Ethnic Nationalism and Support for the Black Lives Matter Movement among Black and Asian Americans

Abstract

This paper explores whether attitudes toward ethnic nationalism among Black and Asian Americans influence attitudes toward the Black Lives Matter Movement. Acceptance of a nationalist ideology typically makes an individual animus towards outgroups. Moreover, ethnic/Black nationalism is known to flare in times of perceived intense oppression. Given current racial tensions in the United States, we are interested in examining factors that may help facilitate alliance-building between Black and Asian Americans—two nonwhite groups that exist on different planks of the U.S. racial hierarchy. We begin by recounting historical and contemporary instances of Afro-Asian solidarity and conflict. This is followed by a review of past theoretical articulation and empirical research on nationalist ideology within each community. We develop a set of group-specific indicators of ethnic nationalism for Black and Asian Americans from the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey. Our results show clear evidence that being sympathetic to ethnic nationalism can unite rather than divide the two racialized communities in their attitudes toward present-day projects such as the Black Lives Matter Movement.

Introduction

Afro-Asian solidarity has a lengthy history in the United States, even though the cultural and political positions of the groups have historically been presented as “radically incommensurable” (Raphael-Hernandez and Steen 2006, 1). Discussions on solidarity between the groups almost always take place during the Civil Rights and Black Power eras, when in fact, this relationship has a longer, more intricate history (Okihiro 1994; Ho and Mullen 2008). Some of the most radical factions of the two groups, Black and Asian American nationalists, have a history of allyship (Ogbar 2001; Maeda 2005). With this in mind, we undertake an examination of Afro-Asian relations in present-day America to determine if the two groups can still find common ground for collective action.

Given the racial tensions of the early 21st century that intensified due to the COVID-19 pandemic and populist rhetoric and politicians, one might suspect that competing racial/ethnic groups would turn against one another (Hua and Junn 2021; Utych et al. 2022). There have been reports that show an increase in hate incidents against Asian Americans since 2020 (Stop AAPI Hate 2023). Moreover, Black Americans continue to face the brunt of police violence, which came to a head during the summer of 2020 after the deaths of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd. Even though Asian and Black Americans may share experiences of racial oppression, anti-Black racism among some Asian Americans, has presented, and may continue to present, a roadblock to cross-racial coalition-building (Hua and Junn 2021).

We are interested in exploring whether being sympathetic to an ethnic nationalist ideology facilitates or stymies solidarity for social change between the two groups. This may seem a counterintuitive endeavor, but prior research on Black nationalism has shown that adherents are not wholly opposed to outgroup coalition building (Brown and Shaw 2002; Spence, Shaw, and Brown 2005). Black nationalists, in particular the Black Panthers, helped inspire and create Asian nationalist organizations such as I Wor Kuen and the Red Guard Party (Maeda 2005). This leads us to hypothesize the possibility of Afro-Asian solidarity in social movement actions in the early 21st century and ask: Would Black and Asian Americans who are sympathetic to ethnic nationalist ideas support the Black Lives Matter Movement? We first recount historical instances of Afro-Asian solidarity and tension. Second, we review past theoretical articulation and empirical research on Black and Asian American nationalism. Third, we develop separate indicators of ethnic nationalism for Black and Asian Americans from the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Our research hopes to contribute to the critical dialogue of how to get along in an increasingly diverse but also divisive, unequal, and ideologically polarized society.

Possibilities and Challenges of Afro-Asian Solidarity

In a white supremacist state that institutionalizes anti-Black and anti-Asian sentiment and maintains power through the divide-n-conquer strategy, people of African and Asian descent have historically been racialized separately and had few encounters with each other. Claire Jean Kim (1999) posits that Asian Americans have been racially triangulated vis-a-vis Blacks and whites simultaneously. In the field of racial positions, Asian Americans are valued over Black Americans in terms of class achievement, but Asian Americans are seen as perpetually foreign and are ostracized from civic life. This racial logic has successfully kept Asian and Black Americans in tension, enabling hegemonic interests to exploit both minorities. Kim’s (2023) latest book centers anti-Blackness in U.S. racial dynamics and stresses how Asian Americans have benefitted from this history and structure.

While conflict, and even violence, exists between the two groups, we are interested in the ways that they have come together against the brunt of a white supremacist state and identify psychological obstacles that need to be overcome for inter-racial peace. The following section will examine the possibilities and challenges of Afro-Asian cooperation and solidarity from the late 19th century to the contemporary period.

Pre-1950 Relations

One of the earliest accounts of Afro-Asian solidarity occurred in 1867 when Fredrick Douglass vehemently defended the equal rights of the Chinese (and other Asians) to immigrate, arguing that free migration is a fundamental human right for a “composite nation” (Blackpast 2007). During the Philippine-American War (1899–1902) when Filipino nationalists fought against the illegal U.S. annexation of the Philippines, prominent Black leaders like Ida B. Wells-Barnett condemned the hypocrisy of the U.S. government for using Black soldiers to expand its territory (Thomas 2017). This anti-imperialist sentiment was shared by Black Americans as many rejected the expansionist program of the United States and viewed the war as “one phase of the larger struggle of all colored people to escape Anglo-Saxon oppression” (Gatewood 1975, 182). A structural manifestation of these attitudes, according to Gatewood, was the Black Man’s Burden Association which sought to link the experiences of Black Americans with victims of the imperial expansion of the United States.

Then, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, against the national sentiment of anti-Asianess, a host of African American journalists, intellectuals, and activists of diverse backgrounds protested the mass relocation and internment of American citizens of Japanese descent. Onishi (2017) observes that the ethos for self-determination (which triggered righteous indignation in the face of racial injustice) played a central role in forging Afro-Asian solidarity. He argues that “[t]his nexus between the local and global dimensions of racism impacted the consciousness of both Blacks and Asians and brought them closer together” (343).

