Although we live in a world of international regimes, the scholarly literature on them remains rudimentary, especially in analytic terms. This essay examines the proposition that all international regimes are social institutions, even though there is great variation among them. Among other things, this suggests that regimes are dependent upon the maintenance of convergent expectations among actors; formalization is not a necessary condition for the effective operation of regimes; and regimes are always created rather than discovered. A conceptual framework and a research agenda for the comparative study of international regimes, as laid out in this essay, would guide studies of specific regimes and improve our ability to reach general conclusions about this fundamental, yet poorly understood, international phenomenon.

Why do nations create institutionalized modes of multilateral collaboration? How can common interests develop in the face of inequalities in power and asymmetries in interdependence? The author explores the role of knowledge in the definition of political objectives and interests. The systematic interplay of changing knowledge and changing objectives results in the redefinition of “issues” and the practice of “issue linkage.” The dynamics of issue-linkage, in turn, tell us something about international regimes for the management of progressively more complex issue areas. An ideal-typical “regime” is described, theoretically applicable to all types of issues. Since the cognitive attributes of the actors who set up such a regime cannot be expected to remain stable, this concept of a “regime” can illuminate cliscussion and analysis, but cannot be expected to provide a clear model for desirable policy. However, it can illustrate the options open to policy makers wishing to choose a mode of collaboration. Regimes dealing with money, the oceans, and technology transfer are used for illustrative purposes.

An analysis of six recent works of psychohistory. A scheme is presented for classifying such works. Four different types of psychohistory are discussed; this typology is offered as a means of understanding and controlling the methodological difficulties inherent in the genre.

The work of Ted Robert Gurr, Chalmers Johnson, Neil Smelser, Samuel P. Huntington, and Charles Tilly has dominated the recent study of revolutions. However, Jeffrey Paige, Ellen Kay Trimberger, S. N. Eisenstadt, and Theda Skocpol have lately produced theories of revolution that are far better grounded historically than those in earlier works. Five major points were neglected by earlier theorists: (1) the variable goals and structures of states; (2) the systematic intrusion of international pressures on the domestic political and economic organization of societies; (3) the structure of peasant communities; (4) the coherence or weakness of the armed forces; and (5) the variables affecting elite behavior. Starting from these points, Paige, Trimberger, Eisenstadt, and Skocpol have produced analyses of the causes and outcomes of a variety of revolutions. Yet significant challenges to the theory of revolutions—such as extending the range of cases analyzed, clarifying the grounds of peasant behavior, and tying theoretical analysis to demographic data—still remain.

Recently, much attention has been focused on the influence that multinational corporations (MNCs) have on the politics of developing countries. Even setting aside past legacies of sinister corporate conduct, most students of politics agree that MNCs are potentially important actors—for better or for worse—in a country's political development because they can influence the rate, direction, and beneficiaries of change. Most case studies begin with the assumption that the political impact resulting from the presence of MNCs in developing countries is primarily a function of the international economic system. However, all but one of the books under review focus on the domestic political system in individual host countries as the independent variable rather than on the international economic system. Taken together, these studies make a strong case that the analysis of the MNC and its impact on politics in developing countries must prace heavy emphasis on the particular political circumstances prevailing in each country. The wants, needs, and motivations of key domestic political actors—many of whom do not behave in the manner predicted by either Liberal or Marxist world models—appear to be of fundamental importance in determining how MNCs affect a developing country's politics, and whether that country can counter any potentially adverse political impacts that may accompany MNCs.