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China–Broiler Products (Article 21.5 – United States) – can the sum of the parts be less than the whole?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2020

Maria Alcover  and
Meredith Crowley
Maria Alcover*
Affiliation:
Counsel at the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL)
Meredith Crowley*
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
*
*Email: [email protected]
**Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article explores economic and legal issues in the WTO dispute China–Broiler Products (Article 21.5–United States). In 2011, the US initiated a dispute against the conduct and results of China's 2009 trade remedy investigation into US broiler products (chickens). The Panel Report found that China had acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations. On the basis of a redetermination, China continued to impose duties and the United States initiated WTO compliance proceedings. The compliance Panel Report, circulated in 2018, concluded that China had failed to comply with its WTO obligations when allocating costs to construct US domestic prices for broiler products. However, China was found to have acted consistently with its WTO obligations with respect to two claims which raise some interesting legal questions. Ultimately, after almost a decade of litigation, China removed the antidumping and countervailing duties on US broiler products in 2018.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , April 2020 , pp. 282 - 296
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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