In this piece we introduce and contextualize the contributions to the special focus on the international theory of Carl Schmitt, and argue that Carl Schmitt's much neglected international thought can provide scholars of both international relations and international law with a new common multidisciplinary research platform pivotal in thinking about the present international predicaments of crisis in international order and legitimacy, of contested liberal hegemony, and of the issue of unipolarity and the emergence of new forms of warfare, such as terrorism and the ‘global war on terror’.

Carl Schmitt's Der Nomos der Erde allows us to rethink his interlinked proposals for the organization of the Weimar Republic, namely his theory of ‘democratic dictatorship’ and the ‘concept of the political’. Connecting the domestic homogeneity of an empowered people with the pluralism of the Westphalian state system, Schmitt seeks to humanize war; he objects to the renaissance of the ‘just war’ tradition, which is premised on a discriminating concept of war. Schmitt's objections are valid today, yet their Eurocentric foundations are also partially outdated. We are thus to argue with Schmitt against Schmitt to reflect on possibilities for the humanization of war.

This article focuses on the evolution of the concept of legal order in Carl Schmitt's thought and in particular on the spatial perspective he developed in his internationalist thought. In order to grasp its relevance, it is necessary to understand it in relation to the theoretical problems and concepts which underlie Schmitt's oeuvre. For this reason the first part of the article focuses on the theoretical problem of the possibility of a legal order in a plural context, trying to assess the distinctiveness of Schmitt's thought in relation to his contemporaries and to the approaches and schools of thought with which he is often associated. The second part then examines the evolution of his constitutionalist output, something which is fundamental to an understanding of his internationalist thought. The third part then focuses on his internationalist thought, and in particular on the theory of the nomos, which represents a synthesis of his whole thought.

Who shall have the power to define international terrorism? To answer this question, which means determining the international public enemy, is an eminently political task. According to Carl Schmitt, politics is essentially about determining the public enemy. When it comes to a situation of emergency, whoever is in the position to distinguish friend from enemy holds ultimate power. While Schmitt was still thinking primarily in terms of the nation-state, the determination of the public enemy has now become an international issue. To demonstrate this point, this article examines the political struggle behind the legal debate on the definition of international terrorism. This is done by comparing two debates on international terrorism, one held in the 1970s and the other in the 2000s. Both these debates had, and still have, their institutional locus in the UN General Assembly and its Legal Committee. In the 1970s the non-aligned countries tried to challenge the discretion of the West in determining the international public enemy. In the 2000s the incumbent regimes of the Third World agree with Western states that terrorism is a common threat. The main cleavage is now between the leading Western powers that would like to determine the public enemy on a case-by-case basis (the United States and the United Kingdom), and the status quo states that would like to tie these hegemonic powers by a legal definition. It is precisely the absence of such a legal definition that makes it possible for the hegemonic powers and their followers to determine the international public enemy on a case-by-case basis. A legal definition would increase the coherence of the international coalition against terrorism and serve as a limitation on the discretionary power of the hegemonic states.

The received wisdom of the times is that a wide gulf has opened up between ‘Europe’ and ‘America’ – or at least has finally become visible. A commitment to a certain vision of international law is presented as a European trait that divides Europe from the United States. ‘European’ international law premises perpetual peace on rules that protect state sovereignty and sustain a world divided into territorial states, and it is at odds with the US preparedness to wage ‘total war’ in the name of some purportedly universal ideal, such as ‘human rights’ or ‘democracy’. This conception of ‘European’, territorially based international law versus US (or Anglo-Saxon) universalism is articulated most forcefully by the extreme-right legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt in his 1950 work, Der Nomos der Erde, and related essays; Schmitt, realizing that the state had met its demise with the fall of the Nazi project that he supported, now conceived of a world divided into Grossraume rather than states. Schmitt's conception was challenged by the Marxist-Hegelian philosopher Alexandre Kojève, both in correspondence with Schmitt and in a public lecture that Kojève gave in Düsseldorf at Schmitt's invitation in the 1950s. Kojève articulated an alternative view of global order and Europe's place in it – a view that accepted global Anglo-American military supremacy while advocating a distinctive place for Latin or continental Europe in the building of global justice and prosperity through economic and legal integration and the construction of a just relationship in trade and finance with the developing world. This essay evaluates the debate between Schmitt and Kojève and draws lessons for contemporary discussion of the place of Europe in a one-superpower world.

