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Sub Rosa Resistance and the Politics of Economic Reform: Land Redistribution in Post-Soviet Ukraine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Jessica Allina-Pisano
Jessica Allina-Pisano
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Colgate University
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This article examines obstacles to economic reform in Ukraine's transition to a market-based economy. Existing explanations for failures of reform in postcommunist states privilege societal actors, as in the case of Przeworski's J-curve, or state actors acting in a private, rent-seeking capacity, as in Hellman's partial reform equilibrium. Other explanations focus on weak state capacity. However, there is evidence to suggest that some groups of individuals who stall or halt market reforms may do so in their capacity as state actors. Their resistance to reform may be sub rosa: state actors may comply with formal institutional requirements of reform even as they seek to preserve the status quo. This tendency is evident in the privatization of land, the focus of this article. This article proposes an explanation for reform failures which suggests that some resistance to economic liberalization may derive from the efforts of state actors to protect the public good.

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Research Article
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World Politics , Volume 56 , Issue 4 , July 2004 , pp. 554 - 581
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Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2004

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References

1 Migdal, Joel S. reviews literature on this phenomenon in other contexts; Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2001CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

2 This was less the case in the People's Republic of China than in Central and Eastern Europe. In the latter case, Jeffrey Sachs provided among the most forceful statements of this component of reform, urging governments to “get the planners out of the process”; Sachs, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy (Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 1993), 46Google Scholar.

3 Przeworski, Adam, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe Latin America (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1991CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

4 Hellman, Joel S., “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions,“ World Politics 50 (January 1998CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Other work on state capture of the postsocialist reform process by rent-seeking elites includes Pitcher, M. Anne, Transforming Mozambique: The Politics of Privatiza tion, 1975–2000 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2002CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

5 For a discussion of the nonunitary state in postcommunist settings, see Luong, Pauline Jones and Grzymala-Busse, Anna, “Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism,“ Politics and Society 30 (December 2002Google Scholar).

6 A relevant contrast here is that between large-scale privatization and price liberalization.

7 Scott, James C., Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1990Google Scholar).

8 Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman argue that a system of rents is necessary to ensure stake-holders' support for reform; Shleifer, and Treisman, , Without a Map: “Political Tactics and Economic Re form in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000Google Scholar).

9 In this article “state actors” refers to members of the regional and subregional Ukrainian state administration involved in the reform process. These included members of regional and district departments of the agricultural-industrial complex, land surveying and cadastre, economics, and other subdivisions. While there were the normal rivalries among departments with different specializations and between levels of state administration, there was remarkable uniformity in attitudes toward reform.

10 Hellman (fn. 4), 205.

11 It is not the purpose of this article to determine the conditions under which rent seeking may occur. Rather, I wish to establish a range of responses to reform policy that includes more than rent seeking, on the one hand, and inept compliance, on the other.

12 Author interview with members of district farmers' association, Bohodukhivs'kiy district, Kharkiv region, May 27, 2000. The statement was made in response to the author's question: What changed after implementation of the decree?

13 Stephen Wegren has argued that claims about the “cosmetic” character of reorganization ignore the broader transformations that indeed have occurred in the post-Soviet countryside. See Wegren, , “Change in Russian Agrarian Reform, 1992–1998: The Case of Kostroma Oblast,“ in Engel-mann, Kurt and Pavlakovic, Vjeran, eds., Rural Development in Eurasia and the Middle East: Land Reform, Demographic Change, and Environmental Constraints (Seattle:University of Washington Press, 2001Google Scholar)

14 Recent work on informal institutions in postcommunist and other contexts includes Dar-den, Keith, “Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma,“ East European Constitutional Review 10 (Spring-Summer 2001Google Scholar); Helmke, Gretchen and Levitsky, Steven, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda,“ Perspectives on Politics 2 (December 2004CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Grzy-mala-Busse, Anna, “Informal Institutions and the Post-Communist State“ (Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Yale University, April 2004Google Scholar); and Way, Lucan, “The Dilemmas of Reform in Weak States: The Case of Post-Soviet Fiscal Reform,“ Politics and Society 30 (December 2002CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

