Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a severe mental health problem of a heterogeneous nature. To add to discussions around defining coherent subtypes of OCD, this paper uses qualitative, cognitive linguistic analysis to show how episodes of OCD can be differentiated based on their underlying conceptualizations of threat. Spoken narratives of OCD episodes told by people with OCD were analyzed using image schema theory and cognitive approaches to deixis in discourse. Through an exploration of the participants’ subjective experiences of time, space, and uncertainty in their recounted OCD episodes, the findings demonstrate that perceptions of threats fluctuate as OCD episodes unfold, and that it is the perceived movement (or not) of the threat that induces distress. Moreover, the dynamism of the threat is conceptualized differently for different subtypes of OCD. This variation can in part be explained by the role of two image schemas in structuring OCD episodes: the SOURCE–PATH–GOAL image schema and the CONTAINER image schema. It is argued that the blanket notion of threat as often investigated in clinical models of OCD is not sensitive enough to capture these shifting perspectives. It is thus recommended that threat perception in OCD is researched as a dynamic, evolving, and highly subjective experience.

This paper investigates the role played by motion in the conceptualization of result in the English resultative and caused-motion constructions. We argue that there is a strong preference for the figurative use of caused motion to express a state change when the affected entity experiences a complete transformation. However, if the affected entity acquires a new property but retains its essence, an adjectival phrase is preferred. Another category encompasses figuratively exploited resultatives that formally employ the caused-motion construction, but semantically do not codify the same kind of change. The paper also discusses the motivating role of the metaphor A CHANGE OF STATE IS A CHANGE OF LOCATION to express result, and proposes the additional activity of other high-level metaphors and metonymies.

The semantics of focus particles like only requires a set of alternatives (Rooth, 1992). In two experiments, we investigated the impact of such particles on the retrieval of alternatives that are mentioned in the prior context or unmentioned. The first experiment used a probe recognition task and showed that focus particles interfere with the recognition of mentioned alternatives and the rejection of unmentioned alternatives relative to a condition without a particle. A second lexical decision experiment demonstrated priming effects for mentioned and unmentioned alternatives (compared with an unrelated condition) while focus particles caused additional interference effects. Overall, our results indicate that focus particles trigger an active search for alternatives and lead to a competition between mentioned alternatives, unmentioned alternatives, and the focused element.

Previous research suggests that situation model construction may be influenced by a reader’s ability to embody the first-person perspective of the protagonist, including character emotions, during online comprehension. This study examined the effect of narrative point-of-view and readers’ own prior personal experience on reading engagement and comprehension. Participants read eighty short story passages on a computer screen, each describing either a familiar or an unfamiliar event. Stories were written in the first or third person, and either featured or did not feature a shift in protagonist emotions in the last sentence of the text. The results indicated that the use of third-person narrative point-of-view had an overall effect on reading engagement and enhanced readers’ ability to monitor changing character emotions. First-person narrative point-of-view, however, promoted protagonist empathy when participants read about unfamiliar events. The results also provide support for the conclusion that readers were more engaged with the story and constructed more effective situation models when they had prior personal experience of story events.

Previous research in Greek aphasia has indicated that functional categories related to verb inflection are differentially impacted, with Aspect most severely affected, Agreement least affected, and Tense occupying an intermediate position. However, research materials were not controlled for overall length or position of the verb within the sentence, confounding functional category with processing load. Using balanced materials, here we tested ten persons with aphasia and ten matched control participants on grammaticality judgment and sentence completion in three functional categories (agreement, tense, and aspect) using ten verbs spanning a range of familiarity. Production results indicated no difference in errors of either lexeme or inflectional morpheme selection. In grammaticality judgment acceptance of incorrect sentences was lower for Agreement but this pattern was mirrored in the control group as well. The results provide no basis to support a specific linguistic deficit in the representation of functional categories in Greek persons with aphasia.

While acknowledging that they have many points of theoretical agreement, the discussion deliberately focuses on areas of incompatibility between integrational and ‘distributed’ approaches to mind, cognition, and language in the light of Roy Harris’ claim that the notion of a ‘distributed mind’ comprises a category mistake. Harris’ position is based on his affirmation of a ‘vulgar concept of mind’ which contrasts sharply with certain accounts of mind originating from within cognitive science. The tension between lay and scientific understandings of mind and language forms a key point of discord between the two approaches. I discuss Harris’ argument that the category mistake inherent in the notion of ‘distributed mind’ can be dissolved by replacing it with the notion of an ‘integrated’ or ‘integrating’ mind. I then consider the derived notion of ‘distributed language’ and its theoretical and explanatory value from an integrational perspective. Finally, I conclude by arguing that although they share many important insights, the differences of perspective which exist between the integrational and distributed approaches are such as likely to prevent the emergence of anything resembling a unified movement.