This article describes the evolution of IBM's effort to manage its relationships with the U.S. government from the time that Thomas Watson, Jr. became CEO. While the Watson family controlled the firm, the family members served as the main bridges between IBM and the government. This personalized approach began to give way in the 1960s, as the intensity and scope of pressure from the firm's political environment grew beyond the capability of any individual to handle. During the 1970s and 1980s, IBM constructed a managerial hierarchy, with a newly opened Washington office at its center, which could gather more detailed intelligence and execute more sophisticated political strategies. The firm's crisis in the early 1990s provoked a second major restructuring of the interface, as IBM became more of a Washington “special interest.” Yet, some traces of the Watson imprint remained, even in the Gerstner era. Tracing IBM's evolution helps us to understand better the broader interactions between U.S. firms and their environments in this period. These interactions entailed adaptation by firms to environmental change but also efforts by firms to exert control over external forces, including public policy.

This article uses a case study to illustrate the dynamics of firm structure and property rights in Brazil during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The St. John d´el Rey Mining Company was a British mining company in Brazil. Its experiences demonstrate that, property rights were not under-specified; they were over-specified and varying provisions for rights were mutually inconsistent. Precise laws protected capital investment to such an extent that dissolving partnerships became problematic. At the same time, inheritance laws mandated partible division of personal estates among heirs. The mining company's history demonstrates the opportunities for posthumously emerged heirs, essentially, to claim partnership rights.

Based on an analysis of the leading trading markets for stock in the United States, I document the dramatic expansion that took place in the scale and scope of the country's stock market from the mid-1880s to the early 1930s. My analysis suggests that a broadbased stock market was a long way from being established even by the early teens. It took the impetus provided by World War I, plus the enthusiasm of the 1920s, to bring such a market into existence. I consider the capacity of today's fashionable theories, which link the development of stock markets to improvements in minority shareholder protection, to explain the growth of the U.S. stock market, and find that they cannot account for the historical patterns that I identify. However, I suggest that there are other arguments that are worthy of further consideration. First, there were factors, besides minority shareholder rights, that led to changes in the demand for corporate stocks during this period, especially an increase in the demand for stocks by institutional investors, notably banks and insurance companies, as well as the emergence of a retail market for stocks after World War I. Second, there were also important developments in the supply of corporate stocks after the War, including the issuance of stock to fund the expansion of young firms, but especially to facilitate mergers and acquisitions by established firms, which seem to have played an important role in driving the expansion of the U.S. stock market.

Offshore development is one of the most important but least analyzed chapters in the history of the petroleum industry, and the Gulf of Mexico is the most explored, drilled, and developed offshore petroleum province in the world. This essay examines offshore oil and gas development in the Gulf of Mexico, highlighting the importance of access and how the unique geology and geography of the Gulf shaped both access and technology. Interactions between technology, capital, geology, and the political structure of access in the Gulf of Mexico generated a functionally and regionally complex extractive industry that repeatedly resolved the material and economic contradictions of expanding into deeper water. This was not achieved, however, simply through technological miracles or increased mastery over the environment, as industry experts and popular accounts often imply. The industry moved deeper only by more profoundly adapting to the environment, not by transcending its limits. This essay diverges from celebratory narratives about offshore development and from interpretations that emphasize the social construction of the environment. It challenges the storyline of market-driven technology and its miraculous ability to expand and create petroleum abundance in the Gulf.

The ‘corporate veil’ refers to the separation of legal identity between parent firms and their subsidiaries, which gives the parent protection against the liabilities of its subsidiaries. Fearing that such liability protection would facilitate illicit activity, early twentieth century courts, especially in America, would sometimes ‘pierce’ the corporate veil. This article explores Adams v. Cape (1990), in which American plaintiffs attempted to persuade the English courts to lift the corporate veil and impose liability for industrial disease on Cape Industries, a leading U.K. asbestos manufacturer. This landmark case shows how corporate strategy can be closely intertwined with international corporate law and occupational health and safety issues. It also highlights how limited liability law and separate legal personality can result in significant injustice to claimants against multinational enterprises.

