15 - Nation-Building in South Vietnam after Geneva

Summary

When, how, and why did the Vietnam War begin? Although its end is dated with great precision to April 30, 1975, there is no agreement as to when it began. The Vietnam War was an enormously complex conflict and even though any comprehensive reckoning of its causes must include the role of the United States, it did not begin as an “American War.” This volume presents the scholarship that has flourished since the 1990s to situate the war and its origins within longer chronologies and wider interpretative perspectives. The Vietnam War was a war for national liberation and an episode of major importance in the Global Cold War. Yet it was also a civil war, and civil warfare was a defining feature of the conflict from the outset. Understanding the Vietnamese and Indochinese origins of the Vietnam War is a critical first step toward reckoning with the history of this violent, costly, and multilayered war.

Nation-building is a daunting task. In the period after World War II, decolonizing nations struggled not only to secure political and military control over their territories but also to forge national unity.¹ In many cases, this task involved multiple ethnic and linguistic groups whose members did not perceive each other as compatriots.

For anticommunists in South Vietnam after 1954, nation-building was daunting in distinctive ways. The challenges of building state power and national unity were exacerbated by the unique circumstances surrounding the country’s creation, the complex external political and military context in which the state operated, and the quality of the domestic leadership. This chapter will examine the South Vietnamese government’s nation-building endeavors in the areas of social integration, economic development, and political allegiance after 1954. But the state was not the only aspiring nation-builder in South Vietnam. Private Vietnamese individuals and organizations also sought to contribute to nation-building. While the contributions of nonstate Vietnamese actors have often been overlooked, their work shows that nation-building in South Vietnam was not an exclusively top-down, state-led affair. Like their political leaders, many ordinary South Vietnamese perceived that they had a stake in the new nation.

By emphasizing the role of South Vietnamese political leaders and social activists, this chapter follows recent scholarly trends, which give due weight to the actions and ideas of Vietnamese people rather than focusing mainly or exclusively on the role of the United States. Nation-building in Vietnam after 1954 was an arena of diverse and at times competing activities, and it was not solely the purview of big powers. The work of nation-building was carried out on the ground by local actors. Still, as the evidence presented here suggests, the United States played a prominent role. American ambitions and plans for South Vietnam had a considerable bearing on the fate of the country.

Diversity and Division

Following the signing of the Geneva Accords and the division of Vietnam in July 1954, the prime minister of the Associated State of Vietnam, Ngô Đình Diệm, set about extricating South Vietnam from the last vestiges of French colonial control and building an independent, centralized state based in Saigon. Diệm officially disassociated Vietnam from the French Union. He took control of South Vietnam’s borders, immigration, and customs, and called for the removal of French military forces from Vietnam.² After the fall 1955 referendum that was widely believed to have been rigged, Diệm established a republic with a powerful presidency, a position he occupied until 1963. As explained by Phi-Vân Nguyen in Chapter 14, the work of state-building was arduous, since it involved adept political maneuvering, diplomacy, and sometimes the use of force. The United States played a vital role in providing financial, military, and technical aid to build South Vietnam’s military, police, and state infrastructure. In the first few years after the creation of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the United States spent $1.5 billion, which went mainly to bolster South Vietnam’s economy and armed forces.³ Thanks in part to this immense American aid, Diệm was able to defeat a formidable array of political and military rivals during 1954–6, and to consolidate control over the state apparatus he had inherited.

Even as he was establishing political and military control, Diệm worried about the lack of national unity and the state’s tenuous connection with the people. This concern was articulated in Diệm’s frequent pronouncements that Vietnam’s main enemies were communism, underdevelopment, and disunity.⁴ Social integration – or the lack thereof – had been a long-standing issue for Vietnamese nationalists. The French colonial divide-and-conquer policy, in place since the mid-nineteenth century, carved Vietnam into three pays (countries). French officials also often deliberately exacerbated ethnic and sectarian divisions. This had contributed to making the quest for sociopolitical community an important theme throughout the colonial period.⁵

The search for cohesion was particularly poignant in Vietnam’s south. Centuries before French colonial rule, the southern realm of the Việt kingdom was remarkably heterogeneous in its population.⁶ When Đại Việt’s Nguyễn lords extended their control southward toward Saigon and the Mekong Delta in the seventeenth century, they had to contend with the diverse populations, which included Chӑm, Khmer, Chinese, and various Highland communities. While the Nguyễn rulers were eventually able to claim political control of the South, the region remained culturally, socially, and ethnically diverse even after the French arrived. It is not surprising that the issue of unity remained an imperative and a source of anxiety during the mid-twentieth century.