1950s to Early 1970s Relations

The global impact of white supremacy on people of color continued to be a point of cohesion among people of African and Asian descent. When the U.S. military entered the Korean peninsula in 1950, African American activists espoused the same anti-imperialist rhetoric that fueled opposition to the Philippine-American war. When Korean-born pro-Independence activists faced deportation for their “subversive” activities, Black leftists in Los Angeles came to their defense. Although many paid a huge price for their dissent, their audacious anti-war stance helped forge a little-known bond with Korean immigrant critics of U.S. Cold War imperialism (Cheng 2013). More to the point, Black Korean war veterans who became radicalized in the conflict fashioned themselves as anti-racist activists and played a key role in the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements (BPM) of the 1960s and early 1970s upon their return to the United States (Parker 2010).

With the escalation of the Vietnam War in the late 1960s, Asian American activists joined Black activists in the Third World Liberation Front to advance an anti-war, anti-racist, and anti-imperialist agenda. They, too, saw a close connection between U.S. domestic racism and U.S. military aggression in Southeast Asia (Liu, Geron, and Lai 2008). The Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) provided the incubator and backbone of the Asian American Movement (AAM). However, as Omatsu (1994) observes, the AAM did not begin with the CRM, but with the later demand for Black liberation and a reclamation of militant struggle. AAM members were guided by the ethnic nationalism practiced by Black nationalists, especially those affiliated with the Black Panther Party (Omatsu 1994; Ogbar 2001). Among the driving constituencies of the AAM were college students, the working class, veterans, and community youths, along with key community activists such as Yuri Kochiyama, Grace Lee Boggs, and Richard Aoki. These activists and organizations adopted the Black Panther message and strategies by creating community-based service programs, valorizing Asian American self-determination, adopting a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist philosophy, and some even adopted the Black Panther style of dress (Maeda 2005). Although Asian American nationalists were inspired and motivated by the symbolism, political strategy, and organization of Black nationalists, Ogbar (2001) observes a symbiotic relationship between Black Power and Yellow Power activists in that the two movements “necessarily influenced each other in alliances, networks, conferences, and general dialogue” (36). Also, rather than aiming to promote race-centered group interest, both Black and Asian American nationalists emphasized the need to address class conflicts and build inter-racial coalitions during this period.

Post-1975 Relations

Inter-racial alliances were challenged by the significant political, contextual, and structural changes following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 (Omatsu 1994). Compounding factors include the oil crisis and economic recession in the late 1970s, the War on Drugs and Reagonomics in the 1980s, and the steady influx of middle-class Asian immigrants into urban spaces traditionally occupied by Black (and other impoverished nonwhite) Americans after the lifting of Asian exclusion in the 1965 Immigration Act. As a result, instances of racial conflict from perceived economic competition and cultural misunderstanding occurred. The 1990–91 Red Apple boycott in Brooklyn, New York, and the 1992 Los Angeles Riots in South Central Los Angeles involving Korean shop owners are two prominent examples captured by the mainstream media.

Fundamental to Black-Asian tensions is the polarizing neoliberal discourse of Asian Americans as the model minority and good (immigrant) Americans, even if they are also simultaneously considered racial outcasts (Kim 1999, 2000; Wu 2013; Hsu 2015; Hua and Junn 2021). Nadia Kim (2008, 2022) advocates for considering the influences of (neo)imperialism, and (neo/post) colonialism, among other foundational projects in the racialization of Asian immigrants and the formation of their race relations with other groups. Immigrants’ own experience of racial mistreatment and their exposure to anti-Black racism and America’s racial hierarchy through cultural exchange in their imperialized homelands in Asia may prime and influence their understanding of America’s racial hierarchy (Kim 2008; Hua and Junn 2021).

A more recent brand of inter-racial conflict is characterized by aggressive efforts led by affluent and conservative Chinese immigrant parents to block legislative attempts, mainly in California, to reinstate affirmative action in college admissions and other progressive initiatives. This wave of activism added a new wrinkle to the increasingly tenuous Black-Asian relationship. Political activism among Asian Americans in the early 21st century is no longer solely driven by the desire for liberation from the white supremacist, capitalist, and imperialist political-economic order. Instead, the desire to become assimilated into the host society of the United States and engage in mainstream politics has compelled some to seek political power in coalition with whites at the expense of disadvantaged groups.

The phenomenon of rising conservative activism among immigrant Chinese Americans should come as no surprise to observers of ethnic politics. Investigating the debates within the Chinese American community in Ho v SFUSD (1996), Zou (2022) uncovers a divergent set of arguments in the community’s battle for educational rights and racial equality. He notes that the same tensions and contradictions reemerged in the recent debates on affirmative action in college admissions. Even if the right-wing efforts among Asian Americans were largely obscured in the English media, well-educated and well-resourced Chinese immigrants developed political acumen and deployed colorblind ideology to demand meritocracy. Some fear that Chinese immigrant activism may be driven in part by their ethnic homeland-based nationalism that is condoned by the Chinese government, and maintained by ethnic and transnational networks after migration through social media platforms such as WeChat (Lin, Song, and Ball-Rokeach 2010; Zhang 2022).

A more recent example is the case of Students for Fair Admissions vs Harvard (2024) where complaints of racial discrimination filed by Chinese American plaintiffs at the advice of a white businessman, Ed Blum, resulted in a landmark decision to overturn race-based affirmative action in college admissions. This ruling occurred despite the filing of amicus briefs by an unprecedented, massive coalition of progressive Asian American-serving organizations and individuals, among other progressive lobbying efforts, to defend race-conscious admissions.

