“If it is not too paradoxical”: archaeology in İstanbul under occupation as a window into understanding the creation of a post-war cultural heritage regime

Abstract

This article studies how Allied archaeological activities in Ottoman lands between 1918 and 1923 were part of the post-war negotiations over those territories. It uses the occupation of İstanbul as a reference point to understand the larger reconstruction of the Middle East through the inspection of practices and policies used by the Allies in the realm of cultural heritage. It explores the changes that World War I brought to this realm and asks what kind of practices were used and why. Using archival documents and archaeological literature, it argues that the Allies used institutions like museums and schools of archaeology, scholarly activities such as excavations and publications, and laws and regulations on cultural property to make geopolitical claims in the region and legitimize their occupation while acquiring as many antiquities as possible. By comparing the motivations, practices, and results of Allied archaeological activities in the capital to those elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, this study shines a light not only on the making of the post-war cultural heritage regime but also on the emerging geopolitical system in the Middle East.

Introduction

An anti-British proclamation which the British authorities suspect emanated from Ottoman sources was published in Hannar [sic], Abyssinia (in contemporary Ethiopia) in the third year of World War I (British Library (BL) IOR/L/P&S/11/94, August 1916). The proclamation declares that the British will “take the black stone [of Mecca] in a short time to the Museum in Europe and exhibit it.” The proclamation is another example that illustrates the religious rhetoric that Ottomans used to galvanize Muslim peoples both inside and outside of the Ottoman Empire against their European enemies (Zürcher 2016). What is perhaps more surprising is that the writers of the proclamation invoked the threat of an enemy power sending one of the most holy relics of Islam to a European museum. This proclamation reflects therefore the anxiety caused by the removal of valuable objects from Ottoman lands, especially now that there was a real threat of European occupation. It also displays the degree of public awareness regarding the European desire to take cultural, historical, and religious objects back home and exhibit them.

Europeans were very much aware of this anxiety. For example, in 1919 the British military representative in İzmir recognized that “all those who are interested in antiquities bear England a grudge for having had many objects of the greatest interest and beauty removed from Asia Minor” (National Archives, UK, FO608/82, May 21, 1919). Europeans also had to face new international public sentiment vis-à-vis the protection of what today we call cultural heritage that emerged in the early years of the war as a response to German destructive activities on the Western front. This awareness, combined with post-war uncertainty about the territorial distribution of Ottoman lands, along with their strong desire for Middle Eastern antiquities paved the way for Europeans to take legal and institutional steps to defend their ability to export antiquities from the Middle East.

Influential actors like the head of the British Museum Frederic Kenyon (1863–1952) wanted to change the Ottoman laws (Madran 1996; Papatheodorou 2017) that required retaining all the antiquities found in the excavations in the country of origin. In a letter to the Foreign Office, Kenyon claimed that “Great Britain … is now responsible in the eyes of the world for the continuance, under proper conditions, of the archaeological research …” Acknowledging in the same document the tension between the rhetoric of safeguarding antiquities and the fact of exportation that might be considered as looting he adds: “…, if it is not too paradoxical, that the object of the Museum is not plunder but the advancement of knowledge …” (BL IOR/L/P&S/10/742, May 17, 1920). We see the same rhetoric in İstanbul under Allied occupation, where French forces conducted excavations and justified their actions as contributions to the beautification of the city (Shaw 2003) while engaging in a tug-of-war with Ottoman archaeological authorities over the right to excavate and export their findings (Abi 2021; Coşkun 2023; Ercan Kydonakis 2022; Özlü 2024). Archaeologist Le Roy, when writing about this period, calls it a schizophrenic archaeological situation (Le Roy 1996).

The history of archaeology in the Middle East has received considerable attention from scholars over the past few decades. There are a number of groundbreaking works focused on individual countries (Bahrani et al. 2011; Bernhardsson 2005; Çelik 2016; Krings and Tassignon 2004; Reid 2001; Shaw 2003) studying the perceptions and uses of antiquities and laws regarding their protection and movement, among many other topics. This literature highlights a constant conflict over control of antiquities between the European empires and source countries like the Ottoman Empire. The latter took robust actions to establish sovereignty over antiquities in its territories. For the post-war period, several great works have also explored the variety of experiences of different countries in the Middle East (Boytner et al. 2010; Chevalier 2002; Goode 2007; Griswold 2020; Melman 2020; Meskell 1998). However, there has been a lack of studies until recently on the cultural heritage-related activities in Ottoman lands that were occupied by the Allies.

This article is based on the emergent literature and documents from various European archives and archaeological journals from the period. It seeks to bring in a holistic perspective, taking into account all European belligerents and without regard to the present-day borders which, in the immediate aftermath of the war, were still in the making. It discusses activities related to archaeology conducted in many locations, but it connects those to the ones in İstanbul under occupation to get a clearer picture of the making of the post-war order. İstanbul is used as a special reference point because it was occupied by not one but many Allied powers (American, British, French, Greek, and Italian forces) between November 1918 and October 1923, the period which this paper covers. Moreover, the Allied powers undertook many archeological activities in the city – including excavations, efforts to establish archaeological schools, and the drafting of a new antiquities law – which had parallels elsewhere in the Empire. What the Allies were and were not willing and able to do in the city and the rest of the Empire reveals their conflicting motivations in the Middle East in the immediate post-war period.

