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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Miroslav Nincic
Miroslav Nincic
Affiliation:
New York University
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Abstract

The notion that the attitudes of the American public vis-a-vis the Soviet Union are driven essentially by emotion, and that they are more extreme and volatile than those of the government itself, is widely believed but may not be valid. While the public typically desires a combination of tough and conciliatory policies, it also tends to express, at any given moment, particular concern about whichever of the two it feels is most slighted in U.S. policy. Thus, the public will tend to seek conciliatory behavior from hawkish administrations while preferring a tough stance from administrations it deems dovish. By so doing, the public is likely to have a moderating effect on official behavior toward Moscow. The proposition is tested with reference to shifts in public approval of presidential Soviet policy, and certain implications are suggested for the manner in which political leadership perceives of its mandate.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 40 , Issue 4 , July 1988 , pp. 452 - 475
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1988

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References

1 See, for example, Gaddis, John Lewis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Halle, Louis J., The Cold War as History (New York: Harper & Row, 1967)Google Scholar; LaFeber, Walter, America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945–1975 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976)Google Scholar; and Weisberger, Bernard A., Cold War, Cold Peace: The United States and Russia since 1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984)Google Scholar.

2 The literature is vast. Representative items include Cusack, Thomas R. and Ward, Michael D., “Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and People's Republic of China”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 25 (September 1981), 429–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Majeski, Stephen J. and Jones, David L., “Arms Race Modeling: Causality, Analysis and Model Specification,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 25 (June 1981), 259–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nacht, Michael, The Age of Vulnerability (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985)Google Scholar; Nincic, Miroslav, The Arms Race (New York: Praeger, 1982)Google Scholar; and Domke, William K., Eichenberg, Richard C., and Kelleher, Catherine M., “The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies: 1948–1978”, American Political Science Review 77 (March 1983), 19–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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4 See, for example, Cusack and Ward (fn. 2); Nincic (fn. 2); and Nincic, Miroslav, “Fluetuations in Soviet Defense Spending”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (December 1983), 648–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But see also Ostrom, Charles and Marra, Robin F., “US Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate”, American Political Science Review 80 (September 1986), 819–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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24 The Harris Survey, May 9, 1983.

25 The wording of the question was: “Tell me whether you approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling this problem: relations with the Soviet Union.” The figures are reported in Gallup Report No. 251 (Princeton, NJ: The Gallup Poll, 1986), 20Google Scholar.

26 In late September, for example, the President dispatched a letter to Secretary Brezhnev seeking a “framework of mutual respect”; this was followed, the next day, by a “frank” talk between Haig and Gromyko setting a date for arms talks in Geneva.

27 Furthermore, the Soviet offer, in mid-March, to forgo further deployment of its nuclear weapons in the European U.S.S.R. if the United States installed no more medium-range missiles in Western Europe, was dismissed by President Reagan as “pure propaganda.”

28 The administration embarked on an all-out effort to stop its allies from providing the U.S.S.R. with pipeline equipment (causing considerable friction within the Alliance). In addition, Alexander Haig declared that trends in Soviet missile deployment belied conciliatory overtures, while the Soviets' proposal to cut their strategic weapons forces, if Washington would agree to shelve its medium-range missile plans, was dismissed as unacceptable. On July 19, Reagan announced an end to the U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban for nuclear weapons; two weeks later, each superpower expelled one of the other's leading journalists.

29 He also undertook a renewed drive for MX deployment, launched his fateful “Star Wars” program, and accused “foreign” (read Soviet) agents of instigating the freeze movement within the United States.

30 “Reagan Denouncing Soviet, Bars Series of Negotiations; Demand It Pay for Jet Losses”, New York Times, September 16, 1983, p. 14.

31 On September 26, 1983, Reagan announced a new set of positions on medium-range nuclear forces; soon after, he put forward a strategic arms proposal based on the build-down concept.

32 On January 16, 1983, the President softened his criticism of the U.S.S.R. and appealed for nuclear arms negotiations and a dialogue between the two countries. Although several days later Reagan submitted a report to Congress alleging Soviet violations of arms control obligations, he again called for improved relations in his State of the Union address on January 24.

33 While there were useful bilateral contacts in Geneva, the talks did not seem to be leading anywhere; the President reiterated, with considerable fanfare, his charge that the Soviets had violated a number of arms treaty provisions.

34 A trade agreement was signed, and President Reagan vowed to abide by the unratified SALT 11 Agreement.

35 In addition, in an unusually provocative move, two U.S. warships sailed into Soviet waters in the Black Sea in March.

36 Gallup seems to have started surveying public approval of presidential Soviet policies at the beginning of the Reagan Presidency. Data for Jimmy Carter's approval ratings are from various issues of the Harris Survey. Respondents were asked whether or not they approved of “Carter's handling relations with Russia.”

37 Following the trials of dissidents Aleksandr Ginzburg and Anatoli Scharantsky, Carter announced a review of existing exchange programs. As part of the same overall policy, he also cancelled a sale of Sperry-Univac computer equipment to Russia.

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39 See fn. 15.

40 The question of ideological identification was asked by the Harris pollsters in 1968, and on 12 subsequent occasions.

41 The Harris Survey, May 1, 1975, and November 3, 1975.

42 In May, 42% approved of his handling of relations with Moscow (The Harris Survey, May 27, 1975). In August and September, the figures were, respectively, 43% and 42% (The Harris Survey, September 25, 1975).

43 The Harris Survey, February 23, 1976.