On a philosophical level, social unity was particularly significant for Diệm and his brother, Ngô Đình Nhu. Both brothers, but especially Nhu, were believers in personalism, a philosophy developed by European Christian thinkers of the left who were grappling with the ravages of the Great Depression.⁷ Humanist and holistic, personalism attended to people’s spiritual life as well as their material needs. Personalists sought to protect the human person and spirit from the dehumanization and brutality of both Stalinist-style communism and unbridled capitalism. Additionally, the philosophy emphasized the importance of community and people’s relationship within it. According to this philosophy, individuals’ full potential could be achieved only when they became aware of their role in the community and worked toward its betterment. Personalism’s focus on community, social responsibility, and self-reliance attracted the attention of many noncommunist Vietnamese who perceived the philosophy as a counterpoint to communism in its emphasis on the common good, but with the potential for deeper revolutionary changes within the person. By 1954, personalist ideas circulated widely in Vietnam, especially among military, political, and educated elites.⁸ Hoping to build on the philosophy’s popularity, the Ngôs based many on their nation-building projects on personalism.

The first nation-building task was settling and integrating the nearly 900,000 refugees who arrived in South Vietnam during 1954–5. With the division of the country at the 17th parallel, the Geneva Accords permitted free movement between the zones for 300 days. Accommodating this massive influx of northern refugees was an enormous undertaking for Ngô Đình Diệm’s government. At the peak migration period, some 5,000 people arrived daily in South Vietnam.⁹ The United States, France, and Britain provided transportation while the United States, along with many Western nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), provided resettlement aid.¹⁰ In addition to humanitarian reasons, there were political and strategic motivations behind the American government’s generous support for refugee resettlement. From the US perspective, the mass migration from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) was invaluable propaganda against communism. By moving to the South, the refugees were deemed to have rejected communism. While it was true that many left because of political convictions and fear of life under communism, there were other reasons for leaving, such as economic hardship.¹¹

After a period in temporary shelters, the refugees were moved to permanent residences. About half a million people were settled in farming and fishing villages throughout South Vietnam.¹² Another 100,000 refugees were directed to the government’s Cái Sắn land reclamation and settlement project in the western Mekong Delta. The rest settled on their own in cities and towns. The government provided houses for some settlers, while others had to build their own with some state funding. From the government’s perspective, the refugees had been successfully resettled by the summer of 1955.¹³

While Northern refugees were relocated to permanent living areas, they were not integrated into southern society as Diệm and American officials had hoped. Even though most of the refugees were ethnic Vietnamese, their northern accents and cultural practices often hindered communication and fostered feelings of distrust among native Southerners. Migrants’ memoirs relate how southern manners of speech, dress, and behavior appeared strange to them.¹⁴ Adding to the difficulties of forging social cohesion, more than 75 percent of the refugees were Catholics. The population of Catholics in South Vietnam had doubled, reaching 1.7 million with the newcomers.¹⁵ Because of differences in regional ecclesiastic cultures, northern Catholics did not always find community with their southern coreligionists.¹⁶

Refugee assimilation was also hindered by Southerners’ perception that the government favored Northerners, particularly Catholics. The financial support that refugees received, such as housing and daily stipends, created resentment among some Southerners, especially the poor.¹⁷ Moreover, many Catholic refugees were given desirable jobs in the state bureaucracy, enterprises, and institutions, triggering accusations of government favoritism. One possible reason for the imbalance was that many refugees shared the government’s anticommunist stance. Furthermore, there were many educated refugees who had administrative experiences, gained from working with either the French or various semi-independent Vietnamese governments. In any case, the perceptions of favoritism made it more difficult for Catholic migrants to integrate into southern society. At times tension rose to the level of open conflict between locals and refugee communities (Figure 15.1).¹⁸

Figure 15.1 Aerial view of a tent city set up for refugees from North Vietnam in Saigon (October 16, 1954).

Source: Bettmann / Contributor / Bettmann / Getty Images.

Another obstacle to national unity from the South Vietnamese authorities’ perspective was the semiautonomous ethnic Chinese communities. Numbering approximately 1 million, the ethnic Chinese, or Hoa people, were the largest ethnic group after the Việt (Kinh).¹⁹ Many overseas Chinese had settled in Vietnam since the seventeenth century but had managed to maintain a distinct cultural identity. In the eighteenth century, officials in the southern part of the Nguyễn realm organized the Hoa population into congregations (bang) according to dialect and place of origin within China.²⁰ French colonial administrators preserved this system, which allowed them a measure of control over the Hoa community, but also gave congregation leaders some administrative responsibilities. The congregations collected taxes on behalf of the colonial state, oversaw health care, and provided education for the Hoa community.²¹ The congregation system thus limited Hoa people’s direct contact with the French and later Vietnamese authorities.