Background: uses of antiquities during armed conflicts

Historically speaking, there is nothing unusual about victors engaging with the material remains of the past (Jevtić and Yalman 2018). Conquerors have long used cultural artifacts to emphasize their victory over their captured territories. In the modern era, victorious powers have also used the material remains of the past to justify control over people they considered “less civilized,” by accusing them of being unable or unwilling to take care of the antiquities in their lands. This type of argumentation can be found plentifully in, for example, the British and French colonization of North Africa, especially in the nineteenth century (for example, Chevalier 2002; Munzi 2001; Oulebsir 2004). The Europeans and Americans also frequently criticized the Empire, especially in the nineteenth century onwards, for not being willing or able to protect their antiquities. Punitive actions using historical materials were also common: one only needs to remember the British and French looting of the Chinese Emperor’s Old Summer Palace at the end of the Second Opium War in 1860 or the Benin Bronzes that the British took from Nigeria during the Benin Expedition of 1897 (Hicks 2020). Looting after a military expedition was such a common practice that Queen Victoria did not have any qualms about naming a Pekingese lion dog, taken from the looted Old Summer Palace, “Looty” (Keyl 1861).

Throughout the nineteenth century, especially after the Napoleonic looting of art around Europe, there were attempts to regulate the rules of armed conflict and what can and cannot be done with historical monuments, art objects, and antiquities. There were many initiatives like the Lieber Code, the Brussels Declaration, and the Hague Conventions that showed a rise in the general awareness of the need to protect antiquities, but most of these were merely recommendations (Schindler and Toman 1988). The Lieber Code of 1863, a national document written for the Union Army during the American Civil War, recognized the distinction of what today we call cultural heritage and the need to protect it against harm during a military operation. Under Article 36, conquerors could seize and remove items, yet because their ultimate ownership was to be decided by the peace treaty, occupiers could not sell, give away, or wantonly destroy or damage these objects. Similar principles emerged in international initiatives as well. In 1874 the Brussels Declaration, prepared by delegates from fifteen European states, banned the destruction or seizure of enemy property not demanded by the necessity of war. Article 17 argued for the protection of buildings dedicated to art, science, or charitable purposes “as far as possible.” The Hague Conventions on land warfare and their accompanying regulations, which were adopted in 1899 and 1907, went further. Article 56 of the 1899 Convention prohibited seizing, destroying, or intentionally damaging cultural and scientific institutions, historical monuments, and works of art or science and introduced the possibility of punishment.

World War I was a new opening for the regulation of wartime activity. As a truly global war, the impact of what happened on one front was felt heavily on the others. Perhaps one of the best examples of this is how German cultural destruction on the Western Front affected the way the war was fought in Ottoman lands. In the first year of World War I, the Germans destroyed important historical and cultural monuments in Western Europe like Reims cathedral and the Cloth Hall in Ypres and burned the Louvain library. European and American publics reacted with outrage to these destructive activities. The Allies used the destruction for propaganda and condemned the Germans as “barbaric Huns,” who were uncivilized and evil (Ascherson 2005; Kramer 2007). To counter that Germans created monument protection units in the Western front, and one in Syria together with Cemal Paşa (Wiegand and Cemal Paşa 1918). The Allies thus used a language that bound civilization with the protection of antiquities. This made an international and permanent mark on our relationship with the material remains of the past.

When confronted with and using the devastating actions of the Germans on the Western Front for their propaganda purposes, the Allies had to exercise caution wherever their forces were present. Accordingly, they issued regulations to protect antiquities in the lands that they occupied in enemy countries or stationed in the territories belonging to their allies. Italians fighting on the Alpine front against the Austro-Hungarians issued regulations in 1915 to protect the historical and artistic heritage in the Austrian areas they occupied (Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS) Presidenza dei Consigli dei Ministri (PCM) Guerra Europea B73 fascicolo 19.2, May 25 and June 29, 1917). During the Macedonian Campaign, in 1916, the French Army of the Orient in Thessaloniki issued a memo concerning “archaeological and artistic discoveries” and later that year a proclamation called “the Instruction on the Conservation and Research of Antiquities” that defined the official protocol for actions to be taken by the soldiers in the event of a discovery of antiquities. The goal of the proclamation was also to avoid looting and circulation of antiquities, which could result in the disruption of scientific inquiries (Abi 2019). In 1917 they expanded this regulation to protect heritage from expatriation, harm, and illegal trafficking. In the Ottoman territories, Nikolai Yudenich, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies entering Ottoman lands, noticed that “individuals, sometimes not members of the army, subject ancient monuments to thoughtless damage and destruction, or, under the pretext of preserving them for science, subject them to petty trading” (Üre 2014). Thus, in March 1916, he declared ancient monuments, without exception, to be under state protection from destruction, and that plundering, sale, purchase, or unauthorized collection of cultural property were strictly forbidden in the areas occupied by the Russian army (Üre 2014). The British also issued proclamations and regulations to protect antiquities in Ottoman lands. Only two months after entering Baghdad in 1917, the British administration in a proclamation declared all antiquities to be the property of the administration of the occupied territories and prohibited all unauthorized removal of them (BL IOR/L/P&S/10/689, May 22, 1917). In April 1918, the British issued an order to protect antiquities in Babylon from the damage done by their own soldiers (BL IOR/L/P&S/10/689, April 6, 1918). The British scholarly institutions were also very much aware of the archaeological potential of Ottoman lands that the British army did not control (BL IOR/L/P&S/10/742, January 9, 1918). At the end of the same year the pro-Jerusalem Society, founded by Sir Ronald Storrs, the British military governor of Jerusalem, published an Antiquities Proclamation issued by the Major-General of Occupied Enemy Territory Administration, South (Money 1921). This proclamation declared all antiquities to be the property of the administration and banned alteration, restoration, movement, or disposal of any antiquity without the approval of the administration. In another article, they emphasized that they would not tolerate destruction or any damage to any ancient monument or site. The British took other active steps not to look like looters. For example, under the Greek occupation of Western Asia Minor, the British officer in the region, together with the Ottoman kaymakam (district governor) and some Greek officers, went to inspect the Bergama Museum in October 1919 to ascertain if the Germans had taken antiquities from the museum and to ensure that no such behavior occurred under their rule (Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN) Occupation de Smyrne, Correspondances avec les départements 3 B. 1, February 3, 1920).

