Cases of Intervention by Invitation, 1990–2017

Dino Kritsiotis; Olivier Corten; Gregory H. Fox

Appendix II Cases of Intervention by Invitation, 1990–2017

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Afghanistan	Government of Afghanistan v. Taliban & Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan	Government of Afghanistan	United States and coalition of 42 other states	2001–present	(3) Counter-terrorism [outlined in Bonn Agreement]	Bonn Agreement, Annex 1, para. 3 : ‘Conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan security and armed forces to be fully constituted and functioning, the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan request the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force.’Footnote ³⁵⁵	UN SC Res. 1378 calls for international assistance to Afghanistan. UN SC Res. 1378 is cited in §V(5) of the Bonn Agreement. Council endorses the Bonn Agreement in UN SC Res. 1383. Council responds to Bonn Annex 1, para. 3, in UN SC Res. 1386, which creates ISAF.

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Afghanistan	Government of Afghanistan v. IS	Government of Afghanistan	Pakistan, United States	2015–17	(3) Counter-terrorism [outlined in US–Afghan and Afghan–NATO Agreements]	United States and Afghanistan entered into a security agreement on 30 September 2014.Footnote ³⁵⁶ Afghanistan and NATO entered into a status-of-force agreement on 30 September 2014.Footnote ³⁵⁷	Council commends Afghan–NATO partnership in UN SC Res. 2210. UN SC Res. 2274 ‘calls upon the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network, as well as Al-Qaida and other violent and extremist groups’.

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Algeria	Government of Algeria v. AQIM	Government of Algeria	Mali, Niger, Chad	2004, 2009	(3) Counter-terrorism [described in agreement]	The governments of Chad, Niger, and Algeria signed an agreement in early July 2003 on cooperation and joint operations for counter terrorism. The governments of Mali and Algeria agreed to coordinate their counter-terrorism efforts along their shared borders.Footnote ³⁵⁸	None

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Angola	Government of Angola v. UNITA	Government of Angola, UNITA	Soviet Union, Cuba, South Africa, United States	1975–88, 2000–01	Support to government against UNITA and FNLA rebels Support to UNITA against government	The MPLA government received substantial military assistance from the Soviet Union and, during the first half of 1975, Cuban troops had already begun to arrive in aid of the leftist movement. They would remain in the country over the next 14 years, increasing in number until reaching a peak of 50,000 in 1988. The United States and South Africa supplied the FNLA (UNITA’s predecessor), and then UNITA, with troops. The South African assistance to the FNLA/UNITA came first, and was followed by Cuban and Soviet aid to the government.Footnote ³⁵⁹	In S/Res/626 (1988) and S/Res/628 (1989), the Council noted ‘the decision of Angola and Cuba to conclude a bilateral agreement … for the redeployment to the north and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola’ and emphasised ‘the importance of these … agreements in strengthening international peace and security’. It did not condemn or approve of this intervention in any of its resolutions.

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Cameroon	Government of Cameroon v. Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)	Government of Cameroon	Chad	2015	(3) Anti-terrorism [UN SC Pres. Statement 2015/14]	Fighting started with Cameroon supporting Nigeria against Boko Haram in 2014. In January 2015, Boko Haram demanded that Cameroon scrap its constitution and embrace Islam. In the following two months, Cameroon fought battles with supporting troops from Chad.Footnote ³⁶⁰	‘The Security Council commends the LCBC Member States [which include Chad] and Benin for their continued efforts to fully operationalize the MNJTF in order to collectively enhance regional military cooperation and coordination to more effectively combat the threat posed by the Boko Haram terrorist group to the Lake Chad Basin region.’Footnote ³⁶¹

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Cameroon	Government of Government of Cameroon v. IS	Government of Cameroon	Chad	2015	(3) Counter-terrorism [Chad as part of AU Multinational Joint Task Force, which was created ‘[i]n response to the rising threat posed by Boko Haram’]Footnote ³⁶²	‘In response to the rising threat posed by Boko Haram, the African Union Peace and Security Council authorized, on 29 January, the deployment of the Multinational Joint Task Force for an initial period of 12 months, with a mandated strength of up to 7,500 military personnel.’Footnote ³⁶³	See above.

