Among the policy changes associated with neoliberalism in Latin America, tax reform has played a leading role as it has been crucial not only to price stabilization but also to managing economic liberalization. But it also has a larger significance, since it involved a reconstitution of core state powers, and these could prove useful to any future government that seeks to expand the state's economic role. This paper seeks to determine its causes more precisely by analyzing data from fifteen Latin American countries from 1977 to 1995. Findings show that the definition of “tax reform” has been remarkably similar across the region with less progressivity, fewer exemptions, a new leading role for the value-added tax (VAT), and the strengthening of tax administration. The data analysis then finds reform is predicted by (in roughly descending importance) past inflation, explicit IMF performance conditions, new administrations, more authoritarian-elected governments, the dominance of the president's party in the legislature, established electoral systems, closed-list proportional representation, less polarized party systems, and more numerous parties. Little or no support exists for the causal importance of past changes in gross domestic product (GDP), the constitutional powers of the president, party institutionalization, or partisan balance. The analysis concludes by placing these results in historical context, referring to theories of state formation and the building of institutions in exchange for resources.

Conceived as a contribution to debates about the role of state institutions in perpetuating racial inequality in modern Brazil, this article explores the relative importance of social and racial characteristics in determining defendants' treatment in Rio de Janeiro's criminal courts between 1930 and 1964. Focusing on rarely noted aspects of defendants' class and citizenship status, and emphasizing the importance of judicial procedure, it argues that social discrimination was open in Rio de Janeiro's courts, but that race alone was a relatively poor predictor of defendants' fates. At the same time, it suggests that racial and social characteristics ought not to be seen as separate and competing categories, both because “social' language had important racial meanings and because ”social“ discrimination had significant racial implications. Institutionalized social prejudice may thus go far in explaining the stubborn persistence of racial inequity in an age when ”racial democracy“ became a national hope and mantra.

Why did machine-age modernist architecture diffuse to Latin America so quickly after its rise in Continental Europe during the 1910s and 1920s? Why was it a more successful movement in relatively backward Brazil and Mexico than in more affluent and industrialized Argentina? After reviewing the historical development of architectural modernism in these three countries, several explanations are tested against the comparative evidence. Standards of living, industrialization, sociopolitical upheaval, and the absence of working-class consumerism are found to be limited as explanations. As in Europe, Modernism diffused to Latin America thanks to state patronage and the professionalization of architects following an engineering model.

This study examines the political and economic determinants of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America. The analysis focuses on fifteen Latin American and Caribbean countries for the period of 1979 to 1996. Market size, workers' skill levels, and political instability are found to have a statistically significant effect on the investment behavior of U.S. multinational firms. In addition, we find that a poor human rights record and military coups d'etat positively influenced U.S. FDI flows during the time series.

In the 1990s the Cuban regime displayed two unexpected characteristics. One was survival. The other was the implementation of uneven economic reforms, meaning that some sectors of the economy were revamped, while others remained untouched. This article connects these two outcomes by arguing that uneven economic reforms explain regime survival. Uneven economic reforms served to strengthen the power of the state vis-à-vis society, and within the state, the power of hard-liners. This new type of state, which I call “the gatekeeper state,” dominates society through a new mechanism—it fragments the economy into different sectors of varying degrees of profitability and then determines which citizens have access to each respective sector. While some authoritarian regimes stay alive by providing widespread economic growth, the Cuban regime in the 1990s survived instead by restricting access to capitalist rewards. This has permitted the incumbents to navigate through societal pressures and postpone regime transition.

This article contributes to feminist state theory and studies of women's police stations in Latin America by examining the processes shaping the multiple and changing positions of explicit alliance, opposition, and ambiguous alliance assumed by policewomen regarding feminists since the creation of the world's first women's police station in 1985 in São Paulo. While studies of women's police stations tend to overlook the political conjuncture, much of the literature on the state and gender explains the relationship between the state and women's movements as a function of the political regime. I argue for a more grounded feminist state theory, taking into account interactive macro and micro, local and international forces. As this case study demonstrates, policewoman-feminist relations evolve due to interactions between the political conjuncture, the hegemonic masculinist police culture, developments in the feminist discourse on violence against women, and the impact of the contact policewomen sustain with women clients.