In its judgments on the preliminary objections in the Legality of Use of Force cases, the Court held that the FRY was not a UN member in the period between 1992 and 2000. This finding is controversial, at odds with previous decisions of the Court, and has indeed attracted criticism from various judges. This article proposes a different construction of the question of the FRY's membership within the UN and reviews arguments that allow doubts to be cast on the reasoning of the Court. Because of the link between UN membership and the FRY's participation in the Genocide Convention, the Court's finding in the Legality of Use of Force cases may have some implications for two sets of proceedings still pending before the Court (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia v. Serbia and Montenegro). In the former case, an interpretation of the extent of the res judicata principle may allow the Court not to reopen the issue of jurisdiction, already decided in 1996 on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention. In the latter case, various options might allow the FRY to be regarded as a party to the Genocide Convention.

Can an occupier invoke the right of self-defence against terrorism stemming from territories which it occupies? In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory the International Court of Justice responded to this question in the negative. This article critically analyses the reasoning presented by the Court concerning the specific question of the right of self-defence, not least in the light of the fact that it was harshly criticized by a number of judges in their individual opinions and by the Supreme Court of Israel in the subsequent Mara'abe (Alfei Menashe) case. It is also suggested that the issues discussed in this article, such as state responsibility for an armed attack, the principle of effective control, and the interplay between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, loom beyond the scope of the concrete question and concern more theoretical issues of international law.

Notwithstanding estimates that 12.3 million persons today are subjected to conditions analogous to slavery, public international lawyers have almost completely ignored slavery and related institutions in recent decades. This article explores the phenomenon of forced labour in the Amazon, where anywhere between 25,000 and 100,000 people are compelled through trickery and coercion to work in subhuman conditions. After outlining the legal regime governing slavery-related practices, the author examines why the Brazilian government has failed in its efforts to secure compliance within its own borders of its obligations under anti-slavery and human rights conventions. The author then argues that holding the Brazilian state responsible and assessing monetary damages is not in fact the most effective and fair way to secure the human rights of the victims of forced labour, and that international criminal sanctions for the individual perpetrators – including prosecution in the ICC for crimes against humanity – is a viable and preferable alternative.

The UN Security Council has recently referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the International Criminal Court. This has been hailed as a breakthrough in international criminal justice. However, aspects of the referral resolution can be criticized from the point of view of their consistency with both the Rome Statute and the UN Charter. The limitations of the referral with respect to whom the Court may investigate also raise issues with respect to the rule of law. In addition, Sudan has accused the Security Council of acting in a neo-colonial fashion by referring the situation in Darfur to the Court. This article investigates these criticisms against the background of the international system in which international criminal law operates, and concludes that although the referral cannot be considered neo-colonial in nature, the referral can be criticized as selective and as an incomplete reaction to the crisis in Darfur. The referral remains, however, a positive step.

The MOX Plant and IJzeren Rijn disputes illustrate the growing problem of concurrent jurisdiction between international courts and tribunals and the ECJ. This article argues that in cases in which Community law is involved in a dispute between two EC member states, international courts and tribunals must accept the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ under Article 292 of the EC Treaty to decide these cases. However, only the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal in the MOX Plant case stayed the proceedings and requested that the parties first find out whether the ECJ had jurisdiction, whereas the OSPAR as well as the IJzeren Rijn arbitral tribunals rendered their awards despite the implications of Article 292. Thus it appears that every arbitral tribunal decides the issue of Article 292 as it sees fit. This situation, it is argued, requires the creation of some sort of hierarchy between the growing number of international courts and tribunals in order to co-ordinate and harmonize their decisions so as to avoid a fragmentation of international law.

The first ever Telders Competition was organized in 1977 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Telders International Law Students Debating Society. Student teams from the universities of Bonn, Cologne, Strasbourg, and Leiden participated. It was so successful that the competition has been held annually ever since. Nowadays it is considered to be the most prestigious and important international moot court competition in Europe. Teams from more than 40 universities compete in the national rounds, with up to 25 teams from as many European countries participating in the international rounds held in the Peace Palace in The Hague.

The case put before the teams this year combines legal issues in various fields of international law including diplomatic protection.

Sigrun Skogly, The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the IMF, London, Cavendish Publishing, 2001, ISBN 1859416659, 240 pp., £71.50 (pb).

Mac Darrow, Between Light and Shadow:The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003, ISBN 1841133906, 376 pp., £42.00.00 (hb).

Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, ISBN 0521016711, 360 pp., £19.99 (pb).