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Are Kantian Emotions Feelings?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 June 2021

Uri Eran
Uri Eran*
Affiliation:
Technion – Israel Institute of Technology
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

According to Alix Cohen, Kant defines emotions as ‘feelings’. Although I find her account of Kantian feelings compelling, I provide three reasons to doubt that it is an account of emotions: (1) it is unclear why Cohen identifies emotions with Kantian feelings; (2) some Kantian feelings are not emotions; (3) some Kantian desires may be emotions. I propose, however, that with some qualifications Cohen’s account may be upheld, provided its extra-textual assumptions about emotions are explicated. Against her claim that Kantian feelings have a derived intentionality, I argue that the text is compatible with their being intrinsically intentional.

Keywords

feelingsemotionspleasuredesiremoral psychologyAlix Cohen
Type
Article
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , September 2021 , pp. 371 - 378
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

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