A state's denunciation of a treaty with the sole objective of re-acceding to it with a reservation may be interpreted as circumventing the prohibition of the late formulation of reservations enshrined in Article 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This article addresses five cases where the denunciation of and re-accession to a treaty was at least considered by certain states and whose analysis promises to clarify the legal characteristics of this practice. One instance involved such a practice being discussed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the context of the amendment of the Swiss interpretative declaration to Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Another instance involved Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana with regard to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A further situation arose when in 2002 Sweden denounced and re-acceded to the Council of Europe Convention on the Reduction of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality with the aim of excluding the obligations contained in Chapter I of this treaty. The last case analyzed in this article is Bolivia's denunciation of and re-accession to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The aim of this article is to offer a critical appraisal of this practice under international law. The article argues that the European states' position differs from the generality of states. In addition, states may include specific provisions on the possibility of denouncing and re-acceding with a reservation when they draft their treaties. States may review more systematically the treaty action and object to practices that are not compatible with the reserving states' good faith treaty obligations. And the ILC may include this topic into its work programme, for example, when updating the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties.

The prohibition of the use of force is generally considered to be a jus cogens rule, which would mean that it does not permit any derogation, neither by consent nor by treaty. Yet multiple apparent derogations from the prohibition exist: Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter, Articles 105, 110 and 111 of the UNCLOS, and other treaties all permit uses of force, and ad hoc consent to use force is common. This article explains how this can be legally valid, by reference to the distinctions between derogations, exceptions, and scope.

Article 16 is one of the most contested provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It authorizes the Security Council to suspend the Court's investigations and prosecutions for a renewable period of twelve months, but does not define the circumstances under which the Council should issue a deferral. In 2013, Kenya and the African Union requested the Council to postpone the trials of President Kenyatta and Vice-President Ruto, but without success. Like with previous deferral requests, such as for President Al-Bashir, the international community turned out to have very different ideas about when Article 16 should be invoked. In light of the unsuccessful deferral requests of African states as well as the ongoing debate about the Court's complicated relationship with the Council, this paper examines the legal and political threshold of Article 16. The first part of the paper provides an overview of the conditions and consequences of a valid deferral, and discusses the four references that the Council has made to Article 16. The second part deconstructs the existing disagreement within the international community on when the Council should use its deferral powers.

With the Treaty of Amsterdam entering into force on 1 May 1999 the European Union has obtained legislative competence concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters. This competence includes the power to unify rules on applicable law (Art. 81(1), (2) letter c TFEU). There are already some European instruments based on this competence. All these instruments contain some identical provisions (e.g., ordre public, renvoi, escape clauses, overriding mandatory provisions). The article raises the question whether shared provisions should be taken out of these instruments and put into a new regulation (the so-called Rome ‘0’ Regulation). Such a Rome 0 Regulation could also deal with other aspects which are not yet covered by the existing instruments and which could also be placed in a general part of the rules on applicable law (e.g., qualification, preliminary questions, agency). Before he comes to the overall conclusion the author describes the advantages and disadvantages of such a Rome 0 Regulation. He takes into account not only the different legislative procedures within Article 81 TFEU for family and non-family law projects but also the special position of Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland within judicial cooperation in civil matters.

By the Act of 27 November 2013, the Dutch Government has radically changed the provisions of its Penal Code pertaining to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction (Arts. 4-8 Penal Code). The new rules take effect from July 1st 2014 onwards. Most importantly, the Act widens the scope of the passive personality principle, generalizes the application of the domicile principle, which equates permanent residents with nationals for purposes of the application of the active personality principle, and establishes jurisdiction over foreigners present in the Netherlands who have committed a serious crime abroad if extradition proves impossible (aut dedere aut judicare), even if international law does not oblige the Netherlands to do so. In addition, the Act brings order to the Penal Code's hitherto rather chaotic jurisdictional provisions by, inter alia, grouping the jurisdictional mandates based on international legal instruments together in one provision, and limiting the number of jurisdictional grounds on which offences can be prosecuted.