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Central African Republic	Government of CAR v. Forces of André Kolingba; Forces of François Bozizé; UFDR	Government of Central African Republic	Chad, Libya, France	2001, 2002, 2006	(1) Forces from Libya supported the president against a challenge by rebelsFootnote ³⁶⁴ Forces from Sudan and Djibouti announced as supporting democratic institutionsFootnote ³⁶⁵ French forces supported President Patassé in conflict with rebel group UFDR, which broke away from the forces of François BozizéFootnote ³⁶⁶	Libyan forces in 2001 supported President Patassé in conflict with forces led by former Army Chief of Staff François Bozizé. Sudan and Djibouti sent forces pursuant to decisions by two regional organisations, Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC).Footnote ³⁶⁷ Pursuant to a military accord, France had troops stationed in the CAR and 220 French troops were deployed in 2006 against the UFDR.	None

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Central African Republic	Government of CAR v. Seleka	Government of CAR	Chad	2012	(1) To support government offensive against the UFDR	‘Elements of the Chadian National Army crossed into the Central African Republic in the Ouham prefecture on 17 December at the request of the Government of the Central African Republic to support the counteroffensive of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA).’Footnote ³⁶⁸	‘The Members of the Security Council commended the swift efforts made by the Economic Community of the Central African States, by the African Union and by the countries in the region to solve the recent crisis.’Footnote ³⁶⁹

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Republic of Congo	Sassaou (Cobras; later Govt of Congo) v. Lissouba (Cocoyes; former Govt of Congo), Ntsiloulous	Sassou – at the time, a rebel leader	Angola, Chad	1997–99, 2002	(4) Angola joined the fight on the side of Sassou because Lissouba’s government had supported UNITA, a rebel group fighting against the Angolan government Chadian troops also joined and supported Sassou, because he was France’s president of choice in earlier yearsFootnote ³⁷⁰	Sassou sought to overthrow Lissouba’s elected regime, which he did in October 1997.Footnote ³⁷¹ In 2002, fighting erupted between Sassou and the Ntsiloulous rebels. ‘The remains of 2002 and the first three months of 2003 saw low-scale fighting … Only at one point was Ntoumi able to seriously threaten Sassou’s regime; when his Ntsiloulous launched a surprise attack on Brazzaville’s Maya-Maya Airport in June. After heavy fighting, the Cobra elements, supported by Angolan troops and army artillery fire, were able to push the Ntsiloulous back into the bush.’Footnote ³⁷³	Council ‘condemns all external interference in the Republic of the Congo, including the intervention of foreign forces, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and calls for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces including mercenaries’.Footnote ³⁷²

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
DR Congo	Government of Zaire – AFDL (the First Congo War)	AFDL	Uganda, Rwanda, Angola	1997	(4) Three states support Laurent Kabila’s AFDL, which sought to oust President Mobutu	Uganda provided troops to AFDL Most analysts conclude that Uganda’s involvement was mainly based on security concerns, as anti-Museveni rebel groups operated out of Zairian territory.Footnote ³⁷⁴ Rwandan troops assisted AFDL, aiming both to root out the Hutu militia operating from Zairian territory and to topple Mobutu, who had supported the previous regime in Rwanda, and who accepted the presence of the armed Hutu groups on Zairian soil.Footnote ³⁷⁶ The only state openly admitting to sending troops in aid of AFDL was Angola, who had the same motivation as Rwanda and Uganda. Mobutu had for years supported Angolan rebel group UNITA, allowing the rebels to launch attacks from Zairian territory.Footnote ³⁷⁷	‘The Council calls on all States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring States in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter. In this connection, it urges all parties to refrain from the use of force as well as cross-border incursions and to engage in a process of negotiation.’Footnote ³⁷⁵

(continued – J)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
DR Congo	Government of DR Congo v. RCD	RCD	Rwanda, Uganda	1998	(4) To overthrow Kabila regime, which had turned hostile to Rwanda and UgandaFootnote ³⁷⁸	After assuming power, Kabila quickly alienated many of his former allies and external supporters. In August 1998, the RCD was formed. It was a group composed of various political elements opposing the government. When the fighting began in August 1998, alliances had shifted, and Kabila’s former main backers Rwanda and Uganda now supported the rebels.Footnote ³⁷⁹	‘The Security Council reaffirms the obligation to respect the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other States in the region and the need for all States to refrain from any interference in each other’s internal affairs.’Footnote ³⁸⁰

