Alan Winters was the editor of the World Trade Review (WTR) from December 2008 to mid-2020. Launched in 2002 as a joint initiative of the WTO Secretariat and Cambridge University Press, the WTR has become the leading multidisciplinary journal in the field of international trade broadly defined. In the period during which Alan was editor of the journal, the number of issues grew from three to five, reflecting the significant increase in the number of quality submissions. The impact factor of the journal rose to 1.6 in 2020, an increase by 150%, above that of The World Economy, arguably the incumbent in the field when the WTR was created.

Globalization and robotics (globotics) are jointly transforming the world economy at an explosive pace. While much of the literature has focused on rich nations, the changes are quite likely to affect developing nations in important ways. The premise of the paper – which should be regarded as a thought-piece – is based on an extreme thought experiment. What does development look like when digital technology has rendered manufacturing jobless and many services freely traded? Our conclusion is that the service-led development path may become the norm rather than the exception; think India, not China. Since success in the service sector is based on quite different factors than success in manufacturing, development strategies and mindsets may have to change. This is an optimistic conclusion since it suggests that developing nations can directly export the source of their comparative advantage – low-cost labour – without having first to make goods with that labour.

With a modified formalization of Heckscher–Ohlin theory as the basis of a novel econometric specification, this paper uses worldwide data over three decades to estimate how the effects of greater openness on industrialization vary among countries with differing endowments of land relative to labour. The results confirm the theoretical prediction that greater openness reduces manufactured output shares in land-abundant countries, while increasing them in land-scarce countries. The implications of these results for trade and development policy are debatable.

This paper develops a Heckscher−Ohlin model in which the effects on production structure of endowments and changes in trade policies depend in a continuous way on a country's degree of openness to trade. Its main contribution is to show semi-formally how the introduction of product differentiation causes the elasticities of output with respect both to factor endowments and to sectoral trade barriers to vary with import penetration (the share of foreign firms in home markets) and export orientation (the share of foreign markets in home-firm sales).

There is limited evidence about the role that participating in international trade has on the diffusion of technologies. This paper analyzes the impact of exporting on firms’ adoption of technologies that are more sophisticated, using a novel dataset, the Firm-level Adoption of Technology (FAT) survey, that includes more than 1,500 firms from Brazil. The survey provides detailed information about the use of more than 300 technologies, combined with data from Brazil's census of formal workers (RAIS) and Brazil’s exports data from the Ministry of Trade. To address some critical endogeneity concerns, we apply a difference-in-differences estimation with multiple periods to examine the effects of entering export markets on technology adoption. We find that exporting has positive effects on firms’ likelihood of adopting advanced technologies in business functions related with business administration, production planning, supply chain management, and quality control, which are important to manage tasks associated to export activities.

This paper examines the impact of trade-related technology diffusion from G7 countries to Latin America and East Asia on total factor productivity controlling for education, governance, and distance. We build on the trade and distance-focused strands of the technology diffusion literature and find that (i) total factor productivity (TFP) increases with education, trade, and governance (ETG) and declines with distance to the G7 countries; (ii) increasing Latin America's ETG to East Asia's level would double TFP, accounting for about 75% of the TFP gap between the two country groups; and (iii) South America's greater remoteness relative to Mexico's from the US and Canada significantly reduces its TFP and similarly for Singapore's greater remoteness from Japan relative to Hong Kong.

The Knowledge-for-Development (K4D) approach has been characterized by a marked concentration of the production of research on development in developed countries. The underlying utilitarian approach to social science research misrepresents the nature and making of policy, raises entry barriers for developing country researchers, and focuses on the production of research to the detriment of its use. Using such research in developing countries requires informed debate, consideration of the local environment, and sufficient local research capacity. Foreign assistance should focus on research capacity building as a specific objective, distinct from the production and publication of research, with its own management, implementation, and monitoring. This is essential if the objective of the K4D approach, namely the better use of scientific knowledge to enhance the quality of policies, is to be achieved.