In keeping with the ideals of a modern nation-state, Diệm saw the imperative of integrating the Hoa community into the nation and administering its members directly. In the first year of the republic, Diệm compelled all Hoa living in Vietnam to become citizens of Vietnam.²² To coerce compliance, the government barred noncitizens from participating in eleven occupations that were typically occupied by Hoa people.²³ Along with these new policies was the requirement for Hoa people to transliterate their names to the Vietnamese equivalents, rendering them more legible to Vietnamese ears. Many Hoa residents found these new requirements oppressive.

Reaching further, the RVN state took control of Chinese-run schools from the congregations in 1957. The several hundred Chinese schools were now under the supervision of the department of national education and were directed to use Vietnamese language in class, to follow a government-approved curriculum, to adopt Vietnamese-style school uniforms, and to start the school day with the singing of the South Vietnamese national anthem.²⁴ In 1960, the congregations were officially dismantled and their collective properties, such as hospitals and community halls, were scheduled to be handed over to the government.

Essentially, these changes aimed to Vietnamize the Hoa, to erode the power of congregation leaders, and to compel the Hoa people to be more reliant on the government. Not surprisingly, the Hoa resented what they saw as assimilationist policies and resisted by organizing strikes and boycotts.²⁵ Their passive and active resistance forced the government to compromise. The RVN state extended deadlines and worked with the Republic of China to allow those who rejected Vietnamese citizenship to migrate to Taiwan. Eventually, the majority of Hoa people became Vietnamese citizens. The congregations, however, resisted giving up their properties. By the early 1960s, Hoa people re-established their community organizations under the guise of mutual-aid societies.²⁶ Moreover, many schools disregarded the government’s directives on language and curriculum.²⁷ Diệm managed to make the Hoa citizens of Vietnam, but he could not make them Vietnamese.

Similar policies were promulgated for other ethnic minority peoples, such as the Highland minority groups, Khmer, and Chӑm. As of the mid-1960s, there were more than 700,000 Highlanders belonging to forty different ethnic groups, many of which practiced some form of swidden agriculture.²⁸ As in the case of the Hoa, the main thrust of the government’s policy was to incorporate Highlanders into the new Việt-dominated nation. The government began administering the Highland peoples directly, doing away with the semiautonomous status that the French had granted. The Highlanders’ schools also had to follow a national curriculum and use the Vietnamese language.

In addition, Diệm’s government was keen to introduce Highland groups to new agrarian practices, particularly sedentary methods of farming, which officials saw as more productive and more likely to raise household incomes. State agencies were established to promote more intensive forms of cultivation, advanced farming methods, and new types of crops. These programs, along with the settlement projects in the Highland areas, were open to other ethnic groups, including Northern refugees and Southerners. Nevertheless, Highlanders felt targeted and resented the assimilationist undercurrent of the projects.²⁹

While the RVN government wanted to boost economic productivity in the Highland areas, political and strategic considerations were also important. Officials feared that communist infiltration into the Highlands would erode RVN authority in the region. The government’s concern was not baseless, for various Highland groups had previously sided with either the French or anticolonial forces. The Tai, for instance, contributed significantly to the victory of the Việt Minh at the battle of Điện Biên Phủ.³⁰ Following the formation of the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Vietnam (NLF) in 1960 under the direction of Hanoi, communist cadres began working in the Central Highlands. The NLF recruited Highlanders, giving some leadership roles, and criticized the Saigon government’s assimilationist policies.³¹ In response, the Diệm government was keen to avoid alienating the Highlanders. The government ordered officials to avoid using coercion and to be flexible when addressing the Highlanders’ concerns.³² Despite these directives, local officials and cadres did not show enough sensitivity and patience. Many programs were consequently implemented in rushed and heavy-handed fashion, causing resistance.

By 1961, another external influence was at work in the Central Highlands: the US military. The CIA and US Special Forces units began recruiting Highlanders for intelligence and counterinsurgency activities.³³ To win local cooperation, American volunteers with the International Voluntary Service were deployed to build schools, roads, and wells.³⁴ While American efforts to eradicate communist influence in the Highlands were welcomed by the RVN state, these activities were often counterproductive to Diệm’s other nation-building aims. In their attempt to win the hearts and minds of Highlanders, Americans and NGOs provided aid and services directly to Highlanders, often without the participation of RVN representatives. As such, American activities competed not only with communists but also the RVN for Highlanders’ cooperation and loyalty.