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
DR CongoFootnote ³⁸¹	Government of DR Congo v. RCD	Government of DR Congo	Chad, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia	1998	(1) To support Kabilia government’s war against multiple rebel groups	Chad had ‘no clear reason’ for supporting the government.’ Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia sent troops under a SADC banner. Angola intervened to refuse UNITA a safe haven on Congolese territory and also because of DR Congo’s diamond sector. Re Zimbabwe: while Mugabe claimed the troops were protecting central Zimbabwean interests such as a vital electricity supply line, it is also obvious that the support given proved very beneficial economically for the country. Namibia’s troop deployment was the smallest.Footnote ³⁸³	‘The Security Council reaffirms the obligation to respect the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other States in the region and the need for all States to refrain from any interference in each other’s internal affairs.’Footnote ³⁸²

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
DR Congo	Government of DR Congo – RCD-ML	RCD–ML	Uganda	1999–2002	(4) The conflict grew increasingly complex during its second phase, as former allies turned on each other and new groups and supporters emerged. When the fighting began in August 1998, alliances had shifted and Kabila’s former main backers Rwanda and Uganda now supported the rebels.Footnote ³⁸⁴	Originally, one of the main causes behind the internal splits was divisions between the movement’s main backers, Uganda and Rwanda. Subsequently, in May 1999, RCD split into the two groups: RCD-Goma, which in this database is seen as the continuation of RCD; and RCD-ML. The former was backed by Rwanda and the latter, by Uganda.Footnote ³⁸⁵	Council ‘[d]eplores the continuing fighting and the presence of forces of foreign States in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’.Footnote ³⁸⁶

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
DR Congo	Government of DR Congo – MLC	MLC	Uganda	1999	(4) To assist rebel group seeking to topple Kabila government.	Created by Jean-Pierre Bemba in September 1998 with the aim of overthrowing Kabila, MLC launched its rebellion in November the same year. In mid-2002, an agreement was signed by the government, MLC, and most of the opposition parties, under which rebel leader Jean Pierre Bemba was to become prime minister in a new transitional government. Negotiations continued in late 2002, aiming to also include the various RCD groups in the accord and, in December, an all-inclusive agreement was reached.Footnote ³⁸⁸	Council ‘[d]eplores the continuing fighting and the presence of forces of foreign States in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’Footnote ³⁸⁷

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
DR Congo	Government of DR Congo v. M23	M23	Rwanda, Uganda	2012–13	(4) On 2 July 2012, Lieutenant Colonel Vianney Kazarama, M23’s military spokesman, told Think Africa Press: ‘[W]e are upset by the Congolese government’s fraudulent election and failure to improve the living conditions of the Congolese people; we want to chase the government in Kinshasa from power. We are calling for a revolution.’Footnote ³⁸⁹	M23 was an armed group active in the North Kivu Province of DR Congo. The group was formed by defectors from the Congolese Army, most of whom had been part of the former rebel group CNDP that had been allowed to integrate into the Congolese Army as part of the 23 March 2009 Peace Agreement.Footnote ³⁹⁰	Council ‘[expresses deep concern at reports indicating that external support continues to be provided to the M23, including through troop reinforcement, tactical advice and the supply of equipment, causing a significant increase of the military abilities of the M23, and reiterates its demand that any and all outside support to the M23 cease immediately’.Footnote ³⁹¹

(continued – O)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Georgia	Government of Georgia v. Republic of Abkhazia	Republic of Abkhazia	Russia	1992–93	(4) Support for Abkhaz independence, although Russia acted inconsistently	Russia’s role in the conflict was widely perceived to be inconsistent. Divisions between factions within the Russian government resulted in a situation in which, at some points, both sides to the conflict received substantial help.Footnote ³⁹²	Council ‘[w]elcomes … the continued efforts of the Secretary-General … and with the assistance of the Government of the Russian Federation as facilitator, to carry forward the peace process with the aim of achieving an overall political settlement’.Footnote ³⁹³

