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Water Governance and Regional Development in Xi's China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 August 2023

Wang Zhou  and
Wen-Hsuan Tsai
Wang Zhou
Affiliation:
Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University, Tianjin, China,
Wen-Hsuan Tsai*
Affiliation:
Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
*
Corresponding author: Wen-Hsuan Tsai; Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The governance of China under Xi Jinping functions mainly through leading groups. Using the case of water governance, this article examines the interaction between these groups at three levels: the top-level design group, the riverine macroregion groups and the implementation groups. This governance model is designed to avoid nomenklatura failure, restrict fiscal federalism and reduce the agency problem between the centre and local leaders. For the purpose of water governance, China has been divided into five blocs based on river basins, which we call riverine macroregions. Using this approach, the Chinese Communist Party is combining water governance with regional development and enhancing local governments’ collective implementation of central policy.

摘要

摘要

领导小组是总书记习近平治国理政的重要措施。相较于过去文献多重视单一小组的运作，本文则关注于不同类别的多个领导小组之间之互动，也就是所谓「组际政治」。以水治理为例，我们区分为顶层设计小组、河域大区小组，和地方执行小组。中共透过这三种领导小组之间互动与协调，来强化河域治理。这种治理模式旨在避免任命制失灵，限制财政联邦主义，以及减少中央和地方领导人之间的代理问题。为了治水，中国以流域为单位划分为五个区域，我们称之为河域大区。通过这种方式，中国将治水与区域发展相结合，加强地方政府在集体行动上的诱因，使之更有助于推动中央的政策。

Keywords

collective actionintergroup politicsleading groupsriverine macroregionstop-level design河域大区组际政治顶层设计集体行动领导小组
Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 257 , March 2024 , pp. 136 - 151
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London

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