partner for Simplicius. ⁴⁰

2. Different viewpoints on Aristotle’s phrasing

In the following example, Alexander criticizes a phrase in Aristotle’s text, and offers a subtle reformulation to improve the text or clarify its meaning. The phrase in question is Physics II 3, 195a23–24 τὰ δ’ ὡς τὸ τέλος καὶ τἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων (‘But the rest [are causes] in the sense of the end or the good of the other things’). Here is what Alexander and Simplicius have to say on it:

Alexander finds fault with the position of the genitive τῶν ἄλλων (‘of the other things’) and suggests a reformulation in which the genitive follows directly upon the term τὸ τέλος. This reformulation does indeed improve the text. The reading ‘the good of the other things’ is somewhat odd, simply because ‘the good’ is not a term that naturally takes a genitive. ⁴¹ Alexander’s subsequent explanation that τὸ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων is to be taken as ‘the end of the other things’, where ‘the other things’ are the things of which the end is the end, makes perfect sense.

Simplicius regards Alexander’s reformulation and explanation worthy of inclusion in his commentary, and credits them to Alexander; however, he also defends Aristotle’s text. ⁴² Simplicius does not claim that Alexander’s reading is wrong, but prefers the reading of the transmitted text, where ‘the other things’ is taken as referring to both the end and the good. Since he disagrees with Alexander on what is the best reading of the Aristotelian phrase, he needs to put a name to the differing view he reports.

The two examples discussed in section IV.i show that when quoting Alexander explicitly (φησίν ‘he says’), Simplicius is a reliable source. In both cases, he disagrees with Alexander, and uses that disagreement to sharpen his own position. Should we then conclude that Simplicius refers to Alexander mostly when he disagrees with him? ⁴³ As I will show in the remainder of this article, this conclusion is too hasty.

ii. Simplicius’ ‘harmonized’ Alexander

In his comments on the efficient cause (ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μϵταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἠρϵμήσϵως, ‘the primary source of change or rest’, 194b29–30), Simplicius argues for a Neoplatonic understanding of causation. Two aspects are important here. First, Simplicius works with Proclus’ scheme (Elements of Theology, prop. 75), ⁴⁴ according to which proper causes cannot be immanent in the things they cause. ⁴⁵ Second, the Neoplatonic theory of causation adds two causes to Aristotle’s four-cause scheme, the paradigmatic and the instrumental causes. ⁴⁶

Simplicius claims Alexander’s authority as support for his reading of Aristotle in which he argues for the non-immanent position of the true efficient cause and for the existence of the instrumental cause. Now that we can compare Alexander’s actual comments with Simplicius’ report, we see that Simplicius gives a tendentious interpretation of Alexander rather than a simple report. Additionally, Simplicius repeatedly invokes Alexander’s authority in several subsequent sections, each time providing as evidence a reading of Alexander that bends what he actually says towards how Simplicius wants to understand him.

Before looking at how Simplicius makes use of Alexander’s authority for his own reading of the text, we should take a bird’s-eye view of the corresponding passages. As we saw in section III, Simplicius relies on Alexander, unacknowledged, for the basic work of his commentary. For instance, Alexander’s exemplification of Aristotle’s addition ‘of rest’ (τῆς ἠρϵμήσϵως) in 349.28–32 can be found slightly reformulated in Simplicius 315.19–22. Simplicius places the comment not at the beginning of the commentary section as Alexander did, but after a point that is more important to him.

This more important point for Simplicius is to defend, with Alexander’s help, his own view on what counts as an efficient or ‘productive’ cause in the strict sense (τὸ κυρίως ποιητικὸν αἴτιον). Here the first of the two Neoplatonic tenets that I mentioned above comes into play, namely that the true (κυρίως) productive cause is not immanent and transcends the thing it produces. ⁴⁹ But let us first look at what Alexander says. He explains that Aristotle added πρώτη (‘primary’) to ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μϵταβολῆς to mark it as the productive cause that is μάλιστα (‘to the greatest degree’). Other productive causes are immanent and have another productive cause as their cause (249.33–35). It is important to state that Alexander does not deny those inherent causes the status of productive cause (τὸ … ἐνυπάρχον … ποιοῦν). They are just not productive in the primary sense and to the greatest degree.⁵⁰ This is what Simplicius makes of the thought: the productive cause must be separate and transcendent (κϵχωρισμένον ϵἶναι καὶ ἐξῃρημένον) from its product and if it is inherent, it is rather a formal cause. He brings in Alexander’s authority (13), by saying that he ‘agrees’ (ὁμολογϵῖ) that nature, qua being inherent, is not a productive cause strictly speaking but rather a formal cause. ⁵¹ This is not, however, what Alexander says here. ⁵² He does not describe the inherent productive cause as formal in nature. All he says is that apart from inherent productive causes there are primary productive causes that are external.

