The concepts of triangular structure and pattern of relations are useful in understanding conflict in U.S.-China relations, particularly over Taiwan, and in explaining the context in which Chinese domestic politics influences the P.R.C.'s policy toward the United States. Through their influence on relative bargaining strengths, shifting patterns of relations have determined Beijing's readiness either to push for change in U.S.-Taiwan relations or to accept the status quo until China's bargaining position improves. The pace of policy change within a particular pattern of relations has been influenced by the P.R.C.'s domestic politics, which has also compelled the leaders to protect their domestic position by issuing statements aimed at the domestic audience.

Many recent studies argue that labor organization and government partisanship were important determinants of the economic performance of the advanced industrial democracies during stagflation. They do not, however, take into account the potential impact on performance of position in the international economy; the relationships reported may therefore be largely spurious. Even when the strong effects of international position, most notably the extent of dependence on imported sources of oil, were controlled for, domestic political structures remained powerful determinants of economic performance during stagflation. “Corporatist” political economies dominated by leftist governments in which labor movements were densely and centrally organized, and “market” political economies in which labor was much weaker and rightist governments were predominant, performed significantly better than the less coherent cases in which the power of labor was distributed asymmetrically between politics and the market.

What circumstances favor the realization of mutual interests in the absence of centralized authority? And through what strategies can nations foster the emergence of cooperation by altering the circumstances that they confront? Elementary game theory suggests three sets of conditions that serve as proximate explanations of the incidence of cooperation and discord: (i) Payoff Structure: Mutual and Conflicting Preferences; (2) The Shadow of the Future: Single-play and Iterated Games; and (3) Number of Players: Two-Person and N-Person Games. Each of these three attributes of context may be subject to willful modification. Nations may create the preconditions for cooperation through strategies to alter payoffs, lengthen the shadow of the future, and reduce the number of actors required to realize limited mutual interests.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran is analyzed as the latest of the “great revolutions” in a comparative perspective ranging from the early modern European revolutions to fascism. The analysis highlights the neglected importance of reactive elements, communal solidarities, and tradition in a wide variety of revolutions and revolutionary movements. Comparative inferences bring out the serious deficiency of the Marxian theory of revolution as well as of those structural theories of revolution that focus exclusively on the state. By contrast, these inferences underline the significance of ideology, religion, and culture. Finally it is argued that the emergence of a distinct Islamic revolutionary ideology can only be understood as a part of the process of crystallization of the revolutionary ideology in Western Europe and its spread to the rest of the world.

Game theory is elaborated as a theoretical approach to international politics by contrasting it with metaphorical and analogical uses of games. Because it embraces a diversity of models, game theory is especially useful for capturing the most important contextual features of the international system that affect prospects for international cooperation. Through a discussion of the relation among and extension of different game models, the versatility and scope of game-theoretic approaches to international relations are demonstrated. Special attention is paid to the empirical issues of international politics which are raised by game theory and are analyzed in other articles in this symposium.

A reexamination of revolutionary processes in the developing countries indicates mounting doubts among Soviet academic specialists that radical third-world policies will redound to the U.S.S.R.'s advantage. The author investigates the following topics: the relationship of socialist orientation to socialism; shortcomings of the vanguard parties; correct foreign and domestic economic policies; the suitability of the Marxist model for Eastern societies; and the evolution of the non-aligned movement. The congruence between these academic discussions and fresh official formulations could give Western analysts and policy makers valuable insights into new Soviet proposals for reducing East-West tensions over events in the third world.

The theory of games is used to investigate several controversial issues in the literature on the balance of power. A simple model of an international system is presented as an n-person noncooperative game in extensive form, and the stability of both constant-sum and nonconstant-sum systems is examined. It is shown not only that constant-sum systems with any number of actors from two through five can be stable, but also that stability is actually promoted by conflict of interest. Contrary to much of the literature, however, there is a well-defined sense in which the most stable system is one with three actors. In each type of system, there is at least one distribution of power that leads not only to system stability but also to peace. Some of these peaceful distributions are more stable than others, and these more stable distributions are shown to be characterized by inequality rather than by equality of power. It is possible to distinguish between a bipolar and a multipolar type of stable distribution, the properties of each of which resemble, to some degree, assertions made about them in the literature. Finally, contrary to much of the recent literature on international cooperation, an increase in the ability of states to make binding agreements may actually diminish the stability of international systems.