All of these Allied proclamations reflect the awareness of the concept of protection of antiquities and their importance. They all assert state/army ownership of the antiquities in the areas these armies occupied and declare the buying and selling of antiquities illegal unless done under a license provided by the authorities. They put the movement of antiquities under strict control, required archaeologists to get approval from military authorities before carrying out excavations, and required people who found antiquities to hand them over to Allied authorities. The Allied proclamations about antiquities all expressed the anxiety about antiquities and how their actions would be perceived in their home countries and people in the occupied territories. Thus, they professed a duty to protect them and control their movement. They did not completely forbid their expatriation. The military administrations wanted to control the flow, not stop it.

The cautiousness of the Allies in matters of antiquities can be easily traced to the actions of the Germans. For example, even before the Armistice, the British were wary of the topic. The Foreign Office strongly deprecated the projected removal of antiquities for it exposed “the British administration of occupied territory to criticism of enemy propaganda” (BL IOR/L/P&S/10/689, July 25, 1918). A few months later they repeated the sentiment:

The methods of wholesale pillage pursued by the Germans in territories under their military occupation have been universally condemned, and nowhere more vehemently than in this country. It surely behoves [sic] us scrupulously to avoid any action that could give a pretext for similar charges against ourselves (BL IOR/L/P&S/10/689, September 19, 1918).

There was an additional reason for the British and French forces to be cautious, along with their desire to avoid looking like looters: the anticipation of future ownership of some parts of the Ottoman lands. The coming of the Wilsonian principles and the concept of mandates as civilizational assistance also contributed to the cautious attitude of Allied officials and shaped the language they used. The new League of Nations assigned tutelage over these lands to the Allies, and that meant international scrutiny. In 1919, the head of the British Foreign Office declared his reluctance to export antiquities from Mesopotamia, their future mandate, pointing out that eventually there would be local museums there, and that the peoples of these countries would develop preservation schemes for their antiquities parallel with their “national development” (BL IOR/L/P&S/10/689, January 27, 1919). Even in the document that gave the title of this paper, Kenyon magnanimously concedes that “they [the British Museum] are willing to give full consideration to the interest of the country of origin” (BL IOR/L/P&S/10/742, May 17, 1920).

Despite this cautiousness, the Allies were aware of and excited about the archaeological opportunities that the war and occupation provided them and took active steps to benefit from their military presence. In World War I, for example, the French excavated during the Gallipoli campaign (Courby et al. 1915; Krempp 2017). Both the French and the British conducted excavations during the Macedonian campaign (Shapland and Stefani 2017). Archaeological authorities back home in Britain were excited about the British occupation and the opportunities they knew it would provide. As early as June 1917, for example, authorities from the Victoria and Albert Museum expressed their hope that if the antiquities left behind by Germans were to be distributed “the claim of the Victoria and Albert Museum would be borne in mind” (BL IOR/L/P&S/10/689, September 19, 1918). When the war came to an end, despite the changing norms around cultural heritage, the Allies turned to the familiar tools of European imperial expansion, claim-making, and legitimacy: the creation of archaeological schools, engaging in scholarly research and excavations, establishing antiquities departments, and writing new antiquities laws to replace the Ottoman laws.

The resurgence of schools of archaeology after World War I

Many European powers and later the United States opened archaeological schools in the nineteenth century onwards in Italy, Greece, and Egypt, the source countries easily accessible to European diplomats and scholars. These schools helped them to extend their influence and their knowledge about these countries. In Greece, for example, the French, Germans, Americans, British, Austrians, and Italians opened schools of archaeology between the first half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. The Europeans intended for these institutions to demonstrate the value they placed on scholarship and the study of the past and thus their status as civilized states. In some cases, it also helped them make historical claims over the territories they studied. The first foreign archaeological school established in İstanbul is a case in point. The Russian Archaeological Institute, which was established in 1895, not only worked predominantly on the Byzantine history of Ottoman lands, but also used the scholarship to support Russian claims to Ottoman lands, including its capital city during the war (Üre 2014).

It is no surprise therefore that the idea of establishing schools of archaeology was in the minds of European scholars after the war and received the support in the high echelons of their governments. For example, the British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem was established in 1919 and started its activities in 1920. The patrons of this school were noteworthy: the Prince of Wales, the head of the British Academy and the British Museum Frederic Kenyon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Curzon (1859–1925), Edmund Allenby (1861–1936), who was the High Commissioner in Egypt, and Herbert Samuel (1870–1963), who was the High Commissioner in Palestine. The mandate administration in Palestine even suggested that the director of the institution should undertake the organization and direction of the Department of Antiquities in Palestine.

According to this suggestion, the school would focus on the research and study of the past, and the department would be in charge of the protection of antiquities and monuments. The British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem would not collect and exhibit antiquities: instead, antiquities

which may come into possession or ownership of the School not claimed by the Government nor required for demonstration or educational purposes shall be divided entirely among public museums except when large numbers of similar objects are available in which case they may be distributed to subscribers (British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem 1920).

