I offer a minimal characterization of naturalism, with ontological, epistemological, psychological and evaluative dimensions. I explain why naturalism is attractive. I note that naturalists disagree among themselves about, among other things, the nature of values, beliefs, and abstractions. I close by responding to some standard objections to naturalism.

Human beings are social animals. A solitary life would be horrible for most of us. What makes life worthwhile is being with others and engaging in shared projects with them. To do justice to these facts, philosophers need to pay more attention to the first-person plural, we/us, and to rethink their accounts of value and virtue.

This is a short introduction to ontological arguments. It begins with a brief characterization of ontological arguments that proceeds mainly by way of example. The rest of the discussion is given over to consideration of what looks like a very simple ontological argument. This consideration turns up many of the issues that arise when more complex ontological arguments are examined.

Hempel's famous Raven Paradox derives from Nicod's criteria for confirmation and the Equivalence Condition, the unintuitive conclusion that things like white roses, green T-shirts and ice cubes confirm the raven hypothesis ‘All ravens are black.’ By a small rearrangement of the Equivalence Condition, I show that we can also derive the conclusion, which sounds even more intuitively intolerable, that observation of black ravens fails to confirm the raven hypothesis. We are left with the contradictory result that black ravens both confirm and do not confirm the raven hypothesis.

Louise Antony explains a variety of naturalisms, and why she doesn't believe in God.

Any philosophy which aspires to universality is caught in a perennial tension: the attempt to transcend the particularities of the individual thinker and her time and place can only be made by specific individuals in specific times and places. Anglophone philosophy deals with this tension by ignoring it.

The word ‘naturalism’ has a bewildering array of uses in philosophy. Roughly speaking, it connotes pro-scientific attitudes and approaches. This article introduces the subject of naturalism by sketching a history of pro-scientific attitudes and approaches in philosophy, from their origins in the early modern period through to the present day. It then distinguishes a number of distinct families of naturalism: metaphysical, logico-linguistic, epistemological, and methodological. The resulting taxonomy encompasses a plurality of loosely related views rather than a number of variations on a single clear and unified theme.

In a philosophical dialogue, Thomas the traditionalist, Harvey the hedonist, and Eric the economist each discuss their respective views concerning the ethics of human sex acts. In the course of their conversation, it becomes clear that if sex is to be treated like any other pleasure (and therefore enjoyed indiscriminately), it is very difficult to explain what is so bad about rape and/or other forms of sexual assault. Taking any kind of sexual assault to be bad, therefore, requires adopting a more traditional view towards sex.

The hit American TV show The Good Place has garnered quite a following in recent years. Its main premise implies a scorekeeping view of the afterlife. People who have collected enough credits in their earthly lives will make the cut and go to the Good Place, while those who do not will be banished to the Bad Place. We suggest that such a premise would have to come to terms with Ted Sider's puzzle about the compatibility of a binary afterlife with God's divine attributes.

What follows is a short thought experiment that aims to show, reductio ad absurdum, that narrow qualia internalism is probably inconsistent with a physicalist/functionalist theory of mind. Those wishing to rebut the argument presented here will need to demonstrate why spatial proximity and the right sort of causal connection of functionally isolated components are necessary to the instantiation of qualia.

In this article, I consider the famous Invisible Gardener Parable which aims to show that theism is not a viable theory because it can be endlessly amended to accommodate for prima facie disconfirming data. I point out that the parable fails to consider how tolerance for theory adjustment is relative to the perceived explanatory power of the theory. I also point out that naturalism is no less subject to adaptation than is theism. Thus, if endless adaptability constitutes an objection for theism then it does so for naturalism as well.

The aim of this article is not to make any arguments that oppose veganism or having children or, in any way, to denigrate those who make them. Rather, the intention is twofold: (1) To attack the inconsistency of those who make arguments for veganism in relation to climate change and the natural world, but who omit to make arguments against having children and the problem of rapidly increasing global population on the same grounds. (2) To attack a form of sanctimony which manifests itself in inconsistent applications of such arguments and which exploits genuine and very serious problems in ways that aim to bring power to their advocates by inducing a sense of shame in their victims. In this way, such moralists try to strengthen the legitimacy of their own preferences – preferences that often run into conflict with other concerns based on the same arguments.

Many philosophers call themselves ‘naturalists’ because they believe theism is incompatible with science. However, many also hold that science is compatible with many other theistic beliefs about morality, free will, the mind, and the meaning of life. Those naturalists who reject these other beliefs need a different label for their view. This article recommends the term ‘scientism’.

Theories of truth are designed to help us understand this fundamental philosophical concept. But some theories of truth do too little while others do too much. Some theories omit important aspects of truth while other theories place limits on what's true and what we can know. Because theories that do too much can have significant drawbacks I propose what I call the Goldilocks Principle. Theories of truth should not do too much or too little but aim to be just right.

It could be argued that there is now a crisis of confidence in the professions. Although many professionals individually undertake their roles with care and diligence, there have been so many systematic failures involving professionals across a range of sectors, both in the UK and globally, that the special status enjoyed by the professions is being widely questioned. In this article, I argue that recent cases are symptomatic of a lack of ethical reasoning in professional practice, yet professions enjoy an elevated status based on claims that ethics, typically communicated in codes of conduct, are central to their purpose. I argue that to help solve this crisis, philosophical literacy needs to be promoted in school, initial professional education and continuing professional development. Passing tests to superficially demonstrate an understanding of a code is quite different from reasoning through practical dilemmas in the professional workplace with judgements informed by philosophical ideas.

This article is about David Hume's account of mixed emotions. Hume on mixed emotions is connected with Sir Isaac Newton's optical experiments and subsequent invention of the colour wheel, as well as more recently to Robert Plutchik's colour wheel of emotions.

In this article I argue that we do not need a strict definition of naturalism, but can satisfactorily describe the naturalistic stance or attitude in terms of hostility to seeing human beings as subject to powers or forces or laws of nature that go beyond those governing the rest of the empirical world. We are to be explained as the evolutionary products of natural processes. I argue that we should see our concepts as well in this light, and explore some examples of the way this attitude can illuminate questions of meaning.