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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
THE German labor unions are presently passing through a critical period. The outward portents of the crisis are clearly visible. The membership of the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB—German Trade Union Federation), which continued to climb regularly until 1952, is now stationary or, viewed in proportion to employment figures, slightly on the decline. Union headquarters ring with controversies between factions and personalities. The recent, predominantly Catholic, split-off from the DGB threatens to enlarge the hitherto minor area of rival or dual unionism; even a moderate enlargement of this sort would probably lead to an increase (as it did in France) in the indifference of the majority of workers toward all labor organizations.
1 Cf. Flechtheim, Ossip K., Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik, Offenbach, 1948.Google Scholar
2 Cf. Preller, Ludwig, Sozialpolitik in der Weimarer Republik, Stuttgart, 1949.Google Scholar
3 In spite of some occasional attempts at reconstructing trade union history, the fact of these last-minute efforts at voluntary Gleichschaltung is beyond doubt (cf. Abendroth, Wolfgang, Die deutschen Gewerkschaften, Heidelberg, 1955, p. 34Google Scholar; Anderson, Evelyn, Hammer oder Amboss, Nuremberg, 1948).Google Scholar For an argument in favor of a critical analysis of trade union history, cf. Abendroth, in Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte (hereafter cited as G.M.), April 1955, p. 260.Google Scholar
4 Trade union reactions to Louis Lochner's Tycoons and Tyrant (Chicago, 1954), the first full-fledged attempt to minimize industry's role in the rise and coming to power of the Nazi regime, have been sharp; cf. Der Gewerkschafter, Monatsschrift für die Funktionäre der IG Metall, 1955, No. 6/7, p. 31, which calls it “an extraordinary, clumsy attempt to distort and confuse the facts, in short, to acquit industry of its share in Hitler's crimes.” For industry's role in Hitler's accession to power, cf. Bracher, K. D., Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik, Stuttgart, 1955, esp. p. 441.Google Scholar
5 The program of the DGB had been outlined by Hans Böckler in his address to the convention in Munich that founded the DGB; cf. Gründungs\ongress des DGB, Cologne, 1949, Protokoll, pp. 183ff.Google Scholar
6 The Research Institute of the DGB, however, contends that wage movements in recent years have been sufficient only to preserve the buying power of the wage and salary earners at their 40–41 per cent share in the net social product; cf. Gleitze, Bruno, “Die Lohnquote im Spiegel der volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung,” WWI Mitteilungen, September 1955, pp. 183ff.Google Scholar These figures are considerably at variance with those cited in employers' publications; cf. Spiegelhalter, F., “Die Westdeutschen Löhne im Internationalen Blickfeld,” Der Arbeitgeber, August 15, 1955, p. 539.Google Scholar
7 This is the gist of Götz Briefs' argument in Das Gewerkschajtsproblem gestern und heute, Frankfurt, 1955. For a German union criticism of Briefs, cf. Wickel, Helmuth, “Gewerkschaften als Gesellschaft,” G.M., December 1955, p. 713.Google Scholar For an American exposition of the dichotomy between the concepts of “trade unionism” and “labor movement,” cf. Kerr, C., “The Trade Union Movement and the Redistribution of Power in Postwar Germany,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, XLVIII (November 1954), p. 535.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
8 A concise description, which, however, avoids criticism of organizational shortcomings, may be found in Abendroth, , Die deutschen Gewerkschaften, op. cit., pp. 42ff.Google Scholar
9 The Social Insurance elections of June 1953, in which all insured salaried employees were entitled to vote, gave the DAG many more votes than it had members. Of 1,443,000 votes cast, 53.7 per cent went to the DAG, and 21.1 per cent to the re-vived Deutschnationaler Handlungsgehilfenverband, which probably had no more than 10,000 members. The DGB list drew only 18.2 per cent, that is to say, many fewer votes than it had organized salaried employees in its ranks. (Cf. DAG, TätigKeits-bericht, Hamburg, 1951–1954, pp. 71–72.)Google Scholar Organizational strength among salaried employees runs generally much lower than among manual workers. At most, it is between 20 and 25 per cent, as against about 35 per cent for manual workers. (Cf. Brunlop, K., “DGB und DAG,” G.M., April 1954, p. 228.)Google Scholar
10 The total membership of DGB-affiliated unions has, for all practical purposes, remained stationary since 1952; it was 6,004,000 in September 1952 and 6,104,000 in September 1955. During the same period, however, the total number of wage and salary earners rose from 15,400,000 to 17,000,000. In 1950, all the trade union organizations together had 7,926 employees, as against 37,992 on the payrolls of industry and manufacturers' associations. (Based on figures given by DrAgartz, Viktorat the third regular convention of the DGB, and published as Wirtschaft und Steuerpolitik, Referat, October 4–9, 1954, p. 26.Google Scholar) However, the increase of employees in the metal workers' organization, from 826 in 1950 to 1,271 in 1953, suggests some, although not necessarily proportional, increases in total union personnel. Cf. IG Metall Geschäftsbericht, 1950–1952, Frankfurt, n.d., p. 299; ibid., 1952–1953, P. 256.
