Focusing particularly on the moment of decolonization, in this article I look at the paradoxes attending the endurance of the statist framework in conceptualizing territorial self-determination as well as in curtailing it. A range of protagonists in the decolonization drama, from the departing colonial powers to Third World nationalists to international jurists, have all clung to the modern nation-state as the means through which self-determination is to be realized. Against the enduring hold of the state, this article tries to foreground the ways in which the statist paradigm prematurely forecloses the self-determination options available to the nomadic communities of Western Sahara, and cramps debates about boundary and uti possidetis in Burkina Faso and Mali. In this vein the received categories of the territorially bounded state reach into the postcolonial imagination to discipline, codify, and produce ‘independence’. At the same time, however, the difficulties confronted by the boundary delimitation process in Burkina Faso and Mali suggest that the reach of the territorially bounded state is limited. It is limited by the sub-national and transnational complexities of people's lives, but also by the indeterminacy of cartographic documentation and the complexities of colonial and postcolonial bureaucracies. Rather, it is argued that international law has a contradictory relationship with decolonization, desiring the self-determination of the former colonies, while also harnessing the decolonization project to fulfil its own desires, ‘to reproduce the law's assumptions regarding the ends of freedom’.I am indebted to Doris Sommers for this formulation.

Drawing from the Pinochet and Congo v. Belgium judgments, this paper addresses issues arising from the question of which courts (national or international?) are best suited to exercise jurisdiction over individuals accused of crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide. It begins by looking at the approach taken in the Statute of the International Criminal Court. It moves on to discuss established views on the matter in general international law and the opposing visions of this relationship depicted in the Pinochet and Congo v. Belgium cases. It closes by addressing the consequences of the prevalence of one or the other view for the future of international law and the prosecution of international crimes.

The International Court of Justice has been exceptionally lucky to have had the services of Carl-August Fleischhauer for a full nine-year term.

It is hard to imagine a candidate with better qualifications. Immediately before coming to the Court Carl-August Fleischhauer had for a period of eleven years been the Legal Counsel of the United Nations. His period of tenure in this highly important but very difficult post was widely admired. He was greatly appreciated by his staff, and in turn gave considerable responsibility to those he especially valued, and was generous in his public acknowledgements of the work of his team. He exemplified the maxim that great leaders not only show the example to be followed, but also take care to express appreciation for work well done. With Fleischhauer, tactical wisdom in this matter fully coincided with his natural instincts as to how he wished to behave towards others. Fleischhauer was at the United Nations through particularly difficult and tumultuous years. His calm and careful advice allowed the United Nations to engage in certain new and imaginative activities, at the same time knowing that the legal basis for this ‘creative lawyering’ was meticulously sound. The morale at the Office of Legal Affairs was high – an equally important matter for a civil servant whether national or international.

According to classical legal positivism, the prerequisite to being selected as a judge on the International Court of Justice is legal expertise and high moral character–the personality of the judge is therefore merely the subject of idle curiosity. American Legal Realists understood that one could not explain past decisions or predict future decisions merely by extrapolating rules; account needed to be taken of history, culture, politics, economics, and the personality of the judge. As a person, Judge Oda is famous for his self-control in personal comportment. As a judge he is a study in independence, having produced an unmatched number of dissents and separate opinions. His contribution to international law will continue to influence us.

In the LaGrand case, the International Court of Justice seems to have created a clear precedent in favour of the binding force of provisional measures. This essay surveys the main lines of argument for and against the binding nature of provisional measures in the relevant literature, and discusses how the LaGrand case was argued in this context. The elation to be found in recent literature with regard to the ‘settlement’ of the issue of the binding force will be questioned by a discussion of the apparent adoption in international law of a system of precedents and stare decisis.

For years the majority of those individuals publicly indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) remained at large due to a lack of co-operation from states whose assistance was required to effect their arrest. In order to assist in this regard, various operations have been undertaken since 1997 by which UN and regional missions have taken steps to assist the ICTY in the difficult task of bringing accused before the Tribunal in The Hague. Such steps were taken in the case of Stevan Todorović, who was captured and transferred to The Hague by means of an operation shrouded in secrecy and alleged to have involved illegal behaviour on the part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force. The following article discusses the nature of Todorović's arrest (based on the limited facts available) and his various attempts to have his indictment dismissed due to the nature of his arrest. In so doing, it considers the state of the law regarding the appropriateness of an international judicial body proceeding with the trial of an individual brought before it by potentially illegal means. Although a plea agreement was reached in the case, with the result that the judicial consideration of the issues is limited, important issues are nevertheless raised in the arguments of the Office of the Prosecution and the defence counsel which are likely to recur in similar cases in the future

The quest of extending the role of tribunals beyond its traditional mission of justice to embrace the difficult need of reconciliation after mass atrocities has revealed itself to be challenging. This difficulty is most clearly illustrated in the case of the ICTR, whose mission is to bring about Rwandan reconciliation through justice. The implementation of this mission that was doubted by some members of the Security Council, including the Rwanda itself, at the time of setting up the ICTR is becoming a difficult experiment, with positive results but also with some negative outcomes capable even of undermining the aimed objective of national reconciliation. The problem of co-operation between the Tribunal and Rwanda, the difficulties of circumscribing individual responsibility without condemning the whole community, the problem of singling out and punishing some criminals and leaving the rest unpunished, the abuse of pardon and clemency, and finally the absence of the victim in a criminal process pretending to restore his situation are some of the difficult problems hampering the proclaimed mission of reconciliation assigned to the ICTR. This article is an attempt to analyse these problems and their impact on national reconciliation in Rwanda.

In the relationship between the Netherlands and the International Criminal Court distinction must be made between the position of the Netherlands as party to the Statute and the special position of the Netherlands as host country. Seen from a political perspective, this distinction is not always obvious, but from a legal perspective it is useful because it helps to show that legal problems and objections raised either do not exist or are solved more easily. As far as the preparations for the actual functioning of the Court are concerned, the legal infrastructure in the host country is largely in place.

The African Union marks a new era in institution-building in postcolonial Africa. It is conceived as an aspect of Africa's response to the challenges of globalization and regional integration. It is also part of the historic quest for deeper African unity. This discussion focuses on the political and contextual dynamics behind this development, and assesses its significance for the project of African integration. While offering no extensive examination of all the core provisions of the Constitutive Act, particular attention has been paid to some key principles. It is argued that the African Union represents a significant departure from the political, legal, and institutional framework of the OAU, and is predicated on a range of principles that reflect new thinking and approaches among the African states.

This article examines the different approaches of European and US policy makers to the use of force in a changing world. The truths and fallacies pertaining to these approaches lead the author to believe that the absence of a common view among the permanent members of the Security Council on what constitutes a threat to international peace and security in order to use force can have a debilitating effect on international security. For this reason the author argues that, rather than endlessly debating how old rules should be applied to new threats, what is needed is a determined effort on both sides of the Atlantic to forge a new framework for the use of force.

Books and Articles in the Field of International Dispute Settlement (Autumn 2002) Compiled by Ingrid Kost