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State Formation and Bureaucratization: Evidence from Pre-Imperial China
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 October 2024
Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between military conflicts and state-building in pre-imperial China. I develop an incomplete contract model to examine rulers’ and local administrators’ incentives in conflict. Defensive wars drive decentralization: landowning local administrators have more to gain from a successful defense and are therefore more committed to it. Offensive wars drive centralization: the landowning ruler has personnel control over the non-land-owning local administrator and can therefore force the latter to participate in less lucrative attacks. Model predictions are corroborated with empirical evidence and historical case studies, and offer broader implications for the political divergence between China and Europe.
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- © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association
Footnotes
I am indebted to Avner Greif, James Fearon, Saumitra Jha, and Avidit Acharya for their guidance and support. This work benefited from helpful comments and suggestions from Ran Abramitzky, Shuo Chen, Yiwei Chen, Xinyu Fan, James Fenske, Robin Gong, Yu Hao, Ruixue Jia, Mark Koyama, Mark Lewis, Cong Liu, Debin Ma, Joel Mokyr, Eric Shi, Yang Xie, Chenggang Xu, Leslie Young, Anthony Lee Zhang, and seminar participants at CKGSB, Fudan, Japanese Empirical Economics Seminar, Peking University, SHUFE, Stanford, Tsinghua, UCSD, All-UC Economic History Workshop, CEPR Economic History Symposium, EHA Annual Meeting, and International Symposium of Quantitative History. This work was supported by the Bradley Graduate Fellowship through a grant to the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, and by the Pre-Doctoral Fellowship from the Stanford Center at Peking University. All errors are my own.