The British School of Archaeology was not alone in Jerusalem (Pottier 1922). There were already French and American schools with which they could collaborate and compete. The American school in Jerusalem, “The American School of Oriental Study and Research in Palestine,” which was closed due to the war reopened in 1919 and started publishing its new journal the Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research (Seger 2001). In 1923, the Americans opened their second school in Baghdad. The French Practical School of Biblical Studies (École pratique d’études bibliques), established in 1882 in the city, changed its name to the French Archaeological School of Jerusalem (École archéologique française de Jérusalem) in 1920 (French Archaeological School of Jerusalem 2024). The French school published its first academic journal Syria: Revue d’art oriental et d’archaeologie in 1920, under the patronage of the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria, General Gouraud (Syria 1920).

Their quickness in publishing their journal was noted by the British (BL IOR/L/P&S/10/742, October 13, 1920). The French preparations for the creation of an antiquities service and museums in Syria started two weeks before the Armistice (November 11, 1918) in the Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles, in the shape of a proposal to have a conference on Syria (Al-Maqdissi 2020; Chevalier 2002). That conference materialized on January 3–5, 1919 and called for the creation of museums and libraries in Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem, the creation of a specialized school for Arab and Islamic Sciences, and, finally, the creation of a general administration for organizing archaeology (Al-Maqdissi 2020). Italian scholars, state officials, and entrepreneurs also started making plans early on. For example, the archaeologist Biagio Pace organized a conference in 1915 called “Towards the Region of Antalya,” which underscored not only the immense archaeological potential of the region but also its agricultural, mineral, and commercial opportunities, which were “neglected due to the lack of Turkish initiative.” The past splendors of ancient Pisidian cities he argued were a testament to this potential and the neglect (D’Andria 1986).

The French were also interested in establishing a school of archaeology in İstanbul. The Byzantinists Jean Ebersolt (who conducted research in 1920 in the city) and Charles Diehl both tried to establish a French archaeological school in İstanbul during the occupation. Diehl’s efforts seem to have gone further, as a potential building was found near Gülhane Park, across Alay Köşkü and very close to the Ottoman Imperial Museum and not too far away from excavations they conducted (discussed in more detail below). Diehl planned for this institution to be devoted to Byzantine studies. The rich library of the Assumptionists, a French Catholic mission established in Kadıköy which had been active since the late nineteenth century in the study of Eastern churches and the history of the Byzantine Empire, would be transported to this new building. According to Halil Edhem [Eldem] Bey (1861–1938), the head of the Ottoman Imperial Museum, the Assumptionists required a place of worship in the building. However, the building was also the site of a masjid, thus making it unacceptable for the Ottoman administration to house a Christian chapel (Etem 1937). ¹

The French also considered locating the archaeological school in the old barracks in Beyazıt, between Süleymaniye mosque and the Ministry of War. However, the building was considered too big and in need of too much repair, making it prohibitively expensive for the French. The active search seems to have stopped towards the end of the occupation. One can surmise that changing political realities on the ground as the Turkish nationalist movement advanced, along with financial concerns, led to a temporary halt to the plans of establishing a French school in İstanbul (CADN 71-IV, 1920). The efforts only became fruitful in 1931, with a building within the French embassy in Beyoğlu (Etem 1937).

Despite the very fluid future of the Middle Eastern lands, around the same time the French made their move, the Italians and possibly the Greeks started to plan schools of archaeology in İstanbul and elsewhere in the Ottoman territories that they deemed to be of interest. The Italians, who were conducting archaeological studies in the places they occupied in Asia Minor, had plans to establish archaeological schools there in Antalya, Konya, and Rhodes, where they had economic priorities (ACS PCM Guerra Roma fascicolo 15.16, August 1920; Elliott 2004). The French Archaeological School in Athens, which published the Bulletin de correspondance hellénique, reported that the Greek state was also planning to open an archaeological institute in İstanbul (Bulletin de correspondance hellénique 1920). The Italians approached the Turkish authorities to establish one in 1925. The Greek and Italian archaeological institutes never materialized. The German one opened its doors in 1929 (German Archaeological Institute Istanbul 2024), and the British one in 1947 (British Institute at Ankara 2024).

Keen yet cautious: archaeological excavations

The Allies also carried out archaeological studies and excavations in the years after the signing of the Armistice of Mudros (October 30, 1918). In May 1919, the Greek forces landed in western Asia Minor and claimed these lands as a part of the Greek state. Accordingly, they started to establish their state apparatus. Archaeology was part and parcel of the Greek government and an important tool for claiming these territories. Accordingly, the Greek High Commission in İzmir established the Greek Archaeological Service of Asia Minor. After the Sèvres Treaty of 1920, the service was renamed the Archaeology Department of the Greek Governance of Smyrna. The goal of this department was to protect ancient monuments, “to salvage and collect movable antiquities,” to conduct excavations, and to manage the archaeological finds and the collections organized by foreign archaeological institutes which were “abandoned and left unguarded by the Ottoman government after the end of World War I, with considerable losses” (Lekakis 2019). Accordingly, this department, together with the Archaeological Society at Athens, excavated at Chios in 1920 (Bulletin de correspondance hellénique 1920), at Klazomenai in August and September of 1921, at Saint John Islet during August and September 1921, and at Ephesus and Nysa in the summers of 1921 and 1922 (Lekakis 2019; Paschalidis 2022; Pavli 2013). The Greeks sometimes utilized Ottoman prisoners of war and prisoners from local penitentiaries, since local workers had harvesting duties during the summer. Greek archaeologists also conducted research trips to identify, document, gather, and transport antiquities from the countryside to Smyrna with the help of the Greek army. The Greek administration published their activities for 1921–1922 in a special issue of the Archaeologikon Deltion, the official annual of the Greek Archaeological Service (Davis 2000).

