What explains business views regarding policy preferences in the Eurozone crisis? Although recent literature examines the impact of the crisis on citizen views, few studies examine business preferences towards adjustment policies. We present unique data from a new representative survey of 500 high-level firm representatives from Spain to test theories about such preferences, in particular views about the euro, fiscal austerity, and wage devaluation, as well as plausible mechanisms for such preferences. We test three broad families of theories to explain such preferences, focusing on the role of structural firm characteristics, economic hardship, and political leanings of firm managers. We find that first, there is a strong conservative position regarding all of these policies. Second, we find that contra conventional approaches to explaining preferences, for the domestic policies (but not for euro views), the political leanings of firms matter much more than baseline structural characteristics. Third, we find that surprisingly economic hardship does not cause firms to demand more left-wing policies, as it might for voters; in fact, firms that have suffered are likely to be more skeptical of such measures. These findings indicate the need to better measure political orientations of firm respondents and suggest that this is a larger division among firms than previously recognized.

In a globalized and hegemonically organized international economy, the economic fundamentals and policy choices of the hegemon often have spillover effects for peripheral economies. This is a well-recognized dynamic of the contemporary political economy, but it was true during the first age of globalization as well. Motivated by literature examining the impact of the U.S. macroeconomic conditions on other economies throughout the international system, this article advances a systemic theory of financial crisis and applies it to the long nineteenth century, when British hegemony reigned. My main motivation is the earliest example of a systemic theory of financial crisis, Charles Kindleberger's Hegemonic Stability Theory. However, while Charles Kindleberger focused on the stability brought about by a hegemonically structured international economy, I emphasize the dynamics of volatility present in this type of system. I argue that a hierarchical distribution of economic activity in the international system means that the financial cycle of the most central country influences the financial conditions in peripheral countries that lead to financial crisis. Evidence from financial crises which occurred in the long nineteenth century supports this theory.

We examine whether engagement in rent-seeking improves firm value in China. Rent-seeking is defined as a firm's use of resources to establish a relationship with the government to obtain government-controlled resources. We incorporate political rents and associated costs into an analytical framework to examine the relationship between rent-seeking and firm value. Using a sample of non-state-owned firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2013, we find evidence of the presence of political rents in the form of government subsidies and evidence of associated costs in the forms of corporate philanthropy and excess management remuneration, which largely explains the insignificant relationship found between rent-seeking and firm value. Our further analysis shows that rent-seeking behavior of firms reduces production efficiency, providing additional evidence to support our thesis that engagement in rent-seeking does not enhance firm value in the Chinese context. In an economy with weak institutions, in particular with weak protection for shareholders, managers and politicians can become rent-seekers and take a considerable share of the economic benefits derived from rent-seeking.

While many scholars have studied “urban bias” in public policy, the potential for bias in the private provision of public goods has received little attention. Private certification is a mechanism encouraging private provision of environmental public goods. We show that within countries, there are often wide disparities in certification rates between firms located in urban and non-urban areas. However, these disparities can be mitigated if there is a countervailing force: scrutiny of firms' practices by key stakeholders. We suggest that the presence of strong civil society, independent media, a functioning state regulatory apparatus, and multinational owners can ameliorate the urban bias in certification uptakes. We test this argument with global, firm-level data covering over 40,000 firms in ninety-three countries. Our analyses suggest that an urban bias is mitigated when stakeholders—both public and private—have the freedom and capacity to scrutinize firms' activities.

While regulators, firms, and the courts must all be able to interpret regulations to best address economic and social issues, regulatory interpretation may vary greatly across parties. After introducing a framework to explain the impact of the complexity of written regulations and the complexity of the regulatory environment on regulatory interpretation, this paper utilizes regulatory examples to explore the challenges associated with regulatory interpretation. Several recent initiatives designed to improve regulatory efficacy are examined to assess potential methods available to reduce challenges associated with regulatory interpretation. When considered with the public policy implementation literature and research on networks in public policy, several implications emerge from the consideration of regulatory interpretation and recent regulatory initiatives. Regulators should pursue strategies to minimize the number of possible interpretations in the design of regulation and seek improved regulatory mechanisms to alleviate regulatory interpretation challenges. Furthermore, theoretical models should acknowledge regulatory interpretation to better assist in the design and implementation of regulation.