This article examines World Trade Organization (WTO) jurisprudence on the question as to if the purpose of suspending concessions or other obligations is to induce compliance, to rebalance concessions, or both. WTO jurisprudence on this issue can be systematized into three steps. First, inducing compliance is the general purpose of suspension as complaining parties have the right to request the authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations as long as they meet the requirements spelled out in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. The second step relates to the level of suspension. In general, WTO jurisprudence has accorded a higher hierarchy to the purpose of rebalancing concessions or other obligations, with some exceptions made regarding disputes on prohibited subsidies and diachronically variable suspension levels. As a third step, WTO jurisprudence has bestowed complaining Members freedom concerning the suspension's content, so as to induce the defending party to comply. Keeping these three steps in mind will hopefully make understanding WTO jurisprudence on suspension of concessions or other obligations easier.

The literature on escape clauses in international commerce focuses on the workings of trade remedies. The logic is that, by adhering to a strict methodology that is subject to legal review, trade remedies credibly signal that the government is only temporarily defecting from free trade. And yet, countries often turn, instead, to a measure that does not adhere to a strict methodology and is not subject to legal review: binding overhang, or the gap between a country's bound and applied tariffs. What explains a government's decision to use trade remedies or binding overhang? We argue that trade remedies are used where import surges are big enough that injury can be proven, but low enough that governments have incentive to prove it. Otherwise, binding overhang is their flexibility measure of choice. We conduct a variety of empirical analyses concerning 22 emerging economies with access to both trade remedies and binding overhang. The results strongly bear out our hypothesis, shedding new light on governments' incentives over the design of the law governing flexibility provisions.

Every third dispute brought to the WTO and not withdrawn early is settled amicably through a mutually agreed solution (MAS). This includes high-profile and long-standing WTO disputes such as EC–Bananas or Softwood Lumber. By offering a negotiated solution to hard cases, MAS have added stability to the multilateral trading system. MAS, however, also raise concerns. Settlements favour the instant resolution of disputes, but may conflict with third party interests and collective stakes. Where WTO members use their MAS to contract out of WTO law (‘WTO+’/‘WTO–’MAS), the multilateral trading system may be at risk. In addition, new forms of bilateral (interim-)settlements not foreseen in the DSU have recently emerged which currently escape multilateral disciplines. This article assesses how well the DSU balances the competing interests involved in amicable settlements, preserving the contractual flexibility of disputants while safeguarding multilateral interests. Contributing to current DSU reform debates, the article rejects the need for greater MAS enforceability, endorses the strengthening of procedural and substantive safeguards protecting collective stakeholders in settlements, and calls for new DSU disciplines on interim-settlements.

This paper attempts to model trade facilitation in a multi-regional and multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, MIRAGE. It follows Decreux and Fontagné (2009) in modeling trade facilitation and in assuming that administrative barriers are an iceberg cost. I extend their model using more comprehensive measures of ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) of red tape costs, which are computed from a gravity model, and are introduced in the CGE model. The novelty in using those AVEs is that they take into account the effects of bureaucracy, internet coverage, corruption, and geographical barriers on the time to trade. The paper has four major findings. Gains derived from trade facilitation are more significant for developing economies (especially for the Middle East and North Africa region and Sub-Saharan countries) than for developed ones, whether in terms of welfare gain (either in the short or long run) or increase in trade. Second, long-run welfare effects of trade facilitation are much higher than in the short run. Third, trade facilitation helps boost both intra-regional trade and inter-regional trade. Fourth and most interestingly, it also helps improve export diversification, leading to an expansion in those sectors that are more sensitive to time, such as food, textiles, and electronics.