Under the Greek administration, the Americans returned to their excavations by the American Society for Excavation of Sardis, the American School in Athens, and the Fogg Museum of Harvard in Kolophon (also spelled Colophon) (Butler 1922; Davis 2000). We learn from American sources that Halil Edhem Bey was offended by the fact that both the Sardis and Kolophon excavations were conducted without his knowledge or approval. He demanded reports and wanted to know the whereabouts of the findings. As time passed by, Halil Edhem Bey sharpened his tone to call these excavations “illegal affairs” (National Archives, USA, Personal Papers, 1919–2000 Grace Reilly Rayhor, April 17, 1925). The return of objects taken from Sardis created tensions between the Americans and Ottoman (and later Turkish) state officials (Goode 2007). Another American mission, under archaeologist Francis Kelsey, conducted an expedition in 1919 that was focused on collecting Greek, Syriac, Persian, and Armenian manuscripts (Watenpaugh 2019). Greek officials also provided permits to the French School in Athens for excavations in Notion, which I will discuss more below.

The British also conducted archaeological excavations and put in place protective measures in the areas under their control. As early as 1918, an official from the British Museum, Captain Reginald Campbell Thompson, serving in the intelligence branch, was tasked with the preservation of ancient sites and buildings and conducting research in Mesopotamia and Palestine (BL IOR/L/P&S/10/742, February 11, 1919; Bernhardsson 2005). He started excavations in the ancient city of Eridu (BL IOR/L/P&S/10/742, September 9, 1919). The excavations in Eridu were taken up by Harry Reginald Hall in 1919, who extended them to Tell ‘Obeid and Ur (Llewellyn Smith 1973). The British and the French both sent experts to act as antiquities inspectors to the region in 1919. British historian of Arab Art Captain Creswell (1879–1974), archaeologist Captain Ernest J. H. Mackay (1880–1943), French artist Léonce Brosse (1871–1945), and archaeologist Robert du Mesnil du Buisson (1895–1986) were in charge of lands stretching from Adana to Jerusalem (National Archives UK, FO 608/82, August 28, 1919). They collaborated during the Sherifian period (1918–1920) to prepare a report on the general conditions of archaeological sites and the state of conservation of buildings (Al-Maqdissi 2020; Chevalier 2002).

In 1919, Italian scholars who disembarked on the southern shores of Asia Minor conducted many archaeological explorations, from Konya, Antalya, Bodrum, and all the way to Kuşadası (Scuola Archeologica Italiana di Atene 1921; Scuola Archeologica Italiana di Atene 1924). They conducted excavations on the Roman road that connected Konya to Antalya and collected antiquities (Petricioli 1990). Italians also undertook restoration and conservation work in Bodrum, Cos, and Rhodes (Bulletin de correspondance hellénique 1920). Ottomans were monitoring Italian activities (Çelebi 2018; Coşkun 2023) and from time to time interfered to demand the stop of the exportation of finds (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA) Dahiliye Nezareti İdare-i Umimiye DH.I.UM 5-2.239 (1337 Z 21); BOA Dahiliye Nezareti İdare-i Umimiye DH.I.UM 5-2 245 (1338 Za 08); Abi 2022; Çelebi 2018).

The French conducted several excavations in Asia Minor, including on the Gallipoli peninsula. The first excavation was at a prehistoric site, the so-called tumulus of Protesilas (also spelled as Protesilaus). They carried out another excavation at the necropolis of the ancient Greek city of Eleonte (Elaious) (Demangel 1926; Picard 1921). This excavation was started during the war as mentioned above (Courby et al. 1915) and antiquities collected were sent to the Louvre during the war (CADN 71-IV, April 7, 1921). The illicit and controversial nature of the French excavations and expatriations are well documented (Ercan Kydonakis 2022). The French did not seek permits to excavate or export antiquities from either the Ottoman authorities, or the Greeks, who claimed the Gallipoli area. When the Greeks confronted the French, invoking Greek antiquities laws, the French argued that because they started excavations during the war, prior to the Treaty of Sèvres, the Greek claims were not valid (CADN 71-IV, August 5, 1921). Nonetheless, recognizing that the future of these lands was still undecided in 1921, the French decided to act cautiously. The letter from the French High Commissioner in İstanbul to his Greek counterpart declared that he could not possibly interrupt the excavations considering the “higher interest of science.” However, he was willing to order that the objects found would be temporarily kept in Gallipoli for “the sake of the future and out of pure concern for fairness” (CADN 71-IV, August 22, 1921). The French later changed their minds, despite Ottoman and Greek efforts to stop the shipment of antiquities. Some of their discoveries were, “after some tugging with the Greek prefect of Gallipoli,” sent to the Louvre Museum and some were sent to the “Turkish national museums” in 1923 (Salaville 1927).

The French also returned to Phocaea, which they had had to leave due to the beginning of the war, and started excavations. Félix Sartiaux and his party conducted archaeological work and topographical and geological studies (Hermary 2012; Sartiaux 1921). There were research trips to Teos in October 1921 (Demangel and Laumonier 1922) that paved the way for further excavations in 1923 (Archives de l’École française d’Athènes, May 28, 1923). Another excavation was the one mentioned above in Notion–Claros, under the Greek Department of Antiquities of Smyrna (Archives de l’École française d’Athènes, May 28, 1923; Demangel and Laumonier 1923). To the best of my knowledge, the only permit the French applied for and received from any archaeological authority was for their excavations in Notion. They sent at least a proportion of their findings to the island of Samos which was under Greek rule for safekeeping (Archives de l’École française d’Athènes, May 28, 1923).