Era of the Black Lives Matter Movement (2013–Present)

When ex-NYPD rookie Peter Liang was convicted of manslaughter for the death of Akai Gurley, a Black man who was fatally shot, Chinese immigrants organized nationwide protests via WeChat in 2016 to demand justice for Liang (Feng and Tseng-Putterman 2019). There were internal debates about whether the pro-Liang faction would be considered anti-Black, some organizers urged sensitivity to race relations and attempted to build coalitions with the Black community. Protesters ultimately rallied behind Liang, calling him a “sacrificial lamb” for both white and Black communities. Their lack of understanding of the movement for Black Lives and the aspiration for liberation rather than assimilation might be understandable, especially given the vulnerability to misinformation and political polarization of WeChat (Zhang 2022). Still, these immigrants’ mistaken perception of BLM as a threat to Asians’ pursuit of equal protection and racial justice is unfortunate and troubling. We hasten to add that a stream of Asian American studies scholars such as Hong (2017), Leroy (2017), Liu (2018), Fu et al. (2019), Hope (2019), Lee et al. (2020), Wong (2022) and Wong and Liu (2022) all note that “Asians For Black Lives” emerged out of the Liang controversy demonstrating the possibilities and necessity of Afro-Asian solidarity.

Speculating on the sustainability of Asian nationalism after the Black Power era, Omatsu (1994) describes the arrival of Asian neoconservatives during the Reagan-Bush era and supply-side economics of the 1980s as “strange and new political animals” (42). The recent wave of conservative activism suggests they are no longer new or strange but a force to be reckoned with.

Afro-Asian Solidarity Reconsidered

From the exploration of historical events of Afro-Asian solidarity, key themes emerge. When people of African and Asian descent identify with one another as people of color and victims of white supremacy, they are able to forge cross-racial bonds. Such is the case of the Philippine-American War, Korean War, and liberation movements of the late 1960s. However, cultural change, economic competition, and the sowing of division by hegemonic actors can cause cross-racial bonds to dissolve. Given intense polarization, economic hardship, and conservative Asian Americans, it raises questions about the sustainability of Afro-Asian solidarity. Namely, can those who are sympathetic to Black and Asian American nationalism get along like they have in times past? We turn, next to a more full discussion of nationalism for Black and Asian Americans.

Ethnic Nationalism and Empirical Evidence in Prior Research

Nationalism is an ideology that serves to advance the interests of a nation-state or imagined community (Anderson 2006). These entities are typically demarcated by history, culture, and place of birth/place of residence. A more primordial form of national identity relies on phenotypic/racial distinctions (Salazar 1998). Nationalist goals can vary but typically include the desire for political, economic, and social self-determination. Part of what makes a national community strong is high levels of group attachment and a positive valuation of one’s grouping (Salazar 1998). Moreover, the distinctness of the “nation” is predicated on its differences with other, often considered “inferior,” communities or groups (Tajfel 1978). We find it interesting that, in the past, the Black community inspired and helped facilitate the creation of Asian American nationalism. Because these supposedly opposing groups have also had similar programs and goals, it suggests solidarity between Asian American nationalists and Black nationalists is not only plausible but temporally legitimate.

Berlin (1972) states that ethnic nationalism gets inflamed when there is a desire among oppressed peoples to be treated as equals. Similarly, Levinger and Lytle (2001) propose a triadic structure of nationalism where a previously dominant national group juxtaposes a glorious past with a degraded present as a way to mobilize members of their community. West (1999) and Dawson (2001) also find that Black nationalist adherence increases following times of racial strife. In a deeply polarized America, we can infer that ethnic nationalism may be more entrenched than in previous years (Stone and Rizova 2020). This would seem to indicate less possibility for cross-racial coalition building. We are interested in investigating whether there’s common ground for supporting social change among ordinary Asian and Black Americans in early 21st century America.

Asian American Nationalism

Asian American nationalism rose to prominence during the early AAM. Influenced by Black activists and the Black Radical Tradition (Robinson 1983; Price 2016), the Asian American nationalist movement centered on ideas of self-reliance, self-determination, equal treatment, the rectification of historic wrongs (Liu, Geron, and Lai 2008), and a yearning for a nation-state (Wong 1995). The movement had political aims tied to the aforementioned ideals and pursuance of these aims often took the form of community care. Community care looked like instituting free legal counseling, child care programs, tutoring services, and breakfast programs (Maeda 2005; Liu, Geron, and Lai 2008). Moreover, the movement was well known for its cultural and intellectual production during this time. The Asian American nationalist movement has been called a cultural nationalist project (Espiritu 2008). Cultural and intellectual work of the time positioned Asian Americans as oppressed in the same way as other U.S. racial minorities which centered them in revolutionary discourse (Omatsu 1994; Liu, Geron, and Lai 2008). Moreover, cultural production served to valorize the Asian American working class and assert an Asian American identity as opposed to an Asian or American identity (Wong 1995).

This cultural nationalism led to the prominence of such figures as Fred Ho. Ho was an activist and musician who had affiliations with such organizations as I Wor Kuen and the Nation of Islam (Price 2016). He also helped found the Scientific Souls Session and the Afro-Asian Music Ensemble. Both organizations were guided by an Afro-Futurist framework where art was used as a medium to express the condition of the oppressed. According to Price, the political, and specifically the cultural, products of Asian American nationalism endure as a kind of technology of the oppressed into the present day.

Wong (1995) finds a trend within Asian American scholarship, which she calls denationalization. The denationalization of Asian Americans is occurring because of (1) the easing of cultural nationalist concerns, (2) Asian American permeability from “Asian Asians,” and (3) viewing Asian Americans as a diasporic category and not as a U.S. minority. Wong argues that denationalization has led to a lack of scholarly attention given to Asian American nationalist products. Due to denationalization and limited quantitative attention given to Asian American nationalism in previous scholarship, we will briefly delve into the historical development of Black nationalism and empirical research in the following subsection to help inform our measure of ethnic nationalism.