15 This article includes both rules and norms in its view of what institutions are, following Crawford, Sue and Ostrom, Elinor, “A Grammar of Institutions,” American Political Science Review 89 (September 1995CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

16 See, for example, D'Anieri, Paul, Kravchuk, Robert S., and Kuzio, Taras, Politics and Society in Ukraine (London:Westview Press, 1999Google Scholar), chap. 4. The claim of state weakness has often served as the foundation for arguments that in postcommunist polities, state building-rather than the dismantling of state institutions-is required to sustain successful economic reform. An exception to this tendency in the literature is Darden (fn. 14).

17 DAnieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio (fn. 16), acknowledging a “distinct lack of precision” in discussions of state capacity, suggest an approach focusing on the management capabilities of state institutions, including the ability to implement economic reforms (p. 96).

18 This has been most clearly illustrated in electoral politics. See Matsuzato, Kimitaka, “All Kuchma's Men: The Reshuffling of Ukrainian Governors and the Presidential Election of 1999,“ Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 42, no. 6 (2001Google Scholar); and Darden (fn. 14).

19 For example, Paul Kubicek describes “the relationship between Kolkhoz Council and state as cor-poratist in content if not in form.” Kubicek, “Ukrainian Interest Groups, Corporatism, and Economic Reform,” in Kuzio, Taras, Kravchuk, Robert S., and DAnien, Paul, eds., State and Institution Building in Ukraine (London:Macmillan, 1999), 67Google Scholar.

20 Further evidence for the alignment of center-periphery state interests through individual economic incentives is provided by JVIatsuzato (fn. 18), who has shown that for Ukrainian regional elites under President Leonid Kuchma, job retention was based on loyalty to the executive, not on improvement of regional economic performance.

21 I say “apparent” devolution because there is evidence-including the language of the reform itself-to suggest that state officials at the national level also preferred to create only the appearance of reform. However, local state officials encountered clear signals from the center to implement the formal aspects of reform.

22 Oral testimony, Kharkiv regional farmers' association conference, January 18, 2000. Oral testimony refers to statements made in in my presence and statements made directly to me outside the context of structured interviews.

23 See Pisano, Allina, “Soviet Men into Peasants: Property Rights and Economy in the Black Earth, 1991–2000“ (Ph.D. diss. Yale University, 2003Google Scholar).

24 Mykola Puhachov, “Organizational Forms of the New Agricultural Enterprises in Ukraine” (Discussion paper, Institute for Policy Reform, Kiev, Iowa State University Ukraine Agricultural Policy Project, September 2000). This paper was subsequently published as Mykola Pugachov, with Van Atta, Don, “Reorganization of Agricultural Enterprises in Ukraine in 2000: A Research Note,“ Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 41 (October-November 2000Google Scholar).

25 Population estimates for the region in the late 1990s hovered at about 3,100,000, of whom approximately half live in the city of Kharkiv, , Statystychnyi shchorichnyk (Kharkiv:Kharkivs'ke oblasne upravlinnia statystyky, 1997Google Scholar).

26 Calculation based on statistics obtained from the Kharkiv regional department of land-resource management, 1999.

27 Datum obtained from the division of private farms in the Kharkiv regional department of agricultural management, 1999.

28 Near the end of the decade compliance with reorganization policy (in most cases, destatifkation and the creation of collective [shared] ownership) among agricultural enterprises in Kharkiv region was 99.3 percent. The national average was 91.4 percent. The disparity is explained by outcomes in three administrative regions of Ukraine in which there was no privatization of agricultural enterprises (Ivano-Frankivs'ka, L'vivs'ka, and Kyiv); State Land Committee of Ukraine, “Informatsiinyi biuleten' shchodo reformuvannia zemel'nykh vidnosyn v Ukraiini“ (Kiev:Derzhkomzem, 1999Google Scholar).