In İstanbul under Allied occupation, there were excavations as well. The first attempt was made by the British. The British School in Athens corresponded with the Foreign Office regarding the possibility of undertaking an excavation in the Hippodrome in the old city in 1919. The British School recognized that the situation was politically difficult as the future of İstanbul was not settled. However, they were eager to make sure that “credit for it [excavations] should go to British explorers.” Interestingly, they added that “there need be no thought of moving from Constantinople any important objects of art that might be found, our aim being to work quite disinterestedly for the promotion of archaeological knowledge” (National Archives, UK, FO 608/82, August 27, 1919). The British ended up not conducting these excavations during the occupation of İstanbul, but they did in the first years of the Turkish Republic (Casson 1928). The emphasis on not seeking to export antiquities sets this attempt apart from the French excavations in the city.

The French Ministry of Public Instruction sent a mission in 1920 to conduct studies in İstanbul. The selection of excavation sites was also related to the placement of the French troops in the old city (Mamboury 1936). The French forces, while looking for a place to store their wine, discovered the subterranean caves and this led to excavations (Abi 2021; Ercan Kydonakis 2022). The French occupation army, together with French scholars, conducted excavations in Gülhane between Demirkapı and Ahırkapı (also known as the Byzantine Mangana quarter) in three phases, one every year from 1921 to 1923 (BOA Hariciye Nezareti İstanbul Murahhaslığı HR.İM.235.80, 1922). The manpower they used came from their occupation soldiers. The French did not apply for a permit from the Ottoman authorities to excavate at the site, which was located close to the Imperial Museum. The Ottoman archaeological authorities tried at first to stop these excavations and, when they failed, tried to control them and corresponded with the French to gather information and make sure that their discoveries were delivered to the Imperial Museum (Abi 2021; Ercan Kydonakis 2022; Özlü 2024).

Another excavation was conducted in Makriköy (contemporary Bakırköy). The French troops were placed in Ottoman barracks in Bakırköy (Demangel and Mamboury 1939). These barracks were built in 1914, and, during their construction, the Ottomans came across Byzantine ruins, which Ottoman Imperial Museum officials studied briefly (Macridy-Bey and Ebersolt 1922). The bifurcation of the authority in Ottoman lands, namely the establishment of a new government in Ankara in 1920 and the changing power dynamics between the French and the new government, played a role in the development of this excavation. After the signing of the Treaty of Ankara between the Ankara government and the French, two officers from the Imperial Museum, Théodore Makridy-Bey (1872–1940) and Aziz [Ogan] Bey (1888–1956) were allowed to attend the Makriköy excavations in return for rights to use the library of the Imperial Museum by the French archaeological team (Özlü 2024). From 1921 onwards the French team worked with the Imperial Museum; Makridy-Bey and Ebersolt, one of the French archaeologists, published their findings together (Demangel 1945; Macridy-Bey and Ebersolt 1922; Mamboury 1936).

The French School of Athens contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of collaboration between the French and Turkish authorities. Despite this collaboration, the delivery of antiquities found in these excavations to the Imperial Museum was far from automatic or easy. Halil Edhem Bey had to persistently demand the return of the antiquities from the French (BOA Hariciye Nezareti İstanbul Murahhaslığı HR.İM.235.80, 22.1.1339 [1923]) and the government in Ankara objected to the French placing the finds in a small make-shift museum established in Gülhane instead of sending them to the Imperial Museum directly (CADN 71-IV, 46/3; Özlü 2024). The issue remained a matter of tension even after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923, and the subsequent French evacuation from İstanbul.

Looking for permanence: museums and laws

Some of these excavations and research trips led to the establishment of museums. The Greeks organized dozens of archaeological warehouses in Mudanya, Sardis, Ephesus, and İzmir. Antiquities coming from Çivril, Afyon Karahısar, and Kütahya were sent north of İzmir and stored in a large military depot. Antiquities coming from Eskişehir, Seyitgazi, and Bursa were stored in a depot by the İzmir railway station (Lekakis 2019). They also created improvised exhibitions of local archaeological collections (as in the school of Ayasuluk, contemporary Selçuk). The Greeks also established multiple museums. In a small mosque at the entrance of Ayasuluk castle at Selçuk, a small depot–museum of Byzantine antiquities was created with the finds of excavations carried out at the Basilica of Saint John. Another small museum was established in Pergamon, converting the largest room of the ancient market, and placing antiquities found around the neighboring area, including the material used for the construction of a nearby Ottoman school. Finally, the Greek Department of Antiquities arranged the archaeological collection of the Evangelical School, which became the place to transfer antiquities from the area. The collection also included donations from the local Seferiadis family and other members of the local community (Davis 2000; Lekakis 2019). This was to be the Asia Minor Museum. Konstantinos Kourouniotis (1872–1945), the second superintendent of Antiquities of the Greek Archaeological Department in İzmir (from January 1921 to September 1922), mentioned plans for a Museum of Asia Minor Antiquities in İzmir, as the central museum institution of the new territory, following the model of the National Archaeological Museum of Greece. All this activity pointed towards a plan and desire to stay in Asia Minor permanently.

In Cilicia under French occupation, the French governor of the city of Adana, Colonel R. Normand created the Adana Museum for antiquities found by military personnel and local civilians. They added the pre-existing Ottoman collection in Silifke and the archaeological finds left behind by German excavations in Zincirli and Carchemish (spelled also as Karkemish or Karkamış) to their collections (Normand 1921). Normand did send some of their finds to the Louvre (Bulletin de correspondance hellénique 1920). The Italians also created a museum with pieces that the Italian scholars and the army collected during their occupation, along with objects donated by citizens of Antalya (D’Andria 1986). The Italian archaeologist Della Seta announced that the restored Bodrum castle would be a great location for the future site of an Asia Minor Museum (Bulletin de correspondance hellénique 1920).