11 Dr. Agartz' contractual relation with the WWI was terminated on December 31, 1955. The future of the WWI remains unclear; it is still possible, though unlikely, that the WWI will lose its organizational independence and be relegated to the status of a subdivision in the DGB's Economic Department. Meanwhile, Dr. Agartz and a colleague who also was released from the WWI have begun publishing a newsletter devoted to critical analysis of union problems and economic affairs in general.
12 Cf. the critical remarks of Fricke, F. in “Konstruktive Gewerkschaftspolitik,” G.M., June 1955, p. 337Google Scholar, and the discussion contributed by H. Seeger, chairman of the woodworkers' union, in ibid., p. 435.
13 The 1952 DGB convention voted on a motion to introduce directives for equalization of benefits among unions; however, the motion did not obtain the two-thirds majority necessary for statutory changes. Cf. Protokoll des 2. ordentlichen Bundeskon-gressses, Berlin, 1952, p. 34.
14 Agartz, V., Staat, Wirtschaft und gewerkschaftliche Lohnpolitik, Cologne, 1954.Google Scholar For the course of trade union wage policies, cf. Reich, Nathan, “Germany's Labor and Economic Recovery,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, XXVI, No. 2 (January 1955), pp. 47–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
15 Cf. Gewerkschaften im Staat: Drittes europäisches Gespräch 1952, 1955, p. 181.
16 This same point is made in V. Agartz' speech at the 1954 Frankfurt DGB convention, published as Wirtschaft und Steuerpolitik, op. cit.; in ÖTV chairman Kummernuss' speech at his own 1955 convention, reprinted as Gewerkschaften in Staat und Gesellchaft, Stuttgart, May 1955; and, in somewhat less elaborate form, in metal union co-chairman Brenner's speech at his convention in September 1954, published as Die Aufgaben unserer Gewerkschaft in der gegenwärtigen Situation, Frankfurt, 1955.
17 Kummernuss, , op. cit., p. 31.Google Scholar One might attempt to correlate the displeasure of the union leadership at prevailing political conditions with the membership's attitude toward present wage levels, especially since the workers used to hold the government and the retail trades responsible, along with employers, for insufficient real wages. In 1952, workers were asked the following question: “Do you believe that workers, by and large, earn decent wages in West Germany?” The answers broke down as follows: 25 per cent, good wages; 37 per cent, barely sufficient wages; 35 per cent, insufficient wages; 3 per cent, don't know (cf. Neumann, E. P. and Noelle, E., Antworten, Allensbach, 1954, p. 106).Google Scholar The Mannesmann inquiry, carried through in the summer of 1954 by the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt, had the following results: 59 per cent of diose earning below DM 300 per month were satisfied with their wages; satisfaction was expressed by only 48 per cent of those earning DM 300–400, and by 45 per cent of those in the DM 400–500 wage bracket (cf. Betriebsklima, eine industriesoziologische Untersuchung in Mannesmann Bereich [mimeographed version], Frankfurt, 1955, p. 48; hereafter cited as Mannesmann study).