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Georgia	Government of Georgia v. Republic of South Ossetia	Republic of South Ossetia	Russia	1998	(4) Russia justified its intervention on both humanitarian grounds and upon consent of the breakaway authorities of South OssetiaFootnote ³⁹⁴	After a few clashes between South Ossetian and Georgian troops in the first days of August, tensions culminated on 7 August 2008. Georgian President Saakashvili launched a large-scale military offensive on Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. Immediately, Russia sent troops, tanks, and bomber planes to repel the Georgian Army.Footnote ³⁹⁵	None

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Guinea-Bissau	Government of Guinea-Bissau v. Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice (MJDC)	Government of Guinea-Bissau	Senegal, Guinea	1998–99	(1) Senegal and Guinea support government in aspect of conflict with MJDCFootnote ³⁹⁶	The conflict concerned Senegalese rebels in Casamançe, which borders Guinea-Bissau. Guinean Army offices in MJDC had supported Casamançe rebels. President Veira reversed prior policy and opposed the rebels. Senegal and Guinea sent troops to assist Viera’s efforts.Footnote ³⁹⁷	Security Council ‘[c]alls upon the Government and the Self-Proclaimed Military Junta to implement fully all the provisions of the agreements, including … in cooperation with all concerned, the withdrawal of all foreign troops in Guinea-Bissau’.Footnote ³⁹⁸

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Iraq	Government of Iraq v. Ansar al-Islam	Government of Iraq	United States and othersFootnote ³⁹⁹	2004–08	(1) To support the Iraqi government against an insurgency movement	In 2004–09, the Iraqi government was supported by troops from a multinational coalition headed by the United States. During these years, the foreign troops provided the majority of the military and security forces on the government side. In early 2007, the Iraqi government and the US supporting troops initiated an offensive against insurgents, as well as other violent actors. This so-called surge led to an intensification of the conflict as insurgents were being pushed north from Baghdad.Footnote ⁴⁰¹	Council approves of presence of multinational force in Iraq. UN SC Res. 1546 is accompanied by a letter from the United States offering assistance and a letter from Iraq accepting that assistance.Footnote ⁴⁰⁰

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Lebanon	Government of Lebanon v. Forces of Michel Aoun	Government of Lebanon	Syria	1990	(1) To support the government of Sunni Muslim Prime Minister Selim Hoss in a conflict with Michel Aoun, leader of the mainly Christian Lebanese Army.Footnote ⁴⁰²	Fighting between the Lebanese Army under Aoun and the Government of Lebanon began in early March, as the Lebanese Army launched a blockade on what it considered to be illegal militia posts in Beirut. In response, forces controlled by Syria and the Hoss government attacked Lebanese Army positions with mortars and artillery.Footnote ⁴⁰³ The new and the old governments claimed that they had acted according to constitutional law. The constitution did not provide an immediate solution to the problem, because it was tradition that dictated that the president should be a Christian and the prime minister a Sunni Muslim. Internationally, the government led by Hoss came to be seen as having the most legitimacy; UCDP also treats the Hoss-led administration as the government of Lebanon.Footnote ⁴⁰⁵	In 1990, the Council ‘[r]eiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries’.Footnote ⁴⁰⁴ In 2004, the Council repeated this language in a preambular paragraph, reaffirming ‘its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon’, and calling upon ‘all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon’.Footnote ⁴⁰⁶

(continued – T)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Lesotho	Government of Lesotho v. Military faction (Lesotho)	Government of Lesotho	South Africa, Botswana	1998	(5) South African and Botswanan troops supported elected government in challenge by mutinous army officers dissatisfied with electoral resultsFootnote ⁴⁰⁷	In 1998, conflict arose in Lesotho as a controversy over election results and the dismissal of a colonel triggered a mutiny within the armed forces. Even though independent observers declared the process to have been free and fair, it provoked legal challenges from the main opposition parties in 20 constituencies. The government of Lesotho called for assistance from SADC countries and, following the deployment of South African and Botswanan troops, the mutinous military faction could eventually be contained.Footnote ⁴⁰⁸	None

(continued – U)