The Empirics of Black Nationalism

Nationalism among Black Americans is one of the oldest and most enduring political ideologies of the group. With historical lineages that trace back to the time of chattel slavery, it represents a rich historical tradition that influences Black political participation and is one of the greatest predictors of Black public opinion (Dawson 2000). Extensive literature surrounds the history of the ideology, but less work attempts to empirically study the ideology’s effect on Black political behavior. This could be due, in part, to the complex nature of the ideology. To date, there is no consensual definition of the concept, leading Henderson (2019) to call Black nationalism one of the most misunderstood ideologies.

The aim of our paper is not to develop a new theoretical understanding or definition of Black nationalism; rather we rely heavily on past research to inform our understanding as well as develop empirical measures. We view Black nationalism as an ideology and identity that reflects the historical formation of the Black nation or “a historically constructed community of shared history and memory; with distinctive cultural, political, and economic interests; and with a geographical or spatial anchor in the nation’s urban centers and the heavily populated Black belt counties of the rural South” (Walters and Smith 1999, 249). We are aware that historical explorations of the ideology highlight what seems to be discontinuities between leaders, actions, and time periods. However, we simply view them as the nature of ideologies; such that ideologies are subject to elite interpretation and change depending on historical context (Dawson 2001). Previous survey-based research shows that acceptance of Black nationalism could be predicated on an individual experiencing linked fate with Black individuals as well as agreeing with Black nationalist items (Dawson 2001; Brown and Shaw 2002; Davis and Brown 2002; Brown et al. 2024). These action items can include support for “Buying Black,” support for Black-only schools, support for Black self-determination, voting for Black candidates, and forming a Black political party, among other things. Disillusionment is also correlated with the acceptance of a Black nationalist ideology (Dawson 2001), such that when a person’s disillusionment hits peak levels, it moderates the effect of one’s linked fate on acceptance (Block 2011).

Davis and Brown (2002) show that a majority of Black Americans agree or strongly agree with 8/10 nationalist items. They offer that acceptance of a Black nationalist ideology leads to antipathy towards whites, which may represent a more radical sector within the ideology (Dawson 2001). Brown and Shaw (2002) try to contend with the disparateness present within the ideology by examining whether two kinds of Black nationalism exist and find community and separatist variants. Community Black nationalists are said to believe that Black individuals should govern where they reside, while separatists enforce and subscribe to a separation between white and Black people, whether that be through pursuance of a sovereign Black state or through cultural distance (Brown and Shaw 2002). Community and separatist nationalists are influenced by group solidarity, but community nationalists are more likely to engage in traditional forms of political participation, while adherence to a separatist ideology is negatively indicated with conventional political participation (Carey 2013). The difference may be explained because community nationalists have more faith in American governing institutions as opposed to separatists who are disillusioned with racial progress (Block 2011; Carey 2013).

Davis and Brown (2002) reject the findings of Brown and Shaw (2002) concerning a multidimensional understanding of Black nationalism. But Tommie Shelby (2003) undertook a textual examination of the writings of the “godfather of Black nationalism,” Martin Delaney, and uncovered a similar dual tradition: classical and pragmatic nationalism. Classical Black nationalism is said to encompass group cohesion as well as the desire for self-determination and actualization, even if it includes physical separation. Meanwhile, pragmatic Black nationalism is equally focused on group cohesion, but pursues it to achieve freedom and equality for Black people (Shelby 2003).

Spence, Shaw, and Brown (2005) also find support for a multidimensional understanding of Black nationalism: Pan-Africanism and Black separatism. Pan-Africanists are said to be concerned with the liberation of all people of African descent and believe that African descendants share a history, culture, and way of being towards the world. Pan-Africanists are more likely to forge and pursue cross-racial alliances (Spence, Shaw, and Brown 2005). The authors believe that acceptance of Pan-Africanism is likely to translate into a third-world consciousness among oppressed people of all backgrounds. However, they leave that task up to future researchers.

Attitudes Towards the Black Lives Matter Movement (and Other Political Participation) in Past Research

The BLM movement is an ideology and a call for action to protest anti-Black racism, state-sanctioned violence, racial oppression, gender/transgender equity, and economic injustice. It was organized in 2013 by three Black feminists and queer-identified activists to protest the senseless death of Trayvon Martin and the acquittal of his confessed murderer. The movement for justice has been (re)fueled by police shootings of Michael Brown, Freddy Grey, Christian Hall, Adam Toledo, and many other innocent Black (& other nonwhite) men and women. Support for the movement received new fervor after the deaths of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd were widely publicized in the spring of 2020. Although the organizers viewed the movement as a continuation of the Black CRM, Dennis and Dennis (2020) find it to be distinguishable in purpose and organization from the CRM by being less for integration than for separatism (emancipation and self-empowerment), a goal sought by the BPM and Black nationalist adherents.

Surveys were taken shortly after George Floyd’s death point to widespread support for the BLM movement across racial and political lines. A poll conducted by Pew Research in June 2020 shows that two-thirds of Americans supported the movement (Parker, Horowitz, and Anderson 2020). However, public support has since declined, a trend that may be explained by media stereotyping and misinformation campaigns launched by right-wing activists to paint BLM as violent and dangerous (Bellamy 2021; Corley 2021). A 2021 report by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project shows that about 94% of the BLM demonstrations in 2020 were non-violent and peaceful, yet most media paid attention only to destructive incidents associated with the demonstrations.