18 The labor viewpoint is expressed in Pothoff, Erich, Zur Geschichte der Montan-Mitbestimmung, Cologne, 1955.Google Scholar
19 The co-determination problem has been amply discussed in American publications; cf. the literature noted in Kerr, , op. cit., p. 522Google Scholar, and Spiro, Herbert J., “Codetermination in Germany,” American Political Science Review, XLVIII (December 1954), pp. 1114–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Cf. also Wallich, H. C., Mainsprings of German Revival, New Haven, Conn., 1955, p. 309.Google Scholar
20 The legality of the “political” strike is affirmed in Schmid, R., “Der politische Streik,” G.M., January 1954, p. 1Google Scholar, and Bauer, F., “Politischer Streik und Strafrecht,” Juristenzeitung, 1953, p. 65.Google Scholar Schmid's article aroused a vehement controversy not only because of its content, but also because of Schmid's job. Many newspapers, members of the legal fraternity, and representatives of industry thought it improper for a president of a Court of Appeals to utter opinions of such a nature. Kaiser, J. H. (Der politische Streik, Berlin, 1955)Google Scholar thinks of the political strike as “a primitive weapon of self-help.” GM. (May 1955, p. 326) gives an analysis of a public discussion between the Jesuit union theoretician Nell-Breuning and the vice-president of the Bundestag, C. Schmid; the latter distinguishes between pressure on the parliament before a decision has been taken and the fact that “the trade unions have no choice other than to accept a decision of Parliament-as they have so far always done.”
21 Viewed in this context, Wildenmann's, R. attempt in Partei und Fraktion (Meisenheim, 1954, p. 28)Google Scholar to draw more far-reaching conclusions from die organizational separation between parties and unions seems unjustified.
22 A rival Christian union organization was officially called into being in November 1955 under the name Christliche Gewerkschaftsbewegung Deutschlands (CGD—German Christian Trade Union Movement). It has the financial and moral support of me Christian Trade Unions International, and is presently engaged in organizing some eighty to ninety locals, most of them in the Catholic areas of the Rhine-Ruhr region. For more detailed data on the KAB, cf. Breitling, R., Die Verbaende in der Bundesrepublik, Meisenheim, 1955, pp. 153–57.Google Scholar
23 Soziale Ordnung, the publication of the Sozialausschüsse (a skeleton organization which may be called the CDU's labor arm), quotes in its issue of November-December 1955 the speeches of both Karl Arnold and Jakob Kaiser, as well as an official resolution of the Executive Committee of the Sozialausschüsse of November 5, 1955. All reject the moves of the Even-Winkelheide CGD group, and accept instead a proposal of DGB chairman Freitag to convene a committee to set up means for protecting minorities within the DGB.
24 2. Deutscher Bundestag, 73rd Session, Bonn, March 17, 1955, p. 4044.
25 Cf. the SPD pamphlet, “Das Betriebsverfassungsgesetz im Bundestag,” Bonn, 1952.
26 Enumeration of the individual demands may be found in IG Metall Geschäftsbericht, 1952–1953, op. cit., p. 9.
27 Lüth, H. K., Lohmar, U., and Tartier, R., Arbeiterjugend gestern und heute, Heidelberg, 1955, p. 346.Google Scholar The amount of literature interpreting the state of mind and job attitudes of German workers is growing steadily. The impressionistic sketch by Bednarik, Karl (Der junge Arbeiter von heute, Stuttgart, 1953)Google Scholar was followed by the more weighty studies by Jantke, Carl (Bergmann und Zeche, die sozialen Verhältnisse einer Schachtanlage des nördlichen Ruhrgebietes in der Sicht der Bergleute, Tübingen, 1953)Google Scholar and by Pirker, Th., Braun, S., Lutz, B., and Hammelrath, F. (Arbeiter, Management, Mitbestimmung, Stuttgart and Düsseldorf, 1955)Google Scholar, as well as by the Mannesmann study (cf. note 17).
28 Cf. Pirker, , et al., op. cit., p. 330Google Scholar; and study, Mannesmann, op. cit., pp. 207ff.Google Scholar
29 For an analysis of management-worker relations in German industry, see the interpretative sections of Pirker, , et al., op. cit., pp. 345–436Google Scholar, and the somewhat more cautious description in study, Mannesmann, op. cit., pp. 287–369.Google Scholar
30 Henry Lillich, manager of the Evangelische Aktionsgemeinschaft für Arbeiter fragen, speaks of “a corruption of trade union consciousness by exaggerated voluntary services of the enterprise” in “Zum Weg der deutschen Gewerkschaften,” G.M., May 1955, pp. 281 and 285.