Libya

Government of Libya v. IS

Government of Libya

United States

2016

(3) To support Libyan Government of National Accord in conflict with IS⁴⁰⁹

A critical turning point in the conflict came in May 2016, when IS fighters attacked government-loyal militias from the town of Misrata at Abu Grein.
By June, the Misratan forces loyal to the Government of Libya were deeply engaged in fierce street battles against IS inside Sirte.
On 1 August, US aircraft and naval forces began bombing targets in Sirte.
The fighting continued for several months, amid more US airstrikes, before the Bunyan Marsous Operations Room finally captured Sirte on 6 December.Footnote ⁴¹¹

On 14 June 2016, the Council, in a resolution concerning Libya, ‘[u]rge[d] Member States to combat by all means, in accordance with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and other obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts’.Footnote ⁴¹⁰
The Resolution further welcomed the Vienna Communiqué of 16 May 2016, which declares that ‘[t]he GNA [Government of National Accord] is the sole legitimate recipient of international security assistance’ and that ‘[w]e fully support the PC’s requests for security assistance to counter Da’esh and other UN-designated terrorist groups for a united national security force’.Footnote ⁴¹² This favourable statement came three months prior to the commencement of the US bombing campaign.

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Mali	Government of Mali v. Ansar Dine, AQIM, MUJAO, Signed-in-Blood Battalion, al-Murabitun; CMA; MNLA	Government of Mali	France	2013	(1) (3) Anti-terrorism and support of Malian government against Tuareg rebel movementFootnote ⁴¹³	Malian government faced challenge in the north from both Tuareg rebel groups and Islamist groups. After first the Tuaregs and then the Islamists took control of significant portions of the country, a transitional government requested and received assistance from France.Footnote ⁴¹⁴	Council welcomed ‘the swift action by the French forces, at the request of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stop the offensive of terrorist, extremist and armed groups towards the south of Mali’.Footnote ⁴¹⁵

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Mauritania	Government of Mauritania v. AQIM	Government of Mauritania	France	2010	(3) Assist Mauritanian government in attacking AQIM enclave and rescue a French citizen held hostageFootnote ⁴¹⁶	On 22 June 2010, the Mauritanian military attacked AQIM in neighbouring Mali, in what was officially claimed to be a pre-emptive strike attempting to deter a suspected AQIM attack on strategic Mauritanian interests. French troops took part in the operation, with a goal of releasing Michel Germaneau, a French aid worker taken captive by AQIM in Niger and held in Mali.Footnote ⁴¹⁷	None

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Mozambique	Government of Mozambique v. Renamo	Government of Mozambique	Zimbabwe, USSR, Tanzania, United Kingdom	1985–92	(1) Provided combat troops and military advisers to Frelimo government in conflict with Renamo rebelsFootnote ⁴¹⁸	Three neighbouring states – Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Malawi – eventually deployed troops into Mozambique to defend their own economic interests against Renamo attacks. Until 1991, the Soviet Union, together with other Eastern bloc countries constituted the Mozambican government’s main backers. From the mid-1980s, military aid was also forthcoming from a number of Western countries, of which the United Kingdom was the leading one.Footnote ⁴¹⁹	None

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State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Niger	Government of Niger v. IS	Government of Niger	Chad, Nigeria	2015–16	(3) Formed multinational joint forces, first against Boko Haram, later against IS	Soon after Boko Haram’s transformation into IS, the group’s attacks on Niger intensified. Late March and April saw the most large-scale attacks in 2015. On 30 March, IS fighters launched a significant cross-border attack on Bosso village from Nigeria, but they were pushed back after sustaining heavy losses. In early June, Bosso once again became the target of an IS attack; hundreds of heavily armed IS fighters were able to temporarily defeat the Army and briefly occupy the town. Subsequently, the Army launched a large-scale counter-attack, using air and land forces, succeeding in pushing the militants out of Bosso. The following months also saw high levels of violence, with a government offensive scoring victories against the Islamists.Footnote ⁴²¹	Security Council issued a presidential statement reaffirming ‘Member States’ determination to continue to do all they can to resolve conflict and to deny terrorist groups the ability to put down roots and establish safe havens to address better the growing threat posed by terrorism’. Council also ‘expresse[d] its concern at the continued threat posed to international peace and security by Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (also known as “Boko Haram”) … and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida’.Footnote ⁴²⁰