29 Kuchma issued the decree in the midst of loan negotiations with the International Monetary Fund. The communist opposition in Ukraine made much of this fact, and in mid-December 1999 more than one hundred members of parliament protested the decree by appealing to Ukraine's Constitutional Court, arguing that decollectivization was unconstitutional. “Will Ukraine Abolish Kolkhozes?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report 1, no. 28 (December 14,1999), www.rferl.org/ reports/pbureport/1999/12/28–141299.asp (accessed November 6, 2004).

30 The decree included a provision that required media coverage of its implementation-"constant illumination of questions of implementation of agrarian reform in Ukraine, including the realization of the provisions of this decree"-on all television channels, radio stations, and newspapers affiliated with regional and district-level state administration. Most of this coverage was, of course, positive.

31 Kanevskiy, E., “Kuchma obeshchaet westi chastnuiu sobstvennost' na zemliu i rasformirovat' kolkhozy,“ Den, December 3, 1999Google Scholar.

32 Perstneva, N., “Vesna prishla! Chinovnik torzhestvuet . . .“ Zerkalo nedeli, March 25, 2000Google Scholar, http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/nn/show/285/26456/ (accessed November 6, 2004). See also Kryklyvyi, Yu., “Lyudyna kriz' pryzmu reform“ Slobids'kyi krai, January 27, 2000, 1–2Google Scholar. Slobids'kyi krai is the newspaper of the Kharkiv regional legislature and state administration.

33 Khablak, M., “Oleh D'omin: ya viru v uspikh reform,“ Slobids'kyi krai, December 31, 1999, 1Google Scholar.

34 See, for example, Mel'nyk, M., “Chyya zemlya v Rokitnomu?“ Slobids'kyi krai, December 25, 1999, 1–2Google Scholar.

35 One of the more obvious examples of this genre is Mel'nyk, M., “Kolhospy svoe vidzhyly-wazhae deputat oblasnoii rady, holova Velykoburluts'koii raiderzhadministratsii V. O. Kur'ianov,“ Slobids'kyi krai, January 29, 2000, 2Google Scholar.

36 Kryklyvyi, Yu., “Zemel'na reforma ne lishe dlya sela, a i dlya vs'oho narodu,“ Slobids'kyi krai, December 21, 1999, 2Google Scholar. Also suggesting that collectively held property was the root of current problems in agriculture is Kryklyvyi, , “Zupynka na pivdorozi. Rivnoznachna vidstupovi,“ Slobids'kyi krai, January 6, 2000, 2Google Scholar.

37 Kryklyvyi, Yu., “Pole svoe i chuzhe,“ Slobids'kyi krai, December 30, 1999, 2Google Scholar.

38 “Private” refers to meetings closed to the press.

39 This fact distinguishes the situation from standard principal-agent dilemmas, in which the principal's interests are more clearly defined.

40 Previous reforms provided for the reorganization of collective forms of production and the establishment of private (peasant) farms. See, for example, Article 5 of the Land Code of Ukraine; Articles 9 and 10 of the Law of Ukraine ”Pro kolektyvne sil's'kohospodars'ke pidpryemstvo” (1992); Article 7 of the Law of Ukraine “Pro orendu zemli”; Articles 4 and 7 of the Law of Ukraine “Pro selians'ke (fer-mers'ke) hospodarstvo” (1993); and the Presidential Decree “Pro nevidkladni zakhody shchodo pryskoriuvannia zemel'noii reformy sferi sil's'kohospodars'koho vyrobnytstva” (1994).

41 By September 2000, ten months after the decree was issued, a total 6, 300,000 people had received land-share certificates nationwide. Only 300,000 of these had received state acts. Uriadovyy kur'er, September 29, 2000, 4.

42 Emphasis added.

43 In theory, joint leasing also could describe individuals who remain in the reconstituted former collectives and lease their land back to it.

44 In the case of private-leasing enterprises, “private entities” typically had a single owner: the director of the former collective.

45 Official commentary on the decree also embodied this contradiction. See, especially, the comments of then deputy head of presidential administration Pavlo Haiduts'kyi on the decree, “Kolektyvnu vlasnist’ zminyla pryvatna,” Uriadovyi kur'ier, December 9, 1999.

