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Peace is a form of cooperation, and so are the cultural technologies which make peace possible

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 January 2024

Julien Lie-Panis Open the ORCID record for Julien Lie-Panis [Opens in a new window]  and
Jean-Baptiste André
Julien Lie-Panis*
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, Département d'études cognitives, Ecole normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France [email protected] https://sites.google.com/view/julien-lie-panis [email protected] http://jb.homepage.free.fr/
Jean-Baptiste André
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, Département d'études cognitives, Ecole normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France [email protected] https://sites.google.com/view/julien-lie-panis [email protected] http://jb.homepage.free.fr/
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

While necessary parts of the puzzle, cultural technologies are insufficient to explain peace. They are a form of second-order cooperation – a cooperative interaction designed to incentivize first-order cooperation. We propose an explanation for peacemaking cultural technologies, and therefore peace, based on the reputational incentives for second-order cooperation.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e16
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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