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What New Look in Defense?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Malcolm W. Hoag
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Extract

Recalling the abrupt changes in American national security policy in 1953 and 1961, we may well ask: What New Look should we expect now? What should we want? Changes will probably emerge more temperately and slowly than they did in those years. To our friends abroad, over-sensitized as they have become to policy modifications, this prospect should be reassuring. Much as they tend to sympathize with dissent within the United States over Vietnam, they realize that our domestic furor over this tragic war threatens to induce a generalized neo-isolationism. Arguments for neo-isolationism have a powerful appeal, but tend to cloud debate about the real issues for long-term security policy choice: what doctrine, military force structure, budgets, and plans?

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , October 1969 , pp. 1 - 28
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1969

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References

1 U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, The National Income and Product Accounts, 1929–1965 (Washington 1966), 158–59Google Scholar. The decline in Total New Obligational Authority requested for defense spending in his first two budgets was, of course, even greater ($26.1 billion).

2 Snyder, Glenn H., “The New Look of 1953,” in Hammond, P. Y., Schilling, W. R., and Snyder, G. H, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York 1962), 436–37Google Scholar.

3 McNamara, Robert S., The Essence of Security (New York 1968), 90Google Scholar.

4 Department of Commerce, 158–59. By Department of Defense accounts, military outlays took 10.5 percent of actual GNP at the Vietnam-war-related peak in Fiscal 1968, but only 8.8 percent in Fiscal 1969. Secretary of Defense Clifford, Clark M., Statement on the 1970 Defense Budget and Defense Program for Fiscal Years 1970–74 (Washington 1969), 157Google Scholar.

5 E.g., Kaysen, Carl, “Military Strategy, Military Forces, and Arms Control,” in Gordon, Kermit, ed., Agenda for the Nation (Washington 1968), 582Google Scholar.

6 Department of Commerce, 158–59.

7 For a succinct account, see Berger, Howard M., “Systems Analysis in the Department of Defense,” The Cost-Effectiveness Newsletter, The Operations Research Society of America, 11 (December 1967), 4–5Google Scholar.

8 Report by Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (90th Cong., 2nd sess.) on Status of U.S. Strategic Power (Washington 1968), 22Google Scholar. Italics added. Also see the Hearings of this Subcommittee, especially Part 1, 127–28, 135.

9 Secretary of Defense McNamara, Robert S., Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969–73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget (Washington 1968), 194Google Scholar and 193 respectively.

10 The Air Force Times, September 25, 1968, 8.

11 Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (90th Cong., 2nd sess.) on U.S. Tactical Air Power Program (Washington 1968), 192Google Scholar.

12 “NATO Ministers Meeting Communique,” The Atlantic Community Quarterly, vi (Spring 1968), 112–14Google Scholar.

13 Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain C. Enthoven, Exhibit A in Report of the Special Subcommittee on National Defense Posture of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives (90th Congress, 2nd sess.), Review of a Systems Analysis Evaluation of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces (Washington 1968), 8–15Google Scholar. For detailed amplification, see Annex iv, Report of the United States Delegation to the Fourteenth Meeting of Members of Parliament from the North Atlantic Assembly Countries, U.S. Senate (91st Congress, Ist sess., Washington 1969), pp. 50–59Google Scholar.

14 Ibid., 15.

15 General Lemnitzer, excerpts from address to Western European Assembly, NATO Letter (July-August 1963), 20. Italics added.

16 General Lauris Norstad, interview, “Defending Europe Without France,” The Atlantic Community Quarterly, iv (Summer 1966), 180Google Scholar.

17 Enthoven, 10.

18 Ibid., 10–13.

19 Defense Minister Dennis Healey, The New York Times, February 2, 1969, 18.

20 Life, Vol. 66 (March 14, 1969), 34. Italics added.

21 Kaysen, 569. Italics added.

22 Enthovcn, 13.

23 Communiqué and Speech, respectively, The North Atlantic Quarterly, vi (Winter 1968–1969), 607Google Scholar and 505.

24 Enthoven, 10.

25 See Hoag, Malcolm W., “Rationalizing NATO Strategy,” World Politics, xvii (October 1964), 131–42Google Scholar.

26 McNamara, The Essence of Security, 40.

27 The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1968–1969 (London 1968), 35Google Scholar.

28 Ibid., 38.

29 Department of Defense Statement of January 16, 1968, refuting allegation inThe Washington Post, in The New York Times, January 17, 1968, 10. For another DoD reaffirmation, see U.S. Senate Hearings, Status of U.S. Strategic Power, Part 1, 138.

30 General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in U.S. Senate Hearings on Status of US. Strategic Power, Part 1, 6–7. Italics added.

31 Brodie, Bernard, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton 1966), 23Google Scholar.

32 Hoag, Malcolm W., “On Stability in Deterrent Races,” World Politics, xiii (July 1961), 523Google Scholar.

33 Statement of Dr. John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, U.S. Senate Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power, Part i, 53.

34 See, notably, Brennan, D. G., “Post-Deployment Policy Issues in Ballistic Missile Defense,” Adelphi Paper 43, The Institute for Strategic Studies (London 1967)Google Scholar.

35 Kaysen, 568 and 581 respectively. Italics added.

36 Charles Schultz, “Post Vietnam Arms Budget Could Soar,” The Washington Post, January 12, 1969, E1–2.

37 Clifford (in Ref. 4), 49–52.

38 See, in particular, Buchan, Alastair, “The Reform of NATO,” Foreign Affairs, 40 (January 1962), 165–182CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Kaysen, 578. Italics added.

40 See, in particular, Bell, Coral, “The Asian Balance of Power: A Comparison with European Precedents,” Adelphi Paper 44, The Institute for Strategic Studies (London 1968)Google Scholar; and Harries, Owen, “Should the U.S. Withdraw from Asia?,” Foreign Affairs, 47 (October 1968), 15–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41 The New York Times, February 26, 1969, 4.

42 Malcolm W. Hoag, “A New Administration Faces National Security Issues: Constraints and Budgetary Options,” The RAND Corporation, P-3959 (Santa Monica 1968), 6–22. Published in part in Japan in The National Defense, xviii (April 1969), 51–64Google Scholar.

43 The Economist, December 21, 1968, 12.