Border controls within the Schengen area are meant to be a thing of the past. Yet, since the refugee crisis of 2015, “temporary” border controls have become quasi permanent in several European Union Member States. Although these controls are against the letter and spirit of the Schengen Borders Code, the Commission has not taken any measures to enforce these rules. One of the reasons for the dismal state of the Schengen area is the one-sided focus on the abolition of internal border controls as primarily functional for the establishment of the internal market. This comes at the expense of Union citizens’ rights and disregards the fundamental role that the abolition of border controls has on how citizens see the Union in political terms and conceive themselves as Union citizens. Against this background, we argue that from its beginning the objective of the project to abolish border controls was to foster a supranational political identity of Union citizens by transforming citizens’ spatial experience. Union citizenship in the current EU Treaty framework constitutes the legal expression of that historical connection between the abolition of border controls and free movement. Emphasizing the citizenship dimension of an area without internal frontiers provides a different perspective on current controls at the Schengen internal borders.

This study analyzes empirically how 236 German court decisions assess the credibility of asylum seekers’ accounts of their persecution. In their reasoning, the courts rely on generally accepted content-based credibility criteria, including consistency, level of detail, and timeliness of the claim. But they also rely on conduct-based criteria, which have been resoundingly discredited in the relevant scientific literature. Too rarely, the courts considered confounding factors such as cultural distance or interpreter mistakes. They need to be more aware of their duty to confront applicants with negative credibility criteria. Article 4 (5) Qualification Directive played no role whatsoever in the sample analyzed in this study, which can be explained by specifics of German asylum law.

The human judgment that is required in the balancing of credibility criteria and confounding factors is problematic for its subjectivity but unavoidable. Attempts at replacing this human credibility assessment with seemingly objective technical means have led to arbitrary decisions and encroached gravely on applicants’ human rights. While the credibility assessment procedure employed in German courts is far from flawless, it can produce convincing decisions. It should be further refined and provided with safeguards to arrive at decisions that are as rational and objective as possible.

This article considers the structural barriers that exist for individuals to hold the EU responsible for violations of human rights abuses in its CSDP missions, despite the theoretical availability of a framework for remedies. This is a result of jurisdictional complications with CFSP/CDSP measures, attribution difficulties, and ambiguity in what constitutes unlawful human rights conduct. While alternative measures exist to compensate individuals for violation of their rights, these do not align with the often-stated right to an effective remedy within the EU. As such, this Article argues that the field requires serious reform in order to ensure that legal relief for individuals against unlawful conduct by the EU is an effective and enforceable right.

The two widely used dichotomies of floor/ceiling and centralization/decentralization often fail to capture the full interactions of rights in multilevel constitutional systems such as the EU or the US. This article offers a comprehensive yet straightforward classification linking rights to the division of power between the center and component states. The typology comprises three overarching categories: plurality, partial and full centrality. These categories are broken down into further subcategories and illustrated through comparative examples from the EU and the US. The typology reveals mezzanine structural levels which go unnoticed when analysis is confined to existing dichotomies. The purpose of the typology is, first, to facilitate more accurate comparisons of the EU and the US’s composite systems and make commonalities and divergences easier to identify. Second, through the ensuing clarity, it aids the normative inquiry into what level of government—the center or the state—is better suited to regulate different types of rights and to what extent. Thirdly, it reconnects the EU-US comparison with comparative constitutionalism’s Aristotelian pedigree of utilizing robust categorization as a necessary cognitive tool for maintaining rationally ordered analyses.

The Kosovo Specialist Chambers embody a remarkable project involving elements of the domestic law of the Republic of Kosovo, the EU’s external relations law, and international criminal law. The Chambers’ hybrid nature is not only unique, but also atypical in regards to its influence in Kosovo’s constitutional order. The Specialist Constitutional Chamber is one of the instances of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers sitting in the Hague. The Specialist Constitutional Chamber resembles Kosovo’s Constitutional Court on a specific, though exclusive, area of law—the law surrounding the court in general. The two courts not only exercise the same generic function—on the basis of exclusive material criteria—but also possibly parallel and compete with each other. The relationship between the “two courts” is at best explained with the term “fragmentation of constitutional jurisdiction.” While the two courts are forced to endure under the same normative roof—the Constitution—they inherently exercise often conflicting functions and protect irreconcilable ideological perspectives. The article examines the interaction between the two courts primarily in a normative and jurisdictional perspective. It also presents recent tendencies of both courts to divert in divergent pathways. The article concludes that while the two courts present an unobserved case in comparative constitutional law, they also reveal an interesting and unconventional constitutional controversy appearing in the context of a sovereign country’s relationship with international law obligations.

The recent years saw the rise in discourse to undo the liberal-democratic amendments introduced between 1999 and 2002 and restore the Indonesian 1945 Constitution to its original 1945 version. Some Indonesian public figures believe that these amendments are not legitimate, because they are deemed to have eliminated the basic values of the original 1945 Constitution which was built on the “integralist” concept as propounded by its main architect Soepomo. According to the integralist conception, the state should be seen as a family in which the government played a role as a wise father who can bring its people to the right choice. This article seeks to prove that these amendments are legitimate although they constitute a “dismemberment” of the original 1945 Constitution. This is because the original 1945 Constitution was formed only by a handful of elites in an institution established by the Japanese occupying power in early 1945. By contrast, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) who was in charge of the four amendments to the 1945 Constitution had a greater democratic legitimacy compared to the drafters of the original Constitution given that they were elected through the 1999 elections. Furthermore, the original 1945 Constitution was never intended to operate beyond the Indonesian revolutionary period, which ended in 1949. It was expected that the document be significantly changed or even replaced by the People’s Consultative Assembly through the amendment process.

As homo socius, the man lives in a community. Because the law deals with relationships between people, it is necessary to know the fundamental characteristics of these relationships, which are established in a community between people. Because all major social changes involve crowds, legislation and regulation must know how to address collectives, how they are influenced, how collective emotions are formed, and how they can effectively deal with external behavior in and between groups. This Article presents basic elements of crowds that should be included in legal decisions, especially in general ones. The Article shows potential applications of crowd elements in the law presented as a systemic arrangement of complex adaptive systems that can be reflected in the determination of public opinion through crowds. When a legal system in the right meaning of the word “system” determines public opinion and implements actions through crowds, it could be more effective and efficient and thus also more legitimate.