46 In the following sections I draw on three meetings at which I was present: at the regional level, in which regional agricultural officials addressed a gathering organized by the regional association of private farmers; a small, closed meeting of district officials and directors of select collectives in a district I have called L'vivs'kyi for the purpose of this article; and a larger meeting in the same district of regional and district officials, directors of collectives, their accountants and agronomists, and members of local (village) councils.

47 Mel'nyk, “Fermery poza reformoiu?” Slobids'kyi krai, January 20, 2000, 1.

48 The deputy head of regional administration urged district administrators to implement the decree saying, “We must sustain this battle. On the side of the president, naturally.” Oral testimony, LVivs'kyi district administration, January 13,2000.

49 Oral testimony, Kharkiv regional farmers' association conference, December 14,1999.

50 ibid.

51 Oral testimony, LVivs'kyi district administration, January 13,2000.

52 Oral testimony, L'vivs'kyi district administration, January 8, 2000.

53 Zoria Poltavschyny no. 5, quoted in The Week in Ukrainian Agriculture (University of Iowa Project on Agrarian Policy in Ukraine) 3, no. 16, January 17–23, 2000. See also, from Dnipropetrovs'k region, “Kak kolkhoz ne perekrashivai, tolku ne budet,” Dneprovskaiapravda, February 1, 2000; from Zapor-izhzhia, Zaporiz'kapravda, January 20, 2000 (The Week in Ukrainian Agriculture 4, no. 17, January 24–30, 2000); and from Vinnytsia region, Vinnychchyna no. 194 (The Week in Ukrainian Agriculture, December 27, 1999-January 3, 2000). Also M. Saenko, “Reforma po kolesami ochkovtiratel'stva,” Dneprovskaia pravda no. 38, April 4, 2000. Quoted in Ohliadpresy: Sil's'kohospodars'ki novyny z usikh rehioniv Ukraiiny 3–9 kvitnia 2000 roku (Kiev: University of Iowa Project on Agrarian Policy in Ukraine, 2000).

54 This reassurance may have been little else than good local politics, as agricultural elites held little real power over local state officials.

55 Oral testimony, LVivs'kyi district administration, January 13, 2000.

56 Resources were so scarce that by April, at least seven collectives in the region had not reorganized because they could not pay for preparation of the necessary documents; Kryklyvyi, Yu., “Kolhospiv uzhe nema, ale iikhni problemy zalyshylysia,“ Slobids'kyi krai, April 4, 2000Google Scholar.

57 ”Na zdiisnennia ahrarnoii reformy,” Slobidskyi krai, January 5, 2000, 1.

58 Oral testimony, Kharkiv regional division of private farms, January 21, 2000.

59 Collectives were to be maintained by establishing leasing arrangements to take the place of membership relations. One head of district administration put it this way: “The process of reforming includes the cessation of membership relations. It assumes transfer to leasing [relationships]. To ensure the preservation of the land mass it is necessary to conclude [leasing] contracts.” Oral testimony, L'vivs'kyi district administration, January 8, 2000.

60 ”Visti iz Zachepylivshchyny. Zemliu—selianam,” Slobids'kyi krai, January 29, 2000,1.

61 Mel'nyk, M., “Shans dlia fermera,“ Slobids'kyi krai, December 21, 1999, 1Google Scholar; the article mentions the existence of this phenomenon at the regional level, and Perstneva (fn. 32) mentions it at the national level. In Blyzniukivs'kiy district, the deputy head of agricultural management put it this way: “The tendency is at first to do the reforming, and then allot the land shares.” Oral testimony, Blyzniukivs'kiy district administration, March 30, 2000.

62 “Na zdiisnennia ahrarnoii reformy“ Slobids'kyi krai, January 5, 2000, 1Google Scholar. A similar logic was applied to the sequence of reform in some districts of Russia. See, for example, Pleshkov, V., “. . . Pokoi nam tol'ko snitsia,“ Liskinskie izvestiia, February 13, 1992, 6Google Scholar.