Like the Hoa, Highlanders also resisted the state’s attempt to absorb them into the national body. Highlanders resisted first by forming the Liberation Front of the Highland People, followed by the Bajarka Movement in 1958. These organizations, which comprised many Highlander groups such as Bahnar, Jarai, Rhade, and Khơho, fought for autonomy from the central state, freedom to practice their culture, and an end to Việt migration into the Highlands. Threatened by the Bajarka Movement, the government imprisoned many of its leaders.³⁵

Other minority groups also experienced similar state attempts to incorporate them into the new nation. Khmer and Chӑm communities were forced to use Vietnamese language and their schools were closed down. Like other minority groups, the Khmer and Chӑm resisted these impositions. In 1964, this resistance became more organized with the formation of the United Front for the Struggle of Oppressed Races (known by its French acronym, FULRO). This encompassed not only the Khmer and Chӑm, but also some Highland groups.³⁶

Integrating different religious and social groups was a priority for the RVN’s nation-building process. Diệm and his administrators set out to build an independent and modern republic in which citizens identified with the nation-state and with each other. However, in the course of pursuing this unity, RVN officials pursued overzealous policies that were coercive and assimilationist, and alienated the very groups that the authorities wanted to draw into the national family. Other policies for nation-building, such as education reform and rural development, were directed at the general population of ethnic Vietnamese. These endeavors sought to strengthen national unity, socioeconomic development, and national security.

Nation-Building through National Education

For RVN officials, as for the leaders of many other postcolonial states, national compulsory education was appealing as a means to forge ties between the state and its citizens. It provided a mechanism to indoctrinate the masses with a set of state-approved values and mores – and to do so in a common language.³⁷ This shared curriculum and experience contributed to the process of imagining community, of creating a national identity.³⁸ The potential of education to forge a bond between the state and its people was thus particularly important to the South Vietnamese government, as Diệm sought desperately to bridge the large gap between him and the rural population.

In 1954 the State of Vietnam inherited the French colonial education system, which Diệm quickly sought to nationalize and Vietnamize. Indeed, the work of Vietnamizing education had already begun well before Diệm took power. During his brief tenure as prime minister of the empire of Vietnam (March–August 1945), Trần Trọng Kim sought to reform and develop the Indochinese educational curriculum, expanding technical training and making Vietnamese – rather than French – the language of instruction.³⁹ Under Diệm, the government reiterated the imperative to use Vietnamese language in all schools. With American aid, Diệm invested in education and built more schools and higher institutions of training. The curriculum was likewise Vietnamized to include Vietnamese history and literature.⁴⁰

The RVN’s communist rivals also recognized the importance of education as a means of mass mobilization. During the French Indochina War, the Việt Minh offered literacy classes and schooling in areas they controlled. The RVN state thus had to compete not only in offering education but also with the messages being transmitted in the schools. The RVN school curriculum promoted a sense of national unity, identity, and pride. In 1958 the ministry of education identified the “Foundational Principles” of RVN education as humanism, nation, and liberalism.⁴¹ Guided by these principles, which epitomize the fundamental ideas of personalism, the school elementary curriculum was dominated by subjects in the humanities. By the last two years of elementary school, close to 50 percent of the classroom time was spent on history, geography, civic and moral education, and Vietnamese language.⁴² RVN authorities were betting on the efficacy of these subjects to nurture people’s patriotism and loyalty to the anticommunist nation-state.

While the political message of nationalism in the RVN curriculum was more nuanced and muted than that of the DRVN, where children were taught about class warfare,⁴³ it was pervasive and clear. The state-approved narrative maintained that the RVN, which encompassed the entire territory of Vietnam, was a modern democracy built on Việt ethnic traditions, Confucian morality, and patriotism. This message was found in seminal historical treatments of Vietnam’s past by nationalist scholars, particularly the work of the aforementioned former prime minister, Trần Trọng Kim. His highly influential A Brief History of Vietnam popularized the description of the Việt people as the “race of the dragon and the fairy” (nòi giống tiên rồng). Although published in 1920, Kim’s racialized narrative continued to be the standard textbook for schools in the First and Second Republic.⁴⁴ It was included in the national curriculum for all children, including non-Việt ethnicities.