(continued – Z)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Nigeria	Government of Nigeria v. Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)	Government of Nigeria	Chad, Niger, Cameroon	2015–16	(3) The three states formed a so-called Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), first against Boko Haram, later against IS	In January 2015, Boko Haram carried out an attack on the town of Baga and its surrounding area, which was the base of the so-called MNJTF. In late January, a major unified offensive was launched from Chad and Nigeria. A few days later, Niger joined in. Boko Haram reformed in 2016 after splitting from IS. With the split in the movement, analysts agree that IS is mostly based in the Nigeria–Niger–Chad–Cameroon border region. In December 2016, the government announced that the last Boko Haram base had been captured.Footnote ⁴²³	The Council stated it was ‘[w]elcoming the commitment expressed by the Governments in the Region to combat Boko Haram, in order to create a safe and secure environment for civilians’.Footnote ⁴²²

(continued – AA)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Nigeria	Government of Nigeria v. IS	Government of Nigeria	Chad, Niger, Cameroon	2015–16	(3) See above	See above.Footnote ⁴²⁴	See above.Footnote ⁴²⁵

(continued – AB)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Rwanda	Government of Rwanda v. FDLR	Government of Rwanda	DR Congo	2009–16	(1) Formed regional alliance against FDLR and a Congolese rebel group previously supported by Rwanda DR Congo then seen as a secondary warring party supporting the Rwandan side in the conflict	In 2009, a new regional alliance was built as Rwanda signed an agreement with the government of DR Congo. DR Congo (Zaire) was then seen as a secondary warring party supporting the Rwandan side in the conflict. This alliance continued between 2010 and 2012, when the regional context again changed dramatically. On 23 September 2015, Rwanda and DR Congo (Zaire) launched a fresh round of security talks to start ‘a new chapter’ in their bilateral relations. Clashes between the Congolese government and FDLR in the Nord Kivu Province of DR Congo (Zaire) activated the conflict again in 2016.Footnote ⁴²⁷	Council stated that it was ‘[e]ncouraging the countries of the Great Lakes region to maintain a high level of commitment to jointly promote peace and stability in the region and welcoming the recent improvements in the relations between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi’.Footnote ⁴²⁶

(continued – AC)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Rwanda	Government of Rwanda v. FPR	Government of Rwanda	France, Zaire	1990	(1) French troops were deployed at checkpoints and also interrogated military prisoners, provided military intelligence, and trained the presidential guard, as well as other troops. In addition, France was also Rwanda’s main arms provider.	Since 1975, France had a military cooperation agreement with Rwanda, and relations between the presidents of the respective countries were close. Thus, when FPR launched its invasion, President Habyarimana invoked the agreement, and France subsequently sent troops in aid of the government.Footnote ⁴²⁸	None

(continued – AD)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Sierra Leone	Government of Sierra Leone v. RUF	Government of Sierra Leone	United Kingdom	2000	(5) British forces engaged in an escalating series of acts to support the Lomé peace agreement and counter spoiler activity by the RUF	In May 2000, the Lomé peace accord unravelled. The United Kingdom, a chief sponsor of the peace in Sierra Leone, deployed a reconnaissance team in early May to prepare to evacuate its citizens. The UK forces first secured the airport and then began to support UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Army against RUF. They were successful in pushing RUF forces eastwards. In mid-June, the UK force was replaced with a 200-strong advice-and-assist team. In September, they successfully rescued British hostages taken by another faction. British elements then remained in Sierra Leone to advise the Sierra Leonean government and military, to support the growing UN mission, and to send a clear signal to any force intent on renewed violence.Footnote ⁴³⁰	No collective statement issued on UK intervention, but support given at 11 May 2000 Council meeting by Secretary-General and nine member states, including Portugal speaking for the European Union.Footnote ⁴²⁹

