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Strategic Interdependence and the Politics of Inertia: Paradoxes of European Defense Cooperation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Michael J. Brenner
Michael J. Brenner
Affiliation:
Cornell University
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Extract

At a time when proposals for a European strategic force centering on Anglo-French nuclear cooperation are once again the subject of serious official discussions, it would seem appropriate to raise a number of more general issues about the making of defense policy in Western Europe today.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 23 , Issue 4 , July 1971 , pp. 635 - 664
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1971

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References

1 This summary of British defense postures and attitudes is derived from a number of excellent critical accounts of that period. Rosecrance, Richard, Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch (New York 1968), 291Google Scholar; Michael Howard, “The Classical Strategists” in Problems of Strategy, Part I, Adelphi Paper No. 54 (London 1969); Brodie, Bernard, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton 1959), 147–72Google Scholar.

2 Thinking along those lines was made all the easier by the rudimentary conceptual apparatus of official strategists who, at first, did not recognize the changes in military doctrine dictated by the introduction of weapons of mass destruction; e.g., the distinction between a strategy of deterrence and a strategy of victory; the elaborate communication systems, and command structures, as well as invulnerable forces necessary for credible second-strike capability; and the enormous casualties that hostilities would produce. See Howard (fn. 1), 22–23. Brodie points out the ambiguous, if not contradictory, assessments of nuclear weapons and the effect of a nuclear attack on a nation's ability to continue resistance; Brodie (fn. 1), 157. He notes Air Marshal John Slessor's book, Strategy for the West, published in 1954, which manages to include widely divergent judgments as to the dislocation to be expected in a nuclear war.

3 Rosecrance (fn. 1), 247. See also L. W. Martin, “British Defence Policy: The Long Recessional,” Adelphi Paper No. 61 (London 1970).

4 Two excellent studies of this period are available: Scheinman, Lawrence, Atomic Energy Policy In France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton 1965)Google Scholar and Goldschmidt, Bertrand, The Atomic Adventure (New York 1964)Google Scholar.

5 See Layton, Christopher, European Advanced Technology (London 1969), 104Google Scholar.

6 Although lacking a concrete political referent, we should bear in mind the strong strain in French thinking—by no means limited to the Gaullists—which, since 1946, has been reluctant to make an unqualified commitment to a U.S.-led alliance, and was tempted to retain some semblance of neutrality vis-à-vis the two Cold War protagonists.

7 Aron, Raymond, The Great Debate (New York 1964), 261Google Scholar.

8 The best surveys of Gaullist foreign policy are in Grosser, Alfred, French Foreign Policy under the Fifth Republic (Boston 1967)Google Scholar; and Newhouse, John, de Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (New York 1970)Google Scholar.

9 A corollary, if less publicized, purpose of her nuclear forces was to exercise an implicit veto over German actions in the event that Germany should seek to take advantage of the new, more fluid, situation to pursue goals deemed antithetical to French national interest. De Gaulle's concern with keeping Germany divided, and West Germany amenable to French political direction, has been one of the hallmarks of Gaullist policy. Michel Debre, now Minister of Defense in the Pompidou Government, has been the most forthright in arguing the need to maintain the Germans in a subordinate position. His German “fixation,” as some would describe it, has led him to question any proposal for European defense cooperation, for fear that Germany would contrive to get a finger on the nuclear trigger. On the eve of the second-round 1969 Presidential election, Debre, speaking at Strasbourg, engaged in a diatribe against Poher's proposals for building European institutions, asserting that they would open the way to a nuclear role for West Germany.

10 I discuss the particulars and implications of this shift in French defense policy in Brenner, M. J., “France's New Defense Strategy and the NATO Puzzle,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, xxv (November 1969), 4–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 There would appear to be two outstanding features of the international situation in Europe today that help to explain the paradoxical position of our nuclear allies. One is the dominance of the two superpowers whose global relationship of mutual deterrence, coupled with a physical commitment on the continent of Europe, is the foundation for the European security system that has successfully maintained the peace since World War II (and is so perceived by all the parties involved). Two, the United States and the USSR accept the status quo in the area for reasons of military expediency and because of their essential satisfaction with the present constellation of political forces; i.e., marginal changes in the military balance are unlikely to lead to great-power aggressiveness, and, in turn, they will both be equally resistant to third-party initiatives. The result is what has properly been termed a “stalemate system.” The conservative influence of nuclear weapons on international politics is most evident in Europe where the stakes are highest, the boundaries between the two camps most clearly drawn, and the military commitments firmest. As allies of the United States and beneficiaries of the protection she provides, Britain and France enjoy both security and at least a semblance of diplomatic independence. It is the strain between strategic dependence as dictated by nuclear arms and the disposition to exercise the normal prerogatives of independence that is the source of the policy dilemmas they face. The ambiguity and paradox inherent in this situation is expressed in our allies' uncertain policy toward the strategic arms that normally are the concomitant of a national foreign policy. As Aron has noted, “integration reaffirms the unity of coalition, but at the same time it also affirms the loss of military independence on the part of the states sovereign in theory.” Aron (fn. 7), 245.