On the question of education, there was some agreement between the RVN and its US ally. Both governments recognized the importance of education in nation-building. But where Vietnamese educators emphasized national solidarity and history, Americans valued education for its modernizing potential. According to the US perspective, education had the power to transform South Vietnam from its traditional and “backward” state into a modern society.⁴⁵ By the mid-1950s, the movement that would become known as modernization theory was gaining influence in American policy and social scientific circles. Armed with this ideology, American nation-builders were increasingly convinced that the path to modernity was linear and universal. They assumed that the desired endpoint for developing societies was one that resembled the United States itself. Once South Vietnam became a modern and developed society, they reasoned, it would no longer be an easy recruiting ground for communism; people would be prosperous and would not be enticed by revolutionary promises. In this way, modernization was deemed an antidote against insurgency.⁴⁶

Convinced of education’s modernizing potential, the United States funneled substantial aid into this sector. Between 1955 and 1966, the United States contributed a total of $17 million for education needs.⁴⁷ The US Operation Mission and Michigan State University led the US effort in education development. Using American monetary aid and technical advice, South Vietnamese officials expanded educational services, reorganized the RVN library system, and advocated reform of higher educational institutions. Some results included the re-establishment of the National School of Administration for training administrators and civil servants. Primary and secondary education opportunities were also increased. From 1955 to 1960, the number of primary school pupils doubled while the number of secondary students more than tripled.⁴⁸ American education reformers emphasized the need for technical and vocational training, which they perceived as critical for an emerging industrial economy. To them, a technical education was more useful than a humanist curriculum focused on history and literature. However, despite the enormous investment, there was still demand for more educational opportunities. As shown below, private Vietnamese initiatives would help make up the shortfall.

Development and Community in the Villages

In the South Vietnamese countryside, Diệm pursued a shifting array of programs to forge ties with the people, stimulate economic development, and secure the villages from communist infiltration. These rural programs were conceived to fight the aforementioned three enemies of the RVN: underdevelopment, communism, and disunity. With these rural nation-building programs, Diệm and Nhu’s belief in personalism was especially evident. While there were earlier pursuits, such as land reform, land settlement, and Civic Action rural extension work, the highlights were the Agroville and Strategic Hamlet Programs.⁴⁹

The Agroville Program was established in 1959 during a period of increasing insecurity in the countryside. In response to Diệm’s repression, particularly his Denounce Communists Campaign, launched in 1955, insurgents struck back, targeting local officials and other supporters of the government.⁵⁰ To mitigate this violence and also to restrict insurgents’ access to villagers, households were relocated to new fortified villages. In theory, the agroville would keep residents safe from insurgents while enabling them to improve their economic and social lives. Each agroville would be comprised of around 400 families, and would include a hospital, school, and market. These would be largely self-sufficient communities that would depend on their members to contribute to the defense, building, and maintenance of the settlement. For the Ngô brothers, the self-reliance aspect of the agrovilles was essential. According to personalism, it was only by working together that one could achieve independence, humanity, and community. Consequently, Diệm did not want to provide much government aid to the agrovilles. The residents were tasked with finding their own solutions and resources. They were expected to build their own schools and hospitals, and to arm themselves with weapons confiscated from communist insurgents. Last of all, agroville residents were not to receive material aid from the United States or associated NGOs, despite the latters’ willingness to provide generously.

It soon became clear that the Agroville Program was based on flawed assumptions. The Ngô brothers discounted the strong connections that rural residents had to their homes and land, and especially to their ancestors’ graves. Peasants resisted being relocated to a new living space where they were expected to contribute labor and time on top of their regular farming work. Moreover, after moving to an agroville, many people had to travel further to get to their fields to tend to their crops. Meanwhile, the ideals underpinning the advocacy for self-reliance was not adequately explained. As a result, local officials resorted to coercion to ensure villagers’ compliance. By August 1960, only thirteen agrovilles had been built, about a quarter of what had been planned. The program was suspended in the following month.⁵¹

In late 1961, RVN officials were pursuing a new idea for rural development. It was not a coincidence that the Strategic Hamlet Program (SHP) came about during a time of rising anti-government activities. By 1960, the insurgency was organized and led by the NLF, which absorbed many disenchanted noncommunist nationalists. The NLF and its military wing spearheaded protests, infiltrated the RVN military and bureaucracy, carried out assassinations, and conducted guerrilla attacks. These activities made rural areas unsafe, especially for government agents and RVN community leaders.