Paul Rosenstein-Rodan argues that economic development requires coordinated investment in many interdependent industries, and prescribes a flood of state-controlled investment across all sectors—a so-called big push. Widespread government failure defeated twentieth-century ‘big push’ schemes. But spillovers across firms and industries, and from public goods, hold-up problems, and capital market limitations are real, and justify coordinated growth across sectors if it can be done without government failures. Large, extensively diversified pyramidal business groups of listed firms dominate the histories of developed economies and the economies of developing economies. Arguing that such groups provided this coordination in prewar Japan after a state-run big push failed, we propose that pyramidal business groups are private-sector mechanisms for coordinating big push growth, and that competition between rival groups induces efficiency unattainable in a state-run big push. We postulate that a successful business-group led big push requires economic openness, basic public goods, rule of law, separation of the state from business, and a timely demise of business groups when the big push phase is complete.Where these criteria are not met, growth stalls and oligarchic families become too powerful to dislodge.

Revolutions have important social, political, and economic consequences with which entrepreneurs have to cope to keep their businesses going. This may involve high transaction costs due to the violence that emerges as a result of armed conflicts. In this article we examine the effect that the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) had on the banking sector and ultimately on bank clients, since revolutionary policies forced most banks to close their doors from 1915 to 1921. By focusing on a major textile firm, the Compañía Industrial Veracruzana, S.A., we observe that companies used nonchartered banks, which spread in the absence of government regulation, and foreign financial institutions, so that daily business operations could continue amidst the revolutionary upheavals.

Business historians have treated the emergence of large, modern, vertically integrated meatpacking firms in the second half of the nineteenth century as the economically rational and inevitable product of the industry's search for ways to maximize profits through technological innovation, vertical integration, and the achievement of economies of scale and scope. This is only part of the story, however. Society's efforts to force the industry to abate its environmental pollution through government regulation and private lawsuits also stimulated and shaped these processes of modernization.

This article poses three main questions: Does the civil-law tradition favor large, concentrated, universal banking systems? Does this sort of legal system work against the development of active securities markets? Do powerful universal banks (whether or not legal tradition lies at the root of bank power) replace securities markets or prevent them from operating efficiently? Based on evidence from Pre-World War I Germany, this paper argues that the answer to all three questions is “no.”

This study aims at enhancing our understanding of how industrial conditions affect the choice of a firm's ownership structure. The Providence/Attleboro area was a center of jewelry production during the nineteenth century. Because of the differentiated nature of the product, the Providence/Attleboro jewelers needed to promote their products among the wholesalers in distant markets. These geographical and industrial conditions motivated the entrepreneurs to organize partnerships for ameliorating informational asymmetries and for mobilizing the capital required to achieve economies of scale in sales and production.

A growing number of historians have turned their attention to the past behavior of industrialists toward their waste. Many have argued that the price system and competition typically fostered a short-term outlook that rewarded pollution rather than encouraging “loop-closing,” a modern term that refers to the linkages between different industries in which the residual of one becomes the input of another. Others have identified precedents in this respect that are credited to Progressive Era reformers. Building on evidence that has, by and large, escaped the attention of the present generation of historical writers, this essay challenges both views by arguing that market institutions, which included both profit motive and property rights, actually resulted in the usage of industrial by-products. Although past industrial activities did create significant pollution problems, perhaps our ancestors should be given more credit than they generally are for the creativity and resourcefulness they displayed in profitably solving numerous environmental problems.

Welfare capitalism, the management ethos adopted by American business leaders in the early twentieth century, emphasizes the role of business rather than trade unions or government in taking care of its workers. This article focuses on the reasons why the United States Rubber Company (USRC), one of the four largest U.S. rubber manufacturers, promoted welfare capitalism at its rubber plantations on the east coast of Sumatra and Malaya between 1910 and 1942. In addition, this study assesses the development of USRC's system of welfare in the areas of housing, profit sharing, pension plans, health care, and recreation. This article argues that USRC's intention was not to forestall unionization (the intention of U.S.-based companies in adopting welfare capitalism), as union formation in Southeast Asia during that period was very unlikely, but to overcome labor shortages and high turnover rates and to ensure labor stability. With reduced labor costs, the availability of financial resources allowed for technical innovations and R & D, which ultimately would lead to increased productivity.

Around 1900 Britain was exceptionally suited to pioneering large scale enterprises because of the precocious development of its equity markets and London's experimentation with a more eclectic range of corporate governance techniques than the world's smaller and less cosmopolitan financial centers. Information dissemination, incentives, and reputation—developed by a serendipitous mix of legal compulsions and flexible voluntarism—set the scene for the growth of large, UK-based, national and international corporations in the twentieth century.

“The investment business is not with us as well developed or as well understood as it is in England.”

W. H. Lyon, Capitalization (Boston, 1913), 207.