Next, the instruments. In the final sentence, Alexander mentions instruments as an example to illustrate the primary productive cause that is external (349.35–37). Instruments do not move themselves but have a primary cause of movement outside themselves. Simplicius takes Alexander’s brief illustrative remark about instruments as welcome support for the existence of an instrumental cause. For Simplicius, instruments are instrumental causes. To support his statements, he refers once more to Alexander (17), stating that Alexander concedes (συγχωρϵῖ) that instruments are causes in some way and that they are instrumental (ὀργανικόν). With this Simplicius puts a Neoplatonic concept into Alexander’s mouth that is not supported by the latter’s words. Alexander mentions instruments as an example, but he does not make them instrumental causes. ⁵³ Simplicius interprets Alexander rather than reporting what he said. And he uses Alexander’s authority to back up his own interpretation of Aristotle’s efficient cause.

This has important implications for my purposes. Simplicius might not always be as trustworthy as we tend to think. At least sometimes, he gives a tendentious version of what Alexander says in his commentary. This receives confirmation in the remainder of Simplicius’ commentary on Physics II 3. Four times in subsequent sections (see A–D in the Appendix, supplementary material), Simplicius comes back to the two interpretations that he ascribes to Alexander, namely, that the efficient cause in the strict sense must be outside and that there exists an instrumental cause. To strengthen his own interpretation, he refers repeatedly to Alexander’s approval of these two points. Alexander, on the other hand, does not even mention them in the corresponding parts of his commentary. Still, Simplicius creates the impression that Alexander discussed them extensively, and thus presents a distorted picture of Alexander’s comments and interests.

We may then say that Simplicius’ presentation of Alexander’s comments on the productive and instrumental causes ends up being misleading with regard to the content, the frequency and the importance of the topic for Alexander. The verbs that Simplicius uses to refer to Alexander’s authority (ὁμολογϵῖ, συγχωρϵῖ) are indicative in two respects. First, they signal that Simplicius does not so much quote from Alexander’s commentary as give his own interpretation of it. It becomes clear then that Simplicius is more trustworthy as a source when he uses the verbs φησί (or even γράφϵι). ⁵⁴ However, as passage A in the Appendix shows, Simplicius may use the verb φησί to express that Alexander said something, but this does not mean that Alexander really said it ad loc. or in the sense that Simplicius claims. Second, the verbs that Simplicius uses here (especially the expression ὁμολογϵῖ) may offer an explanation for how we should think about his distortions of what Alexander says. They are born out of a harmonizing impetus which shapes Simplicius’ approach to Plato and Aristotle, ⁵⁵ and may at times also extend to Alexander’s exegesis of Aristotle. In other words, Simplicius himself clearly wants to get the causes right and hence tends to read his Platonic view into Aristotle as well as into Alexander’s explanation of Aristotle. ⁵⁶ From his perspective, he only brings out what Alexander really wanted to say but did not say clearly enough.

V. Conclusion

My comparative analysis of Alexander’s commentary on Metaphysics V 2, which, I have argued, is a slightly abbreviated version of his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics II 3, and Simplicius’ commentary on the same text yields the following results. There is much more of Alexander in Simplicius than we may infer from the latter’s explicit references. In fact, Alexander’s commentary was the starting point for Simplicius’ writing. He generally adopts and adapts Alexander’s explications of the Aristotelian text and then may add his own considerations, often in direct response to Alexander. Furthermore, we can now better understand Simplicius’ working method and can better estimate how trustworthy a source he is for Alexander’s lost works. When Simplicius names Alexander, he often disagrees with him while being accurate in his reporting of what Alexander says. When he refers to Alexander approvingly, however, we should be cautious. ⁵⁷ There is clear evidence that Simplicius amplifies and even distorts Alexander as needed for his own exegesis and argumentation.