While resembling the Agroville Program, the idea for the SHP originated from experiments in several provinces – Tây Ninh, Quảng Ngãi, and Vĩnh Long – where local leaders spearheaded efforts to build self-defense capability at the hamlet level.⁵² Inspired by these successful experiments and also by the writing of French military theorist Roger Trinquier, who advocated the incorporation of civilians into counterinsurgency activities, the Ngô brothers encouraged other provincial authorities to build fortified hamlets in late 1961.⁵³ Rather than creating new settlements to aggregate the population as in the Agroville Program, the new approach allowed people to remain in their homes as walls and other defenses were constructed around them. In comparison to the Agroville Program, the SHP was more successful. By early 1962, about 500 hamlets had been built and many more were under construction.⁵⁴ As with the agrovilles, Diệm saw in the SHP opportunities to encourage economic development, cultivate people’s self-reliance, and foster communal solidarity. Gains in these areas would strengthen rural security against communist infiltration.

On the potential of the strategic hamlets, many US officials and experts shared Diệm and Nhu’s enthusiasm. However, Diệm and Nhu considered US aid in this instance a detriment. As with the Agroville Program, the two allies had different outlooks regarding the benefits of material and financial aid. The Ngô brothers wanted to foster in the people a sense of self-reliance and cooperation rather than dependence on state handouts. This disagreement was rooted in a more fundamental difference between the Ngôs and their American advisors. Unlike their US allies who emphasized the economic and military goals of the Strategic Hamlet Program, Diệm and Nhu conceived the program as a way to ignite social and political revolution in addition to achieving economic and security aims.⁵⁵

On the issue of security, the strategic hamlets had a perceptible impact in the beginning. The NLF found it difficult to gain access to the villagers in the hamlets, making it challenging for them to conduct political work, acquire food and resources, and intimidate uncooperative villagers. In response to the program, the NLF increased its infiltration activities and concentrated on destroying these fortified hamlets by late 1962. The rise in NFL insurgency made life more precarious for residents of the strategic hamlets.⁵⁶

Like security, the social and spiritual goals of the SHP were also difficult to achieve. According to Nhu, many provincial officials focused most of their attention on the actual fortification and security issues, rather than promoting personal and social transformation. Moreover, provincial officials felt rushed, not only by pressure to show results but also by the surge of NLF activities. As a result, the program included extensive forced relocation of people and households, despite Diệm and Nhu’s directive to avoid repeating this mistake.⁵⁷

Adding to people’s resentment was the program’s requirement for people to contribute labour and to participate in security patrols. The latter was not only time-consuming but also dangerous, especially when the NLF stepped up its activities. In the end, Diệm’s hope for unifying the nation through collective work widened rather than narrowed the gulf between the state and ordinary rural residents.

Civil Society and Nation-Building

During the First Republic, the South Vietnamese government, the United States, and many Western NGOs worked to integrate migrants and minority groups, expand education, and pursue socioeconomic development. Many Vietnamese nonstate actors also took up the mantel of nation-building. Individuals and groups voluntarily pursued a range of social, cultural, and intellectual activities with the expressed goal of contributing in some small way to nation-building. Founding members of the Vietnam Research Association (established in 1957), for example, claimed that their research on socioeconomic conditions contributed to nation-building.⁵⁸ Similarly the Library Association (1956) asserted that its members’ activities contributed to the nation by increasing its cultural and intellectual development. A writer in the first issue of the association’s bulletin declared that because libraries contributed to raising the cultural level of a nation, librarians and technicians were working side by side with the government to build an ideal society in a period when the “nation’s revolutionary endeavor was in its most ardent phase.”⁵⁹

These participants might have been overstating their contributions to society. Their perceptions and activities nevertheless reveal that there were many RVN residents – especially urban anticommunist elites – who wanted a role in nation-building. While not all participants agreed with Diệm’s vision for the country, many wanted Vietnam to be democratic, independent, and modern, and were willing at least initially to cooperate with government efforts.

During Diệm’s early years in power, many lively debates about nation-building coursed through South Vietnam’s public sphere. Emboldened by the slight easing of press restrictions in 1956, RVN newspapers assumed the role of loyal opposition. Groups such as the Democratic Opposition Bloc (Khối Dân Chủ Đối Lập) and its mouthpiece, the Current Commentary Daily (Thời Luận), called on people to participate in national politics, offered critiques of government policies, and advocated for democratic reforms.⁶⁰ The legislative elections of 1959 saw prominent opposition candidates winning seats, despite Diệm’s electoral interference. In April 1960, disenchanted anticommunist nationalists joined forces to draft the so-called Caravelle Manifesto to protest against state repression and the lack of democracy in the RVN.⁶¹ Diệm responded to these challenges, as well as the attempted coup of November 1960, with more suppression and censorship. In this atmosphere, South Vietnamese civil society came to be dominated by pro-state activities or groups that focused strictly on cultural and educational issues.