By analyzing the Brazilian government's surprise endorsement of affirmative action in 2001, this article explores how the state constructs race in society and how ideas drive policy change. After decades defending the myth of “racial democracy,” the state admitted to racism and endorsed an extreme form of affirmative action—quotas—for Afro-Brazilians in government service and higher education. Based on fieldwork conducted in 2002, this article explains the recent policy turnaround as a dialectic between social mobilization and presidential initiative framed within unfolding international events. The presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso nurtured a transformation in political action on race at the same time that the president himself initiated major shifts in official discourse; later, preparations for the World Conference on Racism, held in Durban, South Africa, in 2001, provoked national soul-searching on racial inequalities. The conference itself provided an occasion, and a moment of reckoning, for Brazil to jettison past policies and embrace a new approach. I conclude that ideas emerging from social networks, made salient by presidential interest, and legitimized by international agreements may account for discursive policy change, but that implementation of affirmative action will require attention to material interests and electoral incentives.

We analyze vote buying in Argentina—the payment by political parties of minor benefits (food, clothing, cash) to citizens in exchange for their votes. How widespread is vote buying in Argentina, and what is the profile of the typical vote “seller”? Did the shift toward a neoliberal economic model in the 1990s increase or reduce vote buying? Why do parties attempt to buy votes when the ballot is secret and people could simply accept campaign handouts and then vote as they wish? We analyze responses to surveys we conducted in Argentina in 2002 and offer answers to these questions. Our findings suggest that vote buying is an effective strategy for mobilizing electoral support among low-income people when parties are able to monitor voters' actions, make reasonably accurate inferences about how individuals voted, and credibly threaten to punish voters who defect from the implicit clientelist bargain. Our results point toward ballot reform as one way to reduce vote buying in Argentina.

In response to the growing salience of re-centralization in several Latin American countries that decentralized in the 1980s and 1990s, this paper examines presidential efforts to re-centralize fiscal power in the 1990s. In our study of re-centralization in Argentina and Brazil, we assess the utility of four common political economy explanations: the presence of economic crisis; the partisan powers of the president; the division of formal powers between the branches; and the extent of intra-bureaucratic conflict. We find that the success of economic stabilization measures facilitated re-centralization in both countries, though the pathways connecting the two phenomena were partially distinct. In Argentina, key re-centralization measures were rapidly achieved after stabilization as the result of the president's strong partisan powers and in the form of political deals within the Peronist party. Subsequently, the dissipation of President Carlos Menem's powers over the course of his second term facilitated the “return of the governors.” In Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso re-centralized despite weak partisan powers, largely by using his reputation as a successful stabilizer to build a broad reform coalition. In Cardoso's Brazil, strong partisan cohesion in important cabinet posts also served as a partial substitute for the lack of partisan power in the legislature. These findings suggest the need for a closer examination of re-centralization efforts, particularly in the wake of macroeconomic stabilization and economic reform.

Judicial reform presents a paradox: why would a ruling party agree to judicial reforms that limit its own political power? In the Argentine case, I argue that although the ruling Peronist party could be induced in 1994 to initiate reforms (introduce constitutional revisions to strengthen the judiciary), the party then proved unwilling to accept the costs of an independent judiciary and failed to implement these changes (via enactment of congressional legislation). Only once the Peronists believed that they were unlikely to maintain political power did they implement the revised constitution's judicial advancements. Implementation of judicial reform in such a situation may serve the ruling party as an “insurance policy” in which a stronger judicial branch reduces the risks the ruling party faces should it become the opposition. My research suggests that the likelihood of implementation, the crucial determinant of judicial reform, increases as the ruling party's probability of reelection declines.

This article examines medico-legal and popular interpretations of suicide in early twentieth-century Lima. In this period, often referred to as the Aristocratic Republic, physicians and lawyers interpreted suicide through the lens of modern scientific and legal thought and came to challenge the traditional interpretations of the Church, which insisted that suicide was a voluntary act. For these groups, suicide, almost invariably an act of madness, was essentially a modern phenomenon, both product and evidence of Lima's growing “modernity,” as well as a social disease that could be combated by adopting adequate policies. However, though they opposed the Church's insistence on the responsibility of the suicide, physicians and lawyers viewed the propensity to suicide as evidence of the moral and racial degeneration of Lima's population and shared the Church's condemnation of suicide as a shameful and immoral act. For ordinary people, medico-legal discourse on suicide provided an additional explanation for self-death. In particular, the idea that suicide was caused by forces over which no one had any real control, especially forces that were a product of the perceived “modernization” of Lima, such as neurasthenia (a nervous condition that became a widespread explanation for suicide at the time) helped in the need to dilute blame and guilt. But, although medico-legal and popular understandings of suicide cross-fertilized, attempts by ordinary people to apportion certain meanings to suicide, particularly those that constructed suicide as a voluntary act, were perceived by the medico-legal community, and, indeed, more broadly, as threats to society.