The 1980s and 1990s saw a policy revolution in developing countries in which many highly protected (if not closed) economies were opened to world trade. These reforms were largely undertaken unilaterally, but international economic institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization supported these efforts. This paper examines the ways in which these institutions promoted, or failed to promote, trade policy reform during this pivotal period.

Over the past three decades, tariff protection to farmers has fallen and partly been replaced by domestic support, whilst support for farmers in some emerging economies has grown. Against that backdrop, this paper provides new estimates of national economic impacts of global agricultural tariffs and domestic supports. Using the latest global economy-wide GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model calibrated to 2017, we simulate (a) the removal of food and agricultural domestic supports and agri-food tariffs and (b) the removal also of tariffs on imports of non-agricultural goods. We find that agricultural support policies are still an important part of the global welfare cost of all goods’ trade-restrictive policies (albeit only half as costly as in 2001), and tariffs still dominate the global welfare cost of all farm-support programs. That farm support could be re-instrumented to relieve natural resource and environmental stresses, boost food and nutrition security, and alleviate poverty and income inequality.

Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs) may play an important role in lowering the economic costs of greenhouse gas mitigation and in overcoming political-economy constraints on the use of carbon taxes or equivalent measures. A carbon tax plus a full BCA could deal with the competitiveness challenges arising from carbon taxes by using the WTO's National Treatment principle to apply equal levies on domestic production and on imports, and by symmetrically rebating the carbon tax on exports in the manner of a value-added tax (VAT) export rebate. This approach would shift the base for carbon taxation from production to demand and potentially achieve substantial reductions in the cost of cutting emissions. It would avoid the massive measurement and compliance problems associated with BCAs based on foreign emission intensities. By contrast, import-only BCAs distort prices of importables relative to exportables; create divisive trade conflicts and deterioration in the terms of trade for developing countries; and likely require development of complex sets of import preferences.

The UK's Trade Remedies Authority (TRA) conducts economic assessments of the ramifications of trade remedies, the Economic Interest Test (EIT). Such assessments are not mandated by the World Trade Organization but are conducted by certain trade remedy investigating authorities, including those of Brazil, Canada, the European Union, and New Zealand. The EIT is a mandatory part of the UK trade remedy system and is arguably more transparent than similar interest tests conducted by other trade remedy investigating authorities. However, stakeholder participation remains a challenge and the TRA is working on ways to improve participation. To date, the TRA has completed 11 EITs in its trade remedy cases, with a further ten live cases. These cases cover different products, markets, and countries, across which the likely positive and negative impacts of trade remedy differ. This paper invites experts to review the TRA's EIT methodology.

Rules of Origin (RoO) are critical components of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). They are designed to stop products coming into a PTA through the partner that applies the lowest tariff – a phenomenon known as trade deflection. While RoO are necessary, complex RoO may undo the benefits of trade agreements. Using a novel database of RoO, this paper evaluates the incidence and restrictiveness of different types of Product-Specific Rules of Origin (PSRs) across 128 reciprocal PTAs for the period 1990–2015. Results, based on a structural gravity model controlling for confounding factors, display wide heterogeneity across different categories of PSRs attached to preferential margins, with more flexible PSRs associated with a significantly stronger trade effect compared to more restrictive ones where exporters do not have a choice among PSRs or have to satisfy multiple PSRs. A simulation exercise reveals that a radical simplification reform leading to the adoption of flexible PSRs providing alternative choices to prove origin would have increased global trade under PTAs on average by between 2.7 and 4% during the sample period.

The degree to which firms make use of preferences in exporting to a partner country under a Free Trade Agreement will in good part depend on the restrictiveness of the underlying Rules of Origin (ROOs). Focusing on the post-Brexit Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed by the United Kingdom and the European Union, we examine how access to zero preferential tariffs has been impacted by ROOs. We do so by constructing a ROO restrictiveness index which varies across products. We find that the TCA has an overall moderate degree of ROO restrictiveness. Using product-country level trade data, we find that preference utilization under the TCA has risen over time, and exhibits a positive correlation at the product level with the EU Common External Tariff. Regressions on the determinants of preference utilization indicate that more restrictive ROOs are associated with a lower degree of preference utilization by UK firms in the EU market and this effect is more evident for consumption goods. Preference utilization is also driven by the size of the preferential margin, the size of the trade flows, and the extent to which exports are undertaken by producers as opposed to distributors, as well as the degree of firms’ engagement in value chains.