The French and British also started planning and opening museums in their future mandates (Bernhardsson 2005; Chevalier 2002; Ouahes 2018; Watenpaugh 2004). The plans and establishment of museums can be seen as a signal of French and Italian plans to maintain a long-term presence in the territories they controlled. It also points towards their territorial claims. For example, the Italian and Greek claims overlapped, and both used archaeology to establish their historical legitimacy (Llewellyn Smith 1973). With the changing political and military circumstances in Asia Minor, the Greeks, French, and Italians had to leave these plans behind.

The intention of maintaining long-term control can also be found in the Sèvres Treaty signed in 1920 and it served as a template for all of the antiquities laws to be made in Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in the following years. The Sèvres Treaty had two articles and a lengthy annex that aimed to shape the new cultural heritage regime in the post-war era. The Allies wanted to change the Ottoman antiquities laws that they found too limiting for not allowing the division of finds and expatriation of antiquities outside Ottoman lands. They argued that the prohibition on dividing and expatriating finds encouraged smuggling. The treaty demanded that the Ottoman antiquities laws be replaced within a year and the division and expatriation of finds reintroduced. It also required that antiquities that the Ottomans had taken from areas that had become mandates be transferred to the mandate administrators. This demand represented a claim by the Allies of ownership of the Ottoman lands. It was also meant to settle confusion about antiquities that the Ottomans and Germans had sent to Europe during the war, such as the Samarra antiquities and the Lisbon collection (Bernhardsson 2005; Melman 2020). The confusion was not only about ownership but also about the changing norms regarding war trophies and the “sacred trust of civilisation” that the League of Nations bestowed upon the mandatory powers (League of Nations 1919; Pedersen 2015). Moreover, European scholars were divided over the issue of division and expatriation of artifacts. That debate stemmed in part from a scientific shift in this period. The introduction of stratigraphic digs pointed towards the importance of the preservation of finds in situ (Griswold 2020). This political and scientific shift encouraged scholars and administrators to establish local museums and engage in systematic inventories of archaeological sites. Nevertheless, European mandate holders and the Americans continued to engage in large-scale export of antiquities.

In İstanbul, Halil Ethem Bey, the head of the Ottoman Imperial Museum, drafted an Antiquities Bill in 1921 to fill the requirements of the Sèvres Treaty. It allowed division and exportation (Çal 2005). However, the draft bill was not ratified and never put to use. The French forces resisted Ottoman demands; however, in the end they did not send the antiquities they found to France. The scholars involved seem not to have classified these artifacts as war trophies. They sent their finds to the Ottoman Imperial Museum in İstanbul. What I called an idiosyncratic power dynamic in the occupied city of İstanbul discouraged the French from expatriating archaeological finds, even as they did so in other Ottoman territories (Abi 2022). Also, these excavations do not seem to be punitive missions as there is no mention of such description in the French archives. Nevertheless, they did not attempt to obtain an excavation permit in the occupied city unlike their excavation in Notion under the Greek Administration of İzmir. Davis (2000) argues that France and the United States recognized the sovereignty of Greece in Asia Minor by sending their respective archaeological schools to excavate under their authority.

In both İstanbul and Asia Minor, the Allies were taking advantage of the situation on the ground. In Asia Minor, the Greeks saw the advantage of pleasing the Allies by accepting their archaeological schools. In İstanbul, the Ottomans were operating from a disadvantaged place as they were in a city under occupation, but they pushed occupiers for information, negotiated their activities, and tried to control the flow of antiquities. In Ankara, the new nationalist government also knew the importance of cultural heritage in their dealings with the Allies and in constructing a new national identity as they opened the Anatolian Civilizations Museums in 1921. However, it should be regarded more as a depot than a museum, as the museum as we know it today developed much later (Gürol Öngören 2012). In 1922, they established a directorate for Antiquities in Ankara (Hars Müdüriyeti). In the same year, the Ankara government also took steps to safeguard Islamic sacred relics from the British Government, declaring “The British must only [be allowed to] take the relics through the use of weapons and bloodshed” (Tongo and Schick 2023). The government also pursued an active policy during the Lausanne Conference of 1923, protecting the Turkish state’s rights over its antiquities as well (Özlü 2024).

The Greek forces came to western Asia Minor with clear intentions of staying and making the İzmir region a part of Greece proper with all the institutional infrastructure necessary. So did the French and British in greater Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. The Italians had serious plans too; although their archaeological teams were not as extensive as those of other Allied powers, their territorial ambitions certainly were. The intention of remaining long term in those lands made the Allies act systematically with an eye on the future. Greeks aimed to incorporate the territory into their nation, whereas the other European visions were more akin to colonial projects. This is why we see so many initiatives to create archaeological schools, conduct excavations, and establish museums. The fact that many academic publications accompanied these ventures attests to a genuine desire by scholars from Allied countries to create knowledge and share it internationally. At the same time, an intentional and unintentional side effect of these publications and other academic endeavors was legitimizing the territorial claims of the Allies. In İstanbul, where the Allies did not claim ownership, the French excavations reflected a mixture of opportunism and caution. The French occupational forces and scholars could not get all they wanted, such as shipping finds home and opening their archaeological school in İstanbul during the occupation. They were also cautious in only excavating in locations that were directly under their jurisdiction. The fact that excavations in İstanbul were on Byzantine sites, an area of interest to French scholars and the French public for historical, cultural, and religious reasons, was a welcome boon.