This essay analyzes the complexity and contradiction of resource-tenure regimes on tropical forest frontiers by drawing on a case study carried out in the department of Río San Juan, southeastern Nicaragua. The main attention is given to competing claims over productive resources and to contradictory relationships between the diverse modalities of resource control. The resource struggles emerging in Río San Juan are analyzed in the context of larger political-economic and socio-legal processes to understand the wider relations of politics and power that affect local resource access. The main goal is to reveal how control over resources is defined and contested in the everyday reality of legal pluralism where multiple legal orders intersect in people's lives, and where the conflicts over whose law applies, and who gets what resources and why, have increasing significance.

The relationship between media ownership and partisan bias has been an important source of controversy in emerging democracies. Systematic tests of the effects of ownership, however, remain relatively rare. Using data from content analysis of ninety-three television news programs, as well as more detailed examination of six provincial television stations, we assess the extent of bias exhibited by different types of broadcasters during Mexico's 2000 presidential campaign. We find that privately owned television stations were generally more balanced than public broadcasters, who typically followed propagandistic models of coverage. At the same time, private ownership often entailed collusive arrangements between broadcasters and politicians, based on the prospect of future business concessions (i.e., “crony capitalism”). We conclude that changes in ownership patterns are unlikely to eradicate partisan bias, and we discuss other institutional remedies aimed at insulating both private and state-run media from political manipulation.

The related Latin American doctrines of structuralism and dependency had important repercussions in Spain and Portugal, two nations of the European “periphery” in the postwar era. This paper establishes the influence of the two Latin American ideas in those countries, focusing on the moments of their greatest impact—the 1950s and the 1970s. It explains such influence as a result of three factors — the previous existence of local traditions of structuralist thought, to which the Latin American doctrines could be assimilated; the relevance of Latin American ideas and techniques to pressing economic issues; and the utility of such ideas for foreign policy. It also illustrates that structuralism and dependency were perceived as closely related, and mentions the impact of the two doctrines in another country on the European Periphery, Romania, in the same two decades.

Through examination of the Zapotec movement in Juchitán, Mexico, the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Pan-Mayan movements in Guatemala, and the Afro-Reggae Cultural Group in Rio de Janeiro, this article will show that social movements are best analyzed through a combined focus on the circuitous historical pathways of their origins and emergence and on the diverse pieces of representation and meaning out of which they are made. This dual focus, in turn, enables us to understand how political actors form, the places where politics occurs, and the resignifications that lie at the heart of political conflict.

In presidential systems such as those of Latin America, the institutionalization of legislatures as autonomous representative bodies able to constrain executives and check abuses of power is an important aspect of democratization. Drawing on the experiences of Mexico's state governments, this paper seeks to explain differences in legislative institutionalization. It argues that pluralism within the legislature, rather than electoral competition in itself, provides the best explanation for institutionalization. A process-tracing analysis of the state legislature of Michoacán supports this argument, and a statistical analysis of Mexico's thirty-one states confirms that pluralism in the electorate does shape legislative pluralism—and so indirectly the extent of pressures for institutionalization—but reveals that differences in state electoral laws also play an important role.

This paper presents a typology of different constitutional conceptions, which are designed to help us classify the constitutional conceptions and debates that appeared in Latin America during the nineteenth century and to compare the opposing ideas that were present at the time. Three broad categories of constitutional projects are defined: (1) conservative models, characterized by the defense of political elitism and moral perfectionism; (2) majoritarian or radical constitutions that sought to reach out to the popular sectors and anchored themselves in a form of moral populism; and (3) the individualist or liberal constitutions. This analysis explores the ideas and principal architects of these various constitutional initiatives for a number of Hispano-Latin American nations for the 1810-60 period, when the basic features of their constitutions were shaped.

Although there exists a significant body of literature documenting the under-representation of black Cubans in the island's most important governing institutions throughout the forty-four years of Fidel Castro's rule, these analyses have emphasized limited access to political power as the sole factor responsible for this state of affairs. However, this comprehensive analysis contends that with the aging of the Cuban Revolution, other factors such as low holdover and high replacement rates for blacks during periodic reshuffling of the political elite have become crucial, albeit unacknowledged, explanatory variables for the paucity of blacks among the country's leadership. An important determinant for this pattern is the existence of inter- and intra-institutional stratification among blacks, the reasons for which remain unknown. Nonetheless, the presence of this factor increases the vulnerability of nonwhites as decisions are made about which individuals should be retained or replaced in key government institutions.