In the employment context, non-competes are contractual terms which provide that once the employment ends the employee cannot work for another employer in the same industry or field (i.e. a competitor), within a specified geographic area, for a specified time. The existing law and practice regarding non-competes in Australia is plagued with confusion and uncertainty. Non-competes also have adverse economic consequences; they are associated with reduced employee mobility and consequent negative impacts on wages and productivity.
The use of non-competes by Australian business has increased over the past 5 years and absent a policy response; this trend is likely to continue. Non-competes are no longer limited to highly paid executives but now apply to about one in five Australian workers, across income, age, occupational, and education groups.
The distribution and prevalence of non-competes in Australia are broadly consistent with data in other developed economies. A number of jurisdictions within the Organisation for Economics Co-operation and Development have imposed restrictions on the use of non-competes. The US Federal Trade Commission is considering a ban on their use and, in the UK, the government has announced its intention to limit the term of non-competes to 3 months. In Australia, the Competition Minister has recently asked the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and Treasury for advice on the competitive aspect of non-competes. The Australian Government released an Issues Paper (https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-04/c2024-514668-issues-paper.pdf#page40) – ‘Non-competes and other restraints: understanding the impacts on jobs, business and productivity’ in April 2024. The Issues Paper outlines the existing research and evidence in Australia and overseas on the use and effects of non-competes. A public consultation process will conclude in May 2024 and Treasury will advise the Government on the outcomes of the consultations by the end of 2024.
After reviewing the arguments for and against restricting the ‘reach’ of non-competes, I conclude that the weight of the evidence favours a regulatory response to ameliorate the unfairness inherent in the existing law and practice. A number of possible regulatory responses are considered.