Article 241 of the Sèvres Treaty demanded the writing of a new antiquities law that had equitable terms for the expropriation of antiquities between all nations. Scholars from various European countries tried to influence the Paris Peace Conference to establish international oversight of archaeology to ensure the principle of equality of access to antiquities and archaeological sites. The fact that there were articles in the treaty specifically on antiquities shows the importance given to the topic by the Allies. During the war and its immediate aftermath, scholars, museum officials, and diplomats in Europe spent many hours discussing the future of archaeology in the Middle East (for example, there were no antiquities clauses for the British Mandate in Togoland but there were in all of the Middle Eastern mandates). The plans they developed oscillated between trying to take measures that would not “offend Moslem susceptibilities” (National Archives, UK, FO 608/240, March 15, 1919) and those that completely ignored Ottoman rights (National Archives, UK, FO 608/82/3, January 11, 1919). They actively pursued the alignment of respective antiquities laws and an international regime for cultural heritage. They used international treaties, and the newly established League of Nations as means to hold very internationalized discussions over cultural heritage. Treaties and the League of Nations were also to create international checks and balances in dealing with archaeological affairs.

Conclusion

The black stone in Mecca still stands today where it was when the anti-British proclamation was written back in 1916. The British did not take it to Europe and display it in a museum. Nonetheless, the Ottoman worries about the war increasing the chances of European expatriation opportunities proved to be correct. In this article, I surveyed the first years after the end of World War I in the Empire and examined Allied archaeological activities. I argued that these activities which occurred in an unstable political period were guided by conflicting motivations and at times seemed paradoxical. For example, the French operated with official excavation permits under the Greek administration around İzmir but without one in İstanbul under Allied occupation. The British administration was very worried about being accused of repeating the actions of Germans and labeled as looters. But at the same time, top British museums were pushing hard to get as many antiquities as possible from the Middle East. There were many international collaborations, for example between the French and British authorities and scholars in greater Syria to protect antiquities. There was even collaboration in İstanbul despite the tensions resulting from differences of opinion regarding the destination of antiquities found. Nonetheless, these collaborations were limited as competition over the lands was ongoing.

What motivated these conflicting actions? The first motivation was to take advantage of the great opportunity that occupation allowed for some Allied scholars, soldiers, and politicians. The occupation provided unprecedented access to important archaeological sites and, in some cases, the chance to send their finds to Europe. In İstanbul, the French excavations were also a result of this unprecedented access. The second motivation was to establish territorial claims to Ottoman lands via the material remains of the past. Despite efforts to align antiquities laws and establish international oversight, the pursuit of archaeological endeavors often intersected with the geopolitical interests and territorial ambitions of the Allied powers in the aftermath of the war. The systematic approach by the Greek administration towards archaeology in Asia Minor is a great example of this.

The third and fourth motivations were very much connected to the second one. The Allies wanted to assert their claim to belong to the highest civilization and to legitimize their occupation in the eyes of the peoples who lived in the lands they claimed and also to international audiences by using the protection and study of antiquities. They used the establishment of museums, archaeological schools, antiquities departments, and excavations as a marker of civilization and benefited from prestige resulting from such activities. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations tied the exercise of administering powers to the concept of a “sacred trust of civilisation” and portrayed the Allies as more civilized countries who were given the right to govern the less civilized. We see this rhetoric of benevolence and civilization used by the Allies both in the Middle East, for example in their defense of excavations in İstanbul and in the explanation given when the museum of Adana was created by the French.

The creation of administrative mechanisms for antiquities was part of the creation of a mandatory state apparatus as a whole, which was designed to appear benevolent while favoring European interests. High levels of engagement by the upper echelons of European governments with archaeological activities speak volumes about how much they saw these activities as beneficial to the mandate project. However, there were two issues with this motivation. The rhetoric of benevolence clashed with the opportunity to send antiquities to European museums. Accordingly, we see conflicting opinions and practices, and much negotiation between different state organs on how to proceed with archaeological matters. Moreover, the portrayal of Ottoman lands as uncivilized was problematic. In places like Adana, and Jerusalem, the antiquities museums that the Allies claimed to have established actually had collections organized by the Ottoman authorities (St. Laurent and Taskömür 2013). There had been antiquities regulations in Ottoman lands since the middle of the nineteenth century. In İstanbul, there was a large and respected museum and what today we might call a cultural heritage management system, complete with scholars and administrators in charge of the archaeological affairs of the Ottoman realm.

The fourth motivation that guided Allied archaeological activities was to look good internationally. The growing interest of international public opinion regarding the protection of cultural heritage became a paradigm shift during the war, spurred by the German destruction of cultural heritage. The value of international oversight was also recognized by the Covenant of the League of Nations and became a part of the mandatory system.

All of these sometimes-clashing motivations were instrumental in Allied decisions on where to excavate and build museums, archaeological schools, and departments. In İstanbul, the French seized the great opportunity for access provided by the occupation. Their ability to forgo applying to the Ottomans to excavate in İstanbul signals the disparity of power between the occupiers and the occupied. Even though they had no territorial claims on the city, the French occupiers still utilized the civilizational argument to justify their excavations. Their lack of concern gave way to caution as the political and military context changed, and they took into consideration their future relationship with the Ottoman authorities.

The Allied forces that occupied Ottoman lands and their governments had to face much confusion that came with the opportunity to radically reconfigure the Ottoman territories. We find fervor, caution, confusion, and change in their dealings with archaeology. The Allies employed the usual cultural tools in their imperial toolbox. Establishing archaeological schools and museums, and conducting excavations were dual-purpose acts: knowledge creation and imperial expansion. However, in this period, these tools were used with clashing motivations. These clashes brought different practices in different places. A more colonial attitude in Mesopotamia and greater Syria, a national one in the İzmir region under Greek occupation, and opportunistic and negotiated practices in İstanbul. The Treaty of Sèvres and the creation of the mandates changed the toolbox and added international oversight and antiquities laws to set up a new cultural heritage regime in the Middle East.