In the past decade, the number of democratic states has declined significantly and regimes that seemingly combine features of both democracy and authoritarianism have proliferated (Freedom House 2018). This development betrayed the predictions that countries will transition to liberal democracy in the post-authoritarian period (Huntington Reference Huntington1991). These emerging regimes have been labeled variously depending on the nature of the institutional arrangements, but they are broadly described as hybrid regimes (Diamond Reference Diamond2002). Their resiliency has drawn attention to the causes of and conditions for such ability of these regimes (Gagné Reference Gagné2012). Four arenas are identified as crucial to the endurance of the hybrid regimes, including legislative and judicial realms (Ekman Reference Ekman2009; Levitsky and Way Reference Levitsky and Way2002). In a hybrid regime, the legislative body is stripped of its independence; consequently, it is relegated to a “rubber stamp” for the wishes of the executive. The legislative body then is used to manipulate the constitution to establish control over the electoral arena and judiciary.
Bangladesh embraced parliamentary democracy in 1991, after a short-lived one-party authoritarian system in 1975 and 15 years of military and pseudo-civilian rule. However, by 2018, it is an example of how an enfeebled legislative body can become a tool of the executive in its authoritarian agenda. Between 1991 and 2006, Bangladeshi citizens enjoyed a competitive, multiparty political system with regularly contested elections. Despite serious weaknesses of other democratic institutions—including the Election Commission; a trust deficit among major political parties particularly among two major parties: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL); and repeated episodes of political violence—free and fair elections in regular intervals allowed Bangladeshis to change the government as a result of the constitutional provision of holding elections under a caretaker government (CTG). The constitution stipulated that the incumbent resign 90 days before the election and that a non-party government headed by the immediate past Chief Justice of the Supreme Court be appointed by the president to oversee the election.
Bangladesh embraced parliamentary democracy in 1991, after a short-lived one-party authoritarian system in 1975 and 15 years of military and pseudo-civilian rule. However, by 2018, it is an example of how an enfeebled legislative body can become a tool of the executive in its authoritarian agenda.
In the 2008 election, the BAL secured a two-thirds majority in the parliament. Three years later, the parliament scrapped the CTG provision, citing a court verdict that described the CTG system as contrary to the democratic spirit of the constitution because it is an unelected government. However, the court maintained in the verdict that the next two elections be held under the CTG system and that the parliament be dissolved 42 days before the election. The parliamentary committee, appointed in July 2010 to add amendments to the constitution, “held 27 sessions [during an 11-month period] and consulted experts, political parties (including the ruling party), journalists and civil society representatives” (Majumdar Reference Majumdar2013) and agreed to retain the CTG with minor changes (Riaz Reference Riaz2013). However, at the behest of the prime minister, the CTG provision was eliminated and the provision of holding elections under the incumbent’s supervision was inserted through the 15th amendment of the constitution. The opposition parties made good on their threat to boycott the 2014 election unless their demand for restoring the CTG system was met. Violence engulfed the nation during the election and less than 25% of voters cast their votes (Riaz Reference Riaz2014). More than half of the MPs were elected unopposed; without any opposition, a de facto one-party parliament emerged. In a hybrid regime, a weak and ineffective parliament becomes an accomplice instead of a check to the excesses of the executive. Bangladesh is no exception. The ruling party since 2014 has adopted an authoritarian style of government, enacted draconian laws, and clamped down on any dissent (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2018).
In hybrid regimes, the judicial arena is subordinated through various means, including appointing and dismissing judges and officials (Levitsky and Way Reference Levitsky and Way2002), making the higher courts advocates of the current regime (Brown and Wise Reference Brown and Wise2004). The removal of the Lord President of Malaysia by Mahathir in 1988 and curtailment of power of the Venezuelan Supreme Court under the Chavez government (1992–2012) (Urribarri Reference Urribarri2011) are cases in point. The intent of the 16th Amendment of the Bangladesh Constitution (2014) fits into this pattern. The amendment empowered the parliament to impeach Supreme Court judges. When the High Court and the Supreme Court annulled the amendment (2017), the ruling party engaged in the vilification of the Chief Justice, who later “resigned” and left the country.
Bangladesh’s experience since 2009, particularly two constitutional amendments, shows how a hybrid regime utilized the legislature as a tool for strengthening its authoritarian tendencies.
