The nature of insurgencies is an ambiguous concept. As a step toward theory about it and prudent action in regard to it, the authors argue that insurgency should be regarded as a syncretic phenomenon—a highly potent compound that combines the “spirit” of archaic peasant rebellions (their apocalyptic, millenarian passions) with modern revolutionary ideologies and organization, and the practice of guerrilla warfare. Insurgency thus supplies both the “steam” and the “piston box” that Trotsky considered an irresistible revolutionary combination. The syncretic mix of disparate elements in insurgency has stood in the way of proper conceptualization of the phenomenon, and of good theory and practice regarding it. The authors further maintain that insurgency is generally confused with the Latin American foco as well as with urban terrorism and guerrilla wars of all kinds; in fact thefoco may well foreshadow the end of insurgencies as a special type of collective political violence.

There is no consensus among scholars on how to test hypotheses about deterrence systematically. The disputes are sometimes rooted in differences about theory or sources of data, but they are magnified by methodological confusion, especially over concepts and operational definitions that produce perverse empirical results. Serious theoretical errors include inadequate appreciation of the role of uncertainty in deterrence as well as selection biases that undermine empirical tests. Rigorous examination of our previous work in light of recent criticism discloses very robust findings on the conditions for deterrence success and failure.

Soviet-American disarmament negotiations of the mid-1950s provide a critical case for evaluating theories of cooperation such as Tit-for-Tat and GRIT. Although both sides were close to agreement on the main terms of a treaty by May 1955, the negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful. On the basis of declassified U.S. documents, it now appears that the U.S. did not favor an agreement at the time: thus the game was not Prisoners' Dilemma, but Deadlock. The case reinforces the criticism of Tit-for-Tat that its unitary actor assumption ignores domestic second-image pressures for arming, and it also calls into question “first-image” explanations, such as GRIT, that focus on individual cognitive barriers to cooperation. The importance of understanding the links between internal political coalitions and external bargaining strategies is emphasized.

The literature on international political economy explains foreign economic policies by integrating systemic, state, and societal features. Theoretical approaches to national security, however, have tended to extract the state from its societal context. An adequate conceptualization of security policy must integrate both systemic forces and the domestic political economy.

One way of integrating these concerns is by examining the state's strategies for mobilizing those financial, productive, and human resources considered necessary for national security.

This article examines the political economy of the state's mobilization of resources for national security, called “war preparation,” and proposes a framework for investigation that consists of three elements: (i) the objectives of state managers, (2) the constraints on the state, and (3) the policies of the state for mobilizing its required resources. Based upon these considerations, some tendencies in the government's war preparation strategies are suggested. The utility of this framework is explored through an empirical examination of Israel between 1967 and 1977. The study demonstrates how Israel's war preparation strategies were shaped by the state's domestic and security objectives, the domestic political economy, and systemic constraints and opportunities.

The immediate causes of the current crisis in socialism are the highly authoritarian and extremely hierarchical political and economic structures created by Leninism. Yet the collapse of state socialism also appears to be part of a more general crisis of socialism, a crisis that includes even its potentially more democratic variants. At the core of this broader crisis lies the diminishing appeal of the publicly owned enterprise, an institution that has always been central to the very definition of socialism, but whose economic advantages are called into question by the recent and rapid development of global markets in factors of production and especially in assets. Consequently, communism's demise by no means signifies a victory for either democratic socialism or even social democracy.