Disagreements between East and West on questions of regional security in Africa, South West Asia, and South East Asia have, since the mid-1970s, contributed considerably to the deterioration of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, in the current period of poor relations, one of the most plausible avenues to the outbreak of nuclear war is that of escalation from crisis and confrontation in the Third World—specifically in the Middle East, where the interests of the two blocs most clearly intersect.

There is a widespread view in the West that Soviet strategic doctrine has not changed much since the early 1960s, and still concentrates on fighting and winning an all-out nuclear war. The Soviets are said to be reluctant to recognize thresholds, and therefore have no limited nuclear options, much less a true conventional war-fighting option. To the extent they do have a conventional option, it is contingent on surprise and a two-week blitzkrieg; if the war is not won quickly, they will have to escalate.

The phenomenon of general or hegemonic war has long been viewed as a distinctive kind of conflict, and one that has played a unique Robert Gilpin states: role in world history.

Is consent a sure foundation upon which to build a stable world order? Under what conditions is it achieved? The burgeoning literature on international regimes and regime change is beginning to address the issue E. H. Carr raised over forty years ago. Hegemonic stability theory argues that a preponderance of power provides the basis for international order. Recent observers, however, have noted that order can break down even when the hegemon exercises dominance. Furthermore, stable collaboration can be achieved in the face of declining hegemony. The exercise of power alone cannot lead to a stable international order.

For anyone whose job is to study the United States, the memoirs of its statesmen provide more than merely entertaining reading. They not only give you a closer insight into the “kitchen” of statesmanship and political decision making; they also provide an opportunity to check the assumptions and paradigms that were constructed earlier to analyze the policy of any particular administration. The memoirs confirm that in spite of hundreds of books and thousands of articles in the U.S. press that discuss specific policies, as well as daily debates in Congress and its committees, press conferences, and official statements, the policy process is not as open as it might seem at first glance. Rather, American foreign policy is made within a very restricted circle of the “initiated”—official and unofficial presidential advisers, including selected members of the Cabinet.

Self-Proclaimed nationalist movements have been active since the 19th century; the history of nations, most would agree, can be traced back a good deal further. The importance of nationalism as a force in shaping the modern world seems undeniable, and as an idea, it continues to exhibit great intellectual potency.