For much of the last century, global actors have sparred over the international legal rules governing the compensation a state should pay a foreign investor when it expropriates the latter's property. The competing claims have had many dimensions, including the content of customary international law and the line between bona fide regulations and expropriations. In the modern age of international investment agreements (IIAs), a debate continues over another key issue: When a state expropriates a foreign investment in violation of an IIA, where should a tribunal look for the standard of compensation—to the amount the treaty requires the state to pay when it expropriates, or to an external standard for violations of international law generally? Each is alluring to a tribunal for its legal visibility—one spelled out in the very text under examination, and one stemming from a venerable international court case. But they may point to significantly different results for the investor and the host state. And investor-state tribunals remain wildly inconsistent, even incoherent, in their choice and use of those standards. It remains a significant source of disagreement in contemporary investor-state arbitration.

One dusty day in 2002, at Takhta Baig Voluntary Repatriation Centre near Peshawar in northwestern Pakistan, an Afghan woman—let us call her Amena—entered a nondescript room and sat down in front of a camera. A brief conversation took place with a woman sitting nearby at a computer terminal. Amena placed her chin where she was directed to do so, swept back a few strands of hair creeping out of her veil, and stared straight ahead for a few seconds while a series of photographs of one of her eyes was taken. Almost immediately, a small alarm sounded on the computer terminal of the woman seated alongside her. Amena was gently ushered toward the other side of the room for discussions with other officials. Some short time later, she was advised that her request to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for a modest cash grant and some supplies to aid her and her family's repatriation to Afghanistan had been denied. This was because, according to output of the UNHCR’s iris verification program, she had already received assistance earlier the same year. When asked, Amena admitted that she had indeed sought UNHCR repatriation assistance multiple times, under pressure from family members. She walked away. Soon, she could soon no longer be seen amid the press of trucks, cars, bicycles, and people that stretched to the suburbs in the distance.

In August 2016, in Havana, Cuba, the Colombian Government signed a peace agreement with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP, after four years of negotiations. The agreement provided a window of hope that Colombia's fifty-year armed struggle, the longest-running conflict in Latin America, would finally come to a close. One actor in these negotiations, whose considerable influence has been underappreciated, is the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Colombia has been under preliminary examination by the OTP since 2004. In addition to discharging its investigatory function, the ICC prosecutor has actively influenced the negotiation of two peace processes: first, the 2005 peace process with the paramilitaries; and more recently, the tumultuous negotiations with the FARC. This Comment explores the specific pathways of the OTP's influence in the Colombian peace process, and the broader lessons this episode holds for the ICC's work and for the continuing negotiations in Colombia.

On September 27, 2016, the Trial Chamber (Chamber) of the International Criminal Court (ICC or tribunal) rendered its judgment in Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, wherein the defendant was convicted of the war crime of intentionally directing attacks on protected cultural objects. It is the ICC's first such conviction and the first time that an accused has entered a guilty plea at the tribunal pursuant to Article 65 of the Rome Statute (Statute). Al Mahdi pled guilty to co-perpetrating attacks on protected objects pursuant to Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute for his role in the attack on, and destruction of, ten mosques and mausoleums in Timbuktu. The Trial Chamber sentenced him to nine years in prison.

On August 29, 2016, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Tribunal) sentenced a corporate media enterprise and one of its employees for contemptuously interfering with the Tribunal's proceedings in Ayyash, a prosecution concerning the February 2005 terrorist attack that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The contempt decision is significant for two reasons: (1) it adopts an expansive definition of the crime of contempt to restrict a journalist's freedom of expression; and (2) it is the first international judicial decision to hold a corporate entity criminally responsible.

In a proceeding that challenged the domestic content requirements (DCRs) of India's solar energy program, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) upheld the panel determination that the Indian government's measures violated its international obligations. The decision offers new insights into certain exceptions for environmental policies under the multilateral trading system and elaborates on the relevance of other international legal regimes to the compliance issue under WTO law. Further, it has the potential to increase export opportunities of many countries in the Indian renewable energy market.

On November 25, 2015, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court) held that the state of Suriname had violated the rights of two indigenous groups by denying recognition of their juridical personality and their entitlement to collective property and judicial protection. In Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, the Court also considered the impact of nature reserves on indigenous land rights, as well as the legitimacy of private titling of property that encroaches on land for which collective title has not been attained. The decision pushes the Court's previous jurisprudence significantly—and somewhat controversially—by asserting that under the American Convention on Human Rights, indigenous peoples are entitled, as collective entities, to recognition of their legal personality. In so doing, the Court challenged ordinary assumptions about the individualized character of most adjudication regarding international human rights and made the possibility of enforcing collective rights more palpable.

On September 28, 2016, Congress enacted the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), overriding a presidential veto for the first and only time during Obama's presidency. The Act allows Americans to sue foreign states for playing a role in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. While JASTA was written in general terms, it was drafted specifically to allow families of the victims of the 9/11 attacks to sue Saudi Arabia for its suspected role in those attacks. The Act received widespread bipartisan support despite the administration's consistent stance that the Act would harm U.S. economic, diplomatic, and national security interests.

On October 9, 2013, a group of Haitian cholera victims and their survivors sued the United Nations, along with two UN officials and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the United Nations had negligently and recklessly allowed peacekeepers from Nepal carrying cholera to enter Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake without reasonable health screenings. The suit further alleged that the United Nations had negligently maintained inadequate sanitation facilities. Finally, the petitioners alleged that the United Nations’ refusal to accept responsibility for the outbreak had exacerbated the epidemic. According to the United Nations, by August 2016, nearly 800,000 people had become infected with cholera, and more than 9,000 had died of cholera.

Starting in February 2016, the United States and Russia reached a series of agreements aimed at establishing a cessation of hostilities in the Syrian civil war and facilitating a political settlement of the underlying conflict. Although the agreements showed initial promise, various breakdowns led the United States to suspend bilateral communications with Russia regarding maintenance of the agreements by October 2016.

In October 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin suspended the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), a bilateral treaty between Russia and the United States governing the disposal of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. A Russian Foreign Ministry director explained that the decision was prompted by a “dramatic change in the situation . . . brought about by the unfriendly steps taken by the United States.” He also cited “the United States’ obvious inability and unwillingness to honour its obligations . . . on time and in full.” The United States expressed disappointment at the suspension, arguing that continued implementation was in both states’ interests.

In January 2015, a CIA drone killed an Italian aid worker named Giovanni Lo Porto during a strike on an Al Qaeda compound in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. In July 2016, the Obama Administration reached a settlement agreement with Lo Porto's family that included a payment by the United States of more than one million euros.

The United States deposited its instrument of ratification for the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (the Convention) in September 2016. The Convention entered into force for the United States several months later. Ratification was facilitated by the passage of novel federal implementing legislation that—rather than directly mandating alterations to the domestic legal structure—created a financial incentive for states to change their child support laws. While the Idaho legislature displayed some initial resistance, by early 2016 all fifty states had changed the relevant laws, enabling the submission of U.S. ratification.