Critics of research in political socialization have asserted that the field has been more descriptive than theoretical, overly concerned with socialization to party identification, and too implicit with regard to underlying cultural patterns. At the same time, the study of moral development, largely addressed by psychologists but increasingly of interest to other social scientists and philosophers, has become a focal point of academic inquiry. After a brief discussion of concepts, a model of moral development is presented that integrates existing approaches within a more inclusive theoretical structure. An interrelationship is suggested between the nature of political and social institutions and the form and degree of individual moral development, and some findings show how moral development as an aspect of political socialization can aid in understanding the political behavior of both leaders and followers. Finally, it is suggested that moral development may be an appropriate bridge, within political science, between philosophers and behavioralists.

The problem of whether the rational, self-interested individual will voluntarily subscribe to a large group providing collective benefits is examined, using the perspectives of Hardin's application of game theory and Olson's application of economic theory. The arguments in each case are held to be unsatisfactory, and the same analysis cannot automatically be applied to all problems involving collective action. The subscription to large groups normally represents a distinct sub-class of problems, the solution to which, contrary to the established wisdom, is that the rational, self-interested individual with a net benefit (together, perhaps, with the irrational one with a net loss) will voluntarily subscribe to a group providing a collective good.

At recent all-union party congresses, Soviet republic and province leaders have devoted a progressively larger share of their speeches to foreign policy. By the 25th Congress, their remarks had become substantively rich and surprisingly diverse. Does this growing commentary signal an expansion of the Soviet foreign-policy making arena? After comparing the data to a series of alternative explanatory models, the author proposes that a model based solely on political ambition provides a promising but ultimately insufficient answer to this question and should be supplemented by a model presuming an increasing interest among regional leaders in influencing policy itself. This conclusion implies that the policy arena has expanded, an interpretation which is reinforced with additional data on the Central Committee's involvement in foreign policy discussions. Possible causes of arena expansion are then considered. However, the data suggest few concrete implications for the content of Soviet foreign policy.

The bureaucratic politics model has achieved great popularity in the study of decision making. Yet too often the term “bureaucratic politics” is used by scholars and practitioners without clearly stating its policy application. The decision-making behavior that occurred during the Johnson and Nixon administrations for SALT I serves to illustrate many of the limits of the model. First, the decision-making structure posited by the bureaucratic politics model is not nearly as prevalent within the executive branch as is commonly assumed. Second, even where the bureaucratic politics structure is present, the decision-making process is not always one of bargaining, compromise, and consensus. Finally, the decision context and the decision participants are ignored in the model. To provide a clearer understanding of policy-making behavior, a more systematic decision-making framework is offered, which should contribute to the development of better model- and theory-building.

The paper situates the recent attempt by Immanuel Wallerstein to provide a theoretical account of the emergence of the modern world system in the broader context of contemporary social scientific controversies, exposes the major flaws in the work, and suggests elements of an alternative framework that provides a sounder foundation for the construction of macroanalytic theories of social change. The inadequacies of Waller-stein's theory are revealed on the basis of internal evidence: he treats force as an unaccountable “error factor” which often determinatively shaped relationships among European states as well as between them and the larger world; and he does not account satisfactorily for the structure and the boundaries of the system, nor for the position specific countries came to occupy within it, nor for regime variation among them. The concurrent formation of several states must be considered an irreducible particularity of medieval European social organization. Interactive effects among them shaped the course of each during the early modern period and simultaneously contributed to the emergence of a system of states with its own dynamic. Since these political processes contributed as much to the formation of the modern world system as the economic processes emphasized by Wallerstein, theories of the system's origins and subsequent development must be founded on the notion of co-determination.

Observers have recently challenged the fundamental tenets of NATO's nuclear doctrine, above all its potentially fateful threat—or bluff—to employ theater nuclear weapons to repel Soviet conventional attacks. One group of these commentators has come to view NATO theater nuclear weapons as an anachronism that is neither necessary for deterrence and defense nor usable under any prudent calculation. Another group envisages new weapons and new doctrines that would make theater nuclear weapons more credible instruments of U.S. and NATO foreign policy. The article explores briefly some of the sources of this radical disagreement.

In the process of reviewing three recent books on international monetary developments, this article focuses on both positive and normative aspects of the “exchange-rate crisis” and its effects on policy formulation in both developed and developing countries. It attributes short-run exchange rate volatility mainly to shifts in expectations and movements in international interest rate differentials; at the same time, it links long-run exchange rate movements to the current account positions of various countries. The article also focuses on the policy implications of such volatility in a world characterized by real as opposed to monetary disturbances and discusses the alternatives open to policy makers in that context. Finally, it critically evaluates the argument that flexible exchange rates among industrialized countries have benefited the less developed countries, and discusses the implications of these developments for their choice of exchange-rate regime.