In this paper, I assert that the prohibition on the death penalty brings with it an obligation on abolitionist States to refrain from assisting the use of the death penalty in retentionist States. By considering the law on complicity and State responsibility, the obligation to protect under international human rights law, and the practice of States, I argue that although there are jurisdictional issues and although the death penalty is not prohibited under general international law, an obligation to refrain from being complicit in the death penalty is developing in international law.

This article examines whether there are any limitations on constitutional amendment powers that are external to the constitutional system and above it—‘supra-constitutional’ limits. It considers the theory and practice of the relationship between natural law, international law or other supranational law, and domestic constitutional law in a comparative prism. After considering the alleged supremacy of supranational law over constitutional amendments, the author explores the problem of the relationship between the different legal orders in the external/internal juridical spheres, and the important potential and actual role of national courts in ‘domesticating’ supranational law and enforcing its supremacy. It is claimed that despite the growing influence of supranational law, state practice demonstrates that constitutional law is still generally superior to international law, and even when the normative hierarchical superiority of supranational law is recognized within the domestic legal order, this supremacy derives not from supranational law as a separate legal order, but rather from the constitution itself. Therefore, it is claimed that existing practice regarding arguments of ‘supra-constitutional’ limitations are better described by explicit or implicit limitations within the constitution itself, through which supranational standards can be infused to serve as valid limitations on constitutional amendment powers.

While the rights of domestic workers are expanding in international law, including through the adoption of the ILO Domestic Workers Convention in 2011, migrant domestic workers remain particularly vulnerable to employment-related abuse and exploitation. This article explores the intersection of the employment law and migration law regimes applicable to migrant domestic workers in the United Kingdom, France and Ireland. The article suggests that the precarious immigration status of many migrant domestic workers renders employment protections, such as they exist in each jurisdiction, largely illusory in practice for this group of workers. The labour standards contained in the Domestic Workers Convention, together with the recommendations of the UN Committee on Migrant Workers on the features of an appropriate immigration regime for migrant domestic workers, are identified as providing an alternative normative model for national regulatory frameworks.

Neither in England, nor in Germany, nor in all Canadian provinces, does the law provide specific rules for the redistribution of property for unmarried cohabitants after the breakdown of their relationship. Instead, courts apply the law of trusts, contract and unjust enrichment with an eye to the characteristics of intimate relationships, as, for example, in decisions like the English Jones v Kernott ([2011] UKSC 53) and the Canadian Kerr v Baranow (2011 SCC 10). This article compares English, Canadian, and German case law and evaluates it both from a doctrinal perspective and as a part of a general approach towards cohabitation. The article concludes with an appeal for legislative action that strikes the right balance between party autonomy and protection of the weaker party.

The legal framework pertaining to the use of private armed guards protecting merchant ships from Somalia-based piracy is complex, sometimes ambiguous, and currently in a state of flux. Against the background that commercial shipping increasingly relies on Private Maritime Security Companies and that various regulatory projects on the subject matter are underway, this article sketches out what domestic and international rules govern the use of force and firearms by private armed guards on board merchant ships today. It concludes that at this juncture an effort to coordinate this legal framework is necessary, both regarding the interpretation of existing rules and the creation of new norms.

English private international law generally gives a potential role, where appropriate, to foreign law, by allowing for the application of choice of law rules to determine its relevance. Yet in the context of anti-suit injunctions granted otherwise than in aid of a contractual right not to be sued, choice of law is conspicuously absent. In those cases, courts simply apply the lex fori without paying any regard to foreign law, although the notion of comity is taken into account in the final decision on whether to grant anti-suit relief. Clearer identification of the grounds for granting such relief should limit application of the lex fori to instances where the anti-suit injunction serves as a form of ancillary relief to protect the judicial processes of the forum, and in which comity plays no role. In all other cases, which ultimately concern private justice between the parties, comity is best understood as an expression of justice in cases involving foreign elements, and better reflected through choice of law rules, which might lead to the application of foreign law. This approach is preferable to invoking comity as a consideration relating to the manner in which the court regulates the grant of anti-suit relief, because courts tend to bestow rights, which parties may not otherwise have, under the cloak of comity. Understanding comity as the catalyst for taking account of foreign law assuages concerns about interfering with foreign courts, acts as a deterrent to remedy shopping, and provides greater certainty as regards the vindication of rights. The case for widening the application of choice of law in this context does not depend on Rome II, but if the principle is accepted, courts must follow the process which it specifies.

On 31 October 2012 the Supreme Court of England and Wales handed down its judgment in Rahmatullah v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State for Defence [2012] UKSC 48. The case concerns an application for habeas corpus brought by a citizen of Pakistan originally detained by the United Kingdom in Iraq before being transferred into the custody of the United States. Rahmatullah addresses important issues concerning the extraterritorial reach of habeas corpus under English law in respect of persons held in the custody of a foreign State, as well as the international rule of law. The case may be considered a legal victory for persons detained without trial by the US in facilities thought to be beyond the reach of the courts. However, in reality any strength in the arm of the law is drained by the priority given to the conduct of foreign affairs, ‘forbidden territory’ for the courts, over the Court's ruling and the UK's obligations under international law. The case is examined in the light of similar jurisprudence from US and Australian courts.

The vexed question of State immunity and the extent and application thereof has once again found its way to the International Court of Justice (the Court) in the form of the Case Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy).1 On this occasion, the precise question concerned the so-called ‘territorial tort exception’ to State immunity and involved an assessment of the immunity to be granted to Germany, by Italy, in relation to compensation claims brought in Italy by Italian claimants against German armed forces and the organs of the German Reich during the Second World War.2

This case1 marks the first pronouncement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) in international law. It is the second contentious case in which the ICJ has held the defendant country in breach of its obligations under a human rights convention. The ICJ both added to the corpus of norms it has formally recognized as peremptory norms (jus cogens) and also reinforced the principle that former heads of state are subject to universal jurisdiction for grave violations of international law.