The paper discusses the issue of family involvement in the process of obtaining consent to treatment. Legally, doctors have a duty to inform the patient, and the patient has a right to be informed before making a decision. In this context, however, there is no requirement to involve relatives or to take into account their interests or requests. Yet, findings from in-depth interviews with NHS general practitioners presented in the paper indicate that in reality relatives have a substantial impact on the process of informed consent. Their presence may lead the doctor to provide more information to the patient and help the patient better understand the information conveyed by the doctor. Ultimately, the relatives' involvement enhances the patient's ability to make an informed decision, even though in some cases – when the relative is dominant – this may have a negative impact on the channel of communication between doctor and patient. These findings reflect a relational approach to patient autonomy. They lead the author to suggest that the current doctor-patient partnership model in English medical law would benefit by the addition of relatives as an integral component of the decision making team. Such a significant shift in the legal approach requires changes in the type of information conveyed by the doctor to the patient; in the means to increase the patient's understanding; and lastly at the point when decisions are actually made.

This paper investigates how planning regulation constructs the local, encapsulating a locality and prioritising local decision making over regional and national scales. It draws on a case study of the regulation of multiple occupation to make three interrelated points. First, the analysis emphasises the plurality of ‘locals’ and the interrelationships between them. Secondly, the paper explains how the juridification of the local is required to make a locality legally visible. This operationalisation and construction of the local (legally, spatially and socially) must take place before the political logic of localism, the prioritisation of local decision making over other scales of governance, can take legal effect. Thirdly, the paper explains how, once the ‘local’ is legally constructed and can make decisions, this prioritisation of apparently neutral local expertise and knowledge can act to enclose the spatial and social with sometimes powerful exclusionary and regressive effects.

In this paper, I use Dworkin's distinction between rules and principles to analyse the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. I argue that, inherent in many conceptions of the doctrine, is an assumption that it operates in the conclusive manner of a Dworkinian rule. I then submit that the doctrine actually functions in the flexible way characteristic of a Dworkinian principle. In support of this contention, I argue that Acts of Parliament may be balanced against competing principles or statutes; that they possess the dimension of weight or importance; and that the degree to which they will be adhered in any particular case will be contingent upon the importance attributed to any competing principle or statute. I finish the paper with an evaluation of my arguments and an attempt to anticipate potential counter-arguments.

This paper seeks to explore copyright from the perspective of John Rawls's egalitarian conception of justice. It first evaluates the classical theories for copyright. Next, it examines Rawls's principles of justice with particular emphasis on the difference principle. Then, it applies Rawls to the design of copyright law and debates on two doctrines of copyright law – namely the idea/expression dichotomy and the relevance of the merit of a work for copyright. The significance of the debate is to show that Rawls's perspective on justice offers a better justification for copyright and its principles and would potentially induce better justice.

The common law restraint of trade doctrine continues to provide valuable protection in a variety of business contexts. This paper analyses an incompatibility problem that has arisen between that doctrine and EU competition rules (in particular Art 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU [TFEU]) as implemented by EU Regulation 1/2003, which, amongst other matters, delineates the interface between national law and EU competition law. According to the High Court, once a court has applied Art 101 TFEU, Art 3 of the Regulation prevents a court from reaching a contrary finding under the restraint of trade doctrine. Thus, the court cannot find a clause is void under the doctrine if the clause comes within the scope of, but is not prohibited by, Art 101 TFEU. In effect, this conclusion displaces the restraint of trade doctrine for parties who are subject to unreasonable restraints that fall foul of the doctrine but are not prohibited by Art 101 TFEU. The interface problem and the possible solution are presented as issues of Europeanisation. The negative impact on national law deriving from an EU measure is portrayed as a ‘top down’ Europeanisation scenario. A contrary ‘uploading’ perspective reveals how and why Art 3 and associated Recitals in Regulation 1/2003 were ‘constructed’. These findings on the intended scope of Art 3 are used to challenge the High Court's view on the negative implications of the Regulation for the restraint of trade doctrine. Finally, this paper offers specific proposals as to how courts in the United Kingdom and Ireland could ensure that the restraint of trade doctrine is not an inevitable casualty of Europeanisation. It argues that when looking for a solution to the ‘top-down’ Europeanisation problem faced by the restraint of trade doctrine, the ‘uploading’ perspective of Europeanisation suggests a solution.

The idea of ‘collective memory’ features prominently in several disciplines but rarely in legal scholarship. Drawing on the work of Henri Bergson, Maurice Halbwachs and GWF Hegel, this paper seeks to present an account of collective memory that is relevant to discourse on law and policy. The paper uses the example of the policy response to the European sovereign debt crisis as a means of illustrating how collective memory of events in the distant past can shape individual behaviour and thinking. It argues that the current policy response can be explained, at least in part, by the influence on policy makers of the standard historical narrative of the Great Inflation of Weimar Germany. When, however, collective memory takes the form of Bergsonian ‘habit memory’, it can inhibit our efforts to resolve hard cases and the German government's opposition to the European Central Bank acting as a lender of last resort in the government bond markets neatly illustrates this point. If the debt crisis is to be managed effectively, policy makers must draw on Bergsonian ‘pure memory’ to explore the bounds of political and economic possibility.