12 Britain's strategic forces comprise 75 V-bombers and 4 missile-firing submarines of the Polaris type (which could be refitted with the more advanced Poseidon missile). Her annual defense expenditure of $5.5 billion is approximately 7 per cent of her GNP. Of that amount, which does not include $700 million for weapons research and development, a relatively small sum goes to the maintenance and support of strategic arms. France's nuclear force consists of 62 Mirage II bombers, to which will be added 18 Sol-Sol Ballistique Stratégique (SSBS) intermediate range missiles by 1971, and 4 missile-firing submarines (of her own design and construction)—the first of which will be operational in 1971, after considerable delays. The French military budget, the exact allocations of which are obscured in official figures, constitutes about six per cent of her GNP. Including development and research funds, it amounts to approximately $4.2 billion. A large portion of that, between 25 and 50 per cent, is allocated to her nuclear forces. (The exact percentage of defense funds absorbed by the F.N.S. varies according to whether one includes the cost of research and of support forces.)

The latest official statement of French defense expenditures is contained in a survey by Contrôleur Général Heidt, “Le Budget de la Défense Nationale pour 1970” Revue de Défense Nationale, xxvi (January 1970). The British figures came from Statement on the Defense Estimates, 1969 (London: H.M.S.O., Comd. 3927).

13 Two excellent assessments of future U.S. troop levels in Europe and the diplomatic consequences of their reduction are by Hoag, Malcolm V., “What New Look In Defense?,” World Politics, xxii (October 1969), 1–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Enthoven, Alain C. and Smith, K. W., “What Forces for NATO?,” Foreign Affairs, xlviii (October 1969), 80–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 This point is argued in the article that heralded the shift in French strategic doctrine, Fourquet, M., “Emploi des differents systèmes de force dans la stratégie de dissuasion,” Revue de Défense Rationale, xxv (May 1969), 757–67Google Scholar.

15 Buchan, Alistair, ed., Europe's Future, Europe's Choices (London 1969), 134–37Google Scholar.

16 The technological fragility of European defense programs is analyzed in great detail in the ISS series Defense, Technology, and the Western Alliance (London 1967). See especially Alistair Buchan, “The Implications of a European System of Defense Technology” and John Calmann, “European Cooperation in Defense Technology.”

17 The history of these projects is recounted in rich detail by Layton (fn. 5), who presents persuasive evidence in support of his argument urging more systematic cooperation on a European basis.

18 Hoffmann, Stanley, Gulliver's Troubles, The Paradoxes of United States Foreign Policy (New York 1968)Google Scholar. Its last section is an extensive and highly sophisticated analysis of European international politics and a provocative assessment of alternative courses of development.

An equally brilliant survey of the European situation is by Pierre Hassner, “Change and Security in Europe, Part I: The Background,” Adelphi Paper No. 45, and “Change and Security in Europe, Part II: In Search of a System,” Adelphi Paper No. 49.

19 Hoffmann (fn. 18), 36–37.

20 Indeed, one can envisage the circumstances in which the U.S. might be a source of new weapons technology (at least for the British component of the force). Were the level of satisfaction (or discontent, depending on one's perspective) with existing Alliance arrangements to remain static, the latent desire of the U.K. and France to play some nuclear role, combined with a lack of any clear perception as to its strategic purposes, conceivably could be satisfied by the adoption of American arms. Any such agreement would, of course, itself be striking evidence of their unreadiness to undertake the construction of a European force with broader strategic purposes, and would establish further their dependence on American weapons technology.

21 Buchan (fn. 15), 135.

22 Ibid., 3.

23 Layton (fn. 5), is a rich source of information on British defense technology. See also the Second Report, The Select Committee on Science and Technology: Defense Research (London, H.M.S.O., 1969).

24 These figures are taken from Layton (fn. 5), Appendix, Tables 10 & 11. The best survey and analysis of the French government's efforts in science and technology are in Gilpin, Robert, France In the Age of the Scientific State (Princeton 1968)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Rohrbach, F., La Recherche Atomique en France, Le Programme Militaire (Paris: Ministère des Armees, Document 17/5B, 1969)Google Scholar.

25 Taken from Audorn, Pierre, “Le plan calcul; une nouvelle politique” in Revue de Défense Nationale, xxv (August-September 1969), 1339–50Google Scholar.

26 Quoted in ibid., 1349.

27 Fourquet, M., “La politique d'armament à long-terme” in Revue de Défense Nationale, xxii (May 1967), 7Google Scholar.

28 Second Report (fn. 23), xix.

29 Allison, Graham T., “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The American Political Science Review, lxiii (September 1969), 690Google Scholar.

30 Layton (fn. 5), 144–48.

31 A pertinent discussion of this issue is to be found in Buchan (fn. 16), 16.

32 See, for example, Lawrence Scheinman, “Euratom: Nuclear Integration In ‘Europe,’” International Reconciliation, No. 563 (May 1967), 1.

33 There is no more striking example of how short-term considerations of economic practicality prevail over long-term goals than the recent action of the French government of contracting with American firms to construct nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes rather than delay expansion of power resources in anticipation of the graphite-gas reactors being developed by its own Atomic Energy Authority. (Le Monde, Oct. 18, 1969). In this case, the complicating factors of international cooperation were not even present.

34 Surprisingly, only limited attention has been paid to this question. See, though, Harlow, C.J.E., The European Armaments Base: A Survey, Part I (London 1957), 21Google Scholar.

35 Healey's preoccupation with the nuclear threshold, and its optimum deterrent point, has come at a relatively late date. Martin (fn. 3), 3, describes his attitude in 1964 thus: “The voice of the Labour Minister of Defence, Mr. Denis Healey, became one of the most eloquent suggesting that deterrence made the danger of deliberate aggression and sustained conventional operations sufficiently remote to justify reducing the scale of supplies held in readiness for war in Europe.”