63 Oral testimony, district administration, L'vivs'kyi district, January 8, 2000. Other districts set deadlines for the middle of February. See “Visti iz Zachepylivshchyny. Zemliu-selianam,“ Slobids'kyi krai, January 29, 2000, 1Google Scholar.

64 Oral testimony, dispatcher's office, division of planned economy, L'vivs'kyi district, January 16,2000.

65 It should be noted that one of the catalysts for this reversal of the order of operations was the cost of land surveying. It simply was impractical, illogical, and unaffordable for the vast majority of collective enterprises to conduct extensive surveying, only to lose that land. That the central state provided inadequate support for this process may also be understood as a sign of ambivalence.

66 A private farmer who later took over an entire collective remarked, “It's the certificates that are partitioned, not the land”; oral testimony, Kharkiv regional farmers' association conference, December 14,1999. More than four months later, a regional state official working in the division of private farms remarked of a farmer who had attempted to lease land shares in a neighboring collective: “He doesn't know where his land is. It's like that for the majority [of private farmers leasing land].” Oral testimony, Kharkiv regional division of private farms, April 4, 2000.

67 Khablak, M., “Zatsikavlenist' u reformuvanni velychezna,“ Slobids'kyi krai, January 11, 2000Google Scholar, 1 Figures from the Ministry of Agriculture show that nationwide, nearly one thousand enterprises had concluded leasing contracts between the end of December and the end of February, before there likely had been time to allot land shares in kind.

68 Perstneva (fn. 32). This article also noted that the procedure was being carried out “backward.”

69 Kryklyvyi, Yu., “Zemel'na reforma ne lishe dlia sela, a i dlia vs'oho naroda,“ Slobids'kyi krai, December 21, 1999, 2Google Scholar.

70 It should be noted that in linking incentives to behavior, this argument does not depart from the conventional wisdom circulating among elites in the region at that time. While conducting research in state offices, my queries regarding officials' disapproval of land partition and distribution were most often met with incredulity. The question, for many officials, was not why they privately would oppose dissolution of collectives but why they should support it.

71 References to these ideas with respect to agriculture are far too numerous to discuss here; evidence of the belief that land should not be commodified may be found in the Verkhovna Rada's more than decade-long debate about legalizing the purchase and sale of agricultural land.

72 Mel'nyk, M., “'Vyrobnytstvo—dlia liudei, a ne navpaky': interv'iu z holovoiu derzhadministratsii Kharkivs'koho raionu V. I. Pugachovym,“ Slobids'kyi krai, May 13, 1999, 2Google Scholar. This sentiment is echoed in hundreds if not thousands of press materials from the late Soviet period and post-Soviet decade in the region. For evidence of normative claims regarding agricultural production in post-Soviet space, see Allina-Pisano (fn. 23).

73 For this and other reasons, commodification of land was not supported by much of the rural population. A random sample survey (n=925) conducted in 1998 by the national land committee in Kharkiv and Volyn regions found that only 12.5 percent of those surveyed reported a positive attitude toward the purchase and sale of land held by agricultural enterprises; 27.1 percent agreed that “the purchase and sale of land must be regulated by the state”; and 57 percent said they were against the commodifi-cation of agricultural land. State Land Committee of Ukraine, “Informatsiinyi biuleten’ shchodo reformuvannia zemel'nykh vidnosyn v Ukraiini“ (Kiev:Derzhkomzem, 1998Google Scholar).

74 Oral testimony, L'vivs'kyi district, January 8,2000.

75 Because of the cost of feeding draft animals, in the words of one local cliche, “even a horse is a luxury."

76 I have no connection to the IMF. That my interlocutors, whom I had known for several months and with whom I was on good terms, would assume that I did is further suggestive of their suspicions and concerns about foreign involvement in domestic policy. Their suspicions did not emerge in a vacuum: the foreign scholars whom they had previously encountered had in fact been collecting data for international lending and development institutions.

