Anwar al-Awlaki is a dual Yemeni-American citizen who has emerged in recent years as a leading English-language proponent of violent jihad, including explicit calls for the indiscriminate murder of Americans. According to the US government, moreover, he also has taken on an operational leadership role with the organization al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), recruiting and directing individuals to participate in specific acts of violence.

Until relatively recently, dealing with terror groups and terror activities had been viewed by most nations primarily as an act of law enforcement, regulated by domestic criminal law. Accordingly, in most instances the same codes that applied to ‘ordinary’ criminal acts were applied to acts of terrorism. Such crimes were investigated by law enforcement agencies which were also responsible for the apprehension of terrorists. An alleged terrorist would be prosecuted in a regular civilian court of law for crimes such as murder, destruction of property and assault. Specialized terrorism-related offenses were also codified but continued to be drawn from domestic criminal law. When reviewed by the courts, the legitimacy of such counter-terrorism measures was assessed by judges in light of familiar domestic criminal and constitutional legal standards.

The nature of contemporary operations in Afghanistan reflect the complexities of their environment, particularly in the field of terrorism and insurgency and the reaction of states in combating those (new) forms of violence, generally referred to as counterterrorism (hereinafter CT) and counterinsurgency (hereinafter COIN).

Drones have been credited with eliminating senior leaders of the Taliban and other insurgent groups, and accounts of the recent addition of an American citizen to the target list have received widespread attention. These reports have raised serious questions about whether targeted killing and drone use comport with the relevant international and domestic laws. Tierney J, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Opening Statement, Hearing on ‘Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting’, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, US House of Representatives (2010), http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4903&Itemid=30.

Despite the introduction and increasing use of ‘smart’ bombs, recent bombing campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and Serbia, formerly known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), have resulted in what some commentators consider to be an unacceptably high level of civilian casualties, especially when compared with the low level of combatant casualties in the attacking force. During the most recent Gulf conflict, a conservative estimate suggests that over 1,100 Iraqi civilians died within the first 2 months as a result of aerial bombardment or missile attacks by Coalition forces and that approximately another 600 civilians were killed by unexploded ordinance during the same period. There are no reliable statistics for civilians injured by aerial bombardment and unexploded ordinance in that period but the number is likely to have been many times higher than the number of fatalities.

Debate over the degree to which International Human Rights Law (IHRL) should legitimately inform and alter the interpretation of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is increasing in intensity. It is not a new debate—G.I.A.D. Draper was considering the issue in 1971, and there have been numerous general statements by the UN recognizing that there is indeed interplay between the two bodies of law. Yet despite a long formative period, the debate—which is now beginning to attract much greater attention jurisprudentially, operationally, and academically—is still being conducted in a procedurally flawed manner. This flawed procedure has two characteristics. First, it is characterized by a process of reverse engineering. By this I mean it is characterized by reasoning froma limited number of particular instances to arrive at a general thesis, followed by the subsequent re-application of this apparent general thesis to other instances. The second procedural characteristic is that the debate is substantially in the form of a one-way argument. I will briefly elaborate on both.

On 28 October 2009, Ms Berlanty Azzam, a 22-year-old Palestinian student at Bethlehem University, attended a job interview in Ramallah. On her way back home she was stopped by Israeli soldiers at a check-point near Bethlehem. She was asked to present her ID card, and then questioned about her stay in Bethlehem. The soldiers told Azzam that since her ID card showed her registered address as being in the Gaza Strip, she could not stay in the West Bank without a permit from the Military Commander. Ms Azzam explained that she moved to Bethlehem from Gaza in 2005, when no permit was required in order to move between Gaza and the West Bank, the two parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). Since then she had tried unsuccessfully to change her registered address in the Palestinian Population Registry from Gaza to the West Bank, but was informed by the Palestinian Authority that this could not be done because Israel, the Occupying Power, does not allow such changes to be registered.

2010 was characterised by incidents that raised age-old questions pertaining to IHL, albeit in different guises. The increase in the use of unmanned weapon systems, or drones, triggered heated debate on the interplay between jus ad bellum and jus in bello as well as between IHR and IHL. This raised a host of further questions including: under what conditions does IHL come into operation? Which normative regime—international or non-international—governs the particular armed engagement? And, what is the geographical scope of IHL?

As the war in Afghanistan and the fight against transnational terrorism wage on with no immediate end in sight, US forces have increasingly turned to drone (technically labeled an unmanned aircraft system or UAS) strikes to target Taliban insurgents and Al Qaeda terrorists, especially in Pakistan's tribal areas of North and South Waziristan. Between 2004 and 2007, a mere nine such attacks were conducted. By contrast, in 2010 there were 118, and by mid-February 2011 US forces had already launched 12. The tactic has proven highly effective in disrupting enemy operations. Since 2004, 32 senior members of al Qaeda and the Taliban have been killed. In 2010, for instance, the US successfully targeted such key figures as Ibne Amin, an al Qaeda linked Swat Taliban commander; Ali Marjan, a local Lashkar-e-Islam commander; Sheikh al-Fateh, the al Qaeda chief in Afghanistan and Pakistan; Hamza al-Jufi, an al Qaeda commander; Sadam Hussein Al Hussami, an al Qaeda planner and explosives expert; Mohammad Qari Zafar, a Taliban commander wanted in connection with the 2006 Karachi consulate bombing; Sheikh Mansoor, an Egyptian-Canadian al Qaeda leader; Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, an al Qaeda linked leader of the Turkistani Islamic Party; Jamal Saeed Abdul Rahim, wanted for his alleged role in the 1986 hijacking of a Pan American World Airways flight; and Mahmud Mahdi Zeidan, a Jordanian Taliban commander. Overall, US air strikes are estimated to have killed between 1,060 and 1,707 members of al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated groups in the past 6 years.