The hypothesis that generation has become a major source of political cleavage within the Soviet regional party apparatus is examined in the context of existing models of political generations. The attitudes of a sample of RSFSR provincial officials toward problems in the Soviet economy, as expressed in their newspaper writings, are analyzed according to several variables, including political generation. While it is difficult to speak of a significant difference in perspectives along strict generational lines, generational differences appear to be more significant within subgroups of the elite than within the elite as a whole. Several attitudinal subgroups within the younger generation are identified and their views of economic problems compared with those of their elders and with those of their generational peers. The findings suggest that the process of generational change in the Soviet Union is likely to be more complex than the traditional models of political generations lead one to expect.

Are the Indian nuclear and space programs driven primarily by defense or development motives? What are India's economic and technological capabilities in these fields?

Defense motives are strong, but are offset by the potential consequences of programs of nuclear weapons and delivery systems that could produce less rather than more security by provoking counter-reactions in Pakistan and China. The underlying development motives are equally strong, but the programs may not be cost-efficient in the short run. Ultimately, the justification for these programs is based on a dual argument: strategic circumstances justify the maintenance of the nuclear weapons option through development of civilian nuclear energy and space programs irrespective of cost or efficiency, while civilian needs in nuclear energy and space-based telecommunications and meteorological systems provide the defense sector with nuclear weapons and delivery systems options. Although at present neither may seem economically justifiable independently of the other, together they provide a reinforcing defense-development justification.

International anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation among sovereign states difficult. Transformations of balance-of-power systems into concerts tend to occur after large antihegemonic wars. Such wars undermine the assumptions supporting a balance-ofpower system and alter the actors' payoffs in ways that encourage cooperation. The logic developed in “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” holds: largely because of the increased costs that will be incurred if the grand coalition breaks up, states have greater incentives to cooperate with each other, fewer reasons to fear the consequences of others' defections, and fewer reasons to defect themselves. Cooperation is further facilitated by mechanisms that increase each state's ability to see what others are doing, and to gain “timely warning” of the possibility that the others will defect.

Soviet foreign policy underwent a significant change in orientation in the early 1970s. Emphasis on the pursuit of a new, more constructive relationship with the United States gave way to a primary focus on competition with the U.S. for influence and strategic presence in the third world, and there was a notable reduction of traditional restraints on the conduct of that competition. The article focuses on Soviet policy in the region and the period in which this redirection of policy was first manifested—the Middle East between the June 1967 and the October 1973 wars; it explains this major change by an analysis of the divergent images of the United States and of U.S.-Soviet relations that were held by Soviet elites, and the outcome of conflict among holders of the respective images.

The weapons succession process is an analysis of military-technological change that draws upon classical economics and recent theories of bureaucratic politics. The analysis focuses on the institutional mechanisms for reconciling the demand for weapons with the supply of weapons. In wartime, the demand for weapons, determined in battle, shapes military-technological change. In peacetime, different styles of military-technological change depend on different types of supplier institutions; military-technological change is described as “baroque” in the West and “conservative” in the Soviet Union. The essay speculates about the implications of different styles of military-technological change for economic development and for arms limitation.

Explanations of the growth of the newly industrializing countries (NICs) by neoclassical economists and dependency theorists neglect the role of politics in shaping development strategies. Different social configurations, state structures, and ideas about development help explain the divergent policy choices made by the export-oriented East Asian NICs—Korea and Taiwan—and the more “inward-looking” countries of Latin America, particularly Mexico and Brazil. These different strategic choices, in turn, account for variations in the patterns of external “dependency” that characterize countries in the two regions.

The deceleration of industrial growth in India since the mid-sixties has opened up a debate over industrial policy as the new government of Rajiv Gandhi has attempted to replace many bureaucratic controls by market processes. A central issue is whether the deceleration is due primarily to inadequate investment in key sectors of the economy (a point on which there is considerable agreement) or whether resources have also been inefficiently employed. State controls put in place by antibureaucratic and anticapitalist socialists created interests within the bureaucracy, the governing Congress Party, and the business community, which sustain an industrial structure that the present government, its new orientation notwithstanding, will find difficult to dismantle.