Support for the BLM movement among Asian Americans may be compounded by the right-wing bias propagated in WeChat—a social media platform used mostly by immigrant Chinese Americans (Zhang 2022). Analysis of the 2016 CMPS by Yellow Horse et al. (2021) finds that foreign-born Asian Americans were significantly more likely to report indifference to the BLM movement compared to their US-born counterparts. Nonetheless, the impact of nativity disappears once they account for the sense of belonging and acknowledgment of anti-Black racism. Merseth (2018) finds that Asian support for BLM can be predicted by their sense of linked fate with other Asians and with other nonwhite groups as well as the perception of anti-Black discrimination in the United States. She concludes that race-based and minority-linked fate among Asian Americans is a viable and imperative part of building cross-racial coalitions and contemporary racial justice movements.

Prospects for Asian Americans to join Black and Latino Americans in taking political action for social change are examined in several recent studies that used the 2016 CMPS. Macías Mejía (2024) compares the relationship between indicators of minority-linked fate and political participation, which is a composite measure that includes both electoral and non-electoral activities (e.g., voting, campaigning, protesting, and boycotting), among Latinos, Blacks, and Asian Americans. She finds that co-ethnic-linked fate and immigrant-linked fate are useful predictors of political participation for Latinos and Blacks, but not for Asian Americans. Chan and Jasso (2023) ask a similar question but they control for co-ethnic or (intra-) racial/ethnic-linked fate and distinguish between participation in conventional (electoral) activities and unconventional (non-electoral) activities. Like Macías Mejía (2024), they find that inter-racial linked fate does not lead to conventional participation for Asians as it does for Latinos and Blacks. However, Chan and Jasso find a positive and significant relationship between inter-racial linked fate and unconventional participation in all three minority groups.

These findings are consistent with prior research on Asian Americans. For example, research by Lien, Margaret Conway and Wong (2004), Wong, Lien, and Conway (2005), and Wong et al. (2011) do not find evidence that racial group consciousness, linked fate, and experience with discrimination increased turnout among Asian Americans in the 2000 and 2008 elections. Recently, Masuoka et al. (2018) employed the 2016 CMPS data to examine the independent effects of racial linked fate and personal experiences with racial discrimination on voting participation. They also fail to find a significant relationship. On the other hand, when estimating non-voting forms of political participation, Wong, Lien, and Conway (2005) find a positive and significant relationship to racial group consciousness among Asian Americans. Chan and Jasso (2023) explain that nonwhite respondents who identify with the fate of other minorities (having a sense of inter-racial linked fate) might be incentivized to participate in system-challenging forms of political action, such as protest, on behalf of a minority collective.

With previous instances of Afro-Asian solidarity, nationalist politics, and research on political participation in mind, we present our expectations. First, given the solidarity among Black and Asian American nationalists in the past, we expect ethnic nationalism to have a positive and independent relationship with support for BLM (H1). We expect that there will be more similarities than differences between both groups in the driving factors of popular support for BLM (H2).

Data and Methods

We rely on the 2020 CMPS data to test our expectations of findings. To our knowledge, the CMPS is the nation’s largest and most culturally inclusive public opinion survey to gauge the sentiment of whites and minority populations in the U.S. context on a wide variety of topics. Moreover, most items in the survey instrument were asked of all major racial and ethnic groups. The survey instrument was available in English and nine other languages (i.e., Spanish, Chinese (simplified), Chinese (traditional), Korean, Vietnamese, Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, and Haitian Creole). It was administered online from April 2, 2021 to October 4, 2021 with a total of 16,970 adults, including 3,874 Non-Hispanic Blacks and 3,652 Non-Hispanic Asians. We restrict our analysis to Black and Asian American respondents. (Learn more about the data in Frasure, Wong, Vargas, and Barreto 2024).

Dependent Variables: Attitudes toward Black Lives Matter Movement

Our key dependent variable is support for the BLM movement. On the question gauging general attitude toward BLM (Based on everything you have heard or seen, how much do you support or oppose the Black Lives Matter Movement?), 46% of Blacks and 22% of Asians indicated strong support, 26% of Blacks and 28% of Asians indicated somewhat support, while 21% of Blacks and 27% of Asians indicated indifference. A second question asks respondents to assess how much people in their own race would feel responsible for supporting the BLM (How strongly do you agree or disagree with (PRIMARY RACE)s have a responsibility to support the Black Lives Matter Movement?). A third question asks respondents to estimate how much support people in their own race would say that they could benefit from the success of the BLM (How strongly do you agree or disagree with (PRIMARY RACE)s will benefit from the success of the Black Lives Matter Movement). Among respondents to the 2^nd and 3^rd BLM question, the majority of Blacks (55% and 60%, respectively) perceived their group as feeling responsible for supporting the BLM movement and would benefit from its success while just over 4 in 10 Asians (44% and 41%, respectively) are believed to share this view.

Additionally, there are three questions on taking actions to support the BLM movement. The first question measures participation in BLM protests (Over the past year, did you participate in a Black Lives Matter protest or a protest against police brutality?), 19% of Black and 12% of Asian respondents answered positively. The second question measures support through online activities (Thinking about the issue of police violence and the Black Lives Matter Movement, besides attending an event, did you ever engage on social media, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or other websites either in support of BLM, in support of police, or to discuss the issue in general?). A much higher percentage of Blacks (31%) than Asians (19%) indicated taking online actions to support the BLM. The third question measures levels of support for the BLM through monetary donations (How much, if any, did you donate to the following: Black Lives Matter). A supermajority of Blacks (75%) and Asians (86%) did not donate any, but 12% of Blacks and 8% of Asians donated up to $50, 6% of Blacks and 4% of Asians donated between $51 and $100, 4% of Blacks and 2% of Asians donated between $101 and $500, and 4% Blacks and 1% Asians donated over $500. We constructed an additive measure of BLM Support from these six survey questions discussed above (adj. alpha = .707 for Blacks and .775 for Asians, with the values ranging from .50 to 3.83). (A histogram for BLM Support can be found in the online Appendix A, along with that for the second DV mentioned below).