(continued – AE)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Somalia	Government of Somalia v. ARS/UIC; Al-Shabaab	Government of Somalia	Ethiopia	2006–08	(1) (3) Ethiopian troops supported the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against challenges by the Union of Islamic Courts and Al-Shebab	In 2004, the TFG was created, but it almost immediately fell into conflict with a series of Islamist groups. In that same year, the TFG requested the deployment of regional forces from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union. The Security Council had previously imposed an arms embargo on Somalia, and such an intervention would require that an exception be made. This exception came in UN SC Res. 1725, in which the Council permitted the deployment of an IGAD peacekeeping mission to Somalia. While this process played out, Ethiopian troops entered the country to support the TFG and played a decisive role in conflicts, first with the Union of Islamic Courts and, after 2007, with Al-Shebab.Footnote ⁴³²	Council had numerous opportunities to condemn the Ethiopian presence, which the Secretary-General specifically noted in his reports. Yet it issued no such condemnation.Footnote ⁴³¹

(continued – AF)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
South Sudan	Government of South Sudan v. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Opposition	Government of Sudan	Uganda	2013–15	(1) Uganda sent troops into South Sudan five days after the fighting had broken out and claimed that the government of South Sudan extended an invitation to intervene	With the help of Ugandan troops, government forces wrested control of the towns of Bor, Bentiu, and Malakal back from rebel troops.Footnote ⁴³³	‘The members of the Security Council also strongly discouraged external intervention that could exacerbate the military and political tensions.’Footnote ⁴³⁴

(continued – AG)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Sri Lanka (Eelam)	Government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) v. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers)	Government of Sri Lanka	India	1987–90	(1) Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), numbering 75,000–90,000 troops, engaged in fighting in Sri Lanka	On 29 July 1987, the Indo–Sri Lankan Accord was signed. The terms of the truce specified that the Sri Lankan troops withdraw from the north and the Tamil rebels disarm. It also provided for the introduction of the IPKF in Sri Lanka. The Indo–Sri Lanka Accord, however, did not include LTTE and, soon after it arrived, the IPKF became deeply entangled in regular warfare with the Tamil Tigers. The last IPKF troops withdrew from Sri Lanka in March 1990.Footnote ⁴³⁵	None

(continued – AH)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Sudan	Government of Sudan v. SPLM/A	SPLM/A	Chad	2003/2004–06	(1) Chad deployed troops in Darfur which fought, together with the Sudanese government, against the SPLM/A	The SPLM/A, a rebel group based in southern Sudan, took up arms against the Khartoum regime in 1983. Chadian troops fought, together with the Sudanese government, in Darfur against the SPLM/A in 2003.Footnote ⁴³⁶	Council praises the efforts by the African Union to facilitate peace talks in Sudan, as well as the ‘humanitarian forces’ that have been deployed to Sudan and Darfur specifically. But although the Council takes note of Chad’s efforts, it offers no specific condemnation or approval of Chad’s military support of Sudan.Footnote ⁴³⁷

(continued – AI)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Syria	Government of Syria v. IS	Government of Syria	Russia, Iran	2015–16	(3) Military aid to government to counter rebel and jihadist groups	Syria lost territory to ISIS. On 29 June 2014, ISIS proclaimed a caliphate; at the same time, it changed its name to the ‘Islamic State’. Russia intervened in the Syrian conflicts on 30 September 2015 after an official request from the Assad government. Russian planes conducted air strikes. From the outset, Teheran supported several pro-regime militia groups, which were transformed into the National Defense Forces in 2013 with the help and training from Iran. Further, the Lebanese group Hezbollah and various Shi’ite groupings hailing from Iraq, as well as from within Syria, also participated on the government’s side. These were considered Iranian proxy forces.Footnote ⁴³⁹	Council addresses a variety of issues in the conflict but not external intervention by states.Footnote ⁴³⁸

(continued – AJ)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Syria	Syria v. Syrian insurgents	Government of Syria	Russia, Iran	2015–16	(1) While Russia and Iran’s stated goal was to counter IS insurgents, they also targeted non-IS rebel groups	Russia received invitation from Assad government. The ‘Syrian insurgents’ includes actors with different ideological perspectives – from relative moderates to Salafi hardliners (including al-Qaeda affiliates).Footnote ⁴⁴⁰	Council adopted multiple resolutions in regard to Syria during this time. It ‘[r]eaffirm[ed] the primary responsibility of the Syrian authorities to protect the population in Syria and, reiterat[ed] that parties to armed conflict must take all feasible steps to protect civilians’. It ‘[s]trongly condemn[ed] the arbitrary detention and torture of individuals in Syria, notably in prisons and detention facilities, as well as the kidnappings, abductions, hostage taking and forced disappearances’.Footnote ⁴⁴¹