While organizations such as the Research Association and the Library Association were occupied with generating and disseminating information and research, there were groups that concentrated on foregrounding Vietnamese culture and history. One of these was the Confucian Studies Association, formed in 1957. The group proposed that since Confucianism formed the foundation of Vietnamese society, promoting this ideology would help unify different social sectors and act as a stabilizing influence. The group intended to “make morality prevail” and to “support the national cause.”⁶² Capitalizing on the fact that Diệm drew inspiration from Confucianism, among other philosophies, the association’s periodical focused extensively on Diệm’s support of Confucianism.⁶³ By the late 1960s, this group had grown to include many local chapters that operated throughout South Vietnam.

Other cultural groups promoted Vietnamese historical and legendary heroes in an effort to boost national pride and unity. An important example was the grassroots effort to commemorate the legendary Hùng kings of the Hồng Bàng Dynasty (c. 2879–258 BCE).⁶⁴ The members of this mythical ruling house were widely viewed as the ancient founders of the Vietnamese nation. Even though Diệm mobilized Vietnam’s historical heroes, such as the two Trưng Sisters, for incorporation into his national unity campaigns, he did not see the usefulness of the Hùng kings as a rallying point for support and ordered the annual Hùng Kings’ memorial day delisted as a national holiday. In response, private individuals took it upon themselves to organize the celebrations. These activities show that many in South Vietnam considered Vietnamese historical and legendary heroes central to their national identity – a view that notably excluded other ethnic groups.

Besides promoting cultural pride based on Việt history, grassroots groups also participated in education. One such group was the Vietnam Women’s Association. Established in 1952 by Tô Thị Thân (but known by her husband’s penname, Bút Trà), this association focused on helping poor working women. Its stated aims were to unify women in the struggle for women’s rights, improve the women’s livelihood, and defend the rights of working women.⁶⁵ Mrs. Bút Trà and her husband published a series of popular dailies in Saigon, which she used to promote the activities of her women’s group.⁶⁶ In addition to organizing visits to hospitals, prisons, and orphanages, the Women’s Association promoted literacy among working women. The group established the Literacy Society, which provided free literacy classes. With the newspaper’s promotional help, the Women’s Association grew and, by 1960, it had many local branches.⁶⁷

Though wealthy, Mrs. Bút Trà was not a member of the cultural elite. Her first husband was ethnic Chinese and she experienced discrimination and hostility for her marriage choice. She claimed proudly that her newspapers were produced for the masses. But the group’s efforts among poor women backfired when government officials became suspicious that communists had infiltrated the group. The association’s secretary was subsequently arrested on charges of being a communist. After this event, Mrs. Bút Trà tried to avoid further state scrutiny by enlisting prominent anticommunist women, such as the wives of military and civil officials, into the association.⁶⁸ This event demonstrates that voluntary contribution to nation-building needed to be compatible with the dominant national vision backed by the government, in which any association with communism was anathema.

One of the longest-lasting educational and cultural projects launched under the First Republic was the Popular Polytechnic Institute (PPI), operated by the Popular Culture Association (PCA). Founded in 1954, the PPI offered free night courses to adults who wanted to learn a skill, language, or an academic subject.⁶⁹ In 1962, the school began adult literacy and secondary school equivalency programs for a minimum charge. The PCA also opened public reading rooms and sponsored cultural events. One of its most significant contributions was the publication of Bách Khoa [Encyclopedia], an influential periodical that hosted rigorous discussions on philosophy, literature, culture, and social issues.⁷⁰

The PCA was founded by young, Western-educated professionals who had been invited by the Ngô brothers to return to Vietnam in 1954 to help with nation-building and were assigned to important government positions. One founding member was Huỳnh Vӑn Lang, who worked in the Ministry of Finance and later became the Director of the Foreign Exchange. Lang was also a key member of Nhu’s Cần Lao Party, a powerful organization that acted to extend the Ngô brothers’ influence and to keep tabs on civil servants and military personnel.⁷¹ Another important PCA figure was Đỗ Trọng Chu, who served in the Office of the General Commissioner for Refugees. Chu’s wife, Trần Thị Mầu, director of the PPI in Gia Định, was a member of the Constituent Assembly. From their positions of influence, these members funneled their energies into sociocultural development.

