This article offers an overview of the current state of labor markets and pension coverage in a wide sample of Latin America and the Caribbean countries, and proposes a series of possible avenues toward universal coverage, not only as an instrument to fight poverty during old age, but also as part of an agenda for increasing formal employment and productivity growth. We conclude that despite perspectives of low economic growth and reduced fiscal space, the region is going through intense demographic and socio-economic changes, which increase the demand for better jobs and provide a real opportunity for initiating the bold reforms in pensions, labor, and taxes needed to achieve universal coverage.

We study the effects of pension reform on hours worked, human capital, income and welfare in an open economy populated by four overlapping generations: three active generations (the young, the middle aged and the older) and one generation of retired. Within each generation we distinguish individuals with high, medium or low ability to build human capital. Our simulation results prefer a pay-as-you-go pension system with a particular earnings-related linkage above a fully-funded private system. This pay-as-you-go system conditions pension benefits on past individual labor income, with a high weight on labor income earned when older and a low weight on labor income earned when young. Uncorrected, however, such a system implies welfare losses for current low-ability generations and rising inequality. Complementing or replacing it by basic and/or minimum pension components is negative for aggregate employment and welfare. Better is to maintain the tight link between individual labor income and the pension also for low-ability individuals, but to strongly raise their replacement rate. An additional correction improving the welfare of low-ability individuals would be to maintain for these individuals equal weights on past labor income.

This paper uses a quantitative overlapping generation model to suggest a pension reform able to sustain a retirement system, in the face of deep demographic changes. We derive the reform design from an optimization program that selects one or more policy instruments – and their values – among a predefined set, to minimize the welfare loss of the median voter while keeping sound public finances, sustaining gross domestic product growth and considering the welfare of the newborn generation. We calibrate the model to the Luxembourg economy. The European Commission (2012) forecasts that, among all euro area countries, Luxembourg will experience the largest increase in pension costs between now and 2060. Our simulations show that a single instrument reform would imply severe backlashes on the rest of the economy. The suggested pension reform instead consists of a policy mix including taxation, benefits and the effective retirement age. We stress the need to design pension reforms based on optimization programs that lead to the achievement of desired targets. Indeed, the reform implemented by the Luxembourg government in 2013, which does not result from an optimization program, will not keep public finances sound over the medium term.

This paper analyzes the performance of the Italian defined contribution guaranteed pension funds during the period 2008–2012 through a panel analysis. This paper is organized around three main research questions. The first one is focused on the probability of a guarantee payment in a given year. The second one deals with the determinants of the gap between actual return and minimum guaranteed yield on a yearly basis. The third one focuses on the factors affecting the weight of administrative and management costs and their relationship with the fund dimension.

We use an overlapping generations model economy with endogenous retirement to study the 2011 and 2013 reforms of the Spanish public pension system. These reforms delay the legal retirement ages, increase the contributivity of the system, and adopt a sustainability factor and a pension revualuation index that effectively transform the Spanish pension system into a defined-contribution pension system. We find that these reforms improve the sustainability of Spanish pensions substantially, and that they limit the tax increases that would have been necessary to finance the pension system deficits. But these results are achieved at the expense of large reductions in the real value of the average pension. This reduction is progressive and, by 2050, the average pension is approximately 30% smaller in real terms than what it would have been under the pension system rules that prevailed in 2010. We also show that these reforms are costly in welfare terms and that households born between 1950 and 1970, young disabled workers who are alive at the time of the reform, and future cohorts bear the highest welfare costs. The substantial reduction of pensions and the high welfare costs that these reforms bring about lead us to conjecture that further reforms lurk in the future of Spanish pensions.