Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t8hqh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T08:18:57.906Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Strategies for SALT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Jerome H. Kahan
Jerome H. Kahan
Affiliation:
The Brookings Institution
Get access

Extract

On November 17, 1969, after a three-year delay, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Involving strategic systems and policies vital to the security of both superpowers, their allies, and the world, these talks have the potential of becoming the most important series of United States-Soviet negotiations since World War II. They can affect not only the military-technical aspects of the strategic balance but United States-Soviet political relations and the future role of nuclear weapons. Given the complexity and sensitivity of the subject, it is not surprising that negotiations are still continuing. Even if an early, limited agreement is reached, SALT meetings can be expected to span a period of many years.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , January 1971 , pp. 171 - 188
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1971

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 An explanation of the Administration's approach can be found in United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace, Message from the President of the United States, February 18, 1970. House Document No. 91–258. Preparations for SALT: pp. 143–147.

2 Although there are no official detailed descriptions of the United States proposals presented on July 24, 1970, in Vienna, news reports refer to “a general outline” of a proposal. See New York Times, July 25, 1970 (U.S. Offers Soviet Package Accord to Curb Missiles) and Washington Post, August 1, 1970 (American Plan at SALT sent to Committees).

3 Senate Resolution 211: Resolution Regarding Suspension of Further Deployment of Offensive & Defensive Nuclear Strategic Weapons Systems, June 17, 1969, 91st Congress 1st Session.

4 For an excellent discussion of precedents for informal agreements, as well as an analysis of the alternative forms a SALT agreement might take and the role Congress might play, see Bunn, George, “Missile Limitation: By Treaty or Otherwise,” Columbia Law Review, lxx (January 1970), pp. 1–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.