We analyse the ‘indirect effects’ of Brexit on African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries’ exports that use the UK as a platform to access the EU market and vice versa. First, we use the EORA26 multi-region input–output database for 186 countries and 26 sectors to characterize the ACP domestic content embedded in bilateral trade between the UK and the EU. Second, we apply the GTAP-VA module to carry out a simulation of how the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement will impinge on 121 countries and 65 products. The results suggest that while ‘indirect effects’ on ACP countries’ exports may exist, their economic magnitude is small in aggregate because ACP countries supply only small amounts of inputs used in UK–EU bilateral trade. Our simulations also show that these effects may be offset by the likely increase in ACP domestic content in exports because of TCA friction, mainly towards the UK.

While the theory of economic policy offers a potential framework for thinking about the joint pursuit of economic objectives (EOs) and non-economic objectives (NEOs), over time the theory of economic policy was formalized in a way that considers NEOs as constraints that are given, rather than as goals that may themselves be endogenous alongside EOs. We examine the analytical treatment of NEOs as co-determined with EOs, revisiting some of the ground broken by Alan Winters in his analysis of NEOs. We review the place of NEOs in the theory of economic policy, discuss current practice in the representation of such objectives as exogenous constraints, and develop an argument for representation of NEOs as objectives in themselves.

Using trade policy to achieve foreign policy objectives, such as stable international relations, has a long history, from Kant to the founders of the GATT. Punishing enemies and rewarding ‘friends’ by granting or withholding market access is also not new, and sanctions or blockades are a venerable form of trade policy used as foreign policy. A more recent form is influencing the domestic policy of another country with non-commercial provisions in trade agreements. All these tools are based on linkage, on the assumption that a desired outcome can be achieved by interventions that would increase or decrease trade. The latest instance is so-called ‘friend-shoring’, which would in principle isolate enemies, although it will be difficult in practice and risks undermining multilateralism. The cost of these interventions is susceptible to economic analysis, even if the conclusion is that it is worth paying. Influenced by Alan Winters who referred to national security as a motivation for agriculture protection as a ‘so-called non-economic objective’ or SNO, I argue that using a trade policy tool for a foreign policy purpose as if there is no cost is a SNO job, an attempt to justify an intervention aimed at one objective by framing it as being valuable for another.

This article examines a significant question in navigating trade and climate tension: how to recognize another country as having equivalent climate regulations. Such equivalence forms a core component of many proposed models of so-called climate clubs. Establishing equivalence between distinct national climate regulation regimes poses a unique challenge that draws upon both trade and environmental international cooperation. Drawing on existing proposals, I examine prospects for country-based cooperation through three models: ETS-linking, benchmarking of shared methods and minimum standards, and benchmarking of outcome duties. The analysis concludes that all models necessitate some trade-offs between the goals of rigorous oversight of climate objectives, inclusivity, and WTO compliance. Benchmarking of shared methods and minimum standards seems most feasible, and would provide a deeper level of integration between trade and climate cooperation, but necessitates a shift in how countries, particularly the EU, oversee regulatory compliance.

Negotiations on ‘deeper’ trade agreements and estimates of tariff equivalents have increased the awareness that regulatory trade costs are (too) high. This paper discusses ways to effectively lower such costs, reviewing the potential role of trade agreements and international regulatory cooperation, and the approaches that have been taken in different world regions. Attention is also paid to cost reduction via global technical standardization. Key issues are how to reduce the prevalence of national standards setting and how to best promote international standards. In both dimensions, Europe is argued to play a frontrunner role.