To say that there is room tor improvement in the U.N. development operations would be the understatement of this Development Decade. The truth is that the U.N. launched its development program without an overall policy or a sound strategy III organized for the task, it is still stumbling along an uncharted path.

The Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, or EPTA (so called because it had some modest precursors), was the first program of significant size that brought together the entire U.N. family, i.e.. the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Almost from birth it was caught in a procedural tangle. Expediency, compromises, ad hoc decisions—especially to accommodate the conflicting agency interests and viewpoints—became its hallmark.

For the past half-dozen years I made my living as an ambassador. People have not stopped asking, “Just what does an ambassador do?” The question is something of an improvement on the one encountered by former ambassador to Great Britain, Kingman Brewster, as reported in Newsweek a year ago: “Do you think ambassadors matter any more?” Perhaps my acquaintences are simply kinder—or less sophisticated— than Brewster's.

Most of the classic books on diplomacy try to answer such questions by describing ambassadors as analysts, reporters, and negotiators. The American public favors another, simpler response. So do many top administrators in Washington—especially when they are new to office. They conclude that in this age of jet aircraft, instant communication, summits, and special envoys, ambassadors are mere post office boxes and innkeepers.

There is hardly a nation in the world with a more prominent economic and trade role in the Middle East than Japan. By the same token, few nations are as illequipped to deal with the region on any but strictly economic terms.

Japan's Middle Eastern trade has become absolutely vital to its economic well-being at the very time that political events have reached new levels of chaos in the region. Now in Tokyo voices are being raised in alarm at the shallowness of Japanese foreign policy for the Middle East. At a recent seminar, Toyoaki Ikuta of the Institute of Energy Economics stated flatly: “Japan has no ability militarily or politically to influence Middle Eastern affairs. If there is a problem in oil supply, of all the industrial nations Japan would be the hardest hit. Because of this, Japan must make a greater contribution to security in the Middle East.’