77 Agricultural elites did sometimes provide goods in return. One important means of reciprocity was electoral, in which directors of collective farms could exercise their authority at the local level to deliver votes for the incumbent in presidential elections. However, this still does not suggest a quid pro quo. In this instance, presidential elections had taken place a few months prior to the issuing of the decree. Local officials therefore had no political incentive in spring 2000 to prevent dissolution of collectives.

78 Myriam Hivon provides a convincing case study of this problem in Hivon, Russia, “The Bullied Farmer: Social Pressure as a Survival Strategy?“ in Bridger, Sue and Pine, Frances, eds., Surviving Post-Socialism: Local Strategies and Regional Responses in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (London:Routledge, 1998Google Scholar).

79 In Ukraine low wages in the industrial sector helped maintain urban-rural ties. Urban workers typically assisted rural relatives in household cultivation and received food in return.

80 See, for example, Statystychnyi zbirnyk. Sil's'ke hospodarstvo Ukraiiny 2000 rik (Kiev:Derzhkomstat, 2001Google Scholar).

81 Members of collectives received goods two ways: in lieu of cash wages and as an entitlement. This symbiosis as it functioned in the Russian Federation is documented in Kitching, Gavin, “The Revenge of the Peasant? The Collapse of Large-Scale Russian Agriculture and the Role of the Peasant ‘Private Plot’ in That Collapse, 1991–97,” Journal of Peasant Studies 26, no. 1 (1998CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

82 For a description of a number of these problems, see Perrotta, Louise, “Coping with the Market in Rural Ukraine,“ in Mandel, Ruth and Humphrey, Caroline, eds., Markets and Moralities: Ethnographies of Post-Socialism (Oxford:Berg, 2002Google Scholar).

83 Work in other Central and East European settings has shown similar patterns of incentives and rural people's behavior. See Meurs, Mieke, The Evolution of Agrarian Institutions: A Comparative Study ofPost-Socialist Hungary and Bulgaria (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2001CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Scott Leonard, Carol, “Rational Resistance to Land Privatization: The Response of Rural Producers to Agrarian Reforms in Pre- and Post-Soviet Russia,“ Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 41, no. 8 (2000Google Scholar); and Amelina, Maria, “Why Russian Peasants Remain in Collective Farms: A Household Perspective on Agricultural Restructuring,“ Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 41, no. 7 (2000Google Scholar).

84 See Allina-Pisano, Jessica, “Land Reform and the Social Origins of Private Farmers in Russia and Ukraine,“ Journal of Peasant Studies 32, no. 4 (2004Google Scholar); and Nikolsky, Sergei, “The Treadmill of Socialist Reforms and the Failures of Post-Communist ‘Revolutions’ in Russian Agriculture: Is There an Alternative?“ in Szelenyi, Ivan, ed., Privatizing the Land: Rural Political Economy in Post-Communist Societies (London:Routledge, 1998Google Scholar).

85 This was true not only for total production but also for expected yields. Official statistics showed that private farms operated less efficiently than collectives. For example, in Ukraine in 1999 grain yields for private farms were 16.9 centners per hectare while average grain yields for all types of agricultural enterprises were 19.7 centners per hectare. Ukraiina u tsyfrakh 2002: Korotkiy statystychnyi dovidnyk (Ukraine in figures 2002: A short statistical reference) (Kiev: Konsul'tant, 2003), 109, 120.

86 The subjective nature of local understandings of economic conditions is elaborated at length in Herrera, Yoshiko, Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2004CrossRefGoogle Scholar), chap. 5.

87 Hacker, Jacob S., “Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States,“ American Political Science Review 98 (May 2004CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

88 Penvenne, in a review of Hall, Margaret and Young, Tom, Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence (Athens:Ohio University Press, 1997Google Scholar), in International Journal of African Historical Studies 33, no. 1 (2000). The author thanks Eric Allina-Pisano for this point.

89 Two well-documented examples of this large genre include Edelman, Marc, Peasants against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica (Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press, 1999Google Scholar); and Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, Dmitri, The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism against Democracy (Washington, D.C.:United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001Google Scholar).