While various types of lobbying regulation continue to be devised in different political systems in the world, some questions remain relevant from both a scientific and practical point of view. How can we define a lobbying regulation? What are the principles and the practices that should be pursued by a policy of lobbying regulation? And what is the lobbyists' stance on this matter? We propose a wider definition of lobbying regulation, aiming to overcome the traditional exclusive attention to formal pieces of legislation dedicated to lobbyists and lobbying activities. We refer to the philosophies of open government and deliberative democracy to expand the view on the principles of lobbying regulations, pointing out the macro-dimensions that can be encompassed for a more fine-grained understanding of lobbying regulations, considering not only transparency (as commonly done by most analyses thus far), but also the (fair) equality of access of stakeholders to policymaking and the public accountability of policymakers. On the empirical plan, we test our conceptual framework through an analysis of the perspective of the professional lobbying consultancies enrolled in the lobbying register of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, using in-depth semi-structured video interviews to investigate how such specifically relevant players assess lobbying regulation, and what principles and rules/institutional practices are most significant in their view, finding strong support for measures that aim to pursue the other two principles pointed out beyond transparency.

In recent decades, there has been an institutional shift in the literature on authoritarian regimes, with scholars investigating the role of political institutions, such as elections and political parties, in shaping regime stability and economic performance. However, scant attention has been devoted to the effect of political institutions on policy outcomes, and more specifically, on income inequality. This paper adds to this debate and sheds light on the role of formal and informal institutions, on the one hand, and state capacity, on the other, in influencing levels of income inequality in autocracies. We argue that, while the presence of elections and multiparty competition creates more favourable conditions for the adoption of redistributive policies, state capacity increases the likelihood of successfully implemented policy decisions aimed at reducing the level of inequality. Our empirical analysis rests on a time-series cross-sectional dataset, which includes around 100 countries from 1972 to 2014. The findings indicate that both political institutions and a higher level of state capacity lead to lower levels of income inequality in authoritarian contexts.

The positions of the radical right parties (RRPs) concerning the family have generally been examined through a socio-cultural lens, but very little is known about their distributive preferences. Based on the theoretical insights from the literature on varieties of familialism and social investment, the article investigates the RRPs' family policy agenda in terms of preference and support for familialism and de-familialism. Furthermore, cross-country similarities and differences will be investigated through an explanatory framework that combines the literature on partisan politics with that on historical institutionalism. A content analysis of party manifestos has shown that the RRPs adopt a male-breadwinner policy agenda, mostly intended to please their authoritarian electorate. However, comparative empirical research has highlighted some cross-country differences. These are explained by considering the counter-feedback mechanism triggered by the policy legacies, which provides RRPs with divergent electoral incentives and disincentives to promote their family policy agenda.

Since the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) as one of the leading insurgent forces in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s, the academic literature has increasingly focused on the phenomenon of foreign fighters. Most studies have analyzed transnational insurgents joining the ISIS; however, research on non-jihadi foreign fighters remains underdeveloped. The article sheds much-needed light on the factors motivating non-jihadi fighters to join conflicts abroad. Specifically, it presents the findings of an in-depth analysis of the factors leading Italian nationals to join the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG/YPJ)1 after 2011, their military contribution on the battlefield, and their reasons for returning to Italy. The contributions of the paper are twofold. First, it enriches our general understanding of the motivations of non-jihadi foreign fighters through detailed qualitative analysis, including first-hand accounts and an analysis of fighters' biographies. Second, it offers a more complete picture of the specific factors informing the Italian experience of transnational non-jihadi fighters in recent years. The qualitative data highlight the role of non-material factors in triggering the armed mobilization of foreign fighters. The findings indicate that the Italian foreign fighters contingent within the YPG/YPJ and the SDF has been highly committed, made up mostly of young males with no military experience, and had little to no impact on the battlefield.

This article analyzes the influence of the EU party-voter distance on party support moderated by the impact of EU salience. To this goal, we focus on the party-voter dyad and we analyze patterns of EU issue voting in first-order national elections in five EU countries (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands) between 2017 and 2018. We make use of a combination of data from CHES and a public opinion survey to construct the distance measures, and a mix of CHES and Twitter data to measure EU salience. We show that voters are mobilized on the EU, with EU party positions operating as a driving factor of the voting preferences of the electorate and EU salience moderating this relationship.

A review of three books shows that the crisis of democracy literature is exceptionally diverse. It ranges from overconfident postulations and proposals without systematic arguments and comparative analysis on the one hand to novel theorizing and balanced accounts, including cautious use of historical evidence, on the other hand. Accordingly, there is much variation in how much the different contributions succeed in drawing lessons from historical developments to better understand and reduce contemporary challenges.

Democracy acknowledges its members as free and equal by recognising them as full political agents rather than mere beneficiaries of policies chosen by others and by granting them the opportunity to exercise this role without incurring excessive burdens. This does not require that they directly participate in the decision-making process, because this form of participation would be particularly demanding and it will be limited to a few decisions. To properly embody the democratic ideal, citizens must have the opportunity to shape the political process and to challenge the choices made if these choices do not respond to their interests or ideas.

Gabriele Natalizia and Lorenzo Termine lay out an innovative framework to analyze the trajectory of the current foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. As it stands, it suffers from serious conceptual ambiguities and generates a set of categories that is too large to guide empirical research. After revision, however, the framework that Natalizia and Termine propose can be deployed to elucidate Beijing's behavior in various parts of the world, most notably the Persian Gulf.

The comments by Lawson and Legrenzi to our RISP/IPSR article ‘Tracing the modes of China's revisionism in the Indo-Pacific: a comparison with pre-1941 Shōwa Japan’ contribute to moving the debate on revisionism in international politics a step forward. Their notes on the several issues affecting the International Relations understanding of the phenomenon are on the same page as ours and we appear to share similar doubts and a like-minded curiosity on the subject. While grasping some key topics and shedding light on crucial shortcomings in the literature on international change, power transitions and international order, however, their observations do not come unproblematic. In this reply to their timely remarks, we highlight the perks of their argument but also stress how this falls through in providing a complete framework to understand revisionism in international politics.