This article explores the phenomenon of ‘disaggregation’ of disputes in international law, that is, the carving up of broader disputes into discrete legal claims based on different international legal rules and subject to the jurisdiction of different international tribunals. In particular, its focus is on certain under-explored consequences of this phenomenon for the jurisdiction of international tribunals, asking whether the relationship between the specific claims and the broader dispute might affect the jurisdiction of the tribunals. Employing the ongoing Ukraine/Russia dispute, which has yielded multiple claims before different international tribunals, the article offers an original analysis of these jurisdictional questions. It presents three approaches discernible from case law where tribunals face claims over which they appear to have jurisdiction that implicate a broader dispute over which they do not. The article ends with a consideration of possible explanations for why a tribunal might follow one approach over the others in any given case.

Humanitarian actors sometimes have to decide whether to render assistance in situations that put them at risk of liability for aiding and abetting under international criminal law. This is the problem of the virtuous accomplice—the idea that knowingly contributing to the wrongdoing of others might, exceptionally, be the right thing to do. This article explains why the problem arises and clarifies its scope, before turning to criminal law in England and Wales and Germany to assess potential solutions. It argues that the best approach is to accept a defence of necessity—of justified complicity—and shows that such an argument works in international criminal law.

This article examines how the jurisdictional rules of the recast of the Brussels I Regulation, namely the rules of exclusive jurisdiction for immovable property and company law and governance matters and the rules of special jurisdiction for contracts and torts, deal with unjust enrichment claims and issues concerning unjust enrichment. It also asks whether a new special jurisdiction rule for unjust enrichment should be added to the Regulation.

China has confirmed its ambition to join the global competition for international business dispute resolution services by establishing the China International Commercial Court (CICC). The CICC has now begun operation following a judicial interpretation issued by the Supreme People's Court. By examining the trial process of the CICC as set out by the Supreme People's Court and comparing the rules with other international commercial courts, this article provides a detailed overview and critical analysis of the issues surrounding cases brought to the CICC. Overall, compared with the approaches adopted by other international commercial courts, the approach adopted by the CICC is conservative. Without bold innovations to China's existing judicial system, the competitiveness of the CICC is likely to be limited. This article argues that it is desirable for the Court to be more actively reformed. Such reforms might also promote judicial reform in China generally and increase China's institutional competitiveness in the global business world. This article also aims to outline the challenges that parties (in particular those from overseas) may face in litigation before the CICC and provide the international community with a critical analysis of the operation and framework of the CICC.

The article critically reviews the litigation framework of the Chinese International Commercial Court (‘CICC’) using a comparative approach, taking as a benchmark the Singapore International Commercial Court (‘SICC’)—another Asian international commercial court situated within the Belt and Road Initiative (‘BRI’) geography. It argues that the CICC, despite being lauded as a visionary step toward an innovative, efficient and trustworthy dispute resolution system, does not live up to those grand claims on closer scrutiny. The discussion shows that the CICC is in many respects insular and conservative when compared with the SICC. The distinctions between the two litigation frameworks may be explained by the differences in objectives. Whereas the SICC was created to compete for international judicial business and bolster Singapore as a leading dispute resolution hub, the CICC is presently designed to provide a legal safeguard in BRI disputes with Chinese elements. This article also identifies major challenges confronting the CICC and sets out proposals for change.

Does international law govern how States and armed groups treat their own forces? Do serious violations of the laws of war and human rights law that would otherwise constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity fall squarely outside the scope of international criminal law when committed against fellow members of the same armed forces? Orthodoxy considered that such forces were protected only under relevant domestic criminal law and/or human rights law. However, landmark decisions issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) suggest that crimes committed against members of the same armed forces are not automatically excluded from the scope of international criminal law. This article argues that, while there are some anomalies and gaps in the reasoning of both courts, there is a common overarching approach under which crimes by a member of an armed group against a person from the same forces can be prosecuted under international law. Starting from an assessment of the specific situation of the victim, this article conducts an in-depth analysis of the concepts of ‘hors de combat’ and ‘allegiance’ for war crimes and that of the ‘lawful target’ for crimes against humanity, providing an interpretative framework for the future prosecution of such crimes.

This article challenges the widespread view that existing WTO rules are insufficient for dealing with State capitalism in China, which has been further emboldened by the latest rounds of State-owned enterprise (‘SOE’) reforms. Through a careful review of WTO agreements and jurisprudence, it is argued that new rules are not necessarily needed because the unique challenges created by China's State capitalism can be appropriately addressed by the WTO's existing rules on subsidies coupled with the China-specific obligations. A more realistic approach would be to encourage China to undertake market-oriented reforms through WTO litigation based on existing rules rather than trying to negotiate new rules.

This article discusses the importance of the recently concluded Paris Rulebook, the extent to which it limits national discretion, instils discipline and generates ambition and accountability, and the challenges that lie ahead in implementing the 2015 Paris Agreement. It discusses, in particular, the rules on mitigation, transparency, the global stocktake and the implementation and compliance mechanism, in order to highlight the choices Parties made on three overarching issues that have long bedevilled the climate change regime—prescriptiveness (the level of detail of the rules), legal bindingness (the extent to which particular rules are legally binding) and differentiation (the extent to which particular rules accommodate differences between Parties or apply uniformly to all Parties).

This article makes two main propositions about the role of due diligence in international law, in response to recent interest in the topic. First, a legal requirement to exercise due diligence may be a component part of a primary rule of international law, but this can only be determined by referring back to the primary rule in question (eg what degree of fact-finding does treaty provision X require a State party to that treaty to undertake, either explicitly or implicitly, to act consistently with its terms?). In other words, there is no ‘general principle of due diligence’ in international law. Second, States undertake what could be characterised as ‘due diligence’ activity (eg by introducing policy guidance for their officials), some elements of which may be a result of a legal requirement and some of which may not (eg where done solely for policy reasons). Current practice of the United Kingdom and United States is used to illustrate the point. The lack of a distinction between the ‘legal’ and ‘non-legal’ elements of conduct in a given area gives States the flexibility to act without feeling unduly constrained by international law, and at the same time actually promotes compliance with international law and may assist in its development over time. In contrast, pushing for a ‘general principle of due diligence’ in international law is unnecessary, and risks having a chilling effect on this positive legal/policy ‘due diligence’ behaviour by States.