The 2020 CMPS also contains a question that we believe can be used to gauge the extent of antipathy to the BLM, relatively speaking. It is a forced choice question asking respondents to rank their feelings of dislike for BLM activists as compared to 5 other right-wing and left-wing groups (Which of the following groups do you most DISLIKE?—White supremacists (such as the KKK), Anti-abortion activists, Black Lives Matter activists, Militant anti-fascists (such as Antifa), Democratic Socialists, The Tea Party). After adding up the responses, we found 21% of Blacks and 31% of Asians ranked BLM activists among the top three disliked groups. These numbers are similar to their assessment of the Democratic Socialists but a lot smaller than their rankings for groups on the radical right of U.S. politics. To deal with the huge number of missing values, for respondents who did not indicate a dislike for BLM activists, we created a 4-point scale called Dislike BLM where 3 = most dislike, 2 = dislike, 1 = somewhat dislike, and 0 = no dislike. Among the 31% of Asians who indicated a dislike for BLM activists, about 9% most disliked, close to 11% disliked, and another 11% somewhat disliked them. Among the 21% of Blacks who indicated a dislike for the BLM activists, about 9% most disliked, 6% disliked, and another 6% somewhat disliked them. Because of the lopsided distribution of the responses, we also created a dummy variable with a score of 1 for those who did not enlist BLM activists among the disliked groups. We ran both ordinary least square (OLS) and logistic regression models to estimate attitudes of dislike for BLM activists and yielded similar results in both models. We report OLS findings in Tables 3 and 4 for ease of interpretation of the meanings of slope coefficients.

We are concerned that those respondents who indicated support for BLM as a social movement may not necessarily like or dislike BLM activists. We ran ANOVA to compare the means of the two measures and found a significant difference in the relationship between Support for and Dislike of BLM—for both Blacks and Asians. Among Asians, the mean of support for BLM among those who did not dislike (1.94) is higher than the values among those who disliked it, and those indicated the most dislike of BLM activists have a slightly lower mean of support for BLM (1.24) than those who indicated somewhat dislike (1.31). However, among Blacks, there’s a curvilinear relationship as the means of support for BLM are equally high for people who did not dislike (2.13) and those who indicated most dislike (2.14), while those who indicated somewhat dislike have a slightly lower mean value of support for BLM than those who indicated dislike (1.74 vs. 1.82). It seems Black respondents have mixed feelings about BLM. They can support BLM as a movement for social change but dislike it for the perceived militancy, being anti-police, lack of equal regard for women, disconnect with the underprivileged in the Black community, and other criticisms of the movement. We run separate analyses to estimate support for and dislike of BLM among Black and Asian Americans, respectively.

Independent and Control Variables

The key independent variables in this paper are indicators of ethnic nationalism for Black and Asian Americans. We scrutinize past survey research on Black nationalism to identify plausible measures in the 2020 CMPS that can help gauge feelings of ethnic nationalism for both samples. Linked fate and disillusionment are two distinct pathways to Black nationalism (Block 2011). Regardless, nationalists respond to racial discrimination and subjugation (Carey 2013). Block explains further that when Black Americans espouse nationalist rhetoric they are either reacting to white antipathy or Black racial pride. Thus, we include a measure of racial group pride. Social group membership is a necessary component of a national identity (Davis and Brown 2002), so we include a variable that measures the primacy of one’s racial identity. We also include a measure for ethnic-linked fate, for levels of ethnic-linked fate are shown to correspond with ethnic nationalism among Blacks (Dawson 2001; Brown and Shaw 2002; Davis and Brown 2002; Brown et al. 2024). While we fail to find CMPS variables that measure disillusionment to our liking, we include respondents’ perceptions of white privilege, perceived discrimination, and anti-Blackness to help gauge outgroup antipathy, specifically one’s feelings about white individuals (Davis and Brown 2002; Brown et al. 2024). Because prior research shows that ethnic nationalism is a complex phenomenon that may involve more than one dimension, we propose a composite measure that includes six items as detailed below.

First, to measure racial group pride, we created a 3-item summed index from three questions asking how much pride one would feel under the scenario of: (1) when viewing news or thinking about protests on issues that are important for one’s primary race, (2) when seeing an individual of one’s primary race accomplishing a major milestone, and (3) when seeing someone of one’s primary race holding an elected office. We assigned a value of 4 to those who responded “a lot,” 3 to “some,” 2 to “a little,” and 1 to “none at all.” The reliability analysis of these 3 items shows an alpha of .82 for Blacks and that of .84 for Asians.

Second, to measure the primacy of racial belonging to one’s identity, we utilized a 5-point scale taken directly from responses to the survey question asking How important is being [RACIAL GROUP] to your identity? We assigned a value of 5 to those who checked “extremely important,” 4 to “very important,” 3 to “moderately important,” 2 to “slightly important,” and 1 to “not at all important.”

Third, to measure ethnic-linked fate, we utilized a 5-point scale taken directly from responses to the survey questions (How much do you think what happens to the following groups here in the U.S. will have something to do with what happens in YOUR life: Black people, Asian people). A value of 5 means a huge amount, 4 means a lot, 3 means something, 2 means only a little, and 1 means nothing--to do with what happens in one’s life.

Fourth, to measure perceived discrimination against one’s race, we utilized a 4-point scale taken from responses to the survey questions asking How much discrimination, if any, do you think exists against [the following group] in the U.S. today: Blacks, Asians. A value of 4 means a lot, 3 means some, 2 means a little, and 1 means none at all.

Fifth, to measure recognition of white privilege as a problem, we utilized a 4-point scale taken from responses to the survey question asking respondents to indicate if they agree or disagree with the statement: White privilege is a major problem in the U.S. today. A value of 4 means strongly agree, 3 means agree, 2 means disagree, and 1 means strongly disagree.