(continued – AK)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Uganda	Government of Uganda v. Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)	Government of Uganda	South Sudan, DR Congo	2008–09	(3) The armed forces of Uganda, DR Congo, and Southern Sudan launched Operation Lightning Thunder to push out the LRA members	In 2002, Uganda and Sudan signed an agreement aimed at containing the LRA. On 14 December 2008, the armed forces of Uganda, DR Congo, and South Sudan launched Operation Lightning Thunder, beginning with a surprise air strike against Camp Swahili, LRA’s main camp in the DR Congo. Operation Lightning Thunder continued through the rest of December and into 2009, amidst massive violence carried out by LRA against the civilian Congolese population. Operation Lightning Thunder was ended on 15 March 2009, and the Ugandan troops officially left DR Congo. The armed campaign continued through the rest of the year, however, albeit more covertly.Footnote ⁴⁴³	‘The Security Council strongly condemns the recent attacks by the LRA in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Southern Sudan, which pose a continuing threat to regional security … The Security Council commends the States in the region for their increased cooperation, and welcomes the joint efforts they have made to address the security threat posed by the LRA.’Footnote ⁴⁴²

(continued – AL)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Uzbekistan	Government of Uzbekistan v. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	Government of Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan	2000	(3) Forming a new cooperative security initiative; pushing out IMU	IMU is an Uzbek rebel group fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. However, its operations have taken place not only in Uzbekistan but in the whole region of Central Asia. The two-year conflict in Uzbekistan was fought as much in the neighbouring countries as in Uzbekistan itself. The IMU had bases in Tajikistan, and several clashes took place between IMU and the Kyrgyz Army on Kyrgyz territory.Footnote ⁴⁴⁴	None

(continued – AM)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Yemen	Government of Yemen v. Forces of Hadi	Forces of Hadi	Bahrain, UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan	2015–16	(5) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), led by Saudi Arabia, responded to an invitation from President Hadi to assist in fighting against Huthi rebelsFootnote ⁴⁴⁵	Then Vice-President Hadi stood for election on 21 February 2012 and won 99.8% of votes. However, the Houthis (a Zaydi Shi’ite group based in the north of Yemen) rejected the GCC process, claiming it did not represent the entire Yemeni people, and boycotted the election. The Houthis aligned themselves with still-influential former President Saleh and his remaining supporters, and moved from the north to expand their territorial control. By September, the Houthis had taken control of the capital, Sana’a. The Houthis later signed, but then violated, a peace agreement. On 24 March 2015, President Hadi requested foreign military aid from the GCC. Two days later, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states launched Operation ‘Decisive Storm’.Footnote ⁴⁴⁷	In Resolution 2216, the Council affirmed the democratic legitimacy of Hadi’s government and condemned Houthi actions that could undermine the transition. However, the Council did not explicitly endorse the GCC action.Footnote ⁴⁴⁶

(continued – AN)

State in Which Intervention Occurred	Conflict	Party Being Supported	Intervening State(s)	Date(s) of Intervention	Purpose(s) of InterventionFootnote ³⁵⁴	Description	Security Council Reaction
Yugoslavia	Government of Yugoslavia v. Kosovo Liberation Army (UKC)	Government of Yugoslavia	NATO	1999	(4) Supported Kosovo against Serbian military incursions	On 24 March 1999, NATO launched an air bombardment campaign on Yugoslavian military installations in Kosovo and Serbia. The offensive was designed to force Yugoslavian capitulation to a peace plan.Footnote ⁴⁴⁸	Council passed a series of resolutions demanding a halt to Serbian actions and, after the bombing campaign ended, effectively put Kosovo under an international trustreeship. But it never explicitly approved or disapproved of the NATO action – although a Russian resolution to disapprove was defeated.Footnote ⁴⁴⁹

Book contents

Appendix II - Cases of Intervention by Invitation, 1990–2017

Summary

Appendix II Cases of Intervention by Invitation, 1990–2017

Book contents

Appendix II - Cases of Intervention by Invitation, 1990–2017

Summary

Appendix II Cases of Intervention by Invitation, 1990–2017

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