According to the founding members of these groups, the long decades of colonialism and warfare had deprived Vietnamese people of a general education. The PCA therefore aimed to rectify this problem by offering accessible courses in academic and applied subjects. Their goals were to provide students with an intellectual foundation, a moral education, and physical training. Apart from knowledge, there were other benefits that came with bringing people of different classes together. Association founders averred that the institute had the potential to create bonds among people, providing them with a sense of community. Armed with this new sensibility, citizens would be better able to serve the nation.⁷²

As expected, the political complexion of this institute and association was staunchly anticommunist. The founders leveraged their reputations and connections to attract state and foreign aid to support the school and cultural programs. Their donors included the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Asia Foundation, and UNESCO, which provided technical support, funding, and advice. These organizations supported the PCA’s education and cultural development agenda. The IRC and Asia Foundation were especially enthusiastic about the association’s potential to stem the spread of communist influence. Both these organizations were closely linked to the US government and shared its goals of building an anticommunist, American-friendly South Vietnam.⁷³ Operating with a political agenda, the Asia Foundation and the IRC saw an ally in the PCA.

In addition to funding, the PCA’s institute also attracted many students. In the first session, 8,000 people applied but only 1,500 could be accommodated. In the second session, the institute was able to accept close to 1,900 students. Many enrolled in English classes, while ethnic Chinese took Vietnamese language courses to comply with the state’s Vietnamization policy. From 1954 until 1967, the PPIs in the Saigon–Chợ Lớn area offered twenty-five sessions and had a total enrolment of 43,329 students. The literacy and school equivalency programs graduated 84,065 students for the period of 1955–67.⁷⁴ Propelled by demands from students, the PCA opened chapters and PPIs outside of Saigon. In 1967 there were sixteen chapters throughout South Vietnam, each operating its own PPI. The popularity for the PPI reveals the considerable desire for education; it also indicates that many volunteers were willing to contribute to nation-building.

These are only a few examples of civil society’s effort to contribute to building a strong and united nation in South Vietnam. Participants expressed support for a variety of foundational ideals for the nation. Some emphasized Confucian morality and Vietnamese traditions, while others focused on economic justice and modern education. While endeavors were initiated by people with means and government connections, these projects mobilized support from ordinary volunteers who carried out the work on the ground, such as promoting events, canvasing donations, and teaching literacy classes. Despite their labor, South Vietnam remained fractious, vulnerable to political subversion and instability.

Conclusion

Diệm came to power inspired by nationalist desires to build an independent, modern, and unified noncommunist nation-state. Diệm’s own failings as a leader – his autocratic tendencies, nepotistic practices, inability to compromise, and unwillingness to share power – led eventually to the unraveling of his nation-building endeavors. While Diệm’s willingness to resort to coercion and repression was already evident in the early years of his rule (for example in the Denounce Communists Campaign), this habit became more pronounced following the launch of the DRVN-sponsored rural insurgency during 1959–60. Especially after the establishment of the National Liberation Front in 1960, Diệm targeted not only communists but also noncommunist intellectuals, students, and Buddhists.

Nation-building efforts were also complicated and frequently undermined by the involvement of the United States. While American government agencies and NGOs supplied much-needed funds, material aid, and technical support for Diệm’s nation-building programs, their presence and participation was controversial and often counterproductive. The sheer scale of US aid and the growing presence of American advisors in South Vietnam made it difficult to portray nation-building as a genuinely Vietnamese endeavor. The US presence also seemed to validate the DRVN claim that theirs was the authentic Vietnamese nation-state, and that the southern republic was merely Washington’s creation.

Since Diệm was eventually overthrown and assassinated in 1963 by a group of generals who concluded that he had become a liability in the efforts to build a viable anticommunist South Vietnamese state, most scholars have concluded that his nation-building efforts were an abject failure. In hindsight, it is clear that Diệm did not achieve many of his own nation-building goals. But while his nation-building programs frequently faltered, both his state-building measures and his attempts to forge unity had lasting consequences. Moreover, his death did not mark the end of anticommunist nation-building in South Vietnam. Groups such as the Popular Culture Association survived and even thrived in South Vietnam after 1963. Meanwhile, a host of new groups launched their own initiatives to improve living standards, expand access to education, and promote community-building.

After 1965, the intensifying war in South Vietnam produced new civil society needs, such as caring for those orphaned, wounded, or displaced by violence. At the same time, the RVN state launched a host of new nation-building efforts, many of them based in part on the experience gained during the Diệm years. Although the history of nation-building in republican South Vietnam includes plenty of failed projects and seemingly wasted efforts, that history is not merely a chronicle of ineptitude, nor is it a tale of a venture that was doomed to failure from the outset. It is also part of the larger history of nation-building during the era of decolonization, a time when aspirations for national unity collided with both the daunting legacies of colonialism and the geopolitical imperatives of the Cold War. In South Vietnam, as in North Vietnam and in most of the rest of the Global South, translating nation-building dreams into material realities was hard to do.