Codified in Articles 27 and 15(1)(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights [ICESCR], respectively, cultural rights are still read as distinct from linguistic and religious freedoms. The ICCPR vests cultural rights only in “persons belonging to minorities”, instead of groups. This paper attempts to analyze the reasons for the deficiencies in the ICCPR/ICESCR cultural rights regimes. In so doing, it unpacks the implications of these deficiencies for three current conflicts in Asia—the alleged persecution of Rohingyas in Myanmar, Uighurs in China, and Kashmiri Muslims in India—which are replete with cultural rights violations. It then tests whether the richer culture-based jurisprudence in international criminal law can offer lessons for the recalibration of cultural rights under the ICCPR/ICESCR. In particular, whether such cross-fertilization can trigger the jurisdiction of alternative forums to enforce state responsibility for these violations.

The International Court of Justice [ICJ] delivered its Judgment on Jadhav (India v. Pakistan) in 2019, finding Pakistan in breach of its obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963. Thus, Pakistan is under a continuing obligation to provide, through the means of its own choosing, effective review and reconsideration [ERR] of Jadhav's conviction and sentence. This paper comments on the ICJ's Jadhav Judgment and its implications for Pakistan and India. It also evaluates the legal option if India is not satisfied with Pakistan's implementation of the ERR process effectively. In this situation, India can approach the ICJ again. This paper finds that the possibilities of India's request to be admissible before the ICJ under Article 60 of its Statute are relatively higher than the possibilities of its successful adjudication on the merits.

The distinction between disputes of sea boundary delimitation and disputes over the existence of maritime entitlements was one key element of the legal argument that the Philippines brought forward against China in the Philippines v. China Arbitration. On the one hand, the distinction between delimitation and entitlement allowed the Tribunal to establish its jurisdiction on several Philippine submissions despite the jurisdictional exclusions of China's declaration under Article 298(1)(a)(i) of the Law of the Sea Convention. On the other hand, the Tribunal's finding about the lack of China's entitlements has important consequences. China and a number of lawyers objected to the jurisdictional separability of entitlement and delimitation. The aim of this paper is to discuss the question of whether a tribunal can establish jurisdiction on the existence of maritime entitlements in a context where jurisdiction on boundary delimitation is excluded and where a determination of entitlements has consequences for boundary delimitation.

For any foreign investor, protection of their investment is a primary concern in host states. National legislations and BITs usually provide legal security to them so that they can exercise their desired economic freedom in host countries. Without legal safeguards for their investments, they will not be motivated to invest their capital further. Like other host states, generally, the national laws and BITs of Bangladesh provide significant investment protection guarantees. This paper will discuss how far the protection through judicial or arbitral settlement is established in the legal framework and BITs of Bangladesh. Dispute settlement mechanisms in Bangladesh, various ICSID cases involving Bangladesh, and conflicts between Bangladesh and foreign investors are discussed. The paper also covers the issues and challenges of judicial arrangements in Bangladesh, and findings show that dispute settlement arrangements in Bangladesh are not up to international standards and require significant development. Last, recommendations are provided for consideration.

This paper explores the legality of the land closure imposed upon the Gaza Strip by Israel. After having considered the area under occupation, the paper argues that the legality of the closure must be determined under international humanitarian law, international human rights law, the principle of self-determination of peoples, and the Israeli-Palestinian agreements. In the light of these rules, the arbitrary closure of the Gaza Strip should be considered illegal because it breaches the unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and because it violates the freedom of movement of the local population. Moreover, the closure breaches the relevant rules pertaining to the transit of goods in occupied territory. The paper concludes that most of the violations caused by the closure affect peremptory rules which produce obligations erga omnes, so that any state in the international community is entitled to react under the law of state responsibility.

This paper considers the international legal implications of certain civil lawsuits that recently resulted in Japanese companies being ordered to pay compensation to Korean victims of forced labour, focusing specifically on whether investor-state arbitration could provide a means of redress against judgments affecting those companies. After identifying the jurisdictional hurdles that those companies might face were they to challenge those judgments before an Arbitral Tribunal, this paper explores the most relevant treaty protection disciplines that could be relied upon in bringing such challenges, and discusses the remedies that a competent Arbitral Tribunal could prescribe were it to find that those judgments were not in conformity with Korea's international obligations. Building on existing jurisprudence, this paper shows that investment arbitration may provide a means for offsetting the adverse consequences of Korean forced labour litigation, but also highlights a number of difficulties that the Japanese companies would face in pursuing such an avenue.

Even before Bangladesh's submission on the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 miles from its baseline reaches the head of the queue awaiting the attention of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the maritime boundary delimitations with Myanmar (2012) and India (2014) have produced a unique situation, in which Bangladesh's seabed boundaries have been fully delimited with both neighbours, creating a single continuous outer limit landward of the one submitted to the Commission. This may mean that there is no need to await the Commission's reaction to Bangladesh's submission, as there is nothing to stop Bangladesh simply beginning to exploit areas on its side of the two boundaries. This paper examines whether the position is really that simple, and whether any other state might have grounds for objecting if Bangladesh does so, together with deficits of co-operation that may confound early moves to exploitation.

The development of uncrewed maritime vehicles [UMVs] has the potential to increase the scale of military maritime surveillance in the exclusive economic zones of foreign coastal states. This paper considers the legal implications of the expanded use of UMVs for this purpose. It shows how features of the legal regime—namely how its application depends on determining the intent of a vessel's operation (to distinguish marine scientific research from military surveillance), as well the obligation to have due regard—have a “dynamic” quality that will pose a challenge to UMVs operated by autonomous technology. The legal obligations will require equipping UMVs with the capacity to communicate something about their identity, the purpose of their mission, and to be able to have some capacity to be responsive to the economic and environmental interests of the coastal state.

Mainstream international law is Eurocentric. Throughout the past half millennia, no territory beyond Europe was safe from jus gentium's striking capability to legitimize the intrusion of European civilizational precepts. Beginning with the Americas but quickly shifting to Africa and Asia, each continent was a battleground for the penetration of a provincial knowledge system. In this paper, I explore the implications of Eurocentrism for international legal pedagogy. While textbook authors now pay homage to other civilizations, their effusions are ornamental only. Instead of supporting epistemological equivalency, they centre European international law throughout their works, exorcising the brutalities of European history that generated the law in question. After setting out the dilemma, I outline three approaches towards transforming international legal pedagogy that capitalize on the decolonization movement. Each method builds on the premise that, without epistemic diversity, legal pedagogy will continue to rationalize European international law's predatory impulse.