Taking as its starting point United Nations General Assembly Resolution 64/254, the United Nations Human Rights Council's committee of independent experts in international humanitarian and human rights laws was convened to monitor and assess the domestic legal or other proceedings undertaken by both the Government of Israel and the Palestinian side, with an eye to their conformity with international standards.

Responses to the recent extension of the list of prohibited weapons at the Review Conference of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Kampala, Uganda have been rather mixed. Some have hailed the amendments to Article 8 of the Rome Statute as a milestone development. Others speak of a blatant manifestation of the Rome Statute's inability to deal with prohibited weapons in a meaningful and up-to-date manner. Certainly, the list of prohibited weapons has been extended in Kampala. But as constructed, does it adequately capture the realities of contemporary armed conflicts? In the pursuance of this question, in a first step, this contribution focuses on what actually happened in Kampala and why it had not already happened in Rome in 1998. In a second step, some light will be shed on what did not happen in Kampala. As is well known, initial proposals for the extension of the list of prohibited weapons had been far more extensive than the list that was ultimately adopted. Thirdly, in a final step this Comment concludes with an assessment of whether the Rome Statute's list of prohibited weapons in its amended form now better corresponds to the realities of contemporary armed conflicts.

One of the major legal instruments the US Department of Defense (DoD) will be relying on in terms of planning and carrying out its activities in the near future is a new law of war military manual which is expected to be published sometime in 2011. While on the surface such a document may not seem of critical interest to those interested in security/strategic studies or to humanitarian activists seeking to ban rather than regulate violence, there are important reasons to place a certain amount of emphasis on this DoD product and to expect that it will have a significant impact, especially on issues that are presently widely debated within the humanitarian legal community.

On 27 September 2010 the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva released its analysis of the 31 May 2010 boarding of the large passenger liner, Mavi Marmara, by forces of the Israeli Navy. The ship was interdicted in the eastern Mediterranean Sea by Israeli commandoes, who rappelled vertically onto the top deck of the ship from a helicopter. The boarding incident and ensuing melee that unfolded on the deck of the ship left several Israeli military members seriously injured and resulted in the death of nine Turkish nationals. The event ignited a firestorm of controversy in international humanitarian law. These sad and unfortunate results raise interdisciplinary questions concerning both fact selection—determining what actually happened, or whose version of the facts are accepted—and rule selection—what was the legal relationship between Israel and the vessel Mavi Marmara. Because of the tense stand-off between the Gaza Strip and Israel, however, and the volatile brew of religion, politics and geography that colors choices of fact selection and rule selection, analysis of the incident is especially challenging. The issues of fact selection are more important for resolving questions surrounding the deaths and injuries of persons on board the ship and Israeli naval personnel. Factual claims necessarily are colored by a veneer of subjectivity, and in this case go more toward determining whether the use of force on the part of Israeli commandoes was lawful. The nature of the tactical operation that unfolded on board the ship and the reaction of the vessel's passengers are bitterly disputed, inseparable from who used what force and when.

In the early hours of 31 May 2010, Israel intercepted six vessels on the high seas carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza (collectively called the ‘Gaza Freedom Flotilla’), which resulted in the death of nine civilians and the injury of many more. According to the Free Gaza Movement, the vessels were attempting to cross the Israeli blockade to deliver aid to the blockaded civilians in Gaza. Israel justified its actions by invoking its right to enforce the blockade and prevent contraband from reaching the territory. Nevertheless, the operation prompted moral outrage and a wave of critical statements by governments and international organisations, with many calling on Israel to end the restrictions imposed on Gaza. It also set in motion a highly contested debate on the legality of the blockade and the interception. As with nearly all aspects of the Israeli—Palestinian conflict, the debate involved intense scrutiny of the facts, the rules of international law, and the applicability of these rules to what has undoubtedly become a sui generis situation, unparalleled in its duration, complexity and equivocation.

Correspondents' Reports is compiled and edited by Tim McCormack with the excellent assistance of James Ellis, primarily from information provided to the YIHL by its correspondents but also drawing on other sources. The section does not purport to be a fully inclusive compilation of all international humanitarian law-related developments in every State, but represents a selection of developments during the calendar year 2010 that have come to the Yearbook's attention. Legal developments from early 2010 that were noted in Volume 12 of the YIHL are not repeated here. Readers are thus advised to consult this section in conjunction with Correspondents' Reports in Volume 12. We apologise for this inconvenience. Further, some 2009 humanitarian law-related developments came to our attention after Volume 12 went to press and could not be noted there. For the sake of completeness, we have included them here. Reference is also included to a number of legal developments which are not strictly-speaking related to IHL but which are nonetheless interesting and relevant for our readers, in particular relating to justice issues, jurisdictional questions, jus ad bellum, State security, human rights, refugees and internally displaced persons, and terrorism. Where citations or dates or other details have not been provided, they were not available or obtainable. The YIHL is actively seeking new correspondents, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Interested persons or anyone who is willing to contribute information should contact the Reports Editor at [email protected].