We use a general equilibrium model to study the impact of
fully funding social security on the distribution of consumption
across cohorts and over time. In an initial stationary equilibrium
with an unfunded social security system, the capital/output ratio,
debt/output ratio, and rate of return to capital are 3.2, 0.6, and
6.8%, respectively. In our first experiment, we suddenly terminate
social security payments but compensate entitled generations by a
massive one-time increase in government debt. Eventually, the
aggregate physical capital stock rises by 40%, the return on capital
falls to 4.4%, and the labor income tax rate falls from 33.9 to
14%. We estimate the size of the entitlement debt to be 2.7 times
real GDP, which is paid off by levying a 38% labor income tax rate
during the first 40 years of the transition. In our second
experiment, we leave social security benefits untouched but force the
government temporarily to increase the tax on labor income so as
gradually to accumulate private physical capital, from the proceeds
of which it eventually finances social security payments. This
particular government-run funding scheme delivers larger efficiency
gains (in both the exogenous and endogenous price cases) than
privatization, an outcome stemming from the scheme's public provision
of insurance both against life-span risk and
labor income volatility.