31 study, Mannesmann, op. cit., pp. 134 and 135.Google Scholar Harold Koch, the works director of the Höschwerke, when discussing the Communist works-council election victory at the Westfalenhütte, said: “The greatest fault of the works council was that it debased itself by abandoning the role of a parliament in order to become a part of the executive [i.e., management]”. His rather controversial speech has been reprinted in full in Bergbau und Wirtschaft, IX, No. 3 (March 1956), p. 110.
32 Pirker speaks of “an integration of the top of the social cadres into the informal organization of social management” (Pirker, , et al., op. cit., p. 422).Google Scholar Group differentiation in shop structure leading to “a pathologically small fluctuation of top worker strata” is dealt with by Lutz in ibid., p. 392.
33 Braun, in ibid., p. 424; study, Mannesmann, op. cit., pp. 255ff.Google Scholar
34 Within the jurisdiction of the metal workers' union, 43.8 per cent of those elected to the works councils in 1953, and 43.9 per cent of those elected in 1955, were new members (cf. Gewerkschafter, 1955, No. 8, p. 38).
35 Fifty-six per cent of me interviewees in the Mannesmann shops could name their labor director (study, Mannesmann, op. cit., p. 102).Google Scholar Only 22 per cent had talked with him (ibid., p. 105).
36 Cf. Agartz, , Wirtschaft und Steuerpolitik, op. cit., p. 12Google Scholar, and Pirker, , et al., op. cit., p. 419.Google Scholar In the recent wage dispute in the steel industry, labor directors had a full share in crossing the policies of the management of the metal workers' union (cf. “Neue Lohnkampf taktik an der Ruhr: Arbeitsdirektoren im Kreuzfeuer gewerkschaftlicher Kritik,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 1, 1955; also the speech of Koch, Harold, op. cit., p. 116Google Scholar, in which he calls wage questions in co-determination plants “internal enterprise problems,” and postulates something very close to the trade unions' renunciation of strikes and strike threats in such plants. Cf. also the critical comment,“Mitbestimmungsrecht und Streik,” Gewerkschafter, 1956, No. 1, p. 1.
37 IG Metall Geschäftsbericht, 1952–1953, op. cit., p. 120.
38 The DGB has created a so-called “Co-determination Endowment” into which labor members on boards of directors, whether they come from union or from works-council ranks, pay 20 per cent of their emoluments, to be used for scholarships for workers' children and similar purposes (DGB Geschäftsbericht, 1952–1955, p. 405). By the end of 1955, over half a million DM had been collected in this way.
39 Thirty-one per cent of 1,176 Mannesmann workers chose their works-council representative as the one showing greatest concern for their interests; 24 per cent chose their immediate superiors; and 21 per cent chose their shop delegate (study, Mannesmann, op. cit., p. 111).Google Scholar
40 For the trade union viewpoint on relations between union shop delegates and works councils, cf. Georgi, C., “Gewerkschaft und Betrieb,” G.M., November 1955, pp. 660–63.Google Scholar
41 study, Mannesmann, op. cit., p. 115.Google Scholar
42 Mausolff, A., Gewerkschaft und Betriebsrat im Urteil der Arbeitnehmer, Darmstadt, 1952, p. 98Google Scholar; a youth sample is given in Lüth, , et al., op. cit., p. 348.Google Scholar
43 Pirker, , et al., op. cit., p. 267Google Scholar; study, Mannesmann, op. cit., p. 71.Google Scholar
44 Forty-one per cent of the Darmstadt sample gave this answer (Mausolff, , op. cit., p. 98).Google Scholar
45 The results of mis inquiry, originally made for an employer group (cf. Neumann, and Noelle, , op. cit., pp. 98 and 158)Google Scholar, have meanwhile been confirmed by the study, Mannesmann, op. cit., pp. 197 and 343ff.Google Scholar However, the latter points out correctly that lack of information on, and knowledge of, the working of an institution does not exclude approval, once its functioning has been explained to its presumptive beneficiaries. I would add that, in politics, people often accept something purely on the strength of their confidence in the person who drafted the recommendation, without bothering to inquire about why's and how's.
46 Cf. Gewerkschafter, 1955, No. 8, p. 38.