Unlike liberal democracies where the legitimacy of government inheres mostly in the process of competitive elections, communist regimes are widely believed to be legitimated mostly by their socioeconomic performance. The marked slowdown in the economic growth of the communist countries, particularly since the late 1970s, has suggested to many scholars that regimes of this kind are likely to experience a “legitimacy crisis” in the relatively near future. Prognoses of this kind are held to be premature and probably misconceived; they overlook the ability of the regimes concerned to maneuver politically and to generate additional support by the development of their consultative capacities. Four such “mechanisms of adaptation” are examined in detail: the electoral mechanism; incorporation into the ruling party; associational incorporation; and letters to party and state bodies and to the press.

World War I arose from six remarkable misperceptions that swept through Europe before 1914. Europeans exaggerated the efficacy of offensive military strategies and tactics; overestimated the hostility of neighboring states; falsely believed that strength and bellicosity could intimidate opponents; exaggerated the economic value of empire; believed that war itself was beneficial; and taught themselves a mythical nationalistic history. These misperceptions fostered expansionist foreign policies and bolstered arguments for preemptive and preventive war. They also precluded resort to Tit-for-Tat strategies to achieve cooperation through reciprocity. All of the problems discussed in this collection of essays—perverse payoff structures, short shadows of the future, and large numbers of players—were created or exacerbated by these misconceptions. This case suggests that peace can require political action projects to control malignant misperceptions, although history warns that such projects will not succeed easily.

For many scholars and observers of the Middle East, the uniqueness of the Arabs has proved to be far more interesting than those areas of Arab political life that exhibit similarities with politics elsewhere. Some of the studies reviewed here provide a partial corrective to this gap. They suggest that Arab politics, much like politics in other settings, is concerned with issues of socioeconomic change and conflict, problems of legitimacy, the role of competing ideologies, and elite factionalism. Those of the studies that highlight the weaknesses of pan-Arabism are more persuasive than those that emphasize its vitality. What is needed now is the ability to determine where we can usefully generalize about Arab politics and where politics in the Arab world are in fact unique. The social-scientific approach is deemed more likely to accomplish this analytical goal than the traditional area-studies and policy approaches.

To understand the complex developments in the Caribbean Basin and the U.S. response to them, one needs an image, an interpretive framework. A review of the current literature suggests two clear and coherent images: the security thesis, best articulated by the Reagan administration, views the crisis in the region as orchestrated by the Soviet Union, and the U.S. as playing a beneficial role historically and currently; and the neodependency antithesis, more prevalent in the literature, views the U.S. as the major historical and contemporary problem for the region. Scholars, questioning assumptions that underlie the two theses, have contributed insights on the impact of local actors and middle powers on U.S. policy. A new “interactive perspective” is constructed from these insights; it differs from both the other images in viewing the region as composed of actors, not passive objects. Though U.S. power is disproportionate, local actors have other means of leverage, which makes their actions crucial in understanding the patterns and possibilities of U.S. policy.

Brazil experienced both economic prosperity and political repression in the 1970s. When the “miracle” faltered after the oil shocks, however, repression came to be viewed as neither politically effective nor conducive to further economic growth. Workers, whose incomes had risen during the “economic miracle,” began to seek political freedom as well. The church, a strong proponent of liberation theology, also played an important role by supporting the poor in their struggle. In addition, the elite pressured for liberalization when they perceived that their control over economic rewards was being eroded by increasing state domination of the economy.

The elite may now be more responsive to mass demands in order to preclude the return of military control. Their ability to respond will be largely determined by international factors over which Brazil has little influence.

States interested in reducing the level of arms competition with a rival can employ a variety of strategies designed to promote cooperation. We examine the ability of three important strategies—unilateral action, tacit bargaining, and negotiation—to reduce the intensity of arms races motivated by different patterns of preferences and complicated by different sources of uncertainty. The latter include strategic misrepresentation, imperfect intelligence, problems of interpretation, and problems of control. Examples are drawn from 19th- and 20th-century arms races that did not result in war.