Sixth, to measure recognition of anti-Black racism as a problem, we utilized a 4-point scale taken from responses to a question asking respondents to indicate if they agree or disagree with the statement: Anti-Black racism is a major problem in the (R’s PRIMARY RACE) community. A value of 4 means strongly agree, 3 means agree, 2 means disagree, and 1 means strongly disagree.

It is important to note that our measure of ethnic nationalism differs between its level of adherence for the communities under study (see online Appendix B for a comparison of response patterns between the two samples). On three out of the six measures of ethnic nationalism (1. the primacy of group identity, 2. perceived discrimination against one’s ethnic group, and 3. viewing white privilege as a major U.S. problem), Black respondents were 1.5–2 times more likely to hold ethnic nationalist sentiment. An even larger difference exists among the two groups in their belief that anti-Black racism is a problem in their communities with Black respondents agreeing nearly four times more than Asian American respondents. We find the most parity between the two groups among their feelings of racial group pride and linked fate with fellow co-ethnics. To account for possible confounding influences, we control for personal experiences of discrimination and interminority (or panethnic) linked fate. We also control for the possible influence of political and demographic variables (See online Appendix D for question wording and coding schemes of control variables).

We would like to acknowledge the limitations of secondary analysis of the 2020 CMPS data, especially regarding the measures we used to develop indicators of ethnic nationalism. We admit the lower than ideal adjusted alpha values of .69 in the Black sample and .64 in the Asian sample for the six-item additive index (see online Appendix C for a discussion of the principal component analysis used to assess dimensionality of our proposed measure for Black and Asian Americans). Our measure of ethnic nationalism diverges from past work because it does not include the same set of questions gauging nationalist sentiment used in other surveys. However, we scrutinized past research to inform our identification of plausible ethnic nationalism indicators in the 2020 CMPS dataset. Moreover, as Brown et al. (2024) note, the study of Black nationalism has received relatively little scholarly attention in the last two decades. Previous conclusions about the ideology may no longer hold. There is a need for new measures of ethnic nationalism, but such an undertaking rests outside the scope of this research.

Results and Discussion of Multivariate Analyses

Because our measure for BLM support is a continuous variable, we ran OLS models to estimate the independent impact of ethnic nationalism, both as a six-item index and a concept with six indicators, for our Black and Asian samples separately. Table 1 reports results from the restricted model using the six-item index and Table 2 reports results from the full model with each of the six indicators of ethnic nationalism entered separately. We find strong support among both groups for those who score higher both on our composite measure of ethnic nationalism and its respective components to express higher levels of support for the BLM movement, confirming H1. In Table 1, although the index of ethnic nationalism is positive and significant for both Black and Asian respondents, we note the standardized beta for Blacks (.295) is higher than that for Asians (.233). The weaker sense of ethnic nationalism among Asian respondents is not surprising given our review of past research on the distinct history of racialization that this community faces. What’s worth noting is the significant commonality in the overall structure of racial opinion between the two groups against the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising anti-Asian violence.

Table 1. OLS models estimating support for Black Lives Matter Movement (restricted)

Source: 2020 CMPS. ** denotes p smaller or equal to .005, * denotes p smaller or equal to .05.

Table 2. OLS models estimating support for Black Lives Matter Movement (full)

Source and Note: see Table 1.

To distinguish among which measure(s) of ethnic nationalism may present challenges or opportunities for supporting collective action for social change between Blacks and Asians in the survey, we present the full model estimating support for BLM in Table 2. When ethnic nationalism is measured separately, we find differences in the significance of slope coefficients between both samples in two of the six measures. Although all six indicators are significant for Blacks, our indicator of the primacy of racial grouping (being Black or Asian) to one’s identity is positive and significant only for Blacks. A similar pattern is observed for the indicator of perceived group discrimination, but the sign of the coefficient is negative, suggesting that those Blacks who report lower degrees of anti-Black discrimination would be more supportive of BLM, even if this measure has no effect on Asians. Still, we find indicators of racial pride, importance of being Black/Asian, viewing white privilege as a problem, and the perception of anti-Blackness in one’s racial community to have common effects on the attitudes of Black and Asian respondents, confirming H2. Nonetheless, racial pride and the primacy of racial identity have the largest effects on support for BLM among Blacks which suggests that group membership and positive group valuations drive support for BLM in this community. Our control variable of interminority-linked fate is the strongest predictor of support for BLM among Asians with viewing white privilege as a U.S. problem a close second. Our results partially confirm the findings of Merseth (2018), but, curiously, we find that Asian American linked fate has a significant negative relationship with support for BLM. This mixed set of findings means that different underlying factors may be behind the attitudes of support for BLM among respondents in each community.

Among the control variables, we find that having personally experienced discrimination, possessing a greater sense of interminority-linked fate, being a Democrat, being liberal in ideology, and being younger in age may statistically and positively predict greater support for BLM among both Black and Asian respondents. Our findings on the positive effects of personal experience of discrimination and interminority-linked fate are consistent with expectations from prior research (Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005; Merseth 2018; Chan and Jasso 2023). Curiously, everything else being equal, being a Black woman negatively impacts support for BLM, which is not true among Asian women where gender is not significant. We also note that the net effect of citizenship is negative but significant only for Asians. Conversely, the net effect of education is negative and significant for Blacks but not for Asians. We do not find being foreign-born, owning a home (as a surrogate measure for income), or being employed full-time to have independent effects in either sample.

