Increasing the minimum retirement age is a widespread option chosen by policy makers to reduce spending in financially constrained public pension systems. Yet, the effectiveness of such a reform strongly depends on the ability of individuals to postpone their withdrawal from the labor force. In this paper, we study the immediate impact of the 2010 reform of the French pension system by carrying out a short-term evaluation on the increase of the statutory eligibility age from 60 to 61. We use a differences-in-differences methodology, comparing the trajectories from work to retirement for succeeding generations facing a different statutory age. Using a detailed social security administrative database, we provide a global assessment of the effects of the reform, accounting for the potential substitution effects from old-age insurance toward unemployment, sickness or disability insurance schemes. Our findings suggest that despite a sizable effect on the employment rate, the reform also strongly increased unemployment and disability rates.

It has been long suggested that public pension wealth may crowd out household savings. However, there remains controversy about the extent of this displacement effect. In this paper we use an original microsimulation model based on retrospective survey data collected through the third wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to estimate the displacement effect of public pension wealth on other wealth in Belgium. Combining this rich dataset with an accurate estimation of the individual pension entitlements allows us to circumvent some of the main measurement error problems faced by previous studies. We estimate that an extra euro of public pension wealth is associated with about 14–25 cent decline in households’ non-pension wealth.

This paper investigates whether exposure to explanatory diagrams can affect a major financial decision. In a controlled experiment, participants were given Pension Benefit Statements with or without one or two diagrams, before answering incentivised questions that measured recall, comprehension and choice of contribution rate. The diagrams had at best a marginal influence on recall or comprehension. Nevertheless, a diagram relating contributions to income projections prompted more participants to advocate higher contributions, while both diagrams influenced the rationale participants gave for decisions. The implication is that although pension products remain hard to understand, diagrams may alter decisions by reinforcing relevant causal thinking.

Based on a sample of university students, we provide evidence that a small-scale training intervention has both a statistically and economically significant effect on subjective and objective assessments of financial knowledge. We also show that the intervention increases self-assessed more than actual financial knowledge. The intervention consists of measuring financial literacy before and after a small on-line course and is administered through an on-line platform.

This study investigates the factors affecting financial literacy in Japan using data from Osaka University's Preference Parameter Study. We examine several demographic, socio-economic, and psychological variables drawn from the social learning, consumer socialization, and psychological theories of learning. The results indicate that the demographic factors of gender, age, and education; the socio-economic factors of income and occupation; and the psychological factor of perceptions of the future significantly affect the level of financial literacy. The results are robust to different measures of financial literacy and emphasize that social contact and people's future orientation can improve financial literacy levels in Japan.

The low demand for immediate annuities at retirement has been a long-standing puzzle. We show that a hyperbolic discount model can explain this behaviour and results in the attractiveness of long-term deferred annuities. With a set of benchmark assumptions, we find that retirees would be willing to pay a much higher price than the actuarial fair price for annuities with longer deferred periods. Moreover, if governments were to introduce a pre-commitment device which requires pensioners to make annuitisation decisions around 10 years before retirement, the take up rate of annuities could become higher.

In this paper, we examine reforms characterized by the establishment of mandatory funded privately-managed schemes in the social security framework. We construct a new dataset to analyze the determinants of pension reforms over 1980–2012 in about 100 medium and large economies around the world. Our results highlight the fundamental importance of economic forces in explaining the speed of reforms after adjusting for the confounding effects of demographic and geopolitical factors. Countries with greater globalization growth and a history of economic crisis experienced a shorter time until reform. These findings are robust to variations in empirical methodology.

We compare two contracts for managing systematic longevity risk in retirement: a collective arrangement that distributes the risk among participants, and a market-provided annuity contract. We evaluate the contracts’ appeal with respect to the retiree's welfare, and the viability of the market solution through the financial reward to the annuity provider's equityholders. We find that individuals prefer to bear the risk under a collective arrangement than to insure it with a life insurers' annuity contract subject to insolvency risk (albeit small). Under realistic capital provision hypotheses, the annuity provider is incapable of adequately compensating its equityholders for bearing systematic longevity risk.

Over the past two decades, the share of individuals claiming Social Security at the Early Eligibility Age has dropped and the average retirement age has increased. At the same time, Social Security rules have changed substantially, employer-sponsored retirement plans have shifted from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC), health has improved, and mortality has decreased. In theory, all of these changes could lead to a trend toward later claiming. Disentangling the effect of any one change is difficult because they have been occurring simultaneously. This paper uses the Gustman and Steinmeier structural model of retirement timing to investigate which of these changes matter most by simulating their effects on the original cohort (1931–1941) of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The predicted behavior is then compared with the actual retirements of the Early Boomer cohort (1948–1953) to see how much of the later cohort's delayed claiming and retirement can be explained by these changes. The Early Boomer cohort was less likely to be fully retired than the HRS cohort at both age 62 (36.7% vs. 44.0%) and age 64 (49.5% vs. 53.9%). The model suggests that the shift from DB toward DC plans was the biggest contributor to these declines, followed by better health. Social Security rules and improvements in mortality played smaller roles.