This article examines the extent to which EU and European human rights law, following the enactment of the European Communities Act 1972 and the Human Rights Act 1998, have changed the manner in which English courts use comparative law in the private law field. Despite legislative intervention rendering EU law part of the national legal system and requiring the courts ‘to take into account’ the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, there remains evidence that private law courts retain a preference for comparisons within the common law world. This article will examine, with reference to a number of recent empirical studies, the reasons for this position and what this signifies in terms of future comparative law reasoning.

This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the framework of transition and the enactment of a new constitution for Egypt. It does so by using the relatively under explored concept of transitional constitutionalism, interrogating some of the key claims on which transitional constitutionalism is based, and questioning their application in the Egyptian context. By doing this the paper explores the broader paradox of the imposition of a framework of transition that is rooted in principles of liberalism in the context where liberalism is far from the agreed or prevailing political model.

This article offers a fresh examination of the distinction drawn in international humanitarian law (IHL) between international and non-international armed conflicts. In particular, it considers this issue from the under-explored perspective of the influence of international human rights law (IHRL). It is demonstrated how, over time, the effect of IHRL on this distinction in IHL has changed dramatically. Whereas traditionally IHRL encouraged the partial elimination of the distinction between types of armed conflict, more recently it has been invoked in debates in a manner that would preserve what remains of the distinction. By exploring this important issue, it is hoped that the present article will contribute to the ongoing debates regarding the future development of the law of non-international armed conflict.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the best interests principle codified in Article 3 in particular, is playing an increasingly significant role in decisions involving the admission or removal of a child from a host State. This article examines the extent to which the best interest principle may provide an independent source of international protection. That protection may, for instance, proscribe the removal of a child from a host State notwithstanding that the child is ineligible for protection as a refugee or protection under the more traditional non-refoulement obligations in international human rights law.

With the increased awareness of national security concerns associated with unauthorized disclosure of State secrets, the legal protection of State secrets on national security grounds has assumed renewed significance, while raising ever growing concerns about its impact on freedom of information. Between these competing policy concerns lies a discrete area of law that defines and protects State secrets from unauthorized communication or disclosure. This article aims to ascertain the actual State practice concerning State secrets protection on national security grounds across different countries, and examines common challenges to the delimitation of national security grounds for State secrets protection in light of the changing national security environment.

The 1951 Refugee Convention does not apply to a person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that ‘he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ (Article 1(F)(c)). To date, this exclusion clause has generally been interpreted by courts, commentators and UNHCR in a static manner which fails to take into account developments in international law and practice. This paper considers the ‘evolutive approach’ to treaty interpretation, generally, and applies this approach, alongside standard rules of treaty interpretation, to Article 1(F)(c). This paper challenges a number of assertions commonly made regarding this clause, and concludes that it should be interpreted to the effect that conduct amounting to serious or sustained human rights violations, such that would constitute ‘persecution’ for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention, meets the standard for exclusion under Article 1(F)(c).

The UN Security Council's practice of targeted sanctions has resulted in serious limitations on the enjoyment of targeted individuals' human rights. The European Court of Human Rights pronounced on this issue in two instances. In the cases of Nada (Grand Chamber judgment) and al-Dulimi (Chamber judgment) the Court was asked to evaluate the lawfulness of the domestic implementation of sanction measures against the ECHR. Surprisingly, each Chamber opted for a different solution. The present article will discuss these solutions and evaluate them within the broader framework of international law, the Court's jurisprudence, and the conflicting interests involved.

The idea of investment treaty arbitration as public law is in tension with the concept of international law as a law between representative public agencies. This concept of international law is valuable for its capacity to progress a broad range of public policy aims in an integrated and coordinated manner, including aims extending beyond the economic sphere such as international social, environmental, cultural and related aims. The probable effect on this concept of international law of a radical ‘internationalized public law’ approach to investment treaty arbitration requires further thought, especially with regard to the potential implications of recognizing investor rights under international law.