These findings lend support to the larger theme of our paper; those members of the Black and Asian American community who are sympathetic to an ethnic nationalist ideology are more likely to share common interests in taking action for social justice. To gauge the relationship between sympathies towards Black and Asian American nationalism and attitudes toward BLM activists, who were compared to a list of groups on the radical left and right side of politics, we report results of restricted and full models in Tables 3 and 4. Again, when ethnic nationalism is measured as an additive index, we find results to be consistent across both samples. All else being equal, being sympathetic to a Black or Asian nationalist ideology means that an individual would be less likely to dislike BLM activists (p = .000). When ethnic nationalism is disaggregated, we see more discrepancies between the models for each sample. Indicators of racial pride, perceived group discrimination, and seeing white privilege as a problem are negative and significant for both groups. Attitudes toward anti-Black racism are not a factor for either group, but the role of the primacy of racial grouping to one’s identity differs between the two samples. Asian Americans who consider being Asian to be important to their identity would show more dislike for BLM, but such is not found among Black respondents.

Table 3. OLS models estimating dislike of BLM activists (restricted)

Source and note: see Table 1.

Table 4. OLS models estimating dislike of BLM activists (full)

Source and note: see Table 1.

Among the control variables, for both Asian and Black respondents, being Republican or conservative leads to more dislike of BLM. Yet, curiously, being younger in age, everything else being equal, may also lead to more dislike for both samples. Among Blacks, having experienced discrimination would show less dislike, while having a stronger sense of interminority-linked fate would curiously increase chances of dislike for BLM activists. Perhaps this is because BLM might be viewed as a Black racial project and, therefore, an exclusive cause. However, this is not the case among Asian respondents where those who show a greater sense of interminority-linked fate are less likely to show dislike for BLM activists, while personal experience of discrimination has no net impact. Interestingly, we find being male among Blacks but not among Asians is more likely to dislike BLM activists. Lastly, we find being foreign-born among Asians but not Blacks to be indicative of more dislike. Conversely, we find having more education among Blacks but not Asians to be indicative of less dislike. The status of one’s citizenship, homeownership, or employment has no significant impact on attitudes of dislike for BLM activists.

From our results, it is clear that Black and Asian Americans who are sympathetic to ethnic nationalism have greater support for racial justice projects such as BLM. For Black American respondents, their support mostly hails from their racial group membership and the positive valuation of their group. While for Asian American respondents, their support is strongly associated with a response to, and recognition of, white supremacy. For Black respondents, interminority-linked fate is associated with more dislike of BLM activists, while for Asian Americans, Asian racial pride is associated with more dislike. If BLM is viewed as a Black racial project, this perceived exclusivity may be behind these findings. It remains clear, however, that sympathies toward ethnic nationalism lead to support for unconventional political participation, namely support of BLM.

Conclusion and Implications

Our research aims to explore whether sympathies towards ethnic nationalism among Black and Asian Americans divide or unite them in terms of their attitudes toward the Black Lives Matter Movement. Acceptance of a nationalist ideology typically makes an individual animus towards outgroups. Moreover, ethnic/Black nationalism is known to flare in times of perceived intense oppression. Given the current racial tensions in the United States, we are interested in examining the relationship between Asian and Black Americans—two nonwhite groups that are on different planks of racial triangulation. Employing the 2020 CMPS, our research demonstrates a strong and positive relationship between indicators of ethnic nationalism, either as a six-item index or as separate measures, among support for the Black Lives Matter Movement. This gives us hope that, even in a time of heightened racial tension, efficacious racial group identity and shared concerns over racial marginalization can unite, rather than divide, historically aggrieved racial minorities.

Similar to the findings of Brown and Shaw (2002), our research also indicates that, for Black and Asian Americans who are sympathetic to ethnic nationalism an antipathetic reaction to out-groups may not be a central component of the ideology. Asian and Black Americans who are sympathetic to ethnic nationalism may relate to one another as victims of racial oppression. However, given the limited scope of this paper, more research should be done to determine if these communities can agree on other “hot button” issues such as affirmative action and reparations for slavery. Moreover, it would be interesting for future research to focus on an Asian American racial project like #StopAsianHate to see if Black and Asian Americans switch places, in that Asian Americans support the campaign due to their racial identity, while Black Americans support the campaign due to their recognition of white supremacy.

While Black nationalism is studied as a multidimensional ideology (Dawson 2001; Brown and Shaw 2002; Spence, Shaw, and Brown 2005; Carey 2013), our principal component analysis does not yield identical findings (see Appendix C). This could be due to the limitations of our secondary analysis of the 2020 CMPS and the lack of ideal measures for our notion of ethnic nationalism. Because two components are extracted for Asian Americans, future research should apply a different dataset to investigate if Asian American nationalism is multidimensional in the same way that Black nationalism is speculated to be. Although it is beyond the scope of this research to explore the dimensionality and predictors of ethnic nationalism among Latinos (and other U.S. minorities), we suspect our measures of ethnic nationalism can apply to understand Latino (and other nonwhite) attitudes toward participation in racial justice movements. Extending the current bi-racial project to a multi-racial one in the near future can help uncover whether ethnic nationalism writ large contributes to the formation of a third world consciousness or if a more pragmatic form must be adopted for minority progress in 21st century America.

Last but not least, reports have shown that Asian Americans have been the victims of increased racial violence as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic (Elias et al. 2021). More recent analysis shows there is no systematic evidence to support the perception of Asian victimization by Black perpetrators (Wong and Liu 2022). However, among some Asian Americans, most prevalently well-resourced Chinese immigrants, anti-Black racism has risen out of this misconception. Our research shows that Asian Americans who hold a more politically liberal ideology are less likely to be anti-Black, everything else being equal. This shows that there may be unique opportunities for coalition-building between minority groups who recognize themselves as victims of U.S. imperialism and racism and see other racial and religious minorities as sharing the same fate. Our paper shows that inter-racial coalitions among Asian and Black Americans can be facilitated by their common conviction in ethnic nationalism, even in this polarizing moment.